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HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT

OF THE DOCTRINE OF

THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

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DIVISION SECOND,

FROM THE END OF THE FOURTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT TIME.

VOLUME I.

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SECOND PERIOD.

FROM THE YEAR 381 UNTIL 1800.

THE Church had now to undertake the task of grasping and comprehending in living unity the two aspects of the personality of Christ, each of which separately had been as fully as possible brought to view and established during the course of the previous development of the doctrine:—and it set vigorously to work. Evidently, however, its success could not but be incomplete so long as its conception of the nature of God and man, in their relation to each other, continued to lack definiteness or even accuracy. Relatively to the advancement of Christology, therefore, the first business of the Church was to ascertain the extent of its knowledge of the nature of God, and of the nature of man. During the period on which we are now entering, the Church was actually impelled to endeavour to accomplish this object.

Contemplated in the light of the ultimate goal, the dogma concerning the Person of Christ occupied, for a considerable period, a position rather of secondary than of primary importance. Its further progress depended, in fact, on other dogmas. These other dogmas continued, it is true, to experience the fructifying influence of the ascertained results at which Christology had already arrived, but must themselves needs gain a more fixed form ere they could be capable of reciprocating the benefit and furthering the progress of Christology. The statement just made involves, of course, that the definitions agreed upon by the Church in respect of the nature of Christ, and which also became every day more and more numerous, were and could only be provisional and temporary. The issue of

the efforts for the formation of dogmas which the Church now prepared to put forth, must necessarily be to determine how far the definitions fixed upon at the commencement of the process through which Christian thought had to pass, were not of mere negative importance, as eliminating what was untrue, but of positive also, as faithful and satisfactory expressions of the truth which lay like a kernel within the faith in the God-man.

With this, as it were, expectant attitude, which our dogma was driven to take for a considerable period, it would seem to be inconsistent that unwearied efforts should have been ever afresh devoted to it—that, down to the seventh century, the greatest schismatic and political movements should have been connected with it—and that on it were centred the struggles and discussions of the councils,—its history constituting, in point of fact, their history. But even if the process through which dogmas were passing in these centuries had run a more satisfactory course than it did, we must not forget that, during this period, it was the *Greek* Church which still took the initiative, even though its decision might not prevail, in connection with dogmas; whereas, in the West, signs of a different order of things were early discernible. The Greek Church, also, was especially subjected to severe convulsions and conflicts, owing to the circumstance of its Christology constituting, as it were, its entire dogmatical theology, and the other dogmas, relating to man, God, and redemption, not being permitted to have anything like an independent development From these, on the contrary, the West escaped almost entirely free. The only independent movement in the East, parallel to that going on in the West, was one which took the shape of Christological investigations into the nature of God and man. These investigations, however, were prosecuted with all possible vigour.

Assuming it, then, as a settled point, that every step of real advance in the matter of Christology, made by the Church, must be preceded by a deeper knowledge of the nature of God and man, the question arises, Which of these two subjects was first brought under consideration? For a time it appeared as though the impulse towards the formation of dogmas would leave the Person of Christ and the Trinity, and be directed first to anthropology—and that both in the East and West contem-

poraneously;—in the former, in the school of Antioch; in the latter, in Augustine and Pelagius. But the Eastern Church, which, so long as it retained any life, preferred speculations on the Trinity and on the Person of Christ, was unwilling to join in that opposition to the anthropology of the school of Antioch, which, notwithstanding the many excellent thoughts it embodied, was quite necessary ere a real dogmatical process could be initiated. The Western Church did indeed start an opposition; but both the forms which it took, even that of Augustine, bore a one-sided character, and the resulting discussions consequently failed to combine in living unity the elements of truth of which each side was the representative. Pelagius, laying stress on moral freedom, could see in the doctrine of grace little else than something inimical to freedom: to him, therefore, God was merely the Creator, the Lawgiver, and the Judge, of freedom. Augustine, on the other hand, allowed to man no principle of self-determination, no volitional centre of his own, but considered him, in respect of evil, merely as an *accidens* of the race, and, in respect of the redemptive process, merely as an object of the omnipotent elective grace of God. Owing to this its character, the controversy neither settled the anthropology of Christianity, except on the one point of the general need and capability of salvation, nor determined the inner idea and essential nature of redemptive grace; but merely decided that it was necessary, in general, and that it had found realization in Christianity. The existence of such grace was confessed; its *rationale* remained unsettled. The magical character given by the current representations to the redemptive process in the souls of men, afforded full opportunity for the introduction of a doctrine of freedom which tended to Pelagianism; and we find, as a matter of fact, that the practice and teachings of the Church down to the Reformation show traces of the separate and antagonistic existence of Pelagian and magical elements.

The anthropological discussions of the fifth century could scarcely, therefore, further, even to a moderate extent, the progress of the doctrine concerning the Person of Christ. The character of those disputes was still quite elementary; and their utmost effect was, by the rejection of Manichæan and Pelagian elements, to recover lost ground, and to gain an anthropological

victory parallel to that which had been won over the Ebionitic and Docetic errors.

It became, rather, every day more decidedly the normal course of the impulse towards the formation of dogmas, to occupy itself with the plan of redemption (Soteriology),—that is, with the questions, Wherein consists the salvation bestowed in Christ? and, How was this work accomplished by Him?

But the mode of conceiving the work of redemption is in reality a mode of conceiving how God is in relation to men —how He communicates Himself to them: in other words, it involves the formation of a conception of God in the light of the work of redemption. The work of the Church to the time of the Reformation, may therefore be regarded as concentrated on the development of the knowledge of God, as manifested in the work wrought by Him through Christ for the deliverance and perfection of humanity. Progress in this department was naturally followed by efforts to settle Christian anthropology; —which efforts mainly effected their purpose during the latter part of the period now under consideration,—that is, since the Reformation.

Nor can it be denied that, during the long Second Period, sure progress was, in all essential respects, made towards the realization of that which was absolutely necessary to the further development and revival of the dogma concerning the Person of Christ. Elements of a Pelagian and magical character may be considered as having been once for all condemned before the forum of science, which has in it the seeds and capacity of life. Thus, too, were condemned, both that unethical conception of God and His grace which excludes the freedom of man, and that irreligious conception of man's ability and action, which excludes the necessity for God's assistance. The combination in one dogma of the parts taken respectively by God and man in the work of redemption, in such a manner that they might appear rather as uniting with, than excluding each other, could never be satisfactorily accomplished, until further advances had been made in the knowledge of the nature of God and man. Consequently, all that was necessary to the making a new and decisive step in advance, was to apply to the purposes of Christology the anthropological results arrived at during the second period.

Independently of the circumstance, that on the comprehen-

sion of the redemptive work of God, for and in humanity, both in its objective and subjective aspect, were mainly concentrated the entire dogmatical efforts of this period, so far as they took a normal course, that work is intimately connected with the doctrine whose history we are writing. The redemptive work of God, objectively considered, is essentially nothing else than the work or the *office of Christ;* and, as it became more and more fully understood, so did the knowledge of man's need and capability of redemption and perfection become more complete and thorough.

The Christian mind advanced along three great lines towards a fuller understanding of the work or office of Christ; and to these three great lines correspond the three great Churches—the Greek, the Romish, and the Protestant.

The Greek Church, "seeking after wisdom," regarded Christ as the manifestation of the truth: in its eyes, He was the personal embodiment of wisdom, which, being free from falsity and error, is also free from sin. It regarded Christ predominantly from the point of view of His prophetical office, though not without cherishing the hope that, at the end of the days, He would prove His might as a King in that conflict with evil and death, to which the victory gained over Satan by Christ in a supra-historical struggle, which took place outside of the sphere within which humanity moves, formed the prelude. The "orthodox" Church did, it is true, cling zealously and faithfully to the divinity and humanity of Christ; for, indeed, the doctrine that the Son, the eternal Wisdom, became man, forms a part of the true doctrine of the Person of Christ. Subsequently to the fifth century, however, few of the Greek Fathers were able to give a deeper reason for the incarnation, than that the best means of exhibiting and teaching the truth —that is, God—was that the invisible Wisdom should become visible. Redemption (in its subjective aspect), and faith, are therefore treated almost solely from the theoretical point of view, as consisting in such an acquaintance with, or recognition of, the dogma, as implies it to be true. Placing the chief good in knowledge, the Greek Church directed its main efforts, as a Church, during the period when it still displayed mental activity, to giving its dogmas greater precision of form. The Episcopate was the means employed to this end.

The Romish Church, which, from of old, in accordance with Western tendencies, was more absorbed in the contemplation of self and of the world, and was the inheritress of the practical spirit of the ancient Romans, sought not only to teach, but also to administrate and rule the affairs of men, in agreement with Christian principles. The Episcopate here is not subservient to dogmas; but dogmas are made a means of increasing the power of the Episcopate, of carrying out a spiritual rule, and of instituting a new order of life: the prophetic office is subordinated to, and employed by, the kingly. Christ is represented from the point of view of His kingly authority. The Teacher becomes the Lawgiver; the Gospel, the nova lex. And inasmuch as the Church participates in Christ, who came to found a visible kingdom, with fixed regulations of its own, it has a share, also, of His authority and dominion. Being the image and representative, and, as it were, the continuation of Christ, it arranges its organization with a view to this dominion; in carrying on which, it conceived itself to be acting in the name, and as the vicegerent, of Christ the King. In conformity with this general view of Christ, shepherds became rulers, priests became judges and lawgivers, entrusted with a power of disposal over even the blessings of salvation, and the future and the nether worlds; and, finally, from the midst of the bishops rose the Pope, who was regarded as the king of kings, because, as the servus servorum, he stood in the closest relation to Christ the King. Dogmas here are considered to form part of the law; and as law requires assent or obedience (assensus, obedientia), so did they consider, not error, or even evil only, but disobedience and the debitum which disobedience involved, to be that from which a deliverance was necessary: obedience to Christ's government, His laws, and His propitiation, on the contrary, they regarded as the condition of salvation. The doctrine of the second coming of Christ receded, for evident reasons, to the background: the highest glory of Christ is to have been the Founder of this spiritual state, and the plenipotent Bestower on the Church of all that which it needs, of authority and laws, of sacramental grace and rules of life.

As the Episcopate, the Councils, and the quietly growing power of the Bishop of Rome, constituted during the Greek

period the prelude to the form which the Romish Church assumed in the Middle Ages; so, in the palmy days of the Popedom, Anselm the German became, by means of his work, "Cur Deus homo?" a kind of herald of the Reformation. At the close of that immortal work, however, he sinks back into the general tendency of his time, and applies his theory to the support of an ecclesiastical royalty. The reward which Christ earned by His innocent sufferings, and which He did not need for His own benefit, he represents as having been conferred on the Church,—a treasure which is the basis, and which it administers for the purposes, of its authority.

The central point of the Church of the Reformation, considered subjectively, was the personal need of salvation, and especially of the expiation of guilt (culpa, reatus); its objective centre was the Sacred Passion. Christ is predominantly represented by it, under the form of a servant, as the atoning Mediator and High-priest. Just as in the Old Testament the prophets occupied themselves at first with the Davidic kingdom and with Davidic hopes, afterwards returning to that which was inward and spiritual, so has it been in the history of the inward image formed of the manifested Redeemer in His entirety. The commencement of the Evangelical Church was marked by a similar return from the outward to the inward—from the sphere of mere knowledge and works, to that of the feelings and of the immediate self-consciousness, whose reconciliation was held to be the thing of first importance. It felt and confessed that there is a reconciliation of the individual person; that there is a work of Christ which is more than a mere institution, which respects the individual man; and that we become participators in it,—nay, more, that we become children of God and brothers of the First-born,—if we hold to Him the relation not merely of belief in His truth, and of obedience to His will, but of personal confidence in His mighty, divine, and atoning love: in one word, if our Christianity consist not merely in knowledge, or in works of the will, but in the utter and confident self-surrender of a soul which trusts, and can entrust itself to, Christ.

Such are the general outlines of the advance made towards the understanding of the Divine redemption wrought through Christ, by Christendom, in the three great ecclesiastical forms

under which it has hitherto existed. As a knowledge of the God who revealed Himself in Christ, it involves the knowledge, first, of the *wisdom* of God; secondly, of God as the *righteous Lord*, mighty to save; and, finally, of the *love* of God. At no period was any one of these points left entirely out of view; but what we are now concerned to know is, on which of them, during any particular period, the attention of the Christian mind was chiefly concentrated.

Now, although the form in which the three Churches clothed their conception of God was in all cases determined by the nature of His manifestation of Himself—of His presence, and of His activity—in the God-man, Christ; still, these definitions of the conception of God, according to their nature, were very differently related to the doctrine of the Person of Christ, and especially to the human aspect thereof.

Merely with a view to the communication of the truth, the incarnation was, in fact, scarcely requisite. Inspiration, sacred books, were also fitted for this purpose. The humanity of the Son occupied in the Greek Church, consequently, but a precarious, accidental position—the position, namely, of a mere means to another end. Nor could the humanity of Christ be raised to a firmer and more independent position, unless shown to form an integral portion of the very substance of Christianity, and not destined merely to be the medium for manifesting the invisible Divine Truth, or God.

The case is precisely the same with the category of power and righteousness. If Christ be considered too exclusively under the aspect of a King and eternal Judge, we withdraw Him from humanity,—we allow His humanity to fade away before the majesty of His divinity,—and His incarnation is then, as it were, abrogated by His exaltation. He then becomes merely the Logos. His mission was fulfilled when He had founded the Church, had given it plenary power, and had won for it the saving virtues which it dispenses. But how non-essentially, how accidentally, is His humanity related to this purpose! We are, besides, on all hands assured, and especially by the followers of Anselm, that God could have freely forgiven sin and communicated grace even without Christ. That a theocracy could be established independently of an incarnation, is evident from the Old Testament: why,

then, might not also a new Levitical priesthood have been founded, bearing rather a royal than a priestly character?

We cannot, therefore, be surprised—nay more, we should look as a matter of course—to find that, so long as the Greek and Roman Churches took the lead, too great prominence was, on the whole, given to the divine over the human aspect of Christ's Person; and that the former stood related to the latter as something either inwardly alien, or even exclusive. The reason thereof is, that those Churches assigned to the humanity of Christ a significance of a merely temporary, accidental character. Only when the Church became more distinctly conscious of that holy love of God which effected the atonement of humanity, did it see that the incarnation was a necessity, and consequently assign to the humanity of Christ a position of essential importance. By the incarnation, and not by grace, which is independent of historical events and facts (which would have been an arbitrary and unethical thing), was the reconciliation of the world actually accomplished: the man Christ Jesus reconciled the world with God. This was possible, because in Him God became man. Insight into the possibility of this incarnation depended, as respects the part taken by God, (1) on His being predominantly conceived, not merely as Wisdom, or as Might and Justice, but as self-communicating Love, to which the very highest conceivable form of fellowship must be congruous. It was on the Lutheran Church, after the way had been prepared during the Middle Ages, that this insight into the fact that the essential nature of God is holy love, and not an infinitude (whether of being, or of wisdom, or of power and righteousness) essentially opposed to the finite, dawned most clearly. (2) Further, inasmuch as with this deeper insight into the moral nature of God, and especially into the essentially moral character of the atonement, there was connected a deeper, even a moral and religious, conception of the nature and destiny of man, in opposition both to a Pelagian and a magical view of the method of redemption; and, inasmuch as one of the fundamental postulates of the Evangelical Church was the marriage of man, by faith, in the depths of the soul, with God, man was henceforth viewed, not merely as a finite being, but as infinity in the form of susceptibility. So that, even though it might at first be only in a general form, a

perception must have been gained of the possibility of the union of God and man in Christ, even relatively to the capacity of human nature. For this reason, the Reformation was a turning-point, both in respect to the divine and the human aspects; and, whilst the First Epoch of the Period now under consideration might be described as one in which too great prominence was given to the divine nature of Christ, the Period of the Reformation, on the other hand, in point of principle, as also partially in point of actual teaching, may be designated the new *Second Epoch*—the epoch in which the divine and human aspects attained to a principial, if not to a complete and permanent, equilibrium.

After the Reformation, the leadership in the development of Christian doctrine was transferred from the Romanic to the Germanic peoples; and the Romish Church took up, in relation to the Evangelical, a position similar to that which the Greek Church had previously held towards itself. It fell into a conservatism, which showed scarcely any traces of the continuance of that process of development on which the dogmas of the Church had been launched. This is specially observable in connection with Christology. The Evangelical Germanic peoples, on the contrary, desired neither that absorption in the knowledge and vision of God, which was the chief aim of Greek piety even in its noblest forms, nor to alternate between a passive, willess surrender to grace, whose action bore a magical character, on the one hand, and a Pelagian, arbitrary, and godless subjectivity, on the other. On them devolved the task of asserting, and working out, the true conception of human personality, on the basis of a fuller knowledge of the redemption which had been manifested. The mind of Christendom now, strictly speaking, for the first time concentrated its attention on the development of a Christian anthropology. As we have already remarked, Augustine was in this matter but a forerunner. His system by no means possessed the power of impressing its character either on the period during which he flourished, or on the after-world. On the contrary, at many points it afforded support to views which afterwards became the type and standard of the Romanic peoples. The continuous opposition of the Romish Church undoubtedly helped to keep the science of the Evangelical Church, and soon also

its philosophy, to this its task, and impelled it to devote thereto its entire energies. And when the theology which succeeded the Reformation, instead of tending the new Christological germs which had been planted by the Reformers, began almost immediately to do homage to a traditionalism which buried its talent in the ground, and apparently made it its highest aim to restore the doctrine of the Evangelical Church to identity with that of the time previous to the Reformation,—that is, to render the preponderance of the divine over the human aspect, if possible, greater than ever,—it became doubly necessary, necessary even for Christology, that the right of anthropology to a place amongst Christian dogmas should now, after so long neglect, be thoroughly and scientifically established. During the eighteenth century, however, the efforts put forth for the solution of the anthropological problem bore, at first, traces of a spirit hostile to Christianity and Christology. But the greater the freedom, and the fewer the trammels, with which the Evangelical Church pursued the course of its development on this point, the more valuable has proved the result which was gained, notwithstanding transient confusions and degeneracies. That result was a scientific conviction, that the relation between the nature of man and the idea of God is by no means one of exclusion; but that, on the contrary, man first truly becomes man when he is united with God, without losing his own individuality. How the knowledge of this truth grew and ripened, it will be our task to narrate when we come to the Third Epoch of the Period under consideration. At that epoch, the human aspect of the Person of Christ predominated over the divine. It formed, consequently, the direct counterpart or antithesis to the First Epoch of the same Period (from the year 381 to the year 1517). That such was the case, can be pointed out, even to the very details,—plainly showing the orderly character of the course taken by the development of our doctrine, notwithstanding the arbitrariness and confusion which apparently prevailed.

If, then, the collective result of the Second Period was the full concrete knowledge of that which, as to principle, was expressed in the time of the Reformation (that time, of the transition of the divine from its preponderance over the human, and also, in another respect, of the temporary equili-

brium of the two aspects of the Person of Christ),—to wit, *firstly*, that the only true conception of God is one which, so far from being incompatible with, involves His being determined to an incarnation, by His own eternal moral nature; and, *secondly*, that any conception of humanity is false, which, either in a spirit of defiance or a spirit of pusillanimity, would regard the tabernacling of God in man as a thing either unnecessary or too lofty: we may consider, that with the Third Period the time had arrived, when the conditions might be deemed to have been fulfilled, on which, as we have previously shown, the further progress of this dogma primarily depended, and without the fulfilment of which, all attempts to recognise in the duality of the aspects an unity of the Person of Christ, could only be of a temporary and provisional character. The Christological germs planted in the time of the Reformation were full of promise for the future, and escaped that character of one-sidedness which the attempts put forth, independently of the conditions just referred to, had borne; hence, also, did they give rise to the fruitful labours of the Third Period, then just commencing.

Turning our attention now especially to the First Epoch of the Second Period, whose principal feature, taken as a whole, was the predominance given to the divine aspect over the human, the time from the year 381 to the Reformation naturally falls into three sections.

During the first section of this Epoch, closing with the Council of Chalcedon in the year 451, efforts were made, in opposition alike to the school of Antioch and that of Alexandria, to Nestorianism and Eutychianism, to define more precisely the nature of the problem. Nestorianism, it was affirmed, evades the problem of the union of the two aspects of the Person of Christ, in that it sets up a dead dualism in the place of union; Eutychianism also evades it, in that its union is but a re-absorption of the human by the divine. The Fathers assembled at this Synod viewed the problem positively, as follows:—In Christ is to be recognised a duality of the divine and human; the two infinitely and essentially different natures, which constitute this duality, are notwithstanding united into, and in one Person. In order to secure for this putting of the problem an ecclesiastical sanction, the Church was compelled

to renounce connection with such parties as were unable to recognise in it the expression of their own Christian consciousness. On the one hand, the Nestorians felt that Christ's human nature was not secured against the onesided predominance of the divine by the formulas approved at the Council of Chalcedon; and, on the other hand, the Monophysites complained, that in opposition to the spirit indicated in the ancient expression μία φύσις, the doctrine of two such natures in Christ makes a mockery of every attempt at their union.

But the antagonistic principles of Nestorianism and Monophysitism made their appearance afresh, and gained advocates even within the fold of the Mother Church, from whose limits they had been excluded. It was thus continually reminded of the debt which the Council of Chalcedon had failed to discharge. This forms the principal subject of the other two sections.

The second section, from the year 451 to 793, will narrate how the too powerful inclination to Monophysitism which prevailed in the Greek Church, and which constantly manifested itself in fresh forms, was victoriously combated by the tendency to unity, mainly in the Western Church; and how the duality affirmed by the Council of Chalcedon, was not only maintained, but reasserted with increased distinctness, in that, not only the existence of two essentially different natures, but also the existence of a duality of capacities of volition and knowledge,—nay more, of a duality of the entire functions of the soul,—was recognised. From the year 451 down to the eighth century was, therefore, as far as the decisions of its Synods are concerned, the period of the more distinct and clear definition of the antithesis of two natures affirmed by the Council of Chalcedon. Nothing worthy of mention was done towards showing how the two natures could be united in one person. But when this tendency to contrast and oppose the two natures had culminated in Adoptianism, whose mission it seemed to be, as it were, to set forth and embody the total result of the previous process and movement, the Western Church shrank back from the consequences logically drawn by the school of Antioch, and a turning-point arrived with the Council of Frankfort, in 793.

The third section of this Epoch, from the Council of Frank-

fort to the Reformation, to describe its character in general terms, was the time of the qualification of the antithesis approved by the Council of Chalcedon. During this period the tendency was predominant to uphold the unity of the Person of Christ. But even during the period comprised in the second section, the antithesis of the two natures had been partially qualified, in that the Logos alone was conceived to constitute the Personality of Christ. As all-powerful, He was considered capable of combining and retaining in unity the two natures, however widely they might be separated. This one point was, of course, in itself sufficient to preserve to the divine nature its undue predominance. Against this remainder of Monophysitism or Docetism, which neither had received, nor ever did receive, the sanction of the Church, Adoptianism especially raised its voice, with the hope of being able to preserve the unity of the Person of Christ, even when the human as well as the divine aspect was conceived as personal. But after the turn taken by the science of the Church towards the maintenance of the unity of the Person of Christ—a turn dating from the overthrow of Adoptianism,—the explanation resorted to most eagerly, and most completely carried out, was that of the impersonality of Christ's human nature. This position was very closely connected with the magical character which attached to the doctrines of grace as taught during the Middle Ages, and concealed within itself, as it were, the type of that ecstasy of man in God, subsequently aimed at by the Mystics. Soon enough, however, were the consequences discernible. If the humanity of Christ is selfless, impersonal, the incarnation is not real, true. In such case, Christ's humanity is merely the garment of the Deity; incarnation is a mere theophany; and the strict and proper idea of a God-manhood is renounced for Nihilianism. Christ was thus, as it were, reconverted into the Logos, with a human garment. The scholastic divines, moreover, sought to show that it was unnecessary for God to become man, although they recognised both that such an event was possible, and even that it had actually taken place, in a *figurative sense*. Thus, under the pretence of a solution, the problem was really cast aside; and substitutes for Christology began now, *en masse*, to be introduced into the Church.

The *words* in which Peter Lombard gave honest and open

expression to the secret of this Christology of the Church, were, it is true, officially disavowed; but the *thing* itself could not be altered, as long as the human nature of Christ was treated as impersonal, and as possessed of no independent significance. And as the conception of the personality of man began, under other, and those chiefly Pelagian influences, to assume a more definite shape, and to take up a position either alongside of, or even opposed to, the magical cast of doctrine above alluded to, the knot was drawn ever tighter. Some of the scholastic theologians remained true to tradition; but their unproductiveness, and their return to simpler mystical views of the Person of Christ, show that the interest hitherto taken in the rational development of Christology was already beginning to die out. So with Thomas Aquinas. Others began again to take up the position of Adoptianism, which was now no longer condemned; but, shut up within the formulas of the Church, and feeling the difficulty of uniting the two, they strove in vain to find a solution. So Duns Scotus. On the whole, vacillation and uncertainty prevailed; and the end thereof was a bewildered scepticism, conjoined with blind subjection to the authority of the Church, to which was committed the responsibility of reconciling the apparent or real discordances in its teachings. In one line, however,—in that of the Mystics,—enough life remained to preserve the continuity of the process of development on which Christology had entered. This mystical tendency attained its climax, and thus also its normal and ecclesiastical consummation, in the Reformation. Even Mysticism, however, failed to advance beyond the idea of the impersonality of the humanity of Christ; though it did regard the humanity of Christ, in a general way, as the perfection of human nature. It taught, therefore, at all events by implication, that it is not contradictory of, but solely accordant with, the natures of God and man, that they should enter into the most intimate fellowship with each other, nay more, it is congruous to the nature of both, and not a curtailment of the human, that God alone should be the true personality in man. How far had it thus departed from the spirit and the principles of the Council of Chalcedon! The Lutheran Church, in its doctrine of the "Communicatio Idiomatum" (to its praise be it said), did not, like Mysticism, rest satisfied with the mere unity

of the Ego, and allow the human aspect to be absorbed in the Divine hypostasis, but declared the main problem to be, the union of the two natures themselves *with each other*, and put forth efforts to effect a solution. Inasmuch, however, as at this point a stop began to be put to the building of the edifice, at which the Church had laboured from the year 451 to 793, notwithstanding that the principles which had formerly been presupposed still combined to exert an influence, the proper place for discussing the Lutheran Christology will be the Second Epoch of this Period. We shall be able to show, on the one hand, that it formed the conclusion of the old era; and, on the other hand, that it formed the conclusion of the old, in virtue of a principle which fitted it to inaugurate a new, era.

We have thus tried to present a cursory view of that which constituted the life and soul of the Christological process in the different sections of the First Epoch (from 381 to 1517). Our task is now to take a survey of the various modes of conceiving and explaining the union of the two aspects of the Person of Christ, which resulted from the manifold points of view from which Christology was regarded during this epoch.

At no time in its history was the Christian Church disposed to dispense with a doctrine concerning the Person of Christ. It constantly applied the knowledge it possessed of God and man, whatever might be its measure, to this dogma. So far, therefore, the history of Christology is one of the chief sources of our knowledge of the modes in which different periods conceived of God and man. But, as a Christology could not fairly be considered to have been formed, until Christ was conceived as the unity of the divine and the human, each period, whatever might be its views in other respects, and whatever might be the nature of its main Christological efforts, was called upon to say, what, with the premises which it acknowledged, was its conception of the *Unio*.

The different modes of conceiving of this Unio, which came one after another into vogue, may be classified under three heads. In these, notwithstanding that the first and second were directly opposed the one to the other, a regular progress is discernible.

I. Under the first head belong those views of the Unio which, in that they detracted from, or altogether denied, the individuality and reality of the one or the other nature, had most affinity with Docetism or Ebionitism. They fell into Ebionitism when they represented the divine nature as transformed into the human, and into Docetism, when they represented the human nature as transformed into the divine; and they bore a certain resemblance to both, when they represented the one as tempered and modified by the other, so that, as in chemistry, the result was a compound product, a mixture of both factors. The first form was brought repeatedly under consideration in the first volume: of the second form was Eutychianism: of the third, was Theopassianism. They all belong to the Monophysitic family, which, as well as the school of Antioch, conceived of the divine and human as antagonistic to, and exclusive of, each other. Hence, the only union possible, was one which involved either the entire or the partial absorption of one of the factors; and usually, the divine factor, which was chiefly described and defined by physical categories, absorbed the human. The chief representatives of this class of views flourished, in part, during the First Period.

II. Under the second head must be classed those views which followed on, and were connected with, the condemnatory judgment pronounced by the Church on Apollinarism. The two natures were in this case also regarded as mutually exclusive contrarieties; but at the same time efforts were made to preserve completely to both their distinctive characters,—chiefly in the interest of the humanity of Christ, and of a positive conception of God. Still it was deemed possible to maintain a unity of the entire Person; though, naturally, only by means of a third principle, external to both natures.

That view is scarcely worthy of mention which, without inquiring further into the connecting principle, simply represents the Person of Christ as the sum and result of the two concurrent natures; and which therefore takes no trouble to consider whether the two natures can be thus combined—whether they are so homogeneous as to be capable of addition to one sum (= Person), or whether each is not rather an independent person in itself. It is clear that in this case the two natures are only, as it were, *arithmetically* added together—

pronounced one; and that they are posited as one merely in thought, so that the Unio is purely nominal—an *unio verbalis*. All that was done was to postulate that the two natures be thought at one and the same time: the problem was not more precisely defined, much less was any progress made towards a solution.

The efforts after a unio realis took three forms:—

(1.) The idea which first suggested itself was, that the divine and human natures are one, inasmuch as the latter is the temple or garment of the former. But to term a mere juxtaposition unity, and to represent the natures as one merely on the ground of their presence in one and the same place (unio localis), is to reduce the incarnation to a theophany, and, examined more carefully, is illusory; inasmuch as the divine nature (of which, by the way, no other aspects than those which may be termed physical are brought into view) would appear, in virtue of its omnipresence, to dwell in all things quite as truly as in the humanity of Christ.

It leads to a view of essentially the same character, to appeal to the mere power of God, and to judge that by His mere will He could conjoin and form into one whole, two natures which are not only different in essence, and have no sort of internal connection with each other, but are even mutually opposed. This we may designate the *Mechanical Unio*.

(2.) Inasmuch, however, as neither of the two natures is a mere lifeless substance, a form of union so dead must inevitably inflict injury on both. Hence Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, whose *συνάφεια*, in other respects, bore the closest resemblance to the view just now described, combined therewith, the rudiments of a representation which, though occupying the same platform, was of a higher character. They supposed, namely, that the Logos, who is present in all things, stood in a peculiar relation—a relation as it were of elective affinity—to the man Jesus; the reason thereof being, that the man Jesus, because of His spirit and disposition, was honoured by God with the dignity of Sonship—a title and rank which belonged to the Logos by nature. Whether this excellence of the man Jesus was regarded as innate or as acquired, does not clearly appear. This view, which represents the relation of the Logos to the man Christ as taking a special form, on the ground of the pre-

eminent worth recognised, in the judgment of God, as attaching to Christ's human nature, may be described, when considered from the point of view of its objective basis, as an unio in conformity to the idea of justice, or as the unio forensis; when considered in its actual character, as the relative union—unio relativa, ἕνωσις σχετική.

(3.) The peculiar excellence attaching to the human nature of Christ, and which attracted to itself the special sympathy of the omnipresent divine nature, must on earth, have been rather moral than physical (relating to the φύσις),—that it must mainly have consisted in the sympathy for the divine, felt by this man. Still, the foundation in which this moral excellence inhered, was constituted by two opposed substances,—substances, that is, which were not of a nature to seek an union with, when turned towards, each other; but such, that whilst remaining internally independent, each had the same end in view as the other. Keeping these two points in view, we arrive at a subjective moral unio,—an union consisting in the harmony of two otherwise distinct and separate wills, which manifest the same tendency in similar forms or modes (*a*). This was unquestionably a more spiritual conception of the Unio; but still it was unsatisfactory, so far as it represented the acts of volition, on which the main stress was laid, as proceeding, in analogy with the point of view of law or justice, from two separate and opposed centres of life. The natures were no longer supposed to be merely passively combined; but were conceived as active, as effecting their own union. This union, however, was, after all, external to themselves, consisting in the mere similarity of their activity, and in their having a common aim. The assumption of two such centres of life, necessarily led to the assumption of the existence of two eternally co-ordinate personalities. That such must be the result of the attempt at a subjective moral unio, could not long remain unperceived. On the ground that this form of Christology involved a dualism, the culminating points of which (the Egos) were only held together by an ideal unity outside of and above them, it was justly condemned by the Church, no less than the theories classed under the first head,—both at the Council of Chalcedon. The

(*a*) See Note A, Appendix II., for the German of this passage. Tr.

problem of Christology was then laid down in the manner described above, and declared in that form to be an article of faith.

III. The theories of the second class, just noticed, were logically driven on, by the progress they made towards a higher form of themselves, from the assumption of a duality of natures, to that of a duality of persons; but, as the only unity at which they arrived, was one external both to the natures and the persons, the Council of Chalcedon assumed the duality of the natures, denied the duality of the Egos, in the totality of the Person of Christ, and sought rather to effect a unio by means of some inner principle. The way was thus prepared for the introduction of the third class of the modes of union resorted to during the present epoch. It must not be forgotten, however, that even the efforts relating to this last class started with the Antiochean assumption, that the two natures were essentially different from, and opposed to, each other.

In the first place, Monotheletism (which related not merely to volition, but also to knowledge) endeavoured to secure the unity of the two natures by representing their several capacities and their collective functions, or, in other words, the actual activities of their life, as an unity. It taught the unity of the two natures in Christ; not, indeed, a unity of substance, nor a unity consisting merely in a community of the objects of volition, but an unity of actual concrete character,—that is, it was conceived to be a unity of the *faculty* of will, of the actual volitions and deeds. Here, however, may be discerned a remnant of the doctrine of transformation; for, notwithstanding their abiding inner diversity, the substances, in their actual concrete existence, were supposed to be partially or entirely absorbed by, or transformed into, each other, in order that a living unity of the person might be brought to pass. We may understand, therefore, how the first fruit of the influence of Monotheletism was, that courage was taken to give utterance to Dyotheletism as a Christological truth.

Now, however, the unity was banished not only from the sphere of the natures, but also from that of the capacities and living activities. Christ was represented as a duality of substances,—which duality it was supposed necessary to conceive as a twofold system of faculties and living activities. Whence, then, could arise an inner unity of the Person of Christ?

In general, the reply was necessarily as follows: The Person, as a whole, notwithstanding the distinct aspects or parts of which it is composed, is one, in virtue of the unity of its centre, or Ego. This is the unio hypostatica (the unity which consists in the unity of the Ego), which now begins to run its historical course as a phase of the dogma concerning the Person of Christ. The one personality no longer appears as the result of the combination of the two natures; but, *vice versâ*, the Person of the Son is the principle which unites, and keeps united in one personal whole, the two natures. The hypostasis of the Son is both a part of the compound person, and its centre of unity: He is the personal centre of this compound personality. The last teachers of the Greek Church of any note advocated, but in a manner still very indefinite, this sense of the unio hypostatica. Then in the West there arose the two opposed theories of Adoptianism and Nihilianism. And lastly, at the Reformation, the elements of truth which lay in both began to be combined, at the cost, of course, of a reform of the entire basis anciently recognised, and sanctioned especially by the Council of Chalcedon.

(1.) The teachers of the Church, especially Maximus and John Damascenus, considered the principle of unity to lie within the compass of the personality itself, viewed in its entirety. One constituent thereof, namely, the hypostasis of the Son of God, became the principle of unity of the whole: the Person of the God-man was constituted solely by the act of the hypostasis of the Son of God, which assumed human nature. This hypostasis was, at the same time, the personal centre, the Ego, by which the two opposed natures and systems were kept together. Through this personal unity and identity, into which the human nature was implanted, not only did a nominal interchange (*ἀντίδοσις*) of the predicates of the two natures become possible, but a motion within each other of the two mutually permeating natures was actually brought to pass, and the human powers and excellences underwent an aggrandizement, which may be termed deification (*θέωσις*). But, inasmuch as all Divine attributes and powers belong to the Ego of the Son of God, in virtue of His divine nature, the human nature was subjected to its decisions, both in the matter of knowledge and volition.

(2.) Our notice is next drawn to the antagonistic theories which arose out of this still indefinite doctrine. The *περιχώρησις*, just referred to, had unquestionably, as a form of the unio localis, greater life and reality, but still it remained essentially the same. This mutual approximation and interpenetration of the two natures, was the first step in, but not a completion of, the process of union. For the natures were still supposed to remain, in form and substance, exactly what they were, unaltered; nay more, the unity is represented as always and at once complete. But nothing was done to show how the independence asserted for the human nature, and the freedom of will attributed to it, could be anything more than a mere illusion; and how, on the supposition that the Logos and His omnipotent nature, constituted its inmost and all-dominant centre, the humanity of Christ was not reduced to the rank of a mere impersonal organ.

(*a.*) Adoptianism might therefore well regard it as a more logical carrying out of the doctrine of the duality of natures and functions of life, sanctioned by the Church, when, instead of attributing such a preponderance to the omnipotent Divine hypostasis, it assumed that each of the two systems in Christ had its own personal centre, and that this personal centre was at the same time also the point in which the two systems, like two converging lines, met and were combined. The actual centre of unity of each of these systems—that is, the Ego—is also the element common to both: the centre of unity is in both cases identically one and the same. Hence, however diverse the natures may be, the Ego, in distinction from the nature, may be common to both, and the actual centre of unity. Both parties designated this Ego *Son*, and supposed that in this mezzo termine they had found that which might belong equally to both natures, and prove a bond of real connection between them.

That the Ego of the Divine hypostasis should also be regarded as the Ego of the human nature, had not up to this time been *denied;* and this is the ultimate reason why it was possible for the systems of Maximus and John Damascenus to appear to concede to the human nature of Christ a measure of real independence. Adoptianism, however, forced on a consideration of, and a decision regarding, the obscurity which

these two teachers had left hanging over this point; and when it was rejected, the teachers of the Church gave in their decided adhesion to the view that personality was not predicable of the humanity of Christ.

(*b.*) But the consequence thereof was Nihilianism. Christ was reduced to a mere theophany. He was no longer a real man, but the Son of God, employing the human form assumed by Him, as the symbol of His revelation. And this was a return to the elementary representations of the school of Antioch [see II. (1)], only that stress was now laid on the divine aspect of the Person of Christ in a manner resembling that of Monophysitism.

(*c.*) Adoptianism and Nihilianism were next rejected; but within the limits of the Middle Ages no trace is discoverable of such an union of the elements of truth, conjoined with the rejection of the false, contained in both, as we find attending other decisions. The Tridentine Council effected nothing whatever in this direction. A theology, however, which treated the two natures dualistically, and, banishing unity both from the sphere of the natures and from that of their capacities and functions, assigned it solely to the Ego, was no longer capable of rendering further service. And yet the entire difficulty—How can the divine and human natures unite if they are infinitely diverse one from another?—presented itself again. Nor did it help the matter to put the question thus: "How is it possible for the Divine hypostasis to unite with human nature, on the supposition of their infinite diversity?" Thomas Aquinas held that the Divine hypostasis, without the Divine nature—that is, the Divine personal centre, or Ego, without the Divine attributes—appropriated or incorporated human nature with itself; but still it is not clear how such an Ego could unite itself with human nature, if the latter is absolutely diverse in kind from the former. But whatever attempts at explanation may have been made by the scholastic theologians, it is unquestionable (and this is the main point) that almost all of them grant that the incarnation declares, strictly speaking, nothing new or special regarding God, but only the existence of a peculiar relation of the human nature in Christ to the omnipresent, eternally unchangeable Logos, who is at once outside of and in it. This peculiar relation of the humanity of Christ to the Logos might

either be regarded as consisting in the fact that the Logos constituted the only personality with which the human nature was endowed,—and then Nihilianism would follow; or it might be regarded as arising from the circumstance, that in Christ human nature stood in a unique relation of activity to the Logos,—the relation, namely, of perfect obedience,—and was thus capable of perfectly receiving Him: which view leads back to Adoptianism.

(2.) Out of this state of vacillation between Adoptianism and Nihilianism, the upholders of the old form of the unio hypostatica could find no exit. A precursory indication of progress may be found in the doctrine held by some of the scholastics, and especially by the Mystics, that the hypostasis of the Son not only did not rob humanity, was not merely an honour to humanity, but that the longing of human nature for personality had been completely met and satisfied in the Person of the Son. As we have remarked, however, this doctrine still to a certain degree savours of the notion, that man is to attain perfection by denying and transcending the very idea of man,—by extasis, and so forth: a notion which Nicolas of Cusa endeavoured to define and systematize.

It was reserved for the Reformation to bring the unio hypostatica to a crisis,—the effect of which was the more decided appropriation of the Divine Person to the human nature, and the revendication to the unity, of the sphere of the natures, their powers and their attributes (idiomata).

THE FIRST EPOCH OF THE SECOND PERIOD.

FROM THE YEAR 381 TO THE REFORMATION.

THE TIME DURING WHICH UNDUE STRESS WAS LAID ON THE DIVINE, AS COMPARED WITH THE HUMAN, ASPECT OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

SECTION I.

THE TWO ASPECTS OF CHRIST ARE DECIDED TO BE TWO ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT NATURES, IN ONE PERSON.

From the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381, *to the Council of Chalcedon,* A.D. 451.

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE SCHOOL OF ANTIOCH. DIODORUS OF TARSUS. THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA. NESTORIUS.

THE present section comprises the period during which the school of Antioch enjoyed the greatest degree of prosperity and of influence in the Church,—a prosperity and influence due partly to such men as Diodorus, Theodore, Nestorius, and others, and partly to the victory gained over Apollinarism by the tendency of which these teachers were the representatives. The force of this school, however, lay not in theological speculations. It adopted, and doubtless in all sincerity, the traditional view of the doctrine of the Trinity, even as it affected Christology, and devoted itself with all its weight, and with whatever creative power it could boast, to anthropology:—indeed, in general, to the historical and empirical aspects of theological inquiries (Diodorus, for example, battled with Manichæism and Fatalism). This general tendency did not, however, prevent Theodore of Mopsuestia, in particular, from giving

his conception of the world a speculative colouring, and applying it to the purposes of his very peculiar Christology.

Before entering on details, it will repay us to give a general glance at the Syrian Church, whose history, still in many respects obscure, justly attracts to itself ever more earnest attention, and on which we may unquestionably expect much light to be thrown ere many years have passed (Note 1) (*a*).

The Syrian Church falls into two main divisions. The Western Division, with Antioch as its centre, comprised the cities of Hierapolis, Laodicea, Emesa, and Samosata, all which have as their representatives in history men of reputation. Of the Eastern Division, the chief centres were Edessa and Nisibis, in the northern part of Mesopotamia; and Seleucia, Ctesiphon, and Babylon, in the southern. Throughout both parts of the Eastern Division very numerous Jewish colonies had been planted; about the time of Christ a Jewish royal family existed in the northern part. Rapidly and quietly did Christianity here take root;[1] and Edessa and Nisibis became seats of such learning and culture, that even as early as the second century a prince of Edessa, Abgarus, who reigned from 152 to 187, and was a friend of Bardesanes, became a convert to Christianity.[2] The remarks made in Part First of this work (see pages 144, 145) on Antioch, and the ancient prosperity of the Church of Western Syria, are equally applicable, in the second century, to the Church of Eastern Syria, which stood in close connection with Persia and Armenia, and was frequently designated the Assyrian Church. The Syrian Translation of the New Testament, which existed as early as the middle of the second century, the collections of old Christian hymns, and the development of the forms of worship and of the constitution of the Church, must have given to Christianity in those countries a national position and character at a very early period. That great activity prevailed among the Syrian Christians of the second century, is proved by the numerous forms under which

[1] According to tradition, by the instrumentality of Adæus, and his disciples, Aghæus and Maris.

[2] According to coins stamped with the sign of the cross: Assemanni Bibl. Or. i. 423; Wichelhaus, de Novi Test. Versione Syriaca Antiqua, quam Peschitho vocant LL. iv. 1850, p. 50 ff. Wichelhaus thinks that the Peshito took its rise in Nisibis.

(*a*) See Appendix I.

Gnosticism made its appearance there,[1] by the works of Theophilus of Antioch, and of Tatian (the Assyrian—that is, the East Syrian—with the Encratites), whose Diatessaron, as well as the commentaries of Theophilus and Serapion, bear witness that the Syrian mind had been awakened to the study of Scripture. A hint, if nothing more, regarding the inner condition and history of Christian thought in those districts may be drawn from the fact, that the Mesopotamian bishops are said to have at first sought ordination in Antioch, and afterwards in Jerusalem. After Barchochba it appears that the Church of Eastern Syria asserted for itself an independent position, and that its bishops found a centre of unity in the bishopric of Seleucia, where accordingly the pseudo-Clementine idea of archbishop must have found its first realization. In the *third* century, besides Serapion, who occupied himself with the pseudo-epigraphic literature (see Euseb. H. E. 6, 12), we may mention the learned presbyters, Malchion and Dorotheus (see Euseb. H. E. 9, 29; 7, 32), both of whom were well acquainted with Greek literature. Of these latter, Lucian, pupil of Macarius of Edessa (see "Vita Luciani Presbyt. et Martyris") and the teacher of Arius (vide supra, pp. 733, 802, Part I.), became a disciple, especially in relation to the criticism of the Old Testament, and with him an entire school. We have similar accounts respecting a Christian school which existed at Edessa in the third century, and in connection with which Macarius publicly explained the sacred Scriptures. The oldest Synods of importance—namely, those held at Antioch in opposition to Paul of Samosata—belong also to Syria. How Paul, and probably also Beryll of Bostra, was connected with Theodotus the Syrian, fragments of whose writings are preserved in Clement, we have shown in a former part of this work (see Part I., pp. 505–516, and 551 ff.).

[1] Many apocryphal writings also originated in the districts of Syria. We should further remember the fruitful Ignatian literature; then the Minæans (see above, vol. i., p. 305) * or Nazarenes, who also probably arose in Eastern Syria; then the teacher of Clemens Alexandrinus from Assyria (see vol. i. 442, 443), and the one from Cœle-Syria; and finally, the Excerpta Theodoti, i. 505 ff., with the Melchizedekians. In the third century importance attached to this Church as the bridge of Manichæism, opposition to which was raised especially by Archelaus the Armenian.

* Correct references will be given when the whole is completed.—Tr.

The movement to which the causes just mentioned, and especially the influence of Paul, gave rise in Western Syria, and which extended also to the northern districts, has been previously described. In the North, we find Gregory Thaumaturgus and his brothers leading and administrating the Armenian Church; which again was in close intercourse, even of a political kind, with the Church in Eastern Syria. Worthy of special mention, however, is it, that in the fourth century Nisibis was almost entirely Christian. There flourished the celebrated Bishop James, of Nisibis (comp. his "Sermones" in the Library of the Fathers edited by Galland, Part V., pp. iii.–clvi.); and his disciple Ephraem, called the Prophet of the Syrians, in Edessa, whose school of Christian learning was enriched with a library. But it was in Eastern Syria also that Audius (Udo) gained his many disciples (Audianites); it was in evil repute, moreover, on account of the Messalians (see Esra vi. 12, "those who pray") and the Hypsistarians, not to mention the traces of Persian and Chaldee influences.

The Mesopotamian bishops (of Nisibis, Edessa, Amida, Carrhæ, and so forth) attended the Synods at Nicæa, Antioch, and Constantinople; and the hermit Julian Saba, having been summoned to Antioch, there entered the lists against the Arians.

To the school of Western Syria, after Lucian, belong Eusebius of Emisa, Diodorus of Tarsus, Carterius, and Theodorus,—this last mentioned, first a disciple of Diodorus, and afterwards Bishop of Mopsuestia in Cicilia.[1]

The not unimportant difference between the spirit of Western and that of Eastern Syria, and which, not having been of a merely temporary character, justifies us in speaking of two Syrian schools, is deserving of special attention. The peculiarity of this spirit is clearly seen as soon as we contrast Tatian, Bardesanes, and other dualistic Gnostics, with the men of Western Syria (Sec. 2, 3), Theophilus, Malchion, Dorotheus, and Paul of Samosata; or, in the fourth century, men like Audius, James of Nisibis, and Ephraem, with such as Lucian,

[1] Compare Siefferts, "Theodorus Mopsvestenus V. T. sobrie interpretandi vindex;" Comment. Regiom. 1827; and my Christmas Programme on "Theodori Mopsv. doctrina de imagine Dei, 1844." The introduction treats of the school of Antioch.

Diodorus of Tarsus, and Theodore of Mopsuestia. They were related to each other much as in Africa the Alexandrian school was related to the North African during the third century. The school of Eastern Syria was distinguished by its vivid fancy, by its religious spirit, at once fiery and practical, by fervour and, in part, depth of thought. It exhibited, also, a tendency to the impassioned style and too gorgeous imagery (Note 2) of the East, to mysticism and asceticism. No other country competed, at an early period (since the time of Hilarion in the fourth century), so closely with Egypt in the matter of monasteries as Eastern Syria. These monasteries, moreover, were to a certain extent nurseries of science, and held a very active intercourse with those of Lybia and Egypt. They regarded each other as allies, more especially after the old spirit of the Alexandrian school had given way to dogmatic and monkish tendencies,—a circumstance which is of importance to those who wish to understand the history of the Church from the time of Theophilus of Alexandria down, and subsequent, to Athanasius. The Church of Western Syria, on the contrary, displayed even at an early period that sober, judicious, and critical spirit for which it became renowned, and by which it was especially distinguished from the third to the fifth century. The Eastern school inclined to theosophy, and thus had a certain affinity with the religious systems which prevailed in the East; the Western, on the other hand, took its stand on the firm basis of experience and history. In one word, the contrast between the two divisions of the Syrian Church bore a not inconsiderable resemblance to that which exists between the Lutheran and Reformed Confessions in Germany. Many things might be adduced, especially from the works of Ephraem, confirmatory of this remark.[1] Apollinaris of Laodicea, whose spirit had more affinity with the tendency which predominated in East Syria than with that of the school of Antioch, inoculated to some extent the Church of Western Syria with his own and related

[1] Specially in the doctrine of the Eucharist. Ephraem's view is similar to that of Ignatius (see above, vol. i. 157, 158). In his Christology, the divine aspect had the decided predominance; but he still laid very great stress on the unity of the Person, and made use of the formula *ἀντιμεθίστασις τῶν ὀνομάτων* in order to allow of the divine nature participating in the sufferings of the human.

views (Note 3),—a thing which must have been doubly disagreeable to a school so consolidated as that of Antioch. From the tone in which the adherents of the school of Antioch, even down to the time of Theodoret, speak of Apollinaris, we may see that they were sorely vexed that a foreign and thoroughly antagonistic element should have intruded its presence amongst them.

In no one point does the difference between the two schools show itself so markedly as in the mode of interpreting the Scriptures; and, remarkably enough, this is the point in respect of which there is a measure of affinity between the two. Both schools, namely, oppose that arbitrary allegorical method of interpretation which had been in vogue since the time of Origen, and require of commentators that they give careful attention to the grammatical meaning of words. But the two schools started from opposed points of view, and arrived at opposite results. The followers of Audius, whose true home was in Eastern Syria, but who spread as far as Egypt (see Sec. 4), took advantage of this principle to prove that God must be conceived of as like to man,—"Man is the image of God even according to the body" (see Epiphanii, h. 70; Theodoret, i. h. f. 4, 10): on this ground they were entitled Anthropomorphites. But once assume the existence in God of an eternal humanity, and a germ was planted which might issue in the Apollinarian view of the Person of Christ (Note 4). The adherents of the school of Antioch, on the other hand, set their faces against allegorical interpretations, because they desired to base their views on sober historical investigations. Nor can it be denied that this school rendered good service, not merely in connection with the Old Testament, but also in connection with the Person of the historical Christ. In more than one respect its representation of Christ was more accurate than that adopted by the Church, notwithstanding the contempt with which it has been treated since the fifth century.

In endeavouring to understand the Christology of the school of Antioch, we must start with its peculiar doctrine concerning the nature and constitution of man. Here the first thing that calls for consideration, is the view taken by the school of the Divine Image. Diodorus says: "The Divine Image cannot refer to the invisible essence of the soul; for both angels and

devils are invisible: it refers rather to the visible part of man —to those arrangements of his body which enable him to rule over nature. As the lord or king on earth, as the head of the visible creation, he bears the Divine image. Hence, in 1 Cor. xi. 3, Paul speaks of the man as bearing the image of God; but not so of the woman, as he must have done if the likeness to God ought to be referred to the soul." Theodore of Mopsuestia also denies the latter; but, in opposition to Diodorus, he remarks that spirits also, yea, even evil spirits, exercise power and dominion, without ever being designated Godlike. Man is the only creature in the whole universe to whom such a description applies,—an indication that he is exalted in a peculiar way above all other beings.

By a law inherent in them, all the elements of the earth, all animals, and all the luminaries of heaven, seek in man, whom they are meant to serve, their common centre. The like is said concerning spirits in Heb. i. 14. Man, therefore, though in one respect but a part of the universe, is at the same time the point in which the spiritual and visible worlds meet and unite. He occupies God's place in the world. He is, in short, the cosmical god. For, as all things visible and invisible have in the Creator their common centre of unity, so has He willed that all things on earth should combine and unite in, and thus administer to the well-being of, man, the witness of the Divine existence. But this cosmical god, man, also in turn renders a service to the world. For the world would be imperfect were its various distinctions and parts not conjoined so as to constitute a living unity. This conjunction is effected in man. It was the will of God that the world, with its antagonisms of mortal and immortal, rational and irrational, visible and invisible, should constitute one great whole; and He appointed man to be the living bond uniting all things together,—the certain pledge of universal friendship and harmony. For this reason, man, whom He created, combines in his body all the four elements, fire and water, air and earth, and is thus allied to the visible world; while, on the other hand, by his spirit he resembles the world of spirits. The world thus called for such a unity of antagonisms as is actually realized in the life of man. The whole creation, when it came forth from God's hands, divided itself into numberless antagonisms, which reached a climax in the

dualism between the kingdom of spirits and the visible material world. But creation was impelled to seek a consummation; and this it found in man, who reconciled in his own person that deepest antagonism between the world of spirit and the world of matter. Man is the highest creature—the one in whose nature and constitution the victory is gained over the onesided and antagonistic tendencies of things outside of him (Note 5).

What we have just advanced, might lead to the supposition that Theodore either regarded man as this God-man (God on earth) of which creation was in quest, or that he left no place at all for any such being as a God-man. We shall soon see, however, how matters stood in this respect.

One might, further, also suppose that Theodore, like the pseudo-Clementines and the Audianites, either conceived of God as possessing a distinct form, or that he at all events considered visibility to constitute an essential feature of the idea of God; for, in his view, man's claim to be the image of God is based on the circumstance that he is the unity of the visible and invisible. He may, however, have regarded man as a unity *constituted* out of the antagonisms of the world; God, on the contrary, as that *creative* unity which comprises not only those antagonisms, but even man himself. Besides, as man was already the visible God in relation to the world, the notion that God must of necessity become visible was too remote to have been entertained. What might have much more readily suggested itself was the question, Why, if the unity of the universe is actually realized and secured in God, need it be specially set forth in man? Some of the older teachers assigned to the Eternal Word the position which Theodore gives to man (for example, in Methodius "de Sym. et Anna," ed. Fabr. 409, the Eternal Son is termed the σύνδεσμος, ῥυθμὸς of the universe): they described Him as the chain running through the universe and binding all things together. Theodore invests the Logos with this office (see Phot., ed. Becker, Cod. 177, p. 123); and his name appears amongst those who defended the doctrine of the Church against Arianism. Why, then, does he seek for another bond and pledge of the unity of the world besides the Logos? Unquestionably because a unity of the world which consists in the creative causality of the Logos is external to the world itself, is not immanent in the world, and passed away

with the act of creation. This becomes still more plain when we remember that the world which the Logos originated was a *free* world. At this point the ethical character of his system is seen in all its significance and importance. Theodore's ethical tendency enabled him to perceive that a Christology was both possible and necessary, though he was unable so far to accord with the doctrine of the Church as to see in Christ a manifestation of God.

He believed that souls must be created free; and that, before being stirred by the irresistible might of love, they must be endowed with the knowledge of a law, obedience to which was a matter of free choice. It was necessary that man should be constituted capable of *learning* the nature of good, and of obedience; otherwise, the good in us might have been an irrational thing, and we should have had no certain knowledge of our own concerning that which is good and that which is evil.

It is, therefore, he held, a universal moral law that man cannot be perfect at the very beginning. The beginning and the end must be connected by a moral process, which embraces both knowledge and action, and constitutes a real history. This history having attained its goal, it is not necessary, according to Theodore, that there should always remain the possibility of a new fall, as Origen thought. A free soul, filled and animated by the irresistible might of love, cannot fall—it is no longer able to fall: and, so far from this being the destruction, it is the perfection, of freedom. But, in any case, it was impossible that the regal dignity which belonged to God on earth should be conferred on man the moment he went forth from the hand of God. In addition to this, there came the fall. In consequence thereof, the tie which bound spirit and body together in man was broken; the soul withdrew from the body; death then became a physical necessity,—nay more, the body became so independent that it assumed a position of hostility towards the soul. Instead of the original dissoluble unity and harmony being established by obedience, it was broken up by disobedience, and the world thus lost its bond and pledge of unity. The higher spiritual world, which once lovingly sympathized with man (Luke xv. 7), and presided over visible things for our advantage, was troubled, and became estranged from us; nay more, as the power of sin and death advanced

with ever greater strides, they first despaired of us, and then feelings hostile to us took possession of their hearts, because of the mischief that had been done; and, finally, they forsook us as aliens, because, instead of founding and maintaining the peace and concord of all antagonisms, we had stirred up discord and civil conflicts (Note 6).

By the fall of man, God lacked a creature, in beholding whom, the world presented itself to Him as an united harmonious whole. It is true, indeed, that, even apart from the fall, this harmony and unity were not at once realized in Adam: their actual realization in man must be a work of time. When Adam came forth from God's hand, creation was not yet complete: its completion waited on and presupposed the performance of a moral act by man. Adam's fall, and the subsequent increase of sin, lead not only to the world's remaining incomplete, but to its being involved in rebellion and conflict, and ceasing almost to deserve the name (κόσμος) which it bore. God, however, continued to be the guard of the primal idea of the world, and of the idea of man's likeness to Himself; and herein lies the ground of the Divine incarnation. Through Christ the world became once more a world (*i.e.*, a κόσμος); and all those became actually the sons of God who, according to the Scriptures, ought to have been gods and sons of the Highest, but apart from Christ were dying as men.

The account just given involves of necessity that Theodore's Christology must assume a form totally different from any that had preceded it. In the *first place*, a function of fundamental importance was assigned to the humanity of Christ: the mission of Christ was to be that true and real image of God, which Adam ought to have been, but failed to become. He is regarded as an indispensable part of the κόσμος; and of such an estimate there are only the faintest traces in such writers as Irenæus and Tertullian. In the *second place*, Theodore follows that ethical tendency which claims that Christ also, so far as He is under the necessity of being truly a man, shall undergo a moral development. Previous to Theodore, marked traces of this ethical tendency are scarcely discoverable in any writings save those of Lactantius and Origen. The former, however, did not view freedom as an essential element of the ethical, but contented himself with dogmatically affirming that Christ is

the manifestation, revelation of the living law,—that He sets the law palpably before us in His own Person. Origen, on the other hand, obscured his Christology by the docetical character of his doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, which he applied to Christ. Theodore has most affinity with Origen; differing from him, however, in the greater firmness of his hold on the empirical world, and in his opinion that the destinies of the super-sensual world also depended on the incarnation which took place on earth (Note 7).

The point which brings most clearly to light the peculiar character of the Christology of Diodorus of Tarsus and of Theodore, is their conception of freedom. The Christology of Apollinaris also starts from the same idea. He says, "If Christ had a human soul like ours, He must also have had freedom;" and therein is he at one with the school of Antioch. But, whereas Apollinaris goes on to say, "Because freedom of will involves mutability, therefore Christ cannot have had a human soul," the doctrine of the Church answered confidently, "He cannot have been destitute of a human soul." When, however, the Church came to treat of the question, "In what sense can Christ be said to have had a free human will?" its reply was very uncertain.[1] By some teachers, freedom of choice was not considered to form at all an essential part of human nature: they were of opinion, on the contrary, that we ought at once to ascribe to the God-man a freedom of the same kind as that which belongs to God. So Hilary (see Part I. 1059, Note, and 1070, Note), Athanasius (see Part I., pp. 973, 1071), Gregory Nazianzen (p. 1075, etc.). Men in general are liable to fall; for in them creation is not yet complete: in Christ, on the contrary, it is complete, and therefore He has by nature true freedom—freedom for good, to the complete exclusion of all possibility of the contrary. From such a point of view, freedom of choice appears, of course, rather as a defect than as a good. These teachers, however, contented themselves simply with that image of Christ as a whole which is the result of contemplating Him in the light of His exaltation, and of His significance for the history of the world; or, in other words, in the light of the Divine counsels. But others, who were by no means destitute of deeper insight into the true con-

[1] See above, I., 973, 987, 1059, specially 1071–1075.

ception of freedom, very decidedly teach (and whether in consequence of the influence of Origen, or during the struggle in which they were engaged with fatalistic systems, some of which had even a dualistic character, it is difficult to say) that freedom of choice is a good, when they discourse of man; but when they discourse of Christ, they convert freedom into the τρεπτὸν, that is, into mutability, passibility, and capability of development,—understanding thereby a passive capacity of devetopment: they never view it as the power of self-determination. Such was the position taken by Gregory of Nyssa. Against all such the school of Apollinaris continued justly to protest, and to assert that the Church had committed an act of injustice in excluding Apollinaris, its head, so long as his teaching was at one with that of the Church on the point which he considered most essential. His aim had been to show that the humanity of Christ had no self, in order to avoid the necessity of attributing to Him freedom of choice, which, in his opinion, endangered both the unity of the Person of the God-man, and the certainty of the fulfilment of His redemptive mission. But the teachers of the Church did exactly the same thing when they denied to Jesus freedom of choice, in the strict sense of the term. In the place of the human αὐτεξούσιον, in which Apollinaris considered the true essence of the human νοῦς, in its common acceptation, to lie, they set the overpowering, all-dominant might of the Logos. The postulate of a true human soul necessarily involved freedom of choice, and not merely mutability in the physical sense, or even a φύσις δεκτικὴ for antagonistic elements (I. 1071), which, being in Christ's case from the very commencement wholly occupied by the good, can only in abstracto be described as a susceptibility to evil, or as exposed to conflict. Were not this the case, Apollinaris might without difficulty have granted the existence of a human soul in the sense of a multiplicity of spiritual powers in one body, which are subjected to the sway of the Logos.

It was at this point that the school of Antioch, and above all Theodore, brought its influence to bear on the development of the doctrine of the Person of Christ. In agreement with Apollinaris, Theodore maintained that freedom of will, the power of self-determination, forms an essential part of a true human soul: in opposition to Apollinaris, and in agreement

with the Church, he claims for Christ a genuine human soul. When he taught that freedom was a necessary part of a true human soul, he touched a point which had hitherto been treated only very cautiously, and concerning which the Church had arrived at no definite judgment. It was his sincere conviction, in doing so, that he was but pursuing the path which the Church itself had rightly taken, and to which it had held when opposing Apollinaris. For how can the human soul or the human development be such in reality and truth, if the human nature be but an absolutely passive organ of the divine nature,—that is, merely a form in which the divine nature manifests itself? Nay more, what would become of the incarnation itself, if what we see in Christ were not a real man, but merely the appearance of a man, called into existence by a being foreign to man, that is, by the Logos, who gathered round Himself a congeries of human powers and attributes without a human centre of unity; and whose object was not to be really a man, but simply to have the semblance of a man, or to appear as God through the medium of an illusory man, as His organ? To Theodore, the conscientious and careful investigator of Scripture, the New Testament presented a totally different image of Christ. He appears there as in every respect a true man: to this, His growth, His temptations, and the sufferings He underwent, loudly bear witness.

Theodore did not fail to perceive that by such premises the problem of the Person of Christ was burdened with increased difficulties. The course to be pursued wears a much smoother aspect, if either the view taken by Apollinaris be adopted, or the inquiry, whether freedom also be an attribute of the humanity of Christ, be given up as impracticable, as it was by the Church previous to the time of Theodore. But when, for the reasons just assigned, he applied himself to the task of demonstrating the unity of the Person of Christ from the simple and unmutilated premises offered by the New Testament, he derived support from the higher conception of freedom with which he started, and which had probably dawned on him during his struggle with Arianism. Now this very conception of freedom was an object of abhorrence to the teachers of the Church, specially because they supposed it to involve that mutability which Arius had ascribed to the Son of God (I. 973). The

same detestation must necessarily also have attended the view upheld by Theodore, had he ascribed the τρεπτὸν absolutely (that is, both physically and ethically, and also as a state destined to endure) to the God-man, even in regard to His human nature. For, in such a case, the Christian mind must have lost entirely its conviction of the certainty of redemption, and revelation could never have assumed its complete and final form. To this, it was necessary that there should be a human nature, but not necessary that there should be eternal uncertainty and vacillation.

Theodore, however, could neither allow the existence of freedom where God alone was the Actor, nor regard freedom as mere mobility of the power of choice (as Origen did): power of choice he considered to be an essential element, but not the whole, of the true idea of freedom. He believed the full idea of freedom to involve, quite as necessarily, harmony with the determining Divine Spirit; nay more, true freedom, in his view, is the higher unity of liberty of choice and necessity: such freedom he finds realized in the unrestrainable energy of free love. But this true idea of human freedom does not allow of its being represented as a thing, ready-made and complete at once; it requires that a process be undergone, which shall effect the union, commingling, and mutual interpenetration of the apparently antagonistic principles of freedom and necessity. This process constitutes the moral character of freedom: it bears, on the contrary, a physical character when represented as complete from the very commencement, from the moment of its origination; and that whether it be liberty of choice, or the being determined by the Divine will. His aim is a union of the human and the divine in a moral, and not in a merely physical sense (γρώμῃ μὴ φύσει). Inasmuch, however, as he deemed it impossible for the human to attain to perfection without the aid of the divine, it was by no means inconsistent with his conception of freedom to hold that the divine exercised a determinant influence on the development from its very commencement, provided only that the true moral character of that development were preserved, by according to man a power of freely acting and deciding for himself. Room being left for this, the humanity of Christ ceases to have a merely Docetic existence; notwithstanding that the very freedom which discriminates it from, and, so to speak, constitutes

its independence of, the absolute God, is brought into play, for the purpose of realizing an indissoluble living unity with the Spirit of God—that unity, namely, which Theodore considered to be necessary to the perfection of true freedom.

Even before his time, we have found the school of Antioch insisting more strongly on the reality of the human soul of Christ than did the Church generally (Note 8). Its chief aim, however, in doing so, had been rather to assert in general that He underwent a process, a development; and that He was therefore mutable. Theodore, on the contrary, was guided by ethical principles in determining both the true idea of humanity and of its development, and the true idea of God.

In his work on the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ,[1] he asks, whether the indwelling of God (ἐνοίκησις) is to be conceived as an indwelling of His nature or of His energy (ἐνέργεια)? Before an answer can be given to this question, the true idea of the Divine omnipresence must be determined. Does God dwell in all men, or only in his saints? Inasmuch as His indwelling is the subject of a promise ("I will dwell in them, and walk in them," etc., 2 Cor. vi. 16), it cannot be a simple matter of course—it cannot denote that God is in all creatures alike, but must be something peculiar to saints. Does the distinction and specialty then consist in God's dwelling in the saints according to His nature and essence, and otherwise in other creatures? Such an answer would be derogatory to the honour of God: it would detract from the infinitude and omnipresence of His nature, which is bound by no limits of space, by shutting it out from all beings except holy men. If the indwelling of God be an indwelling of His nature or substance, it must be ascribed to all men alike,—nay, even to the irrational and inanimate part of creation,—which would be as perverse as to consider His nature to be circumscribed in consequence of His indwelling. But either to the first or the second of these conclusions we must be led, if the indwelling of God be an indwelling of His substance: there is, therefore, no alternative but to reject the idea of His indwelling being that of His nature. The case, however, is a perfectly similar one, if we understand by the indwelling of God His energizing in His creatures. Again, we are driven to choose between the two alter-

[1] A. Mai Coll. Nov. T. vi. 300-312, from Leontius.

natives: *either*, this energy is restricted to saints, and bounded by them; *or*, all things participate in this energy—all things being, in fact, subject to its sway. If we take the first alternative, we are met at once by the inquiry—What place would then be left for the Logos, whose office it is to exercise providence, to govern the world, and everywhere to work what is right? On the second alternative, we should necessarily reduce the Divine indwelling to something absolutely indeterminate and general. Consequently, neither according to His substance, nor according to His energy, is God able to effect what is termed an indwelling. How then shall we express and preserve its distinctive character? It is the good pleasure (*εὐδοκία*) God takes in His saints that causes His presence in them to be of a different character from His presence in other creatures. In other words, by the indwelling of God, Theodore means a moral union or alliance (Note 9). As to His illimited, omnipresent nature, God is in all beings alike: as to His complacence, He is far from some, and nigh unto others; He is far from sinners, but nigh unto those whose disposition constitutes them worthy of His nearness. By itself, His nature (*φύσις*) produces neither a greater nearness nor a greater remoteness; the nearness or remoteness of God is determined by the temper of mind of the being concerned (*σχέσει τῆς γνώμης*). Now, as the Divine *εὐδοκία* determines God's nearness or remoteness, so also is it the instrument of His perfect indwelling. No limitation does He allow His nature and activity (*φύσιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν*) to experience from those in whom He dwells: as to both, He continues omnipresent, though He is at the same time separated from the unworthy, on account of their character. We see thus, that Theodore distinguished between God's physical or metaphysical omnipresence, and His moral presence; at the same time, he considered the essential nature of God to lie not in the moral but in the physical. By means, however, of the distinction drawn between God's moral presence or being in man, and that being of His *φύσις* and *ἐνέργεια* which we designate omnipresence, he secured a place for a peculiar alliance of God with man. He remarks, moreover, that so far from the infinitude of God's nature being disparaged by the affirmation that, besides His omnipresence, there is another kind of presence, namely, an ethical one, which is

peculiar to those with whom He is well-pleased, on the contrary, His omnipresence in the general sense is not characterized by freedom, but is simply a natural necessity, unless we hold that, though omnipresent, yet by His complacency He is nigh to the worthy, and far from the unworthy. God would appear enslaved to the infinity and unboundedness of His own nature as to a fate, if the omnipresence of His nature involved the omnipresence of His complacency. For then He would no longer be present as to His disposition (*γνώμῃ*), that is, by a free moral volition, but would be subjected to necessity, and His disposition (*γνώμῃ*) would be the enthralled puppet of the infinitude of His nature.[1]

But, he then proceeds, as God is everywhere present with His nature and activity, but only "dwells in" a very small number,—as, for example, in the Apostles and in the righteous generally,—in whom He takes pleasure, and whose virtuous character is to Him a source of joy; so is His indwelling not in every case equal, for the same *εὐδοκία*, through which His indwelling is brought to pass at all, determines also its measure and mode. He does not dwell in other men as He dwelt in Christ; for in Christ God dwelt as in the Son. By His indwelling, the Logos united the entire man assumed by Him to Himself, and fitted Him to share all the honour which belonged by nature to the indwelling (eternal) Son. The result of this union was one person. Hence Christ's dominion, His judgment of the world at the last day, and so forth, are quite as truly acts of His human, as of His divine nature.

After such a view of the doctrine of the Person of Christ, it might appear as though the union with the Logos was realized in Jesus in consequence of, and by way of reward for, His virtue: a supposition which must necessarily lead to an essentially Cerin-

[1] P. 302: His infinitude *μειζόνως σώζεται, ὅταν φαίνηται μὴ ὡς ἀνάγκῃ τινὶ δουλεύων τῷ ἀπεριγράφῳ τῆς φύσεώς. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπαυταχοῦ παρὼν τῇ εὐδοκίᾳ, ἑτέρως πάλιν ἀνάγκῃ δουλεύων εὑρίσκετο, οὐκέτι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν παρουσίαν ποιούμενος, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὴν γνώμην ἑπομένην ἔχων.* L. c. p. 306, ix., he says: "What a change of place is to us, that God effects by means of His will." When we say, "It is my will to be yonder," we are compelled to change our place; but this is not necessary for God, who is everywhere present as to His nature. But still He is able to be present in a special manner in a place, through His mind or will. It is of interest to compare with this his discussion on the omnipresence of God, sec. 16.

thian, or even Ebionitic Christology. But in Theodore's estimation, εὐδοκία does not designate merely God's pleasure in virtue, as might possibly be concluded from Matthew iii. 17, but also the fulness, and the free manifestation, of His grace (see Col. i. 19, comp. ii. 9). Moreover, as we well know, Theodore's conception of human freedom was not that deistic one which necessarily requires it to have been separated from God, at all events in the beginning, in order to be really freedom: he held, that without prejudice to the reality and truth of freedom, it was possible for God to exercise a decided influence upon it from the very beginning; provided only (and this condition he regards as essential) the result be more than a mere physical process or illusory development.

Theodore consequently represents the Divine complacency, or the indwelling of the Logos, as enjoyed by Jesus from the very commencement, not arbitrarily, but wisely or with foresight. When this man was first formed, the Logos united Himself with him, foreseeing what he would become (κατὰ πρόγνωσιν ὁποῖός τις ἔσται). For a time, it is true, because it was requisite, He suffered the man, previously to his crucifixion, to exercise his virtue, for our benefit, according to his own purpose; but even then the Logos worked in him most of what he did, impelled him onwards, and strengthened him for the perfect fulfilment of his task. When Jesus arrived at the age at which, in the ordinary course of nature, human beings begin to discriminate between good and evil, yea, even previous to that time, the capacity and habit of discrimination developed themselves, under the influence of the Logos, with extraordinary rapidity; and in such matters Christ was remarkably in advance even of those who excel the generality of men. Indeed, He must necessarily have been superior to other men even in respect of the human, seeing that He was not originated like other men, but was formed by the Divine power of the Spirit. He was also stirred by a mighty impulse towards the good, for the sake of union (ἕνωσις) with the Logos—that is, with God—who honoured him by descending from above to unite Himself with him. As the consequence of these superior advantages, the moment Jesus distinguished good from evil, he felt abhorrence for the latter, and followed after the former with irrepressible love. Enjoying a co-operation of the Logos,

which accorded with his own purpose and disposition (*πρόθεσις, γνώμη*), he remained thenceforward free from the possibility of a change for the worse; and that as much because he himself was minded for good, as because his resolves were formed under the eye of the Logos. With the greatest ease, therefore, did he lead a life of the most finished virtue: both in his observation of the law previously to baptism, in his conduct during his state of grace (*τὴν ἐν χάριτι μετιὼν πολιτείαν*), and, lastly, subsequently to his resurrection and ascension, he stands as an example for us all. In the presence of the cross, indeed, we find him still hungering and thirsting, trembling, and on some points ignorant, although he adhered firmly to his resolve even in the midst of suffering. His life in the state of exaltation, however, exhibits the perfect realization of union with the Logos: there he acts no longer distinctly and separately from the Logos, who is God; but the Logos is completely and entirely in him (*παντελῶς, καθόλου*), and because of his *ἕνωσις* with, works all in, him.

Theodore thus preserves a specific distinction between Christ and the Apostles and Prophets,—a distinction grounded not merely in His sinlessness, but in His supernatural generation by the Spirit of God, and, finally, in His union with the Logos. For the two latter reasons was Christ the realization of the original idea of humanity, and is the true Godlike man. He was the fulfilment of all that had been previously declared concerning man's likeness to God, and concerning the significance of that likeness in relation to the universe. In Christ, the world, humanity, became the alter Deus, the cosmical God, the son of God, and that in unity with the Eternal Son. We see thus that Theodore did not, like most of the teachers of the Church, content himself with simply affirming Christ's humanity to be of one substance with our common humanity: he regarded Christ's humanity, on the contrary, as distinguished not merely through the indwelling of the Logos, but in itself (Coll. N. vi. 307; xiv. 203, ii.). And yet he at the same time so carefully insisted on the necessary laws of human development, that he could undertake to incorporate into his Christology all those passages of the life of Jesus which allude to His development. It must not, however, be supposed that even for a single moment he regards Christ by Himself as a mere man born of

the Holy Ghost, and the union with the Logos as having been first initiated at a subsequent period. He believed, rather, that at the very moment when the man Jesus was formed, God the Logos began to unite Himself with him, in accordance with the Divine foreknowledge of His virtue (Note 10).

The completeness of his conception of the humanity of Christ may be seen from a series of individual traits which he has preserved for us. Mary gave birth to Jesus, not to the Logos; for the Logos was, and continued to be, omnipresent, although from the very commencement He dwelt in a peculiar way in Jesus. The Logos did not originate with and in Jesus. Mary, therefore, was properly the mother of Christ, not of God. Only in a figure, per anaphoram, can she be styled the mother of God—namely, on the ground that God was in Christ in a special manner (l. c. 309, xxviii.). Strictly speaking, she bore a man, with whom the Logos had already, it is true, begun to unite Himself; but the union was at first so far from complete, that Jesus could not then have been termed Son of God or Redeemer. He was called Jesus—a name which Joshua also had borne. Not till after His baptism was He designated Son of God by the voice of the Father; just as Simon and Saul received, at a later period, the names Peter and Paul. He grew in years, wisdom, and favour with God and men, and was, as a man, though eminent and peerless, subject to the law until His baptism,—to which fact may perhaps be referred the words, "He was justified in the Spirit." John saw Him come to him for baptism as a man; and the words, "I have need to be baptized of Thee, and comest Thou to me?" do not prove that the Baptist did not look upon Him as a man. John knew, of course, that he himself was far surpassed by Jesus in energy of spirit and of virtue; and by a vision it was afterwards made known to him, that on this man had been conferred the honour of Divine Sonship, and that He was therefore distinguished by the title, Son of God. But even subsequent to baptism He was a man, and had a human will and a human understanding of His own; which, however, constantly united themselves with the will and thought of the Logos. Through ever fresh temptations was this union to be confirmed and displayed. In the wilderness He overcame the temptations of *ἡδονὴ*, *δόξα*, and of the *ἀγαθὰ τοῦ κόσμου* (l. c. 308, xxiii.–xxv.). But He was ex-

posed far more to spiritual than bodily assaults (xxix.); especially in Gethsemane had He to sustain so severe a struggle, that an angel was sent from heaven to strengthen Him. These things clearly show that He was a man (p. 306, x.). By nature this man was neither Son of God nor Lord (comp. Mar. Merc. ed. Baluz. p. 347). He underwent death also,—that tribute which, according to the law of nature, every man is forced to pay (Merc. 344). In short, He wore the appearance and spoke the language of a man, and was held to be nothing but a mere man by all who saw Him (Facund. Herm. defens. trium Capitul. ed. Sirmond, p. 73). Subsequently, however, the Apostles, enlightened by the Holy Ghost, saw that the Eternal Son of God was in Him. Never, as Apollinaris taught, did a commingling (κρᾶσις) of the divine and human take place in Him: both natures remained ever distinct from each other. On this point Theodore was completely at one with Diodorus of Tarsus.[1]

It cannot be denied that Theodore was stirred quite as much by a regard to the interests of religion as to the requirements of exegesis, when he insisted so strongly on the humanity of Christ. If it were God's purpose to make changeable human nature unchangeable, it was necessary that He should assume human nature in its state of mutability. So also had taught both Irenæus and Athanasius. But Theodore deemed it necessary to the accomplishment of the work of salvation, that Christ's free will should sustain a conflict with evil. For, unless a true, and not simply a perfect, man, were its principle and ground, salvation would be an arbitrary thing, a thing effected by a species of magic; and if this man had not been compelled to pass through grave and genuine conflicts, His human life and struggles would be for us a mere spectacle (θέατρον), devoid of all reality. When, then, the humanity of Christ is either curtailed or denied, as is the case when His personality is regarded

[1] Mar. Merc. 349; Jesus grew, etc., etc., which cannot be said of the Logos, who neither has need of anything, nor grows. "Non enim ei mox formato vel edito omnem propriam sapientiam Deitas contulit, sed hanc particulatim corpori (?) tribuebat." Therefore also is He "a Prophet from amidst His brethren," in Deut. xviii. The Word of God is not our brother. If we refuse to discriminate divine and human, says he, in opposition to Apollinaris, we might also maintain that He who was of David's seed was not of David's seed, but existed eternally.

as solely and exclusively divine, the work of redemption which God appointed Him to accomplish is deprived of truth, and reduced to a vain show.

Theodore's opponents, however, objected that he had by no means shown that an actual union had been effected in Christ, or even that an incarnation of the Logos had come to pass. To these objections he replied (vi. viii. xxx. cll. xxxiii.), and at the same time endeavoured, by means of his reply, to make clear and intelligible the mode in which the union was realized.

A commingling of the two natures would have been repugnant to both. There is a difference between the divine form and the servant's form; between the temple chosen, and Him who dwelleth therein; between Him who underwent the dissolution of death, and the One who raised Him from the dead; between Him who was made perfect by suffering, and the One by whom He was perfected; between Him who was made a little lower than the angels, and the One by whom He was humbled; between Him who was crowned with glory and honour, and the One by whom He was thus crowned. This distinction must be preserved: each nature remained indissolubly what it was in its own essence (ἀδιαλύτως ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς). But it is quite as evident that a union (ἕνωσις) was congruous to both. For, being thus brought together, the two natures (φύσεις) constituted, as far as respects the union, one person (πρόσωπον). Hence, as the Lord said of man and wife that they were no longer two, but one flesh, so, in conformity to the union, can we say that there are no longer two persons, but one,—preserving intact, however, the distinction of the natures. As, in the former case, the oneness of the flesh, so far as we can speak of such a oneness, is not destroyed by the duality, so, in the latter case, the unity of the person is not dissolved by the distinction of the natures. Looking at the natures in their distinction from one another, we characterize that (φύσις) of God the Logos as complete; in like manner, also, His divine personality: for a self-existent being cannot be said to be impersonal (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπρόσωπόν ἐστιν ὑπόστασιν εἰπεῖν): but we characterize the human nature and person also as perfect and complete. When, however, we direct our attention to the conjunction (συνάφεια), we say, There is one person (vi.). We affirm, it is true, most decidedly that the Logos has taken to

Himself a man; but we hold it to be an absurdity that He *became man*. When John says (see chap. i. 14), "The Logos became flesh"—that is, man—the expression is not to be too strictly interpreted; otherwise it would imply that the Logos changed Himself into flesh, which the Evangelist did not intend to teach. John spoke, therefore, according to the appearance of the thing. That the Logos took to Himself a man, was not a mere show and seeming; but it was only in appearance that He *became* man (viii.). Moreover, it was not the Son of God who was born of Mary, but simply a man in whom God was.

This very significantly indicates Theodore's peculiar position. He strove, in the first place, to conceive the two natures as personal, in order to conceive them as complete; and was therefore, in the second place, indisposed to bring them into so near relationship to each other, that the one should constitute a mere modification of the essence, and form part of the being, of the other. On the contrary, in the third place, he recognised no union where there are not two actual persons. Essentialiter, they continued to be two persons; actualiter, they had the appearance of one person. They constituted one person, in such a manner that the thought and volition of the man Jesus were, in point of *contents*, the thought and volition of the Logos; and that, at all events, in the state of exaltation, all the thought and volition of the Logos appertained to the man. He maintained, however, that the *form* in which the mind of Jesus actually expressed itself, was determined by the Logos; though, in consonance with his theory of freedom, he represented this determination as a mere influence of the Logos. Theodore never really arrived at the conception of volitions and thoughts which were at once divine and human (divine-human); for he supposed the two natures (represented by him, at the same time, also as persons), as to their inmost essence, to continue separate and distinct,—and that, not merely previous to the assumption of humanity by the Logos, or during Christ's development, but eternally. Strictly speaking, the two persons were one only in outward appearance, as the image of marriage shows. Inwardly, they were still two persons, though harmoniously related; and so closely connected, that everything done was done at the impulse of the Logos in Christ. This view is confirmed when we, by way of conclusion, glance back at his idea of man's like-

ness to God. He held it to have been fully realized in Christ, and believed that thus the great *thought of the world* reached its eternal goal. Principially, Christ was the realization of the idea of the world. This does not involve, Theodore maintains, that the world was restored and led back into the divine life or essence, when, by the incarnation of the divine, the human became divine. But the Man *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, that crown of the world and principle of its unity, took up in the world the position of God. Spirit and nature found in Him their centre of unity, and became again one, as they were when they proceeded forth from God, their primal source. These two principles had separated and become discordant; but in Christ, within and from the world itself, though at the same time through the action of God, they are restored to unity. Thus, as the perfect man and the image of God, Christ is the cosmical God: to Him, therefore, pertain all authority and honour as God, after that He became the Son of God for the good of the world, and for the sake of its unity and harmony. It is evident that here there was presented to Theodore a point of connection for what we have termed the Mystical Christology,—of course, in a peculiar form, and with the reservation, that in Christ neither God became man, nor man God. So far from allowing this, he maintained that God (whom he viewed as a Trinity) and the world, the divine and the human, remain eternally apart, eternally separated by their essential nature; which, whilst permitting the two to be connected with, and to exert an influence upon, each other, does not allow of a union in which the human is counted to belong to God, and the divine, therefore, to have become human. Nor does he concede even to love the power of bridging over this chasm, notwithstanding the strong stress he lays on the ethical. The reason thereof is, that he did not consider the ethical to constitute the very essence of God—to be that on which His nature is dependent; but held the nature of God (omnipresence, and so forth) to be an independent power in Him, and only so far subject to the divine will, that it cannot prevent God, notwithstanding His omnipresence, taking up His abode at certain points of the living world in a peculiar way, and even dwelling in an unique and unexampled manner in Him who is the centre of the world, and through whom, henceforth, God is connected with the

world.[1] Substantially, this is a species of Arian view of the Person of Christ,—with the difference, that the place of the præ-mundane central creature is (and, if one may so say, more after modern fashion) occupied by the Son of God, who becomes man. The doctrine of the Trinity, which may unquestionably be said to have taken its rise in the efforts to understand the nature and Person of Christ, becomes, notwithstanding its loftiness, an abstract and unproductive thing as soon as we deny that the Logos became man; and although Theodore clung very firmly to the Trinity, his system afforded no sufficient foundation for it. The Son is constantly represented as retaining His hypostasis for Himself; and one cannot see why the activity, and even the unique indwelling in Christ, attributed to Him, should not be referred to God's general presence. On the contrary, almost the sole aim of the Trinitarian conception of God seems to be, to set forth God as self-contained, self-sufficient, and to assert His unapproachable and absolute transcendence.

There remained still another aspect of these considerations to be applied to the work of Christ. One would have supposed that, as Theodore laid such stress on the freedom of man, he would devote equal attention to man's consciousness of personal responsibility and guilt. But this was not the case. His attention was directed almost exclusively to the other result of sin, namely, punishment,—summed up in death and mortality. In this point he exactly resembles the other Greek Fathers of the fourth and fifth century. Failing to pay special regard to the fact of human guilt, the work of Christ appeared to him to consist not so much in the atonement, as in the overcoming of death, or in the bestowal of immortality by His kingly power. Still, in fairness, it must not be forgotten that the older theories of the atonement took, in general, little notice of guilt, and that they chiefly occupied themselves with death. They began with that which was most external, and thence penetrated more deeply towards the centre and root of the matter. Some, in fact, employed the term θάνατος, as it is not unfrequently used in the New Testament, to designate the state of misery involved in, and constituted by, sin. Theodore's system, however, contains no trace of this spiritual meaning of death. According

[1] Compare the passage xxvi.

to it, the term no longer denotes the mischief in its totality, both internal and external, but merely its outward aspect; and the mode which he took to show that outward death itself contained a principle of spiritual corruption, was not altogether free from artificiality. On the other hand, with reference to sin itself, Theodore taught, as distinctly as other orthodox Fathers of the Greek Church, that the Spirit sent by Christ exercises an influence on the free human will; nay, he took more pains than the others to show freedom to be a reality, and not a mere illusion, whilst he at the same time represented the work of redemption as a work of sanctification. In his view, freedom was not the mere capability of being turned, now in one direction, and then in another, but the faculty of self-determination; and yet he showed, on ethico-religious principles, that there is a point at which the free will cries out for the help of grace. In this respect he occupied a higher position than the first Fathers of the Greek Church—than such as Origen, Athanasius, and the Cappadocian bishops; whilst, on the other hand, he differed decidedly, to his advantage, from Pelagius.[1] In common with the former, however, he was quite unable to give a reason why the gift of the Holy Spirit was dependent on the manifestation of Christ: in other words, though he did not consider sanctification, or deliverance from sin, to be merely the work of man, yet he was unable to bring this grace into more than a merely outward connection with the work of Christ.

Theodore of Mopsuestia was the crown and climax of the school of Antioch. The compass of his learning, his acuteness, and, as we must suppose also, the force of his personal character, conjoined with his labours through many years as a teacher both of churches and of young and talented disciples, and as a prolific writer, gained for him the title of Magister Orientis.[2] He laboured on uninterruptedly till his death in the year 427; and was regarded with an appreciation the more widely extended, as he was the first Oriental theologian of his time. What specially commended and extended the influence of his teachings, was the aversion of the Church to Apollinarism, of which Theodore proved himself a very warm opponent, without allow-

[1] Compare the Programme by Dr Dorner, p. 19 ff.

[2] See the Programme by Dr Dorner, pp. 3–5.

ing the Arian elements which partly coloured his theological system to detract from the deity of the Son. We shall not, however, be mistaken if we trace the opposition raised by the Church to Apollinarism to causes somewhat different from those which influenced Theodore. His aim was not so much to assert the thorough reality of the incarnation of God,—for in this respect his method of procedure was defective,—but mainly to distinguish clearly, and to emphasize duly, the reality and freedom of the human aspect of Christ's Person. No wonder, therefore, that attention was soon directed to this characteristic of his teachings, and that fears of Ebionitic elements should begin to be cherished. The antagonism which, at this period, divided the Western Church, was fought out in the East in connection with Christology (Note 11).

CHAPTER II.

CYRILL OF ALEXANDRIA IN CONFLICT WITH NESTORIUS.

After the disappearance from the scene of those distinguished Fathers of the Greek Church, Athanasius, the two Gregories, Basilius the Great, Didymus and others, who in general held Origen in thankful remembrance, a reaction set in against that teacher, due especially, as is well known, to Epiphanius and Jerome, and in Alexandria to Theophilus. Through the influence of Theophilus, the monks of Origen's school were worsted by the uneducated anthropomorphite monks who had settled round Mount Nitra. And in proportion as the Origenistic element, which continued for a time to work in the Church of Alexandria, died out, in that proportion also vanished that noble spirit of inner catholicity and of magnanimous tolerance, by which Athanasius was still distinguished, and that sobriety in religion and judiciousness in theological science which had once prevailed. In their place came a harsh and passionate polemical spirit, an orthodoxy ambitious of power, and gloating over the condemnation of the dissentients. And so, at the end of the fourth, and during the course of the fifth century, Alex-

andria presented a very different appearance from that which it bore during the fourth century.

It would be a false pragmatism, however, to trace the differences which now broke out between the school of Antioch and that of Alexandria solely to the intolerant spirit to which reference has just been made. To it was due only the manner in which the struggle was conducted between Epiphanius and Theophilus on the one side, and Chrysostom (who refused his consent to the condemnation of Origen on the other), Cyrill of Alexandria, and Nestorius. The differences themselves, with which alone we are for the present concerned, had deeper roots.

Widely extended, and for a time almost irresistible, as was the influence of the school of Antioch in Asia and Constantinople, especially after the elevation of Chrysostom, the Roman Church, and Africa in particular, did not at all sympathize with it. One part of Africa, it is true, decided by Augustine, took very little part in the conflict against the school of Antioch; but nevertheless both parties in the West—that, namely of Pelagius, and that of Augustine—were distinctly conscious of their affinity with the respective Christological views which stood in antagonism to each other in the East. On the one hand, Augustine joined issue with the monk Leporius, whose doctrine had a Nestorian cast; and on the other hand, the mission of the Pelagian Cassian to Theodore of Mopsuestia shows that the two schools expected to make common cause with each other. The relationship between the Pelagian and the Antiocheian type of doctrine was by no means a recommendation of either of them, in that part of the West which was under the influence of Augustine. The eastern part of Northern Africa, on the contrary, manifested a strong inclination to mysticism, which came to a focus in the monachism of Egypt. Two opposed tendencies may be distinguished in this monachism,—the one to speculation and free thought; the other, which lacked culture, to a stormy emotionalism: both, however, were opposed to the Antiocheian spirit, by their bias to either speculative or practical mysticism;—especially the latter, which grew ever stronger, and was on terms of friendship with that old mystic tendency which we found existing in Syria alongside of the school of Antioch (p. 25 ff.). Decided additional evidence of the lively intercourse carried on between the Mystics of Syria and those

of Egypt, has recently been furnished by Cureton's discoveries regarding the Epistles of Ignatius. To the influence of the Syrian monks, among other causes, may be attributed the circumstance, that the Nitræan monks—as, indeed, generally those of the Scetic desert—gradually fell more and more into a churchly mysticism. At first, under Theophilus and Cyrill, they were Anthropomorphites (Audius the Syrian was their precursor in this path), and were assailed by the bishops; soon, however, they gained great influence, and whilst supporting, to a certain extent also controlled, the Episcopacy.

This state of matters throws light on the Nestorian controversies. Subsequently to the period treated of in Section V., the Church of Alexandria was mainly under the influence of a mysticism which was antagonistic alike to Origen and the school of Antioch, and which had adherents and defenders in Syria. Although intercourse was kept up with Athanasius in Alexandria, and a partial opposition was raised to the Anthropomorphites, and the connection with the synodal tradition from the year 325 to 381 was maintained with special zeal, these Councils being described as inspired by the Holy Ghost, yet the supposition that Apollinarism, though condemned by the Church, underwent a partial revival in Alexandria, was one that might be deemed not merely convenient, but also probable, by the adherents of the school of Antioch in general, and Theodoret in particular. That mystical spirit with which the school of Antioch had carried on in Syria a long and severe struggle, manifested itself afresh in Egypt; and, as we learn especially from the example of Theodoret, the hatred cherished towards its native opponents was very soon transferred to the Alexandrians, who were held to be advocates and agents of Apollinarism.

Nestorius, who in point of doctrine was a disciple of Theodore, having been raised to the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 428, endeavoured to make dominant in the Church the tendency represented by the school of Antioch, especially the Antiocheian Christology, which, with perfect good faith, he might have regarded as the view sanctioned by the Church when it rejected the doctrine of Apollinaris. That such was his aim must be acknowledged, whatever else that is estimable may be said respecting him. By way of accomplishing his

purpose, he sought to set aside the name of "Mother of God" given to Mary, which had already become naturalized, and found a support in the monkish worship of the Virgin then in vogue. This, however, brought him into a fatal conflict, which soon enough, alas! became the conflict of the Patriarchates. His doctrine, so far as it can be gathered from the Transactions of the Councils (Mansi. T. iv. 1198 ff., v. 753 ff. 762), and from his own discourses preserved in Marius Mercator, differs from the Christology of Theodore, only in its containing fewer speculative elements, and in its evincing less anxiety (perhaps on polemical grounds) to preserve the unity of the Person of Christ, than was displayed by his teacher. The point on which he concentrated all his efforts, was to guard completely against the heathenish elements, which, in his view, were endeavouring to force their way into the doctrine of the Person of Christ. In the first instance, therefore, he gave in his adhesion to all those propositions laid down by Theodore, which were held to distinguish between the Godhead of the Logos and humanity, His garment or instrument. Hence his opposition to the term *θεοτόκος*. To say that God had been born, would lead back, he thought, to the mythologies of heathenism, and would constitute Mary a goddess, and a mother of gods. The utmost that can be said is, that Christ having been peculiarly allied to the Logos from the very beginning, was, therefore, even as a man termed *Θεός*,—namely, in the wider sense of *ἰσοτιμία, ἀξία*. Only in this sense can Mary be designated *θεοτόκος*; but never in the sense of her having given birth to the Deity, to the very Divine essence (*θεότητα*). It is impossible for a creature to bear the uncreated, for the later to bear the elder. Inasmuch now, as one party styles her merely the mother of a man, and the other the mother of God, the best expression—that which would reconcile both extremes—is *χριστοτόκος*. But the same grounds which forbid us ascribing birth to the Logos, forbid us also, he urges, to say of Him that He suffered, died, and was buried; seeing that to predicate these things of Christ would be to give again to heathenish elements a home in the midst of the Church (Mar. Merc. Serm. I. II.). His humanity was the *θεοδόχος μορφὴ*, with which the Logos was inseparably, though invisibly united. Both, therefore, are to be regarded with the same reverence (*ἰσοτιμία*): *τὴν φορουμένην τῷ φοροῦντι συντι-*

μῶμεν φύσει—two natures, but one honour. As to nature, we acknowledge two Christs; as to worship, we have but one (that is, the Christian consciousness subjectively recognises but one Christ). But the objective basis of this oneness of reverence is taken away, as soon as we deny that Christ was really and truly one person. Now, as Nestorius made no distinction between natures and person, he ought, in strict consequence, to have concluded from the existence of two natures, the existence of two persons. Subsequent witnesses, however, inform us that he, or at all events his school, sought to escape from the difficulty by means similar to those adopted by the later Monotheletes,—namely, by representing the two natures as converging in a unity of will. But neither he nor his school expressed themselves very distinctly on the matter. He remained satisfied with Theodore's εὐδοκία: he never arrived at an incarnation of God, but only at a relationship (σχέσις) between two natures which continue separate,—a relationship which he termed a mysterious conjunction (συνάφεια).

That the Patriarch Cyrill of Alexandria was not primarily moved by envy or ambition of power to oppose the school of Antioch, is clear from the general character of his fundamental views, which are marked by unity and consequence; and quite as decidedly necessitated making God the starting-point in an inquiry, as the views of the school of Antioch necessitated beginning with man. It is clear also, from the circumstance, that Cyrill composed his treatise on the Incarnation of the Only-begotten One as an appendix to his work on the Trinity (Dialog. 8) under Atticus,—that is, not only before the struggle with Nestorius commenced, but even before Nestorius was elevated to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. We are warranted in assigning the treatise to this date, not only by Cyrill's own testimony,[1] but by its entire tone, which may be very advantageously compared with his later polemical writings (such, for example, as that most passionate Dialog. 9, "Quod unus sit Christus"). Nestorius's attack on the expression, "Mother of God," was but the external occasion of the outbreak of an antagonism both older and deeper.

To designate this antagonism in as general terms as possible, so far as it affects Christology, we may say that, whereas the

[1] Epist. ad Nestor. 2 Opp. Cyr. Al. T. v. 2, p. 21. Ed. Aubert, 1638.

school of Antioch, by way of preventing an Apollinarian identification of the divine and the human in the νοῦς of Christ, distinguished between the two aspects as two natures, the school of Alexandria started with laying emphasis on the unity (ἕνωσις φυσική), and then proceeded to consider what could be said concerning the duality. Both held that the divine nature, the Logos, had a substantial existence, an hypostasis; but whilst the Alexandrians attached the humanity of Christ, including the soul and its powers, to the divine hypostasis as little more than a receptive passive material, the Antiocheians, for the reasons previously mentioned, strove to prove that the human factor also had a relative independence, but showed themselves not infrequently inclined to the use of expressions which attributed to the human aspect an independent hypostasis or personality. Cyrill did not by any means return to that old indefinite mode of speech, in the employment of which the faith of the Church had been guided by an instinctive perception of the unity of the Person of Christ in its totality. Nor will the effort to bring him into complete accordance with later standards of orthodoxy succeed, unless, like the Council of Chalcedon, we determine what his doctrine was, from fragments of his works, in which he expresses himself cautiously or hesitatingly, or seeks to bring about a compromise. The strong terms in which he speaks of the one nature of Christ, and insists on the unity of His φύσις, might indeed be ascribed to a difficulty experienced in finding terms accurately expressive of the distinction between the ideas or words, "Person" and "Nature," and which occasioned his speaking of the one φύσις of the Incarnate, when he meant to speak of the one person. But this explanation is by no means sufficient. In his use of the word ὑπόστασις he inclines, it is true, at one time to the meaning, "substance" or φύσις, and at another time to that of Person—πρόσωπον: this, however, was not accidental, but in the interest of his fundamental views. Where it was his interest to do so, he drew a very sharp and decided distinction between person (πρόσωπον) and φύσις; and he never took the human φύσις in the sense of πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις, as he did the divine φύσις. He proved himself competent enough to show how, if the two natures are separated from each other, as two persons, no such thing as an incarnation has taken place. But

he sought to convict Nestorianism of holding a duality of persons, because it distinguished two natures even after the incarnation; and of not being able to reduce this duality to a unity deserving of the name.[1] When endeavouring to express himself accurately, he designates the unity which resulted from the union of the two natures, not so willingly by the term which at a subsequent period became dominant, "one person"—ἓν πρόσωπον, but rather by the term "one essence," "one indissoluble substance or existence" (μία φύσις). Not as though he confounded φύσις and πρόσωπον, or treated them as synonymous terms, but because it is characteristic of him to treat the unity of natures in Christ as a substantial physical unity; and further, especially because, instead of conceding to the human aspect of the Person of Christ an existence of its own, he regarded it as a mere congeries of real attributes appropriated by the Logos to Himself, and thus incorporated with His substance or φύσις. Christ is simply God, that is, God with us (Immanuel), God physically united with a part of the world; and, so far as it is included in the one Person of Christ, humanity is a mere attribute or predicate of God.

Considering the matter, however, in connection with the development of the Church and its dogma, much may be said in favour of Cyrill; and we find that his fault was principally that of too tenaciously clinging to the vagueness of expression and thought which prevailed at an earlier period, without its defectiveness being felt,—treating it as though it were perfect and satisfactory, and setting himself in opposition to those who demanded that the unity should be more accurately defined, and the *rationale* thereof be more distinctly exhibited. The consequence thereof to himself was, that that earlier indefiniteness, which rather called for, than excluded, greater clearness, settled down into an obstinate and decided partiality, and that his opposition to Nestorianism, however justifiable in one respect, fell far short of effecting the recognition of the element of truth which it certainly asserted.

[1] Ep. ad Acac. p. 116: Prior to the incarnation there were two φύσεις, one πρόσωπον, not two. Ep. 4, Cyrilli ad Nestor. p. 23 f.: In the incarnation there was not an ἕνωσις τῶν προσώπων, but an ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν. The result, according to Ep. ad Monachos Aeg. p. 9, is, ἑνότης φυσικὴ; according to Ep. ad Acac. p. 115, μία φύσις.

Let us first direct our attention to Cyrill's polemic against the Christology of Nestorius, and then to the view entertained by himself. He was above all opposed to the Nestorian "conjunction" (*συνάφεια*). He considered that it left the Son of God, and man, separate from, and outside of, each other, only combining them mechanically, so that *ἕτερος* was *ἐν ἑτέρῳ*.[1] In the system of Nestorius, says he, there is no trace whatever of such an union as is required: he resolves the saying, "The Logos became flesh," into a mere juxtaposition of two beings, God and man. He represents the human aspect as in possession of such a degree of independence, and the two natures as continuing so foreign to each other, that we ought logically to assume the existence of two *ἰδικαὶ ὑποστάσεις* or *πρόσωπα* (p. 725 l. c.); that the Son of God must be regarded as little more than a mere guest of this man's (*πρόξενος, παρακομιστής*); and that there only remained certain relations and connections between the two (*σχετικὴ συνάφεια*, p. 730). If the Son of God did not make humanity really His own, he argues, then His relations thereto cannot have been other than merely external; and Christ the man was a Son merely by participation and adjudication (*μεθεκτικῶς καὶ εἰσκεκριμένως*). A thing, however, which is merely bestowed as a gift, or awarded, and does not naturally flow from the very inward nature of the being, may be afterwards lost: that which is conferred from without (*τὸ θύραθεν πορισθὲν*) may be again taken away. The Nestorians affirm, indeed, that "they do not teach the existence of two Sons;" but the reason thereof is, that they term the Logos alone, a "Son by nature:" they also deny teaching that there are "two Christs;" but the explanation of this is, that they only designate the man, "Christ (anointed) by nature." They retain, notwithstanding, two centres. When they term Christ "Son," it is not *φύσει*, but only *θέσει* (*υἱὸς θετὸς*): that is, He is nothing more than an adopted Son, who is held to partake of the Divine dignity and the Divine powers. But what sort of a son would he be? To worship a man, who stands in mere *συνάφεια* with God, is manifest idolatry: it would be equivalent to setting up a new God, ejecting the Logos from His position of supremacy, and compelling Him to give way to the man Christ, that *ἕτερος*, were we to allow the adoptive son actually to share in the

[1] "De Incarn. Unig." 705.

worship due to the only-begotten Son. There would then be no real difference between Christ's nature and the sonship which becomes ours. The Nestorians try, it is true, to avoid the difficulty, by resorting to the use of the figure of *ἀναφορὰ*. They say, namely, that even as a man Christ may be worshipped, if the worship be referred in thought to God, or to the Logos united with Christ. But this would be no worship of Christ. Nor can the mere *συνάφεια* ever justify the worshipping of humanity. Even marriage is more than *σινάφεια*; for Paul says, "He that is wedded to the Lord is one Spirit" (1 Cor. vi. 17). And yet believers are not worshipped. The Nestorians wish to do away with the old recognised term *ἕνωσις*, although it by no means implies a confusion, but only a *συνδρομὴ* of the divine and human. For we do not employ the term "unity" to designate merely that which is simple, or *μονοειδὲς*; but also that which is compounded of two, or even three elements. But the terms *συνάφεια* and *συνδεσμὸς*, which the Nestorians retain, do not involve any closer relationship than that between master and pupil or assistant. Cyrill then proceeds to adduce arguments drawn from the work of Christ. The Nestorians, he urges, cannot fairly speak of a humiliation: according to their teachings, the Logos continued as, and what, He was; to the man, on the contrary, ever more and more was given. The Son, therefore, instead of being a deliverer, was Himself ever more fully delivered from imperfection (p. 745). Save us He could not, merely as a man united with God, nor as a man like God (*εἰδοποιηθεὶς Θεὸς*, p. 730): He could only save us as God, becoming like us who are surrounded by danger (p. 744), and thus enabled to reach us (p. 753). A God somewhat resembling God, would be *Θεὸς ψευδώνυμος, υἱὸς εἰσποίητος, νόθος ὑποβολιμαῖος*. Inasmuch as, according to Nestorius, the Logos received nothing, and did not even undergo humiliation, the sufferings of Christ were merely those of a man, and therefore did not possess infinite value (p. 760 ff.). Further, how could Christ be called our Head on the ground of His being God-man, and communicate to us the divine life, if the Logos did not really become man? In short, the entire system of Nestorius was the fruit of mental incapacity to fathom and grasp the depth of the Divine mystery (p. 744). Cyrill used most bitterness, however, when referring to the nullification of

the fundamental idea of the incarnation, to which he supposed the teachings of his opponent to lead. He asks (p. 750), "How do those men account for the circumstance of the Word of God being called man?" They answer, For the same reason that Jesus was called a Nazarene, because He dwelt in Nazareth. They regard Christ, therefore, as an ἀνθρωποπολίτης, as belonging to a man (ἀνθρωπαῖος), but not as a man in Himself. But Christ could not be styled man merely because He inhabited a man, any more than He could have been called Nazareth because He dwelt in that city. The Father and the Son dwell also in other men, but are not, on that ground, termed man. And when Nestorius teaches that Christ differed from believers and prophets in that He was full of the Holy Spirit from His very birth, He posits merely a quantitative, not a qualitative distinction. Only when the Logos became really man, did the principle of universality, the central divine principle, become actually a part of the world (p. 700).[1]

From the character of his controversy with Nestorius, we see at once the point in which Cyrill was especially interested. He maintains that in Christ God is present with men, and has actually become part of the world; and that, as He allows human nature to share in all that is His, so He participates in all that is ours. A favourite expression of his is, "Christ is Immanuel, God with us." He was led to take this course mainly by a warm interest in religion: he was anxious that the marvellous love of God, manifested in the incarnation, should not suffer the least diminution of its glory, but that it should be comprehended in its entire depth. Undeniable is it that he had a far clearer perception of the greatness and importance of the problem in its religious aspect, than the Antiocheians, nay, even than Apollinaris himself. He regarded Christ, above all, as a gift of God to humanity, not merely as the example or type of a man who is like God: in his view, Christ was not merely endowed with the power of communicating an immortal life in the future, by way of reward for His virtue, but was by nature filled with Divine powers of salvation. His ability to save did not arise from the Logos as such, but from that real participation in

[1] Other passages touching on this mystical aspect are, "de Inc. Unig." 690, 692, 693, 698, 700, 704; Dial. ix. 723, 744, 761, 764; "Ep. ad. Mon. Aeg." p. 18.

the Divine power of the Logos, to which humanity attained through Him. The main object was not simply to make the invisible Logos visible, and to exhibit Him to man. That would have been mere teaching, and the mere semblance of an incarnation (de Incarn. Unig. 690 ff., 702, 705–707). Rather was the Logos under the necessity of becoming actually man—of entering into complete and vital fellowship with human nature, inasmuch as His mission was, to bestow both immortality on the body, and righteousness on the soul. He effected both by becoming our brother according to the flesh, and by communicating to our nature, primarily in His own Person, quickening and sanctifying powers: thus also did He secure in His humanity, an organ through which He was able to act upon the whole of mankind, as upon that which was essentially like Himself. In order, however, to his being able to bestow on His own humanity, and through His own humanity on ours, a share in His divine nature, it was before all things necessary that He should participate in our nature—not in a glorified and perfected humanity, but in humanity as it is, with the exception of sin. Nor was it possible for Him to appropriate humanity to Himself, without in turn communicating Himself to humanity: one is the condition of the other. Only when both are realized together, do we gain a real view of that loving will of the Logos which is mighty to save, and which enters into true and complete fellowship with us, in order to lead us to fellowship with God. Cyrill regarded the incarnation as the interpenetration, the mutual permeation of the two things above referred to—of the appropriation of our nature (*οἰκείωσις*, *ἰδιοποίησις*, l. c. 704, 707, 712, T. v. 2), and the communication of His (*κοινοποιεῖν*, p. 711). In the one Person of Christ, both things were effected: the Son of God appropriated the human to Himself, and communicated Himself to man. That which is written concerning Christ in the New Testament does not apply to the one nature or to the other, by itself; but to His entire Person in its unity, For when the one Son of God became incarnate, He desired to call everything His—both human and divine—weariness, hunger, learning, praying (l. c. 758). All that is said concerning Christ's human nature,—as, for example, that He was born, suffered, rose from the dead, was exalted,—must be referred to His divine nature; and that especially, because the Son of God alone was the

subject in which the attributes of the Person of Christ inhered. What we ought to say, therefore, is this: He who, in the first instance, was born of God, was, in the second instance, born of the seed of David (p. 696); and of one and the same being we predicate alike eternal existence and death (p. 727 conf. 726), yea, even the anointing with the Holy Ghost. Could the Son of God not be said to have been born, had Mary not given birth to Him, the Incarnate One, but only to a man, there would have been in fact no real incarnation. But if we are forbidden to deny that the Son of God was born, we are equally forbidden to deny that He suffered, or to represent His Godhead as a stranger to suffering (p. 775 ff.).[1]

On the other hand, however, the Logos constituted His humanity a partaker of Divine glory: divinity became the actual possession of human nature (Dial. 8, l. c. 706, 707; Dial. 9, p. 749). Miracles, for example, were worked not by the Father, or by the Logos, alone, but by the incarnate Son of God. He animated the humanity which He had appropriated and made one aspect of Himself, with Divine, vitalizing power. His humanity is now the organ through which He communicates His Spirit: He is our Life, not merely as God, or by means of the Holy Spirit, but by giving us for food His own exalted humanity (ἐδεστὴν παρατίθησι τὴν ἀναληφθεῖσαν φύσιν, p. 707).

What we have just advanced brings to view mainly the religious roots of his Christology: it exhibits to us, also, as the general image resulting from his Christological inquiries, the actual living manifestation in Jesus of the loving will of the Logos, who seeks by participation and communication to establish the closest and most complete interchange between Himself and the human race. In this participation and communication, the Logos is conceived by him as from the commencement the only active agent. In Cyrill's system, no significance at-

[1] Only with regard to the words, "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" was he willing to allow that they did not directly refer to the incarnate Son of God (p. 755). Nor were even the Nestorians disposed to attribute them to despondency, or the alienation of God; the words were therefore held to have a deep mystical significance. Christ cried out thus in our stead, as the second Adam. As one of ourselves, He uttered the words for the whole of human nature.

taches to the man Jesus as such, either as an end in Himself, or as a mundane good, as was the case in that of Theodore of Mopsuestia: but the human nature is simply the instrument employed by the Logos for the manifestation of His love; and it became capable of discharging this function, in consequence of His appropriation of its weaknesses, and of His communication of His Divine powers.

But, however right it may be to consider the incarnation as the unity of Divine participation and communication, it is not enough merely to postulate the combination and mutual interpenetration of these two activities;—we must show how the two constitute a real Christology, especially as it is by no means self-evident that they can be thus conjoined. For if the deity of the Logos communicates its own attributes, nay more, its very self, to the human nature of Christ, Christ's humanity would seem to be thus raised above all imperfection and every possibility of suffering; consequently, it is mere pretence to represent the Son as appropriating these characteristics of humanity. On the other hand, if the Logos did really assume these *πάθη*, so that the finite imperfections, which form part of human nature as it actually is, became really His attributes, how was it possible that He, being thus emptied of His Divine power, should communicate it to humanity? That personal relation of love, into which the Logos seeks to enter with us, demands, it is true, both participation and communication, yet the one seems to be incompatible with the other; and that both should be effected in conjunction, seems a sheer impossibility.

Now, how far did Cyrill aid in the solution of this antinomy? He felt deeply the difficulty of the problem; but, rather than follow the example of Nestorius, and do away with it, he preferred falling back on the assertion that it is an absolute mystery and miracle.[1] Such is his procedure in innumerable passages. This was not, however, all that he did; for he put forth honest and diligent efforts to arrive at a solution.

In endeavouring to show clearly and intelligibly how it was possible for the Son of God to appropriate to Himself human passibility and finiteness, the thought would readily suggest itself, that the Logos emptied Himself of His glory; and, having thus resigned the divinity, whose possession was incom-

[1] Homil. xvii., p. 227.

patible with human finiteness, was able to appear in the form of a servant. We have already repeatedly met with this idea; and Cyrill gave it his careful attention, but it failed to gain his approval.[1] He discusses two forms of the thought:—I. According to some, the Son left all His divine attributes (or His divine nature) behind Him in heaven, and did not bring them to the earth; His divine Personality, on the contrary, was on earth as Immanuel, and not in heaven. On this view, the only bond between the Logos and humanity would be the hypostasis of the former without the divine nature: His personality alone, and not His divine essence, would be united with man.[2] Cyrill was unable to adopt this theory, because he attached quite as great importance to the communication of the divine nature, as to its participation in humanity. He raised also the objection, that hypostasis and nature cannot thus be separated from each other,—that the divine nature of the Son could not be so limited as to be unable to be on earth at the same time that it was in heaven. He disapproved, also, of representing the Logos as mutable, in so far as He could pass hypostatically out of the sphere of the divine, into that of the mundane, without at the same time continuing in the former. II. The other form of the doctrine of the self-abasement of the Logos, represented not only His hypostasis or person, but also His divine essence, as passing out of the divine world of infinitude, which was unfitted for the accomplishment of an incarnation, into the world of finitude, and the κένωσις as extending both to person and nature: the divine nature was thus circumscribed, and made appropriable (οἰστὴ) by human nature.[3] Cyrill, reasoning that if the Deity of the Son were curtailed, as it was represented to be, at all events, for a time, He was reduced to the position of a subordinate cosmical being, characterized the conception as heathenish, and as akin to Arianism, which also spoke of a divine element existing apart from God.

[1] Adv. Anthropomorphitas, L. i. c. 18.

[2] L. c. The Anthropomorphites say: Ὡς ὁ μονογενὴς τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱὸς κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς θεότητος καὶ οὐσίας συνῆν τῷ πατρὶ, ἡνίκα ἐπὶ γῆς ἐχρημάτισε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συναναστρέφετο, ὡς ὁμοούσιος ὢν αὐτῷ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως λόγον οὐκ ἔτι. Κεκένωτο γὰρ πᾶσα, ὡς αὐτοί φασι καὶ οἰστικὴ ὑπόστασις ἔκ τε τῶν οὐρανῶν καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν πατρικῶν κόλπων.

[3] L. c. c. 19.

Since, then, Cyrill refused to base the possibility of the appropriation of human nature by the Son of God on the conversion or transformation of the Son Himself into a finite nature; since, further, it is quite as impossible to show that Cyrill, like Apollinaris, supposed humanity or finiteness to be an eternal attribute or determination of the Logos Himself; how could he maintain that the Logos had constituted humanity a determination of His own being?

Special difficulties arose in Cyrill's way from the prevailing conception of God, to the ethical element of which had not been secured due preponderance over the physical, even in the system of a man like Theodore, who attached such great importance to the ethical. In order to escape from the charge made by the school of Antioch, of representing God, after the manner of the heathen, as physical and passible,—a charge founded on his appropriation of the human to God by means of the Logos,—Cyrill declared most emphatically that he conceived the divine and human as separated from each other by an infinite gulf; and the expressions which he employs in doing so, are scarcely a whit less strong than those of the Antiocheians. He speaks of an ἄνισος, ἀνόμοιος, ἑτέρα φύσις of God and man (T. v. 2, p. 688). Nay more, he says God is essentially immutable—incapable of change, incapable of suffering (T. v. 2, 683, 743, 744; Dialog. de Trin. T. vi. 625). It is as impossible for the divine nature to resign its stability and immutability, as it is for human nature to leap or be transformed into the divine. God, as to His essence, is uncircumscribed, without shape or form, without substance or quantity, and therefore essentially different from us. Omnipresence belongs to His nature; and God can no more be circumscribed by humanity, than humanity can possess omnipresence. The two natures being thus defined, man and God would seem to be necessarily exclusive of each other; and a real appropriation of humanity by the Son, or real participation of humanity in the Deity, would seem to be an impossibility. If God is by nature, and essentially, incapable of suffering, how can He take upon Himself human sufferings? If He is unchangeable, how can He become flesh? If God is essentially unlimited, how can He so subject Himself to the limitations of the humanity of Christ, as in Him to be really with us? In fine, if He be in essence altogether different from

man, how is an appropriation of the human possible to Him, or a participation in the divine possible to us? Or is Nestorius right when he writes to Cyrill—"Cyrill deserves praise for distinguishing the two natures, and confessing that the Godhead cannot undergo suffering. He thus follows in the steps of the Council of Nicæa, which acknowledged an incarnation, but did not allow that God suffered, or that the Son of God was born of Mary. At the same time, however, all else that he says is inconsistent therewith, unless his words have some hidden wise meaning; and whether that be the case or no, must be left to him to declare. At one time, he says that God cannot suffer or be born; afterwards he declares that He did suffer and was born, as though every attribute essentially belonging to the Son of God were suddenly destroyed by His assumption of flesh. Cyrill therefore is an innovator, and carries the idea of appropriation too far."

But Cyrill did not at all allow himself to be thus imposed upon. He answered,—As far as our power of comprehension is concerned, the divine and human natures cannot be made to constitute a physical or natural unity (*ἀσύμβατα εἰς ἕνωσιν φυσικήν*). Notwithstanding, both were united, and that most intimately (*ἄφραστος συμπλοκὴ, σύνοδος, συνδρομὴ, ἡ ἀνωτάτω ἕνωσις*). (Note 12.) The result was not, it is true, that the natures became one and the same: the natures, in point of number, were not one, but two; and yet they were so united, that though we distinguish between the two, they are no longer specifically different (*ἰδικὴν ἑτερότητα*). We can no longer say that each stands by itself separate, but the thought of the one necessarily gives rise to the thought of the other (T. v. 2, p. 731 ff.). To attempt now to conceive of the one apart from the other, would be as perverse as for any one to represent the human body as a man in and by itself, or to say that a mother had brought forth a body, instead of, that she had brought forth a man. The one Son, who was *φύσει* God, should also be conceived as a man (Ep. ad Monach. p. 15). It is not, indeed, proper to designate Christ, a man who became God, but only, a God who has become man (T. v. 2, Homil. xvii. p. 231 f.). When John says, "The Word became flesh," he refers, as indeed is the case with all that takes place in God, not to His essence and an alteration in it, but to His action, to His operations (Thesaur.

Assert. xii.). The Logos underwent neither augmentation nor diminution through the incarnation: He remained impassive even in the midst of the sufferings to which through the flesh He was susceptible; He remained omniscient, despite the ignorance to which His humanity was subject; He remained also omnipresent apart from the flesh of Christ, and yet as to His entirety had become man.

From this it would seem as though Cyrill considered the inmost nature of the Logos to have remained entirely unaffected by the incarnation; humanity to have been a mere external "ascititium" of the Logos; and the union, after all, to have been no deeper than the superficial and inefficient one referred to when we say, that in Christ there was the divine nature, impassive, omniscient, and so forth, and alongside of it a human nature, subject to suffering, limited, and so forth. But Nestorius also granted that there was no ground for assuming the divine personality and nature to have been united with the human personality and nature. In order to understand him aright, however, we must remember that he supposes the Logos to have been the real subject in the Person of Christ: He who from eternity was an hypostasis or person, and whose nature remained unchanged, assumed humanity in such a way that all attributes, the human as well as the divine, could be predicated of Him, and Him alone. For this reason, these attributes must not be ascribed to the human nature in Christ as to something specifically different from and external to the Logos; but the Logos made them His own, in addition to those which originally belonged to Him. But when a specific human nature was spoken of as the vehicle and bearer of these human attributes subsequently to the incarnation, Cyrill considered the miracle of the incarnation to be either depreciated or altogether denied. He eschewed the notion of the human nature having any personal centre of its own: to him, it was merely the periphery of the divine centre, which was its sole real point of unity. It had, therefore, no independent substance: the divine substance had taken the place of the human; and the human nature continued to subsist merely in the form of a congeries of accidents, held together solely by the Logos as their centre. The human nature of Christ never had an independent centre of unity; and, therefore, there was no need for its being absorbed: from the very

commencement the human nature was brought into existence and constituted by the Logos alone. Strictly speaking, therefore, Cyrill's system taught no such thing as a transformation or transubstantiation of the human into the divine substance: it might, however, allow of an *In*substantiation as well as an *En*-hypostatization of human nature in the Logos. The incarnation having taken place, flesh became a determination or attribute of the Logos Himself as the sole personal subject; it became one of His qualities, apart from which no conception may be formed of Him—it is now physically, naturally His (Dial. 9, p. 770). The Logos and humanity constitute, accordingly, one nature (*μία φύσις*): an *ἕνωσις φυσικὴ* is thus established; and without the loss of His original and peculiar attributes, He has appropriated also human attributes, which, inasmuch as He is their personal subject or centre, cannot but be regarded by Him as His own.

Now, although what has been advanced shows very clearly that Cyrill discriminated himself cardinally from the school of Antioch, by laying stress on the unity of the person, and even of the nature, of Christ, and by his assertion of the *οἰκείωσις* of human attributes by the Logos, nothing was done in the way of answer to the question, "How was it possible for the Logos to appropriate to Himself human attributes in addition to His own infinite divine attributes?" And having failed to show how these opposite attributes could be united in one and the same person, the apparently inevitable dissolution of the unity of the person could not be prevented, by conjoining them in paradoxical propositions.

Cyrill did try to render some service in this direction; but, as we have said, without making himself master of the ethical conception of God.

In the judgment of Cyrill, the *will* of the Logos was the ultimate ground of His ability to assume human nature, its capacity of suffering, and so forth. Now, although this will is considered by him rather from the point of view of mere power than from that of almighty love, still the notion of an ability of the Logos to determine His own nature is involved therein. By the action of this will, the divine nature was made endurable by the human (*οἰστὴ*, Homil. p. 230, l. c. 736, 737) (*a*). The

(*a*) See Note B, Appendix II.

position thus taken implies that the Logos, at all events in His actuality, subjected Himself to limitations, in order that He might be able to assume human nature as human nature in the true sense, and as exposed to suffering. He did not, however, advance far enough to see that the unchangeableness and the inmost essence of the Logos are love, which remains unaltered, even though it express itself in acts of self-abasement. On the contrary, he dissociates the participation in finitude and the communication of the Godhead, each of which is incompatible with the other so soon as both are represented as being fully realized at one and the same time; supposes that at the beginning the divine participated in the human, but that the human did not at the same time participate completely in the divine; and in this way leaves room for a human development. This leads us to the second moment of Cyrill's view of the incarnation; namely, the communication of the Deity to the humanity of Christ. Cyrill will not, indeed, have us say that the humanity of Christ grew and increased (Hom. xvii. 230). That would be ascribing to it too great independence. And yet he does not by any means wish to detract from its reality and truth by the communication of the Divine attributes.[1] The Logos, he conceives, appropriated human nature in the form which it naturally takes at the various stages, and in the various circumstances, of its life. Cyrill repeatedly denies that the Son of God effected any transmutation of the human into the divine, or any identification of the two. The human nature, although nothing in comparison with the divine, was not dissipated by the latter; but the divine made the human nature immediately its own (*ἀμέσως ἰδία*, Dial. 9, p. 776), as that human nature existed in, and was given by, the Virgin; the Logos appropriated it to Himself, with its measures, laws, and relations (Hom. xvii. p. 227). To this connection belongs the expression quoted above, "The divine nature made itself endurable by human nature" (l. c. 736, *v.* Hom. xvii. 230); which does not signify that human nature was endowed or anointed with the power to receive the divine, but refers to that act of the Logos by which He, as it were, extinguished or dimmed His rays, and did not allow His Divine essence to have free course. Although

[1] The human nature *οὐ δαπανᾶται, ὑποκλέπτεται* by the divine: l. c. 736, 737.

the Logos participated in human weakness in order to raise it to His own strength, yet He communicated Himself to human nature only within the limits which must have been recognised by Him as binding when He resolved on an incarnation. This he expresses as follows:—When the Logos assumed human nature, He allowed the laws thereof to exercise a certain power over Himself.[1] From this point he ought to have been led logically to the doctrine of a gradually fuller informing of the divine nature in the human—to the recognition of the dependence of the communication of the Divine attributes on the laws of a true human (moral) development, as well as of the dependence of the entire divine nature in its actuality, on the ethical will of the Logos. In that case, the incarnation could not have been considered to have been at once completely realized by a mere act of will on the part of the Logos, but must have been represented as dependent on the continuous volition of the Son of God. Here again, however, Cyrill was unable to escape from the circle of physical ideas within which he moved. He does, indeed, represent the union of the Logos with the congeries of human attributes as originating in His *εὐδοκία*, in His love; but he also represents the volitional process as being brought at once to a termination in a *naturation* (Naturirung), in a physical result,—that is, in the *ἕνωσις φυσικὴ*, which, in his view, was by no means merely an *ἕνωσις τῶν φύσεων*, but a union which had become actually, veritably, the nature or essence. In this way alone did he consider the indissolubleness of the unio to be made certain.[2]

Had Cyrill regarded the incarnation under the aspect of an actual and continuous process, it would have been possible for him to concede not only the initiatory imperfection of the human, and of its appropriation by the Logos, but also that the divine was communicated to, and united itself with humanity, in ever increasing measure. Plainly, however, the humanity of Christ could not then have been conceived as

[1] *Ἡφίει τοῖς μέτροις τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ κρατεῖν.* Dial. 9, p. 760.

[2] L. c. p. 738:—Whatever is not based on physical laws (*φυσικοῖς ἐρήρεισται νόμοις*), leaves room for fear that it may again be lost. P. 705:—The Logos was not put into man as from without; He was not *ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἔξωθεν ἐγκεχριμένος*, but *φύσει προσών* (Dial. 9, pp. 745, 770).

impersonal or selfless, as a mere attribute of the incarnate Logos without immanent laws of development of its own, and without freedom. For the realization of the object towards which his efforts were directed, Cyrill needed exactly that element of truth which was maintained by Nestorius, but overlooked by himself. He fancied that the incarnation was the more worthily estimated the more exclusively it was regarded as the sole act of God; forgetting that the Logos would have served no end by His act of incarnation if He had not posited an actual man, the true man, who, whilst man, is at the same time God, and not a mere ὄργανον of God, whatever ingenuity and similarity to man might characterize its system of powers or susceptibilities.[1] Cyrill's experience thus teaches us very forcibly, that, whatever may be its fervour and depth, the religious view of the Person of Christ must fail to arrive at definite results, as long as it undervalues the ethical, the volitional, aspect, in comparison with the φύσις. To this lack may be traced Cyrill's continued vacillation, and the antagonistic opinions expressed by him,—antagonisms which he hoped, but in vain, to bridge over by means of analogies drawn from the natural world. For example, he says, in reference to the formula (which, be it observed, is not to be understood docetically) ἀπαθῶς ἔπαθεν, "As fire may be incorporated with a substance—for example, with iron—and yet, when the iron is struck, the fire does not suffer, so also the Godhead did not suffer."[2] If this comparison proved anything, it proved that the divine and human might interpenetrate each other without having everything in common. It is, therefore, quite as much a Nestorian comparison as anything else; for, as to the main point,—that is, the attribution of suffering also to the Son of God, to a common centre of consciousness, and without detriment to the Divine dignity and unchangeableness of the Logos,—it is decidedly defective. Such an attribution is only possible when the ethical—that is, love—is conceived to constitute the essence and the glory of

[1] He avails himself most readily of words of the neuter gender for the designation of the natures, specially of the human nature; for example, πράγματα. Compare Ep. ad Monach. p. 9; De incarn. Unig. 700, 708, 713.

[2] L. c. 776.

the Logos, which remains unalterably the same, not only notwithstanding, but even through, His participation in human nature. The same remark may be made respecting his attempt to reconcile the abiding omnipresence of the Logos with His extraordinary and exceptional presence in Christ. He makes use of the comparison of light, which, on the one hand, is accumulated in the luminous body of the sun, and yet, on the other hand, diffuses its rays throughout infinitude.[1] But, however striking may be the conception of Christ, as the central organ of the light and the life of the world, subsequently advanced, he fails to show how it rhymes with what he elsewhere teaches regarding the essential and necessary omnipresence of the divine nature. In order to show that God might be present in Christ in an exceptional manner, notwithstanding His omnipresence, he ought to have advanced beyond that physical omnipresence which is a natural necessity, to the ethical aspect of God's essence, which cannot be subject to the natural necessity of being everywhere present alike, but which has power over the natural aspect of the Divine Being. To his mind, the Antiocheian formula, "It was God's good pleasure that the fulness of the Deity should dwell in Christ bodily," did not exclude the possibility of a severation of the Logos from humanity, and represented the whole too exclusively as resting on a mere act of will, and not as firmly rooted and grounded in the very being (Sein): the course was therefore open to him to treat the ethical in the light of a substance, as constituting the true and innermost nature of God. Had he taken this course, he might have assumed, after the manner of Apollinaris, the existence in the very nature of God of an eternal tendency to incarnation. But nothing whatever justified him in his simple exclusion of the type of doctrine adopted by the school of Antioch; and he himself experienced the evil results of his conduct in this respect.

Cyrill justly rejects an unio which aims merely at a kind of interpenetrative consociation of two natures which are inwardly external, the one to the other (*mechanical unio*); or which merely comprehends the two under one name and title; or which consists in the mere relatedness of two natures which continue separate and distinct (σχέσις, ἕνωσις σχετική). He

[1] Adv. Anthropomorph. L. I. c. 18.

nevertheless does manifold injustice to Nestorius, not only by undervaluing the ethical element, but also by attributing to him views which he had no intention of holding; as, for example, Arianism, the theory of two Sons, and a denial of the incarnation. If an unsatisfactory solution be the denial of a problem, Cyrill was in the same position as Nestorius, although in an opposite direction. Not an ethical, but primarily a physical, Christology, was the result of his inquiries; for, according to his representations, the incarnation was, strictly speaking, accomplished as soon as the Logos had appropriated the human, and made it an actual modification of Himself, so soon as the human became physically insubstantiated with the divine. From that time onwards, the human aspect pursued no longer even a relatively independent course, although the Logos during His mundane existence was mindful of, and regulated His self-representation according to, human laws. On his view, therefore, Christ was simply God with the appearance of a man, but not a real man: and, consequently, He did not arrive at a real incarnation of God. Several of the images employed by him (for example, those of fire and iron, wine and water), show undoubtedly that he aspired beyond the mechanical, to the dynamical, view of the union of the divine and human in Christ. But his images still bear a *chemical* character: he was still far from the moral dynamical, and took a view of the process of redemption which savoured not a little of the physical. In this respect, the school of Antioch represented an element of truth which Cyrill lacked. Its representation was unquestionably an imperfect one, for it had no clear knowledge of the metaphysical, ontological character of the ethical, of love; and therefore the Antiocheian Christology seemed to Cyrill to be built in the air, to be destitute of the "physical (φύσις) basis."

Scientifically regarded, therefore, both tendencies are substantially the same. Both were an advance on Docetism and the older doctrine of the Logos, inasmuch as they treated the appearance of Christ not merely as a means of teaching and revealing truths, but as a new reality. More closely considered, Cyrill's strength lay in the religious view he took of Christology, as the redemptive act of God, which brought not merely a system of doctrines, but an actual reality. His view of this reality, however, lacked the necessary ethical character. God

incarnate was held to have overcome the foes of man by His might; a representation which leads further to an unethical conception of sin. Evil is set forth more in the light of a curse, or of a foreign deadly power which holds sway over man, than as personal guilt. On this subjective moral aspect, the school of Antioch laid stress: it rightly perceived that in ethical matters nothing can be decided by mere power. Hence also did it disapprove of any theory of deliverance which savoured of the magical; holding that man himself must personally co-operate in his redemption. Apart from the future, it was especially as an example, as a moral prototype, that the school of Antioch considered Christ to be its Redeemer. Starting with this distinction, we may say that Cyrill was 'content rather with the view of the gift of God in its entirety, with the unity of the Person of Christ; whereas the school of Antioch fixed the unity whilst it was in progress towards completion, stamped with permanence the very process by which the unity was effected.

Taking a survey of this state of matters, it is impossible not to confess that these antagonisms were destined to be mutually complementary, that neither of them without the other could realize the object at which it aimed. The one found in Christ, it is true, a marvellous work of God, but failed to discern that ethical character from which it derived its true value; the other found, it is true, an ethical reality, but under such a form that religious contemplation was unable to dwell upon it as upon a veritable act of God, and a true unity. It is greatly to be regretted, therefore, that foreign and alien influences should have introduced perturbations into the course of the Church's development, and hindered the interpenetration and union of elements which belonged to and complemented each other; above all, that impatience should have driven Synods on to precipitate conclusions—Synods which were swayed more by subjective and political considerations than by the true spirit of the Church, and which resulted rather in hollow treaties and concessions, than in mutual understanding.[1]

[1] As the following narrative of the history of the dogma is composed under the conviction that the Council of Chalcedon had neither an internal nor an external vocation to form a positive decision, which was in reality premature and unsatisfactory, this will be the proper place for justifying

In the first instance, Cyrill, leagued with Cœlestine of Rome, retained the upper hand of the Patriarch of Constantinople, at the Council of Ephesus, in the year 431. The chief reason thereof, apart from the intrigues of Cyrill, the weakness of the Emperor, and other considerations well known in ecclesiastical history, was, that Cyrill's view undoubtedly more carefully preserved the marvellous act of God, and the mystery of the incarnation, and that it was more fitted to enkindle a warm interest in the mass of the people and the monks, who attached no importance to clear conceptions, than the representation of Nestorius, which, whilst more modest, was also less capable of affecting the religious feelings. But, notwithstanding the great power and authority exerted by Cyrill, the Council of Ephesus consented neither to draw up a confession of faith of its own, nor to endorse Cyrill's anathemas. Even after Cyrill's victory over the person of Nestorius, the Eastern Church was so far from coinciding in his doctrine of one nature after the incarnation, that he found himself compelled, either for the sake of keeping peace with the Emperor, or because, for the time, nothing more could be attained, to subscribe the so-called Oriental Confession of Faith, which John of Antioch, in the name of the Eastern Church, presented to the Emperor at Ephesus. This confession contained the milder form of doctrine which, whether for the sake of peace, or from want of dogmatical acuteness, had been accepted by the mass of Oriental bishops (Note 13).

In the course of these later negotiations between Antioch and Alexandria, the terminology—"two natures, but one person" (*ὑπόστασις*)—was already being adopted. This expression, however, was adequate only to the position assumed by the later and more moderate adherents of the school of Antioch. Cyrill, on the contrary, as is clear from the Epistle to Acacius, employed these terms in an unusual sense. He took them, namely, to imply, that even subsequent to the incarnation, one may speak in abstracto (*ἐπινοίᾳ*) of two natures, and may employ double *φωνὰς*, although in reality there was only *μία φύσις*, to wit, that of the incarnate Son. The formula of concord, therefore, instead of removing, merely concealed, the antago-

that conviction by details of the manner in which the decrees of Chalcedon were arrived at.

nism, which was destined soon enough to break out again. Each party regarded itself as the victor: *Cyrill*, because Nestorius had been condemned, and because he himself had not accepted the Oriental Confession without persisting, for his own part, in his anathemas: the *Orientals*, because Cyrill appeared to have conceded the two natures, and the application to them of the declarations of the New Testament; that is, he appeared to have granted that the two natures still existed after the incarnation. But Cyrill was as far from conceding the latter as the Orientals were from conceding the μία φύσις, when they joined Cyrill in condemning Nestorius. The term θεοτόκος they allowed to pass; not, however, as signifying that the Person of the Logos had been born of Mary, but merely, that on account of the connection or relation into which the Logos entered with humanity, that which, strictly speaking, concerned the latter alone, because predicable also of the former, so far as He constituted the personal element in Christ. The moderate Antiocheians, of whom Theodoret was the type, were undoubtedly distinguished from the older followers of that school, in that they more decidedly ceased to count the personality as belonging to the natures as such; and by not only objecting to a double personality, but even inclining to regard the personality of the Logos predominantly as the personal centre of Christ. How they could, notwithstanding, so persistently keep aloof from Cyrill, and assume a double series of spiritual actions, both subsequently to the incarnation, and without a human subject, is another question, which will again come under consideration at a later opportunity.

The Nestorians, repelled and persecuted by the Council of Ephesus and the party of Cyrill, formed at the eastern confines of the Empire, in Edessa, Nisibis, and Seleucia, a kind of missionary Church for the interior of Asia, extending their labours especially from Chaldæa and Assyria towards Persia. At their head were teachers of note, such as Ibas, Maris, and Barsumas, who were the means of propagating a zealous study of the Scripture. Under Persian protection, they obtained an ecclesiastical organization of their own, and continued divided from the great body of the Church, under a patriarch (Catholicos), as a special schismatical Church party. This was the first party which the Church showed itself incapable of overcoming—an

incapability arising from its neglecting either to appropriate, or to evolve from itself the element of truth of which the party was the representative. For the same reason, at a later period, fresh attempts were repeatedly made, in the very bosom of the Church, to bring about a recognition of the fundamental thought of Nestorianism, which was, that Christ possessed a true human nature with a true personal self (Note 14).

In the West, the Gallic monk Leporius gave in his adherence to Nestorius, but was persuaded by Augustine to retract. He then accepted merely an incarnation of the person, but not of the nature, of the Logos: of the latter he conceived the Logos emptied Himself in order to become man. Neither Augustine nor Ambrose (de Incarn.) developed any productiveness worthy of mention in connection with the present dogma. The former effected the introduction of the formula, "Two natures in one person," into the West before the time of Leo (Note 15). Augustine was less successful than with Leporius in his contest with Julian of Erlanum, who also directed his attention to Christology. The discussion started with anthropology, and revolved around the question, How are we to conceive of the impeccability of Christ? Augustine maintained that there could have been no concupiscentia in Christ, for that were sin. It was not enough that Christ fulfilled the command, "*Walk* not after the lusts of thine own heart;" He also fulfilled that other, "Thou shalt not lust." From these evil lusts He was freed by being born of a virgin. Julian objected, that this was confounding the ethical with the physical. If it was not actually possible for Christ to lust, He owed His virtue to a natural inability to feel as we feel. In this case the power, nay more, even the reality of His example, would have disappeared; for they are grounded on the fact, that although born of the Virgin and united with the Son of God, He was exposed to temptations as we are, yet without sin, that is, without consenting to the temptations. Augustine says, urged Julian, that if lusts ever arose in Him, He was ipso facto a sinner, even though He might not suffer them to pass into action: but herein he does but confound the ethical with the physical. For, to assert that Christ could have been a sinner without consenting to evil, would be to assume the existence of an evil substance or nature, and to regard moral worth as independent of the free will. We

are bound, therefore, to say, that the rising of lust within us is not itself sin, but merely the possibility of sin. But Augustine (so proceeds Julian), after the manner of Apollinaris, denies the existence of a free will in Christ, without which virtue is inconceivable, and furbishes Apollinarism, which the Church has rejected, with the Manichæan principle that there exists not only a moral but also a natural evil, and that, out of regard to His impeccability, we must assume the presence of a natural good in Christ. To say this, however, would be equivalent to saying that Christ did not take *our* nature (Note 16).

At first (de Nupt.) Augustine's views on the subject of concupiscentia were not quite fixed. His uncertainty was greatly due to the opinion, already prevailing, that chastity was a virtue of a higher order. The fact of Jerome's going almost as far, in his contest with Jovinian, as to throw the blame of sin on generation as such, because it is connected with lust, contributed also thereto. When considering the matter more closely, however, he distinguishes (Op. imp. L. v.) between the "motus" of the "natura sana," and those of the "natura vitiata." From the latter alone does he affirm that Christ is free; but, be it remarked, by *nature* free. When Julian urges, that in such a case Christ could neither be said to have virtue nor to be our example, he forgets that even God is an example to men. Christ bore a perfect resemblance to our nature, but not to its faults; otherwise He could not have healed them. Some, indeed, suppose that that is no virtue which does not stand where there is a possibility of sin; but this is equivalent to saying, that the more virtue one desires to exhibit the more libido must one feel (c. Jul. v. 15; Op. imp. iv. § 49). It is therefore false in Julian to impute to him (Augustine), in any sense, a denial of the true humanity of Christ: he only denies to Christ the deformities of human nature. Physically, it was possible for Christ to experience every kind of lust, as far as His humanity was concerned; but not necessary. He was also, it is true, Son of God. The righteousness of Christ, like ours, depended on the active assistance of God; and when Julian maintains that Christ's righteousness flowed from no difference between His nature and ours, but from the free act of His will, he proceeds as though he meant to deny the incarnation; for he seems to maintain that the righteousness of

Christ owed nothing at all to the circumstance that the assumption of human nature by the Logos had constituted God and man one person (Note 17).

The question was thus brought to a point beyond which it could not advance in the then position of anthropology. The course taken by Augustine necessarily led to the denial of the freedom of Christ's will; and this denial alone enabled him to retain his hold on the incarnation, though it involved the sacrifice of the truth and reality of the human development of Christ. Julian, on the other hand, was anxious to assert for Christ freedom of will, and the possibility of temptation and sin; but failed to do it in such a way as enabled him to show that Christ could be more than a mere virtuous man, even the God-man. The overthrow of Pelagianism soon hid from view, even in the West, the defect of the Christology of Augustine just described, and strengthened the presumption (undoubtedly, for the most part, *tacitly* held), that the will of Christ was not free; or, where freedom was conceded in name, the possibility of actual temptation was denied.[1]

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE ATTEMPT TO MAKE MONOPHYSITISM SUPREME; AND THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON, A.D. 451.

CYRILL had only entered into the compact with the school of Antioch in 432, on the one hand, because he found it unnecessary to sacrifice his own view of one nature after the incarnation, and, on the other hand, because, by securing the general condemnation of Nestorius, he supposed himself to have got an earnest of the condemnation of Nestorianism and of the Antiocheians. This is evident from the fact that he did not then keep quiet, but made preparations for employing the

[1] Jerome rendered still less service to Christology than even Augustine. His reply to Porphyry's charge of vacillation with respect to John vii. 8 cll. 10 is as follows:—"Porphyry speaks thus: Nesciens omnia scandala ad carnem esse referenda" (caro is unquestionably equivalent to, state of accomodatio,—regarding which he had come into conflict with Augustine on account of Gal. ii. 11 ff.; Cf. Dialog. c. Pelag. i. 8, ii. 6, iii. 1).

position he had gained as a basis of operations to secure to his doctrine concerning the Person of Christ authoritative recognition in the Church. His further literary efforts against Theodore and others were devoted to this purpose (Note 18); but, ere his object could be attained, he was overtaken by death in the year 444.

His successor was Dioscurus, who trod in his footsteps. With the passionate zeal that characterized him, this man might well hope to accomplish the purpose for which his predecessor had laboured—to wit, the suppression of the already modified doctrine of the school of Antioch, and the establishment of the supremacy of the Alexandrian, especially as the close ties between the monks of Egypt and Syria had, in the course of time, been more and more firmly knit, and the Alexandrian type of doctrine had made allies not only of them, but even of the abbots and monks in the neighbourhood of the metropolis. By the condemnation of Nestorius, without any formal statement of what Nestorianism was, and without accepting the doctrine of Cyrill, the whole question in dispute had been brought into a false position, and the knot only more firmly tied. To both parties, reconciled as they were merely in appearance, the position must have been an unpleasant one. The party of Dioscurus had gained nothing so long as under Theodore's name the doctrine of Nestorius could be propagated without hindrance, and that in a still more precise form. It felt that it must lose even the little it had already gained, unless it gained something more. The other party, however, was under a still more urgent necessity of securing for itself a more favourable position,—if it were not prepared, sooner or later, to submit to the conclusion, evidently justly drawn by Cyrill, that unless it had merely pretended to join in the condemnation of Nestorius, it must of necessity concur in Cyrill's condemnation of Nestorianism. The consequence thereof would have been a denial, on their part, of the duality of natures in Christ, taught by Nestorius (he had never taught that there were two *persons*), and the affirmation of the unity of nature, taught by Cyrill. In order to escape, once for all, from such a demand, and to avoid giving in their adherence to Monophysitism, only one course remained open to them, namely, to bring about supplementarily, or even under another name, the condemnation of the doctrine of Cyrill.

Cyrill's efforts against Theodore having come to nought, and the Emperor being resolved not to favour a further advance of the Alexandrian doctrines, the situation seemed to present a favourable opportunity of making good the blow which had fallen on Nestorius by a counter-blow against the doctrine of Cyrill, and consequently of bringing the matter, as far as possible, back to the point at which it stood prior to the Council of Ephesus. This result was in part attained at the Synod of Chalcedon. All that that Council really did, was to decide on two negations—the negation of the unity of nature, and that of the duality of persons. Now, as Nestorianism had never really meant to assert the duality of the persons, it was less affected by this decision than the doctrine of Cyrill, who actually had taught the unity of nature. But let us now pass to the preliminary history of the Council of Chalcedon.

In 448 Theodoret published his book entitled "The Beggar" (ἐρανιστὴς), or πολύμορφος; which was a decided challenge to the entire party of Cyrill, especially to the monks, to whom even the title of the work may possibly be a satirical allusion. By this challenge he aimed at rendering it impossible for the Church to sanction the doctrine of Monophysitism. He showed that it must end in representing God as subject to suffering and change, in introducing a confusion of the divine and human, —all which threatens to corrupt the purity of the Christian conception of God with heathenish (pantheistic) elements. These arguments, which had long been the standing ones employed against Cyrill, he did not expressly direct against Cyrill, but (and not without adroitness) against Apollinaris and the revivers of his error, whom he styled Synousiasts (συνουσιαστὴς) because they held that the divine and human essence coalesced in one. This mode of procedure was unjust, in so far as Cyrill and his party had also reprobated both the Apollinarian denial of the human soul of Christ, and the opinion that He had a veritable human nature even in eternity.[1] Still Theodoret was not so completely unjust as some seem to suppose. For Apollinaris also had taught that there was μία φύσις; understanding thereby, undoubtedly, quite as much the essential oneness of the divine and human, as the unity of the person. Cyrill, on the contrary, had deemed it necessary *in thesi* to insist on the infinite diversity,

[1] See above, Part I., p. 1006 ff. 1021.

yea, heterogeneity, of the divine and human. He had further taught, exactly as Apollinaris did, a unity, and not a duality, of thought and volition in Christ: in this respect keeping aloof from the later Dyotheletism. He attached importance also to the view that not only God (the Logos), but also Christ, possessed and exercised a Divine miraculous power, and that the flesh of Christ was endowed with quickening Divine powers, especially in the Eucharist.[1] And, lastly, Cyrill made as little use of his doctrine of the "human soul of Christ" as Apollinaris of his opposed doctrine that Christ had not a human soul: it remained a dead thing. Apollinaris said, "If Christ did not learn, He must have been wise and holy from birth: He must have been raised above the necessity of exercise in knowledge and virtue." Cyrill's principles, strictly carried out, led to the same result, notwithstanding the artifices to which he resorted, —at one time affirming that the same Christ knew and did not know the same thing; at another, tracing such predicates of Christ as implied human imperfection to His love, which lead Him to take the place of human-kind, and to consider or speak of that which belonged to it as His own, although in the strict sense it belonged only to the men outside of Him.[2]

To bring to light this family resemblance between the tendency followed by Cyrill's party and doctrines already condemned, accorded remarkably well with the design of the school of Antioch to pay off the blow struck at them by a counter-blow, and to raise up a barrier in the way of the Church's rejection of that which constituted the central-point of historical Nestorianism. It can scarcely be regarded as accidental, that in the same year in which Theodoret's aggressive work was published, a formal attack on a chief representative of the Monophysitical view was made at a Particular Synod held at Constantinople,—so toned, however, that there was an appearance of agreement with Cyrill and Dioscurus. Theodoret's "Eranist" may be regarded as the programme of this Synod.

[1] T. v. 2, pp. 702, 707.

[2] Ignorance, the acquisition of knowledge, and the strengthening of capacities by practice, were accordingly attributed to the humanity of Christ merely in a sense similar to that in which He is said by Paul to have become a curse for us, namely, by transference,—that is, by an ἀναφορά, in the manner of Cyrill.

Eusebius of Dorylæum appeared there as a complainant against Eutyches, the leader of the Monachist party in Constantinople: he thus also indirectly attacked the Egyptian party.[1] Meanwhile, it would appear that the party of Dioscurus had managed to inspire the Emperor with a degree of distrust of that Synod; and the Patriarch Flavian tried to induce the Council to let the point of dispute rest, but the bishops insisted on prosecuting their case against Eutyches. Eutyches was, at first, unwilling to define more accurately his conception of the nature of Christ, and kept to expressly scriptural terms. At a later period, however, he acknowledged that he viewed Christ simply as his God, and as the Lord of heaven and earth; and that, after the incarnation, he could find no place for a duality of natures, although he granted their existence previous to the incarnation. How he explained the transition from duality to unity, is not very easy to discover.[2] He admitted, it is true, that there was a *σῶμα ἀνθρώπινον*, even subsequent to the unio, but not that there was an *ἄνθρωπον*; consequently, viewing the Deity as the exclusive principle of personality in the one nature. The main difference between him and Cyrill lay in his further maintaining, that "this body of Christ was not of the same substance with ours." Still it was by no means his intention to represent the body (to the *soul* he makes no allusion) as absorbed by the divine nature, though later writers do attribute to him the doctrine of *ἡ φύσις σύνθετος*. He expressly repudiated the notion of a transmutation of the human element, derived from Mary, into the divine, ending in the volatilization and disappearance of the human; as also, the doctrine of the swallowing up of the humanity, which Theodoret tried to fasten on him. In his view, consequently, it continued to exist in some way or other. When, therefore, on the other hand, he shrank from

[1] Mansi Concil. Coll. T. vi. 495 ff. and 650 ff.

[2] The charge against him, of teaching the doctrine of the pre-existence of the humanity of Christ, that is, its existence in heaven, and of two persons which afterwards became one, was unquestionably mere logical wire-drawing. The same remark applies to the charge of teaching that the Logos did not assume anything really human, but merely produced something resembling the human, when He *ἀτρέπτως ἐτράπη* and became flesh, and that He merely passed through Mary. Theodoret was his calumniator in this respect.

declaring it, after the unio, to be of the same substance with us, his idea must have been, that the effect of the unio was not merely an exaltation or glorification, but an ennobling transmutation, of humanity. And although Eutyches himself may not have compared the human nature to a drop of honey cast into the sea, yet no comparison of the unio, as set forth by him, can be more relevant than that to such a chemical permeation (Note 19) of the human nature by the divine, as allowed of the former still continuing in some sense to exist.

Eutyches was deposed; and the condemnation of the doctrine that there was but one nature after the incarnation, and that the humanity of Christ was completely ὁμοούσιος with ours, resulted in the transference of the leadership once again to the school of Antioch. Cyrill's doctrine was condemned by implication, notwithstanding the stratagem resorted to, of employing him as a "testis veritatis," by means of passages of his writings wrenched from their proper connection.

Eutyches, however, did not rest; but appealed to the Bishops of Alexandria and Rome, who, undoubtedly, in the days of Cyrill had always acted in concert. In agreement with them, he expressed his readiness to teach two natures. At this point the Egyptian tendency (strictly so termed) was summoned to the foreground. It was to the interest of Dioscurus to attempt to make good the defeat he had suffered at this σύνοδος ἐνδημοῦσα, by means of a General Council; and both his great influence with the Court, and the expectation of having the Bishop of Rome on his side, encouraged him to hope for an issue of the most favourable character (Note 20).

The contest, which, after being only half decided, had been interrupted by an armistice, it was now intended to bring to a definite conclusion. An Œcumenical Council was summoned by the Emperor for the year 449 (Mansi Conc. vi. 503), in declared hostility to the Patriarch of Constantinople, Flavian, and with the express purpose of tearing up the Nestorian heresy by the very roots. Theodoret, and others who shared his opinions, especially all the members of the Synod held against Eutyches, were refused admittance to, or at all events were deprived of the right of voting at, the Council: Dioscurus was appointed to preside, and was entrusted with extended powers against the enemies of the holy, that is, the Alexan-

drian, faith. At the Synod itself, a multitude of fanatical monks, with the Abbot Barsumas, who had a seat and vote therein, at their head, wielded a terrorism which threatened to suppress with violence every opinion opposed to the doctrines of Cyrill. The first thing Dioscurus did, was to go back to the Council of Ephesus, urging that everything had been then unchangeably settled, and that, consequently, a reopening of the inquiry into the Church's doctrine was inadmissible. The Egyptian monks and bishops cried out against the doctrine that Christ consisted of two natures, saying, "Whoso speaks of two natures is a Nestorius, and let him be even cut asunder." By means of tumult, violence, and trickery, the bishops of the opposite view found themselves compelled to acknowledge that there was one nature in Christ. The position taken up was, that the doctrine of two natures in Christ is opposed to the spirit of the first Synod of Ephesus; and that, consequently, the condemnation of Eutyches was unjustifiable, and the Synod of Constantinople heretical. Flavian and Eusebius were, in consequence, at once deposed. The same fate was designed also for Theodoret and other leaders of the school of Antioch. Dioscurus was unquestionably right when he affirmed that the Council of Ephesus in 431 was substantially on his side; and Cyrill's mode of procedure then, was not so totally different from that of Dioscurus now, that it can be considered consistent to designate the first Council of Ephesus a holy Œcumenical Council, if it be just to call the second the Robber Synod.

Dioscurus followed up his victory with the same violence as he had used in gaining it. The Orientals either yielded to compulsion and outwardly conformed, or, like Theodoret, went into exile. Unexpectedly, however, the scene was destined to change.

The Bishop of Rome, Leo the Great, a man of strong character, undaunted courage, and clear practical understanding,—more skilled, however, in the composition of formulas of a full-toned liturgical character than capable of contributing to the scientific development of a doctrine,—on whose co-operation Dioscurus had at first confidently reckoned, but to whom, in the violence of his ambition, he had neglected at Ephesus to pay due respect, had not yet recorded his vote (Note 21). The course taken on a former occasion by Eutyches and Flavian,[1] was

[1] Compare Mansi, v. 1323, 1329, 1351.

now taken by the oppressed Orientals, especially by Theodoret,[1] —they appealed to Leo at the close of the second Council of Ephesus. Even at Ephesus itself, Leo's nuncio, the deacon Hilarus, had united in the protest entered by Flavian against the decision of the Synod. From this time Leo energetically supported the Orientals (Note 22).

As early as the 13th of June 449, Leo wrote to Flavian the celebrated Epistle, in which he endeavoured finally to decide the true doctrine of the Church regarding the Person of Christ. A distinctive peculiarity of this treatise is, that whilst, on the one hand, it lays down decidedly and clearly, in separate propositions, that which Leo considered ought to form part of a general Christian confession of faith; on the other hand, it entirely evades the task properly devolving on a theologian, which is, not merely to bring these propositions into juxtaposition, but also to exhibit their internal compatibility, and close mutual relationship,—in short, to present a clear connected image of the Person of Christ. This is the case, notwithstanding that, both in point of compass and form, he had attempted rather a theological treatise than a mere symbol or creed. Not in the tone of investigation and argumentation, but in that of judicial decision,—in the full-toned solemn style of the Church, and with frequent recourse to a rhetorical collocation of full-sounding antitheses,—he commences with the error of Eutyches, which gave rise to the dispute. He charges him with the denial of the true humanity of Christ, and confutes him first from the Apostles' Creed, and then from the Scriptures (c. ii.). Leo concedes that the generation of Christ was unique and miraculous; but would not allow that the temporal birth of Christ either took anything away from, or added anything to, His divine eternal birth; or that, by the novelty of this creation, its distinctive generic character was abolished (ut per novitatem creationis proprietas remota sit generis). Christ devoted Himself entirely to the restoration of man, in order by His power to overcome death and the devil. We should have been unable to overcome the author of sin and death if our nature had not been appropriated by Him, whom neither sin could stain, nor death retain; —which independence of sin and death He owed to His having been conceived by the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin,

[1] Letter of Theodoret to Leo, Mansi, vi. 35.

who herself both conceived and gave birth to Him in the state of spotless virginity. He passes then to the question regarding the natures; and after deciding that there were two, He touches on their relation, not so much to each other, as to the individual acts and functions. In reference to the first point, his main proposition is the following:—God so became man that each nature and substance preserved its distinctive characteristics, whilst both were conjoined in one person.[1] This personality might in itself be the Ego—the bond of the unity of the natures: and then would arise the question as to its origin—whether it proceeded from one nature, or both, or from no nature at all; or again, whether it were a third something, in addition to the natures. Leo, however, understands by the personality, not so much the Ego, as the result of the conjunction of natures, the sum-total of both, the collective person or centre of vital unity, which is at once God and man. The Invisible, Incomprehensible One, wished to become visible and comprehensible. In order to be a true mediator, it was necessary that in one aspect He should be able to die, in the other aspect, not be able to die.[2] He assumed the form of a servant without sin, thus exalting the humanity without curtailing the Deity; for the self-abnegation by means of which the Invisible made Himself visible, and the Creator and Ruler of the Universe sought to become one amongst mortals, was not a loss of power, but a compassionate act of condescension.[3]

Both natures retained their individuality: and, as the form of God did not do away with the form of the servant, so the form of the servant did not detract from the form of God. God was not changed by His compassion, nor was man consumed by the Divine majesty. The true God was born in the entire and perfect nature of a true man: He was "totus in suis, totus in nostris." Thus, according to Leo's representation, the Christian consciousness requires not merely that God shall

[1] "Salva igitur proprietate utriusque naturæ (et substantiæ) et in unam coëunte personam, suscepta est a majestate humilitas, a virtute infirmitas, ab æternitate mortalitas, etc." Cap. iii.

[2] "Ad resolvendum conditionis nostræ debitum natura inviolabilis naturæ est unita passibili; ut,—unus atque idem mediator dei et hominum et mori posset ex uno, et mori non posset ex altero."

[3] "Assumsit formam servi—humanam augens, divinam non minuens: quia exinanitio illa—inclinatio fuit miserationis, non defectio potestatis."

have human predicates in Christ, or that He shall have and bear a man both as to body and soul, or that He shall be and dwell *in* a man, but that He shall *be man;* and yet, at the same time, it is not satisfied unless the two natures are represented as existing on unmixed, and the divine nature as neither gaining nor losing anything by the union. On the one hand, the Invisible should be represented as having become visible and tangible in the form of a servant; on the other hand, humanity should be represented as overshadowing the infinitude of the Divine majesty, which yet remained internally undiminished and entire. It was a deep thought, when, in answer to the charge of introducing an alteration into God by the incarnation, Leo reminded his opponents that God, so far from undergoing a change when He experiences compassion or love (miseratio), does but pursue, by means of His work of love, the course already prescribed by justice. Nay more, Leo gives them to understand that God ought far rather to be said to have changed, if at the beginning He had been all goodness, and, after the fall, all severity, towards man,—if He had allowed justice to rob Him entirely of goodness, instead of supplementing His first loving arrangements by a still more secret mystery (sacramentum).[1]

He fails, however, to develop this thought, that the unchangeableness of God is insured by His love; and observes, in a contrary spirit, that when the Son of God descended from the Divine throne He did not quit His Father's glory.[2] If the descent of the Son from the throne is not combined with His omnipresence, then to say that He still retained His glory, is equivalent to saying that He did not really empty Himself, but, strictly speaking, only veiled, or did not reveal, His Divine majesty. When giving prominence to the unity of the Person of Christ, he does not hesitate to teach that the Son of God not only assumed human nature, but actually became man—that the Eternal was born in time, that the Impassible suffered: and yet, when his aim is to preserve the distinction of the natures, he

[1] "Opus fuit, ut incommutabilis Deus, cujus voluntas non potest sua benignitate privari, primam erga nos pietatis suæ dispositionem sacramento occultiore compleret."

[2] Cap. iv. "Filius Dei de cœlesti sede descendens et a paterna gloria, non recedens ingreditur hæc mundi infima."

defines the mutual relationship as a mere relationship of communion—the two natures are merely conjoined in action.[1] Cyrill had directed his entire efforts to the retention of a principle of unity even subsequent to the Unio, at the same time conceding the diversity of the predicates, and had aimed to characterize all acts and sufferings as at once divine and human (divine-human): Leo, on the contrary, distributed one thing to the divine, and another to the human nature, even after the Unio; for example, miracles he apportioned to the divine nature, sufferings to the human. "It did not become one and the same nature to say, 'I and the Father are one,' and, 'The Father is greater than I.'"[2] God and man were indeed, in Christ, one person, and therefore reproach and honour were common to both; but the reproach of each, and the honour of each, came from a different quarter. Leo says clearly, and this constitutes his merit, that the fundamental truth of Christianity is sacrificed quite as much by a curtailment of the humanity, as by a curtailment of the divinity of Christ.[3] He displayed also great ecclesiastical tact in the manner in which he repeatedly describes Nestorianism and Eutychianism, as two opposed rocks, on each of which alike a correct doctrine of the incarnation must suffer shipwreck,—a thought to which he often subsequently recurred.[4] At the Council of Ephesus the Church was brought into such a position of antagonism to Nestorius, that the victory of Cyrill's doctrine of one nature seemed inevitable; but Leo now did all in his power so to influence the development of the Church,

[1] "Agit enim utraque forma cum ulterius communione, quod proprium est, Verbo scilicet operante quod Verbi est, et carne exsequente quod carnis est." "Forma" is in the nominative case.

[2] Cap. iv. "Unum horum coruscat miraculis, alterum succumbit injuriis—non ejusdem naturæ est, dicere, 'Ego et pater unum sumus,' et dicere, 'Pater major me est.'" With the doctrine of a real "communicatio idiomatum," such as is taught by the Lutheran Church, the Epistle of Leo, sanctioned by the Council of Chalcedon, is not in harmony.

[3] Cap. v. "Catholica ecclesia hac fide vivit, hac proficit, ut in Christo Jesus nec sine vera divinitate humanitas, nec sine vera humanitate divinitas," for, "negatio veræ carnis negatio est etiam corporeæ passionis. Unum horum sine alio receptum non prodcrat ad salutem et æqualis erat periculi, dominum Jesum Christum aut deum tantummodo sine homine, aut sine deo solum hominem credidisse."

[4] Mansi, vi. ep. 54, p. 46; ep. 75, p. 97; ep. 90, pp. 127, 130. Tom. v. ep. 30, p. 1398. Tom. vi. ep. 88, p. 124.

that it should pursue a middle course between two equally objectionable extremes. Whether he or the Council of Chalcedon actually hit upon this middle course, is another question. One thing only is certain, be it precursorily remarked: that Leo's rejection of the twofold personality ascribed to Nestorius, and of the doctrine of a conversion (transubstantiation) of the human nature into the divine, in which there then remained only a congeries of human predicates as accidents of a foreign substance, throws little or no positive light on the Unio itself, and the internal relation of the two natures. Most of the other propositions adduced above are mere verbal conjunctions of *enantiophaniès*, which are imposing as paradoxes, but in no respect clear up the difficulty.

This letter to Flavian, partly through the influence of him and his friends, and partly through its own intrinsic value, speedily attained wide circulation and recognition. But when Leo found that the so-called Robber Synod not only refused to accept his exposition, but that Dioscurus had even undertaken to excommunicate him; when, further, he had received an accurate account of the tumults which had taken place at the Synod, of the maltreatment of Flavian, and the deposition of others,—he drew up the project of a new Œcumenical Council, to be held in Italy, for the special consideration of this subject. Theodosius the Younger regarded him, it is true, with little favour; was formerly, and still remained, devoted to Dioscurus; urged that the peace of the Church would have been at once established had the decisions of the second Council of Ephesus been carried out; and, further, questioned Leo's right to pronounce judgment in the matter. Moreover, great difficulty attended the reinstatement of the deposed bishops; firstly, because not only a great part of the Church, comprehending the Egyptian, Palestinian, and Illyrian bishops, who, leagued with a host of monks in Asia and Africa, formed a considerable force, took the side of Dioscurus; but also, secondly, because nearly all the Oriental bishops at the Synod of Ephesus had, even though under constraint, subscribed that which Dioscurus required. Here again Leo acted with remarkable circumspection and prudent calmness, in endeavouring to compass his end. Possessing the spirit of a statesman, he had an inexhaustible mine of resources. So long as there was hope of securing any one as an ally, he

adopted a moderate and persuasive tone; but no sooner was the desired ally seen to be an opponent, than he openly opposed him, speaking and acting firmly, and with increasing plainness. As his Epistle to Theodosius produced no effect, he addressed himself to Valentinian and Marcian, and some of the female members of the imperial family; but their interference also proved of no avail. Towards Flavian's successor, Anatolius, who had announced to him his election, Leo took up an expectant posture, until he should have signed his Epistle to Flavian. At the same time, he was unwearied in his efforts to sustain the courage and faithfulness of those who were favourable to Flavian. With this view he wrote both the series of letters to Greek and Gallic bishops, and the circular to the clergy and people of Constantinople.[1]

In these he tried to prove the reality of the humanity of Christ from the holy Eucharist. In this mystical repast of spiritual food, says he, it is given us to receive the strength of the heavenly food, that we may be changed into the flesh of Him who became our flesh.[2] He further shows, that in passages which speak of an exaltation of Christ, we must necessarily allow Arianism to be in the right, unless they be referred to a veritable humanity. Eutyches, he maintains, must either conceive the Godhead to be subjected to suffering, or altogether deny the truth of the humanity of Christ. The immutable Son of God became a Son of man, not by a transmutation of His substance; but, assuming our nature, He came to seek that which was lost. His coming was proclaimed from the very beginning of the human race (cap. iv.). Not, however (cap. iii.), by an approach as through space, or by a bodily movement towards us, as though He had previously been absent, and now became present; nor did His coming involve His leaving the

[1] Mansi vi. ep. 59, pp. 57–64, compare ep. 50, p. 29.

[2] "In illa mystica distributione spiritalis alimoniæ hoc impertitur, hoc sumitur, ut accipientes virtutem cœlestis cibi in carnem ipsius, qui caro nostra factus est, transeamus.—In quibus isti ignorantiæ tenebris—jacuere, ut nec—cognoscerent quod in ecclesia dei in omnium ore tam consonum est, ut nec ab infantium linguis veritas corporis et sanguinis Christi inter communionis sacramenta taceatur:" cap. ii. As Augustine deemed the holy rite of Baptism (specially infant baptism) to have an important bearing on the formation of an anthropology, so Leo the holy Eucharist on Christology. The conversion he regards as taking place in us.

place whence He proceeded. He came in and through that which was visible and accessible to all, in order that He might become an object of immediate perception; He assumed the body and soul of man, in order that He might unite the form of a servant with the form of God, which He retained; thus exalting His humanity without curtailing His Deity.[1] He lacked nothing that can certainly be said properly to belong to human nature,—neither soul, reason, nor body. The last mentioned originated neither in a transmutation of the Word into flesh, nor in a new creation, but was taken from Mary (cap. v.).

Dioscurus he did not excommunicate; and that, unquestionably, because of the intended Council, and the number and influence of his adherents; for it was desirable to avoid a breach which might either give Dioscurus the predominance in the Council, or at all events endanger the victory. Leo's preparations were nevertheless unwearied. He particularly adopted the plan of holding lesser synods in Rome, which rejected the second Council of Ephesus as a Robber Synod, and gave in their adhesion to Leo's doctrine. The Gallic and Oriental bishops did so also. It is hard to say, however, whether he would have attained his goal had not Theodosius the Younger died in 450. Through this event Leo gained the powerful support of Valentinian, and especially of Marcian: Dioscurus, on the contrary, lost his ally. With the greatest readiness did they agree to Leo's demand for a Council; desiring, however, that it should be assembled in Asia Minor, not in Italy.

Now, however, Leo suddenly preferred that the Council should be postponed, if not altogether abandoned; professedly, on account of the incursions of the barbarians into Italy, which rendered the absence of many of the bishops impossible;—really,

[1] Compare herewith the passage quoted in note 2, page 88. This exaltation is involved in the very fact of the incarnation of the Son, so far as honour was thus done to humanity; especially, however, in the fact of the resurrection (compare Hagenbach's "Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte," 3 Aufl. 1853, p. 230),—de resurr. dom. c. 4: Resurrectio Domini non finis carnis sed commutatio fuit nec virtutis augmento consumta substantia est. The caro remained "ipsa per substantiam, non ipsa per gloriam," for, "factum est corpus impassibile, immortale, incorruptibile." Relatively to the body of Christ the process was conceded, which, in reference to the soul, was for the most part denied.

because the Council was not to be held in Italy, and because, in the altered position of affairs, a satisfactory issue appeared easier of attainment without a Council.[1] But the Council was appointed to meet; and the space intervening between the convocation and the assembling was so short, that it was impossible for all the bishops to receive the summons in time (Note 23). Still Leo was unwilling to oppose the Emperor. He only expressed a hope that the members of the Council would not be under obligation to meddle with difficult points of dispute, especially as the Orientals had already subscribed the condemnation of Nestorius and Eutyches. Leo's idea had been,[2] not to allow any controversy whatever on matters of faith at the Council, but simply to set before the bishops the alternative, either of abiding by Cyrill's letter to Nestorius, or of adopting Leo's letter to Flavian; and to open the door for the readmission, under the prescribed conditions, of all those bishops who had either taught or acted in opposition thereto. (as, for example, by subscription at the Council of Ephesus). The imperial rescript, however, required the more accurate definition of matters of faith.

When the Council of Chalcedon was opened, two great parties stood in direct opposition to each other; and the two chief representatives of these parties—in the one case Eutyches, in the other Flavian—had been in turn deposed and excommunicated. It would have been necessary for these two parties to continue much longer under the moral and intellectual treatment of the Holy Spirit, ere attaining to concord, had not the power and will of the Emperor supplied the place of harmony of spirit. The proceedings commenced with an indictment, in due form, of Dioscurus, and the validity of his Council. His adherents, however, were so powerful, and so little inclined towards the milder doctrine of the school of Antioch, which was in the end adopted by the Council of Chalcedon, that when Theodoret, who had again been acknowledged bishop by the Emperor and Leo, entered the assembly for the purpose of taking his place in it, the bishops from Egypt, Palestine, and Illyria cried out with a loud voice, "The faith is perishing; the laws of the Church cast him out; cast

[1] Mansi, vi. ep. 84, p. 105.

[2] Ep. 70, pp. 86, 87, l. c. ad Pulcheriam.

out the teacher of Nestorius."[1] When the same cry was raised against Dioscurus by the Orientals, the civil authorities present at last secured quiet, by causing (with very little impartiality it must be confessed, when we recall to mind the Council of 431) Theodoret to appear in the character of accuser, and Dioscurus in that of accused. Only very unsatisfactorily, we must allow, could the latter justify his violent and illegal procedure at Ephesus; but, as regards the matter of faith, he was fully able to show that he had then adopted no other course than that which Leo, in his manner (as has been observed above), intended to pursue at Chalcedon. No disputes about the faith ought to be allowed, but they should simply abide by the old decisions. Amongst these, he of course reckoned, not alone the decisions of Nicæa, but also those of the first Synod of Ephesus. Whoso takes away therefrom, or adds thereto, let him be excommunicated. After this, and what had passed before, he felt justly conscious of not desiring any other faith than that of Cyrill, and of not at all needing innovations. All he wanted was the general recognition of the principles which led the first Synod of Ephesus to depose Nestorius. As Dioscurus took his stand firmly on this position, the situation became an awkward one. Authorities were opposed to authorities. A decision would involve a split; nay more, it would be impossible to arrive at a decision unless Leo and his party could succeed, as Cyrill had done at Ephesus, in transferring the question from the sphere of the dogmatical to that of the personal and formal. In that way the opposed party might be struck down in its leader; and after a victory over the person of Dioscurus, which would give a tone to the whole affair, they might return to the dogma, and succeed in forcing concessions from his dispirited party.

The attention of the Council was first of all directed to the acts of the two Synods of Ephesus, as also to those of the Synod of Flavian, held at Constantinople, with the view of testing the legality of the procedure of Dioscurus in deposing Flavian and reinstating Eutyches.[2]

[1] Mansi, Tom. vi. conc. Chalc. actio prima, p. 590.

[2] To this circumstance we owe the preservation of, at all events, a large part of the acts of the said three earlier Councils. They were incorporated with the acts of the Council of Chalcedon.

Not before the conduct of Dioscurus had been investigated, and he had been pronounced worthy of deposition, was the dogma in dispute again brought under closer consideration.[1] In this connection, it is more remarkable than gratifying to observe the difference in the manner of employing the authority of the very same Fathers, between the two Synods of Ephesus, in 431 and 449, on the one side, and those of Constantinople and Chalcedon, on the other side. The principal Fathers of the Church are cited in part in support of the decisions of opposed Synods,—especially the Bishops of Rome. As favourable to the doctrine of Cyrill, were adduced at the first Synod of Ephesus, on whose authority the second Synod of Ephesus leaned in dogmatical questions,[2] the testimony of Peter of Alexandria, of Athanasius, of the Roman Bishops Julius and Felix, of Theophilus of Alexandria, of Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory Nazianzen;[3]—some of whom employed the expression θεοτόκος, as Gregory and Athanasius; others protesting against a duality of Sons; and others again teaching, either that Christ is nothing but the incarnate Word, or that it is correct to speak of the one (but that the) incarnate nature of the Word of God. Basilius says, that through the medium of His flesh, God suffered without suffering. Similar passages from Atticus of Constantinople and Amphilochius of Iconium were then also adduced. Suffering is invariably represented as the chief end of the incarnation;—not that the suffering was supposed to have touched the essential nature of the Deity, which rather remained unaffected, but that God subjected Himself to it through the medium of His flesh. In short, Dioscurus said, at the second Council of Ephesus, "We conceive of the presence of Christ in the flesh as did Athanasius, Cyrill, Gregory, and all orthodox bishops."

The Council of Constantinople, on the contrary, had appealed to a letter of Cyrill to Nestorius,[4] in which he writes:—"Incarnation was not a transmutation of the Logos into flesh, nor into an entire man with soul and body. He is man in that He united hypostatically with Himself (ἑνώσας ἑαυτῷ καθ' ὑπόστασιν), a fleshly body animated by a rational soul. Hence was He designated, 'Son of Man;' not merely because it was

[1] Mansi, Tom. vi. actio ii., p. 937 ff.
[2] Mansi, vi. 867.
[3] Mansi, vi. 876-886.
[4] Mansi, vi. 661.

His will or good pleasure to be so designated, nor merely because of His assumption of a (human) person. The natures thus conjoined in true unity are indeed different, but the two constitute one Christ and Son. Not as though the distinction of the natures had been abolished, for the sake of the unity; but by being mysteriously conjoined in unity, they constituted for us the one Lord and Christ." Reference is then further made to the previously noticed letter addressed by Cyrill to John of Antioch, which, whilst favourable to the school of Antioch, through its adoption of their creed, yet gave it such an interpretation as might have contented even Eutyches. Other passages from Cyrill's writings, which contain his real doctrine, and where he employs such expressions as *μία φύσις λόγου σεσαρκωμένη, φυσικὴ ἕνωσις*, were passed over in silence by the Council of Constantinople. The Fathers at Chalcedon resorted to methods of harmonizing characterized by precisely the same arbitrariness. That which was opposed to their views in the writings of Cyrill they silently suppressed. Nor did even the cry of distress, raised by the justly astonished adherents of Dioscurus, at such a representation of Cyrill, "Dioscurus rather holds the faith of Cyril," bring his real teachings to the light. Scarcely, however, would the Egyptian bishops have allowed themselves to be persuaded to recognise the Cyrill of the Council, of Chalcedon, who was much too like an Antiochêian to pass for the genuine Cyrill, had not the opposition to Dioscurus already gone to great lengths, and the dogmatical bias of the Court been clearly manifested. These two considerations supplied any lack of force in the historical arguments adduced by their opponents. At Chalcedon, the two letters of Cyrill above mentioned were publicly read; then that of Leo to Flavian; and, afterwards, a series of passages from Hilary, Gregory Nazianzen, Ambrose, and Chrysostom, and some also from other writings of Cyrill. Hereupon the bishops cried out, with reference to the letter of Leo, "That is the faith of the Fathers; that is the faith of the Apostles: Peter has spoken through Leo; Leo and Cyril have taught the same doctrines; let Cyrill be held in eternal remembrance! Anathema to him who does not hold this faith! Why was it not thus read to us in Ephesus? Dioscurus concealed it from us!" As though the Egyptian party, accurately acquainted as it was

with the writings of Cyrill, did not well know that not merely the conflicting aspects of his doctrine, but even the real doctrine itself, had now been suppressed.[1]

In this way it became probable that the wish of the Emperor—a wish undoubtedly inspired by political considerations—would attain realization. At first, a great part of the assembly, along with Leo, deemed it advisable not to enter upon strictly dogmatical discussions, and not to attempt the construction of another new creed; but Marcian persisted in desiring that the two great and powerful ecclesiastical parties should, if possible, be united by means of one formula of concord. And many showed an inclination to fall in with this wish. After the alarming personal defeat of Dioscurus, and after the reading of the quotations just referred to, the imperial authorities present in the assembly were well able to ask, "Who, after all that, is in doubt?" whereupon the bishops cried out, "No one doubts!" Still, Atticus of Nicopolis begged for a delay of a few days, in order that, in calm reflection and quiet, a formula might be constructed (τυπωθῇ), which should embody what was consonant to the will of God and the holy Fathers. Leo's letter, he urged, has been read, it is true; but Cyrill's letter to Nestorius, to the twelve chapters of which he required him to assent, should also be read, in order that the bishops may be properly prepared to enter on the business before them. Others then cried out, "We demand also that the Fathers be thoroughly examined!" The ship was thus again steered towards the breakers from which it had just scarcely escaped. The imperial judges and senators hit upon the expedient of a five days' postponement; requesting the bishops, however, to advise with each other, and with the Patriarch of Constantinople, regarding the faith, and to *get light upon their doubts*. The bishops, probably the Orientals, then cried out, "We believe as Leo believes; none of us doubts; we have already subscribed (viz., Leo's letter)." But the authorities replied, that it was not necessary for all to meet, but yet right that doubters should be convinced; and, for this purpose, it would be well

[1] Now, it is true, we stand at the close of Actio ii., Tom. vi. 971 ff., when this party saw fit, instead of making an uproar, as at the commencement, to cry out, "We have all sinned;—forgiveness for all! We pray you have compassion on all!" (p. 975).

for Anatolius to select from the number of those who had subscribed, such as were fitted to enlighten the ignorant and doubting. What this meant, was plain enough to the Egyptian party. Instead of a discussion in which the same rights were to be conceded to them as to their opponents, the imperial authorities gave them to understand that they were expected to allow themselves to be convinced, by Anatolius and others, of the correctness of Leo's doctrine. And now the Egyptian party exclaimed, "We ask for the Fathers, for the Fathers of the Synod." But the opposite party cried out, "Of the Synod, those who agree with Leo; into exile with Dioscurus; whoso holds fellowship with him is a Jew!" and then the Egyptian and Illyrian bishops begged for mercy for their own persons and that of Dioscurus.[1] Still they were by no means convinced, and had no intention of surrendering at discretion.

A degree of obscurity lies upon these private proceedings. What took place in the first instance, can only be learnt from a sudden change which came over both the Emperor and Anatolius. The Egyptian-party showed itself, possibly, more obstinate and dangerous than the Emperor had supposed: the haughty and defiant Barsumas, who had taken part in the murder of Flavian, had again made his appearance: Eutyches stirred up the fire—a host of monks was like a swarm of bees when excited—and held out bold threats of the excommunication of the bishops; they refused to recognise the deposition of Dioscurus, and went to him for counsel. Petitions were addressed to the Emperor, who was the more inclined to adopt a considerate mode of treatment, as the few Egyptian bishops who were still present had already withdrawn from the Synod, declaring that they must be prepared for a general feeling of indignation at the Council in their dioceses, and for certain death as the penalty of their participation in it. In short, the first signs of the brewing storm of Monophysitism, which was destined soon enough to burst, showed themselves even at Chalcedon. In addition to this, the Emperor wished his metropolis, the new Rome, to be a patriarchate of the second rank, which was only possible at the expense of Alexandria; on which ground both he and Anatolius were probably disposed to make concessions in other matters, especially as both of them began

[1] Mansi, vi. 973 ff.

to feel annoyed at the very marked predominance exercised, however deservedly, by Leo. Finally, it must not be forgotten that Anatolius had formerly been in the service of Dioscurus, and therefore had probably shared his dogmatical views. Accordingly, the following project seems to have been sketched. Nothing was to be done to prevent Leo's circular from continuing to enjoy the recognition which it had gained (nay more, efforts were made to influence the Egyptian party in its favour); for, both in itself, and on account of the Orientals and Leo, that was undesirable. They took up, instead, with the idea of a new special creed, in which the dogmatical views of the Egyptians should be duly recognised. Inasmuch as the symbolum of the Synod itself must naturally attain to greater practical importance, and be accepted as the standard for the interpretation of a treatise approved by the said Synod, if they could succeed in carrying through such a symbolum, Leo's letter would be made as harmless as possible, and the Egyptian party perhaps tranquillized. To this end an ambiguous formula was quietly constructed (apparently without the prevision of Leo's nuncios); communicated in the first instance to a wider circle of bishops, which must have comprised a very large number; and, immediately after Actio IV., when Leo's letter was accepted by the bishops in council, and every one, consequently, on the Oriental side secured, laid before the Synod. By those to whom it was first communicated it was universally approved. But, whether because the Roman nuncios had afterwards bethought themselves, or because they had never been favourable to it, when the symbolum was laid before the Synod, the Orientals, with whom the Romans agreed, loudly opposed it,[1] whereas the Egyptian party greeted it with applause (Note 24). This first symbolum has, unfortunately, not been preserved; but it must have contained the formula that Christ consisted of two natures (ἐκ δυῶν φύσεων). This, of course, the Monophysite part could adopt; for they granted, in abstracto, that Christ had become out of two natures one, and only repudiated that which this symbolum cannot have included, namely, that after the unio also there were two distinct natures in Christ; or, that Christ subsisted in a duality of

[1] John of Germanicia expressed the doubts of others in the words (Tom. vii. 100), Οὐκ ἔχει καλῶς ὁ ὅρος, καὶ ὀφείλει καλῶς γενέσθαι.

natures. When it was found that this symbol did not produce concord, and that the nuncio threatened to leave if they departed from Leo's letter, the inclination of the Emperor to make concessions to the obstinate Egyptian party was again paralyzed; and the only effect of the whole incident was to bring clearly to light the contemptible dependence of the Synod on the will and power of the Emperor, the influence of intrigue, and especially the fact, that the majority of these men were capable of giving in their adhesion to two opposed symbols at one and the same Synod.

The Emperor now issued an injunction to the Council to prepare another symbol (Note 25). A commission, consisting of representatives of the different parties, met for consultation, and agreed upon "the Symbol of Chalcedon," which, on being laid before the Synod, was adopted and subscribed without protest. At the following sitting, the Emperor Marcian appeared in person; announced it to be his will that all his peoples should hold one faith; declared that Constantine was his model in ecclesiastical matters; and promised to take measures "for securing the universal recognition of the doctrinal decisions of the Synod as authoritative, and for preserving to the Church the blessing which had proceeded from their labours." The decisions of the Council were then solemnly read in his presence. They had been already subscribed in the former sitting. The Emperor then asked whether all assented to the formula as it had then been read to them. They exclaimed, "So do we all believe; we are of one mind, one opinion. That is the faith of the Fathers, of the Apostles: this faith hath delivered the whole world! Hail to Marcian, the second Constantine, the second Paul, the second David!" Nor did they forget to designate the Empress a second Helena! Both were lauded as lights of orthodoxy, and peace was promised to the whole world. The conduct of the Emperor was the most dignified and honourable. He first thanked God, although he had caused them great trouble; but he admonished them to pray that God would everywhere bestow peace. He then notified that punishment would be visited on those who should stir up discontent and confusion in opposition to the conclusions now arrived at.

As far as the decisions of the Council of Chalcedon themselves are concerned, they repeat the Nicene and Constantino-

politan symbol of the year 381: the Council of Ephesus also is mentioned, although only in a general way, with approval.[1] The Nicene-Constantinopolitan Council, it was observed, was, strictly speaking, sufficient, in regard to the Trinity and the incarnation, for such as sincerely accepted it. But as the enemies of the truth, by their heresies, had given rise to new errors,—some venturing to corrupt the mystery of faith by the denial of the θεοτόκος, and others introducing confusion and commixture by teaching that the flesh and the Godhead were one nature, that the divine nature of the Son was made capable of suffering by mixture,—the Synod determined, in order to put an end to all such machinations against the truth, to give a full and perfect statement of the doctrine which from the beginning had remained unchanged. In carrying out this purpose, they adopted the synodal circular letter of Cyrill to Nestorius and the Orientals, in opposition to the errors of Nestorius; as also the letter addressed by Leo to Flavian, in opposition to the Eutychian heresy. It repudiated alike those who, rending asunder the one mystery of the Divine economy, tried to bring in a duality of Sons; those who take upon themselves to say that the Godhead of the Only-begotten is capable of suffering; and those who teach, either that the two natures were intermixed or blended, or, that the servant's form assumed by Him was of heavenly, or any other than human, substance, and who pretend that, previous to the union, there were two natures, but after it only one. "Following the example of the holy Fathers, we teach and confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in deity, and the same perfect in humanity, very God and very man, consisting of reasonable soul and flesh, of the same substance with the Father as touching His Godhead, of the same substance with us as touching His humanity; in all things like to us, without sin; begotten of the Father, as touching His Godhead, before the Æons; begotten in the latter days, for our redemption, of the Virgin Mary, the mother of God, as touching His humanity; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten (do we confess), in two natures (al. *of* two natures, ἐκ δυῶν φύσεων), acknowledged unmixed, unconverted, undivided, so that the distinction of natures was never abolished by the union, but rather the peculiarity of each preserved, and

[1] Mansi, vii. 109.

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combined into one person and one hypostasis (Note 26): not one, severed or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, Him who is God, Λόγος, and the Lord Jesus Christ. And inasmuch as the holy Synod has formularized these things in all aspects, with all accuracy and care, it decrees that it be not allowed to propound any other faith, neither in writings nor in thought, nor to teach it to others. Whosoever dareth to act in opposition to this decree, shall be deposed, if of the clergy; shall be excommunicated, if of the laity."

We have not concealed how much corruption was mixed up with the movements and struggles which took place between the first Council of Constantinople and the Council of Chalcedon. Very far indeed was the latter, notwithstanding its 630 bishops, from deserving to be invested with canonical authority. The Fathers of this Council displayed neither the unanimity of an assembly animated by the Holy Spirit, nor that firmness of judgment which is raised above vacillation and inconsistency, nor that courage in the maintenance of convictions, which is possible where a clear and distinct common understanding has been arrived at, after long internal conflicts. When this has taken place, the clarified and ripened knowledge easily, and at the right moment, finds a common expression, in which all believers recognise their own views, which they afterwards justly hold in great honour, and which they fit in to the growing edifice of the Church's knowledge, as another solid and well-wrought stone. But the decision at Chalcedon was premature, originating in an impatient desire for an absolute uniformity of creed, such as we do not find in the first centuries of the history of the Christian Church. The Council compelled entire churches to choose between blind submission to decisions, of the correctness of which they were still very far from being inwardly convinced, on the one hand; and exclusion from communion with the Church General, on the other hand: and when the latter alternative was preferred, they were thrown back upon themselves, and shut out from the wholesome influence of the rest of Christendom. The Church also thus deprived itself, as far as lay in its power, of the co-operation of a factor whose help was still urgently required if the Christological process should not be brought to a standstill.

This, however, is but one, and that the empirical aspect, of the matter. If even a scientific view of history, in the general sense of the word, justly requires that a higher reason be seen to hold energetic sway over the human weaknesses, vacillations, and passions which cross each other continually, and of which no one in particular can claim to have all the right on its side; and if, at decisive conjunctures in ancient times, which have exercised a lasting influence on following ages, it is especially inclined to expect to find that some step has been taken in advance, which, though not perhaps blameless in manner, is still worthy of note: then surely it becomes Christian science to contemplate and weigh decisions like those of the Council of Chalcedon, whose effects were so decisive and enduring, not merely in the light of their empirical origin,—with which, unquestionably, much ungodliness both of thought and act was associated,—but with the reflection, that even the impurity of man is unable to stay the progress of the work of the kingdom of God. Without prejudice, therefore, it is our duty to consider the question, whether in Chalcedon something salutary was not effected for the development of the doctrine of the Person of Christ.

When we examine the decrees of Chalcedon from this point of view, we find, firstly, that their determinations were, in part, genuinely Christological; secondly, that, as contrasted with Monophysitism, which was ready to rest contented with a unity in its immediate, undeveloped form, they have both a scientific and religious value, however unsatisfactory and inconclusive the new positive theses of the Council may be in themselves.

Firstly, It cannot be denied that Nestorius and Eutyches were, in point of fact, treated unjustly at the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. They had not taught what these Synods represented them as teaching; and consequences drawn from their teachings were treated as principles distinctly laid down. It was not proved that Eutyches held either the divine nature to have become capable of suffering in Christ, or the human nature to have been absorbed in the divine; and yet, at the Council of Chalcedon, he was reproached with both views, and that although they are scarcely reconcileable with each other. It has been proved that Nestorius did not mean to teach a duality of persons in Christ. But, even though the

Synod was wrong on this point, it was not wrong in deciding that the two theories of Nestorianism and Eutychianism, to which henceforth a dogmatical, instead of a merely historical, significance attached, should be anticipatorily laid down as buoys pointing out to the Church the middle course, along which its voyage must proceed. In this respect, the Symb. Chalc. may be characterized as a declaration, on the part of the Church, that no doctrine of the Person of Christ can lay claim to the name of Christian which puts a double Christ in the place of the incarnate Son of God, or which teaches either a mere conversion of God into a man, or, *vice versâ*, of a man into God. The former, that is, the Nestorian view, does not admit of a process by which God becomes man, and a man becomes God: both, on the contrary, are left, as in the ante-Christian period, essentially and eternally separate. On the other hand, its Eutychian counterpart represents the process as advancing with a physical rapidity, so that either the divine nature, being converted into human, ceases to exist, and the man alone remains behind in Christ (Ebionitically); or, at the first contact of the divine with the human, the latter is transmuted into the former. But a true incarnation of God is incompatible with either of the just-mentioned alternatives. Docetism and Ebionitism equally do away with the fundamental fact of Christianity, which must be perennial; and it makes only an apparent difference, whether the reality of either the divine or the human aspect of the Person of Christ be called in question from the very commencement, as in the case of the early Ebionitism and Docetism; or whether the annulment of the one or the other be the result of the process commenced with both aspects. The ἀτρέπτως, ἀσυγχύτως must, therefore, hold good of both aspects of the Person of Christ, namely, of their essence. Besides rejecting the notion of a twofold personality, by the adoption of the more precise terms ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως, the Council decided that the two aspects of the one person may not be conceived as separated or divided. Now, although these are but negative determinations, they involve the demand that the two natures should constitute a real unity, and the repudiation of an identification either in the one or the other mode.

Secondly, In the history of our dogma up to this time, there has passed before us, it is true, a multitude of attempts to show

how the two natures, according to the conception thereof in vogue at each period, were united in the one person. But, apart from the circumstance, that down to the fourth century the conception formed of the two natures was an imperfect one, and that, consequently, the conception of their union could not but be also imperfect (as in the case of Arianism and Apollinarism), the form which this unity of the Person of Christ took in the common faith of the Church, with the single exception of the school of Antioch, was such that no further endeavour was made to discriminate the two aspects subsequently to the Unio. Not that there was any intention of denying the reality of the two aspects; but doubt seemed to it to be thrown on the very incarnation itself, unless everything human in Christ were represented as also divine, and everything divine as also human. And, in point of fact, even that grand Christian intuition, which we have designated the mystical one, and which united as it were in one view such apparent opposites as the infinite and the finite, entirely failed, so far as can be ascertained, definitely to distinguish between the divine and the human. This, indeed, was only possible on the condition that a conception had been formed of each by itself, and apart from the other, such as the Unio was not considered to admit. On the contrary, special delight was taken in setting forth how humanity in Christ was endowed with the power of God, how it worked miracles, how it ascended with Christ to the heavens, and there sits at the right hand of God; and further, how God was with us in Him, and appropriated everything human to Himself—birth, suffering, death. So long as the divine was contemplated by itself, and the human by itself (that is, apart from the Unio), it was felt that their individual characteristics remained unmixed; but being united, they have all things in common.[1] It was both natural and necessary for the Church to make this latter a part of its doctrine. For, unless the divine nature of Christ took part in His work, in some way or another, no satisfactory conception could be formed of the work of redemption; out of regard to which, the Latin and Greek Fathers always attached the greatest importance to the view of Christ in the totality and unity of His person. In this interest, older teachers of the Church, such

[1] Gregory of Nyssa c. Eunom. iv. 589 ff.; compare Münscher, iv. 37.

as Irenæus, Hilary, and Athanasius, made use of expressions from which, if pressed, the conclusion might be drawn that the divine nature suffered. Subsequently to the fourth century, the, it is true, somewhat vague qualification was often added, that the divine nature suffered without suffering,—showing that their sole purpose was to assert for the divine nature a participation in the work of redemption. Similar motives led, even (as can be shown) as early as the fourth century, to the introduction of the term θεοτόκος into the style of the Church. Looking chiefly to practical interests, the Church invariably inquired, first of all, what was the final sum-total; it troubled itself little about the way in which that sum-total was arrived at,—that is, about the mode of conciliating the different factors (which conciliation presupposes them to have been already distinct and separate); but, conscious that in the work of redemption the divine and human natures were united, clung with cheerful faith to the grand result which lay before the inner eye of Christendom.

It would be easy to show that the greatest Church-teachers of the fourth century, not to mention earlier ones, conceived the duality of natures to have been abolished by the act of incarnation. After the incarnation they no longer distinguished accurately between divine and human; for, by so doing, they would have believed themselves detracting to some extent from the marvellous greatness of the final result. Irenæus having set the example, it became for a long period the custom to define the union as a "mixture" (μῖξις, κρᾶσις, ἀνάκρασις, κατάκρασις) of the divine and human,—a definition which implied not merely the homogeneity of the divine and human, but also the production of a third new substance. That the humanity of Christ *in* the Unio is not like ours, although *our* humanity was assumed and glorified by the Logos, is not only taught by Hilary, but is also essentially involved in the mystical view of Christ as the Head, above referred to, as well as in the idea of the uniqueness of His nature. In like manner, the teachers of the Church—as, for example, Cyrill and Hilary—did not hesitate to say that the Divine Word had emptied itself, in order that human nature might be capable of being its vehicle and bearer. Gregory of Nyssa went so far even as to teach that the humanity was converted into the Deity, by the commingling of the latter with the former; for he says, that the

body which suffered, being mixed with the divine nature, became, by means of this mixture, the same as the nature which assumed it;[1] and he uses the simile,—as a drop of vinegar, when cast into the ocean, loses itself, and is changed into the nature of the ocean, so did the flesh pass over into the immutable ocean of the Godhead.[2] This, of course, overshot the intended mark; for what was aimed at, was not the utter cessation of the human, and the resumption of the incarnation, under the pretence of its complete realization. The words were really meant to express, though in an exaggerated rhetorical form, the thoroughness and completeness of the union between the divine and the human. So much, however, is clear, that Gregory, in using such expressions, had not the least notion of a permanent difference between the divine and human natures in the Unio: on the contrary, the two aspects of the Person of Christ were posited as homogeneous magnitudes, which might very well be combined to form a new, third something. Nay more, this homogeneity is so defined by Gregory Nazianzen as not to admit of more than a quantitative distinction: which would, of course, logically warrant the conclusion that, by means of the Unio, the humanity was either converted into, or swallowed up in, the Deity. Especially, however, were the duality of substances, and the continued existence of this duality subsequent to, and within the Unio, expressly controverted in the letter, which we have attributed to the Roman Bishop Julius (see the First Part, Sec. 4).[3] He expresses himself in the strongest manner against the doctrine of "two natures," because thus two Christs are posited,—one, a perfect man—the other, the Son of God. Such a discerption, he affirmed, must lead directly to a Samosatenical conception of Jesus. And although the Western Fathers, Ambrose, Augustine, Leo, soon taught otherwise, Cœlestine of Rome still took the part of Cyrill. Even an Athanasius, however earnestly he had endeavoured to maintain the completeness of the humanity of Christ in opposition to Apollinaris, taught that there was but one substance, the incarnate nature of the Logos

[1] Greg. Nyss. c. Eunom. iv. 581.

[2] Epiphanius rejects the σύγχυσις and τροπή, on the ground that, as the mediatory function related to two aspects, it required ἑκάτερα. But still he says that "God was, τὰ δύο κεράσας εἰς ἕν."

[3] Doubts are indeed thrown by some on the genuineness of this letter.

(*μία Θεοῦ λόγου φύσις σεσαρκωμένη*), after the incarnation.[1] To this tendency and this terminology the Alexandrian theologians remained peculiarly faithful; and they found most adherents amongst those who looked for nothing good from scientific distinctions and conciliations, and who, in the partial continuance of the distinctions, as they existed apart from the incarnation, saw nothing but a partial denial of the main fact, an attenuation of the grand unity which had been realized. Their opposition was partly based on religious considerations: to these were due its obstinacy and long continuance. They were unwilling to allow that mystical image of the Person of Christ to be either stolen from them or disfigured. Even from a scientific point of view, they deemed the attempts in an opposite direction to be superficial; for, as they observed, the mark at which aim is taken is not the true one, the problem is shortened that the solution may become possible, and thus the pretended explanations are a denial of the great marvel in its depth. The opinion, that when the Fathers who took this view of the matter protest against two naturas, *φύσεις*, they really mean only to repudiate two persons, is historically untenable. It is true, that in the use of the words, *φύσις, οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον*, natura, essentia, substantia or subsistentia, persona, a vacillation long prevailed, which made it difficult to find precise expressions; but it is almost ludicrous to convert this whole earnest struggle into a mere battle about words. *An unprejudiced consideration of the course which this dogma pursued, must convince us that, prior to the Council of Chalcedon, the doctrine of a duality of natures within the unio, was not really a doctrine of the Church*; however confidently the teachers of the Church might hold that the unity, whatever it were, had been constituted by the union of two natures. Behind the two natures, which continued to exist even in the perfect Unio, they not only thought they saw a duality of persons, but regarded the eternal duration of the two substances or natures in the one person as a derogation from, and alteration of, the Unio itself, and of the significance of the very act of incarnation. Instead of establishing distinctions even within the Person of Christ, they preferred to dwell on the first, most immediate and inward aspect of the

[1] Compare the remarks in Part I., 1073, of this work, on the *φυσικὴ ἕνωσις* of Athanasius.

union, which had been accomplished in Him between the remotest contrarieties.

In such a state, however, the matter could not remain. This immediate unity, and the image, in its mystical totality, of which it was the basis, must at last allow of justice being done both to the distinctions, and to the process by which the distinct elements were mediated, in order that a higher unity, satisfactory both in a scientific and religious point of view, might be the final result.

The school of Antioch, during its struggle with Apollinaris, had seen clearly enough that it was necessary to pass from that immediate unity to an examination of the distinctions; and the ecclesiastical favour with which it was for a long time regarded, was due to the feeling, if not to the clear perception, of this necessity. Described historically, Cyrill's fault was that of refusing to learn the lesson which the history of the Church since Apollinaris taught him, and of supposing that he would be surest of hitting upon the right, if he could maintain the earlier and more general point of view, and, as though nothing whatever had taken place during the interval, could effect a restoration in opposition to the Antiocheians. This is the most general reason why Cyrill, and Dioscurus (who meant to be thoroughly of one mind with him), when considered in the light of later events, appear as forms of but very ambiguous orthodoxy. When Cyrill is regarded in connection with the course of the development of the Church and its dogma, much may be urged in his favour; but still it must be confessed that he failed to discern the true character of the point at which this development then stood,—that he resisted, and, in the main, without result, a step which the dogma was now not only justified, but necessitated, to take,—and that, by his works, he caused much trouble to, whilst he exercised little wholesome influence on, later generations, which, on account of the irrevocable Council of Ephesus, could not avoid estimating him in the light of the orthodoxy of a subsequent period. Whosoever, at crises such as the one referred to, when the Church is called upon to quit an old path, and to enter upon a new sphere both of thought and speech, persists in keeping to the old, will be left behind by orthodoxy; and not the firmest confidence in the justice of his own position, nor the strongest authorities of former ages,

can save an orthodoxy, so obsolete, from bearing an ambiguous and doubtful character. Such probably was the experience of Cyrill and Dioscurus.[1]

But we must now examine the reasons why it was necessary that, from the fifth century onwards, the attention of the Christian Church should be directed to the distinctions in the Person of Christ, and why the Council of Chalcedon was justified in its opposition to Monophysitism, which resisted the turn matters were taking.

In general, the Church may be said to have already upheld the interests of Christian science in opposition to the Monophysitism of the Alexandrians and monks of that age. Cyrill took pleasure in bringing into juxtaposition the most marked paradoxes;—for example, Christ created the world; God suffered and yet remained unchangeable. And yet he did very little to explain the mystery, preferring to lay stress on its absolute incomprehensibleness. In this respect he made an unfair use of the religious intuitions which, to judge from many deep passages in his works, he must have possessed in great intensity; for he employed them to throw discredit on efforts to exhibit the rationale of faith. This would only indicate that the Christian consciousness was in the retrogressive or sickly condition of doubting its ability to keep abreast of culture and science in general. Herein were the Orientals, and above all the Antiocheians, in advance of Cyrill. Two alternatives lay before Christian intellect;—either to stand still, or to apply itself to a subject which the Alexandrian party endeavoured by all means to proscribe, namely, to the analysis in thought of that primitive and immediate intuition of the unity of the Person of Christ possessed by faith, in order afterwards to undertake the synthetical conciliation and combina-

[1] Such examples from the history of dogmas are highly instructive, both in relation to the laws of development in this sphere, and to the orthodoxy of the individual. We learn from them, that in the judgment of history, a man may become heterodox through orthodoxy. Whoso seeks to eternize a particular mode of thought, which has been merely experimentally adopted by the restlessly self-developing spirit of the Church, may easily miss its true significance, and thus prove faithless to it through very persistency and lack of freedom. The above words, which occurred in the first edition of this work, I repeat here the more readily, as illustrations enough of their truth have presented themselves since the date of its appearance.

tion of its elements. The Council of Chalcedon, so far from making a dogma of the absolute incomprehensibility of this doctrine, by the very mode in which it defined the problem, rather encouraged attempts at its solution.

This one point alone, entitles the Council of Chalcedon to grateful recognition. That which is absolutely incomprehensible estranges the mind, and can lay no claim to mould and determine the view it takes of the world in its totality; and as Christology necessarily claims to be the very centre of any general view of the world, it cannot, without inconsistency, start with the assertion of its own utter incomprehensibleness. Mention should be further made of a circumstance which was of special importance for that time. In the fourth century, as we have previously remarked, the heathen found their way into the Church in masses. Now, the more rapidly this took place, the more necessary was it for the Church to guard, at all events in the matter of doctrine, most carefully against heathenish and pantheistic elements. But without question a pantheistic mode of thought might find support—a very firm support too—at the very centre of Christianity, so long as a doctrine was received by the Church like that of Monophysitism, which posited a unity of the divine and human without doing justice to the distinction between the two.[1] Further on also, we shall find pantheistic tendencies manifesting themselves within the sphere of Monophysitism; nor was it the work of mere fancy, when the Fathers of the Council were reminded, by the Monophysitism of Eutyches, of Gnostic and Apollinarian errors. Here, however, it will be well to cast a glance at the history of anthropology in the Church, especially as related to the doctrine of the nature of God, that we may discover the whereabouts of the Church in the fourth century, and better understand how necessary it was that a deeper view should be now taken of the distinction between the divine and human.

During the period of the rise and ascendancy of the Logos-doctrine, but little heed was paid to the distinction. According

1 We shall soon find that a pantheistic element could be very well combined with the above described exclusive view of the idea of God taken by Cyrill, according to which God, as to His nature, is absolutely different from, and exalted above us.

to that doctrine, the human and the divine are in all cases partially one; for human reason is itself a divine emanation. This opinion seemed at first very favourable to Christology; but, in reality, the notion of such a primitive immediate unity of the divine and the human, made the position of Christianity a very precarious one, and concealed from view its moral and regenerative bearings (Note 28). To the unimpaired conservation of the essential characteristics of Christianity, more earnest reflection on sin was necessary; and, as is well known, this condition was fulfilled especially in the West, by Irenæus, Tertullian, and others down to Augustine. All that the Greek Church did, was sternly to repel Manichæism; it had only a doctrine of formal freedom, such as even Pelagius laid down, to oppose to it: whereas Augustine, in the course of his development, had not without profit passed through the stage of Manichæism.

Such reflection on the human, in its common empirical, sinful condition, must have been, more than anything else, fitted to modify the doctrine of an universal and direct participation of humanity in the Logos, and to establish the necessity of the historical redemption of humanity by the God-man—it must also have added force to the tendency to lay stress on the distinction between the divine and the human. The Church accustomed itself to give prominence to the infinite distance between the divine and human (the empirical form of the latter involuntarily exercising a decided influence on its idea), to the absolute difference between the nature of God and man. This may, perhaps, be the ultimate reason why in the West, with the exception of the brief period of hesitancy on the part of Julius and Cœlestine, who were inclined to Monophysitism, from the fifth century onwards, Dyophysitism pretty constantly found representatives.

There was, no doubt, a wide difference between the early anthropological doctrines of the Greek Church, and those of Augustine, or Tertullian, or Hilary; the former having been more inclined to a moral view of the nature of man, the latter to an absolute supernaturalism in religion. Still, each of these opposed tendencies in anthropology served to further Christology; and in consequence of their momentary concurrence at Chalcedon, it became possible to clear the way for the assertion

of the distinctions in the Person of Christ, in opposition to an identification which would have again introduced an heathenish or pantheistic conception of God. But the two concurrent parties were influenced by very different considerations. Those who thought with the school of Antioch, guarded jealously the moral freedom of man, and supposed themselves therefore unable to assign to the divine in Christ more than a foreign and external position. Led by religious considerations, the Westerns, on the contrary, insisted on the infinite distance of the human from the divine, for the purpose of bringing out the Divine miracle of the incarnation. So much the more significant, therefore, must the fact be found, that the strongly antagonistic views taken of anthropology by such as Augustine, on the one hand, and by such as were inclined to Pelagianism, on the other, should have found a meeting-point and a common expression, at all events in Christology.

It may be, that in the unadjusted antagonism between the Antiocheian doctrine of freedom, as a factor essential to the completeness of human nature, and the Augustinian doctrine of grace, there slumbered a further, even a Christological, antagonism: but what was necessary for the present, was accomplished at Chalcedon, in that, by the more careful distinction of the divine from the human, at all events the foundations of Christianity were secured against an anti-ethical theory, of a physical character,—against Pantheism. Had the discrimination of the divine and human within the Person of Christ been pretermitted, and had the Church persisted in that unreflective spontaneous view of the unity of the divine and human which had hitherto been in vogue (annihilating instead of conciliating the distinctions), by thus refusing to do justice to these distinctions, the unity would have been converted into mixture or identification, and the conviction of the reality and completeness of, at all events, the human aspect of the Person of Christ, which had been gained during the first period, would have been again endangered. The danger of this was all the greater, as the Antiocheian Christology had had for a considerable time no distinguished representative; and as, from the whole spirit of the time, a curtailment of the divine aspect of the Person of Christ was less to be expected than a curtailment of the human.

The Christological antagonism which slumbered in the

anthropological, is, in fact, easy of recognition; and the consideration of it will form a transition to the defects of the Chalcedonian formula.

In the supposed interest of moral freedom, stress was laid by some on the human aspect, to the essential and eternal exclusion of the divine. These, therefore, could not consistently admit the actual realization of a union between the divine and human. By way of describing the loose, outward connection established between the two, they employed the simile of a temple or garment; by no means intending, however, to represent the human nature of Christ as a mere thing destitute of independence.

Others placed themselves on the divine side; but equally posited an absolute difference of essence. A Christology became thus, in itself, a simple impossibility. But, whereas the former failed seriously to recognise the necessity of a Christology, the latter bridged over the gulf by means of their religious consciousness of sin and of the Divine omnipotence.

Even though the gulf between God and man be an infinite one, the infinite *power* of God, they considered, bridges it over for our salvation; and the deeper and wider the gulf, the brighter was the radiance of the miracle of the Divine omnipotence. But, by giving such prominence to the Divine omnipotence, and, in connection therewith, to the absolutely supernatural character of the mystery, we fail again to free ourselves from the notion of the inner exclusiveness of the factors (in this case, of the divine), and to cast out the leaven of Pantheism. The Divine omnipotence is, after all, but a physical determination. Love may be represented as the inmost motive of omnipotence in accomplishing the incarnation; but, unless its mode of operation be also conceived to be moral, an ethical process in Christ cannot be admitted: furthermore, mere omnipotence, as such, would exclude the reality of the humanity of Christ; and, notwithstanding every appearance to the contrary, leave it only the semblance of an existence. Thus, instead of our seeing God in Christ, who is also the veritable Son of man, full of grace and truth, the humanity of Christ must logically be lowered to the position of a mere selfless ὄργανον of God, or even to that of a mere temple or garment. These images are here again employed, where the intention is, on the one hand, to uphold a real Unio, and yet, on the other hand, to indicate the impersonal

character of the humanity. Even the Augustinian denial of human freedom bore traces of Pantheism; and a conception of God, the chief feature of which is the attribute of omnipotence, is chargeable with the very same anti-Christological exclusiveness which distinguished the anthropological idea of freedom taught by the Orientals.

These two tendencies, which, by means of their mutual alliance, and of the aid of the State, succeeded in gaining the victory at Chalcedon, were agreed in representing the divine and human as mutually exclusive, the one of the other, though they started from opposite points of view. However just might be their joint antagonism to Monophysitism, which was unwilling to admit of a unity constituted by the rational conciliation of distinctions, on the point just mentioned they were at one. And when they, notwithstanding, concurred in reducing the distinctions to the expression, "Two natures or substances" (*φύσεις, οὐσίαι*), the true historical meaning thereof is this,—that the two natures are infinitely and totally, or essentially, different from each other, but that the Divine omnipotence made the impossible possible.

The positing of *such* a duality of natures cannot be designated a progress in Christology, but was simply a grave fault, which might have been avoided if there had been less haste to form a symbolum. Through the eagerness to triumph prematurely over Monophysitism, instead of making it their ally and servant, the Fathers at Chalcedon subjected themselves to an inward bondage to that contrariety. They supposed themselves to possess the truth when they had shut out the pretended double personality of Nestorianism, and had established the simple opposite of Monophysitism; not considering what was required in order that the unity which was desired even by themselves might be possible.

The religio-ethical tendency pursued by Augustinianism in the matter of ponerology (*a*), did not at all necessitate the positing of two natures in the Person of Christ, which must eternally remain substantially or essentially different. Its fault, on the contrary, was, that instead of carrying the ethical point of view fully out, it ended physically or metaphysically in the omnipotence of God; or, in other words, that it did not extrude the

(*a*) "Ponerologie;" from *πονηρός* and *λόγος* = doctrine of evil or sin. —Tr.

pantheistic element which still remained behind. Evil is not truly known until it is seen to be as strongly opposed to the idea of man as it is to the idea of God. The pure idea of man cannot be incompatible with the divine: they are bound and belong inwardly to each other; and to bring them together is not a work of mere omnipotence. Not until the ethical had been truly recognised as the essential and characteristic (not a merely accidental or adventitious) feature of each, could the distinction between God and humanity be completely secured against the inroads of Pantheism: but, this once confessed, the distinction was safe, for, being moral, each is related affirmatively to the other, instead of necessitating its curtailment, or even dissipation. If, then, the ethical is the most essential element of the idea both of God and man, it can be no longer permitted to describe the idea of humanity, which attained realization in the humanity of Christ, as fundamentally different from God.

Prior to the Reformation, as is well known, few traces are discoverable of such a logical following out of the ethical principles laid down by Augustine. On the contrary, an unreal and incoherent semi-Pelagianism,—that jumble of a doctrine of freedom which excluded the divine, and of a doctrine of God and grace which excluded the really moral in man, that compound of Pelagian and magical elements,—for the most part took the lead. This having been confessedly the characteristic of the Romanic Church, it would be a mark of great shortsightedness to maintain that the Christology of this period—which, like all others, could only operate with such conceptions of the divine and human as happened then to prevail—took none but sound forms, needing no reform. Not that we mean by any means to deny altogether the orderliness of its further course; for even error, where it has penetrated, is compelled to pursue a normal path by the strong cohibitive arm of truth.

After what has been advanced, we are justified in saying, that the Council of Chalcedon did not form a deep enough estimate of the distinction between the divine and the human, but so defined it, that the two, when they meet, commingle, and the human necessarily disappears in the divine, which is related to the human, as the infinite, to a finite power. The reason thereof is, that the distinction between the two is not conceived as ethically conciliated. Every one allows that a

form of inspiration which suppresses human self-consciousness is unethical, and even pantheistic, in so far as it allows the individual Ego to be nothing but an impersonal organ of the Divine power, to which it succumbs. If now we conceive the action of Divine power to be extended to the will, and to all the psychical and somatical (corporeal) functions; if, moreover, we suppose it to be, not merely momentary, but perennial and retained to all eternity: then the result is, not a Christ who is both Son of man and Son of God—not a filial position for humanity, but a permanent state of bondage, if not even less:—in one word, such a view leaves us only a Christ whose origin and home is the domain of pantheistic intuitions. The doctrine of the Church had the *desire* to discriminate itself from Pantheism; but the discrimination was not carried through, because it was not transferred to its true sphere, the sphere of the ethical, where alone Pantheism can be overcome in its very principle, and the distinction be again conciliated. This same thing is clear also from the consideration, that to treat the Deity and humanity predominantly as φύσεις, as physical substances, is in effect to represent them as essentially equal—as immediately primitively equal. The equality, moreover, is one before which any inequality, however great it may otherwise be, vanishes; inasmuch as everything that is merely φύσις pertains to a sphere, from which the ethical is in the first instance excluded as something essentially disparate. This Christology, based as it was upon views of God and man, which we were compelled to trace to a parentage still partially pantheistic, found characteristic and conclusive expression, at a subsequent period, in the doctrine of the impersonality of the human nature—a doctrine which, though sanctioned by no Œcumenical Council, was certainly adopted by later teachers of the Church. However unwillingly and late they arrived at this position, it was but the open and plain confession of that which necessarily followed on the eternization of the duality of essentially different natures in the Person of Christ. With the defect just described was associated another.

The formula of Chalcedon, viewed in its historical connection, may be said to have taken the side of the discrimination, in opposition to that of the oneness, of nature, in the Person of Christ; and to have stamped the distinction as an eternal

duality of natures.[1] It thus sensibly estranged itself from that mystical image of the Person of Christ in its unity and totality, which represents the entire Deity of the Logos as having become man, in such a way that the man also, at the same time, became God. Regarded from the point of view of that mystical Christology, the Dyophysitism which now rose to supremacy lowered the Christological task to one of the mere combination of the two natures in one person;[2] but still without any reasonable prospect of thus bringing about a solution of the problem. Witnesses for that higher, original Christological image, never at any time utterly failed; the religious interest, which concentrated itself chiefly on that image, burst out ever afresh, sometimes conjoined with logical inconsistencies, and sometimes in circuitous paths. But the Council of Chalcedon threw obstacles in the way of that intuitional image of Christ, by withdrawing from it that without which it could not be carried through, and by imposing upon it that with which its existence was incompatible. The Fathers displayed herein most clearly that same lack of deep interest in religion, which was evidenced by the whole spirit of their proceedings. The Council had nothing further to say concerning the humanity of Christ, than that it was of the same substance as ours, with the exception of sin; whilst, in the discussions relative to Eutyches, it entirely overlooked the fact, that even as touching His humanity, to Christ must be attributed a thoroughly exceptional character, in virtue of which He, and He alone, is the Head in the organism of the true humanity, and alone sets forth that true idea of humanity which through Him is to be realized in us. This plainly shows that the image of the Person of Christ, in its totality, must have receded very far into the background, as compared with the interest in maintaining the distinctions; and yet, at no period was there a greater necessity for keeping firm hold on it than now, when the duality of natures and their infinite distinction from each other had been definitely

[1] As Niedner well remarks, it favoured and met the modified Antiocheian, rather than the monophysitic tendency.

[2] The piety of the Church would no longer suffer itself to be deprived of the expression "Mother of God" (*θεοτόκος*), although, strictly viewed, it owed its origin to another period, and one more favourable to Monophysitism, to wit, the pre-Chalcedonian period.

posited :—a circumstance which made a conciliatory element doubly needful.

From all this we see that even Monophysitism was partially justified in its opposition to the Council of Chalcedon. But it was impossible for the ancient Church to do justice to that system.[1] It started with the unity of the person ; took up, therefore, its point of view at the very centre of Christianity, within the precincts of the incarnation already accomplished ; and sought thence, as we shall see, to effect the discrimination of the unity. The Church, on the contrary, now starts with the duality of natures ; begins its constructive work from the pre-Christian point of view ; and, instead of taking the unity for granted as an inexpugnable axiom, leaves it to be developed in the course of the scientific process through which dogmas were passing. And when we find the Church continually vacillating, during the process, between a principially pantheistic annihilation of the human by the divine, on the one hand, and a Judaistic separation of the two, on the other ; we shall see merely a not unexpected counterpart to that fluctuation between a Pelagian and a magical view of the doctrine of man and of grace, which was peculiar to the Romanic Period. For more than three centuries the dualism of natures posited by the Council of Chalcedon gained ever wider recognition, in opposition to the traces of Monophysitism, which still remained in the Church, until the Christian mind was warned, by the rise and spread of Adoptianism, to do justice to the unity of the Person of Christ. In discharging this debt, however, it made such a use of the doctrine of the impersonality of the human nature, that the tendency towards the magical view of the operations of grace, and towards transubstantiation, which was characteristic of the Middle Ages, found ever increased satisfaction.

[1] The debt due to Monophysitism began first to be discharged by the Lutheran Christology.

SECTION II.

THE SETTLEMENT AND THE LOGICAL COMPLETION OF THE CHALCEDONIAN DOCTRINE OF TWO NATURES.

From the Council of Chalcedon, to the Council of Frankfurt, A.D. 794.

CHAPTER FIRST.

DYOPHYSITISM IN CONFLICT WITH MONOPHYSITISM.

FROM THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON, A.D. 451, TO THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANTINOPLE, A.D. 553.

As the threats uttered by the monks and their representatives, prior to the Synod of Chalcedon, would have led us to expect, the Monophysites did not submit to the Council, and considered themselves quite as justified in designating this Synod a Party Synod, as did the Fathers at Chalcedon, the Synod of 449. The doggedness of the resistance offered by the vanquished, may be partially explained from the little moral respect which the history of the Council commands; but was primarily due also to religious considerations. The Monophysite party now separated itself from the great body of the Church, and constituted itself into a sect, as the Nestorian party had previously done. The compass of the former, however, was far greater than that of the latter. Not only in Illyria, but even in Constantinople, did the Monophysites remain for a long time powerful; and more than one Emperor, induced by the consideration of their great influence in the East (specially in one part of Syria and Armenia), in Egypt, and in Abyssinia, was repeatedly on the point of either consign-

ing the decrees of Chalcedon to silent oblivion, or more directly assailing them.[1] The party rose further in intrinsic significance, from the circumstance that many of its adherents exhibited a truly philosophical spirit, and applied themselves in particular to the Aristotelian philosophy. On the one hand, it understood how to enchain the immediate Christian consciousness of the people by its manner, and, on the other hand, displayed both skill, and to a certain extent superiority, in its scientific enforcement of its view of the unity of the nature of Christ. It is quite true, of course, that in the efforts which were put forth, much formal subtlety, sophistry, and scholasticism came to light: this struggle was, to a certain extent, a prelude of the struggle between Nominalism and Realism: finally, moreover, the religious considerations which were the primary motive fell into the background. But still it deserves more favour and attention than have been ordinarily bestowed on it.[2] If it be interesting to watch how, from the date of the Council of Chalcedon, when the Church formally posited the duality of the natures, it was compelled to inquire what could be done for the assertion of their unity; it must be equally interesting to watch how the Monophysites, starting with the unity, and bent on preserving it untouched, endeavoured to arrive at a duality, if not of natures, of aspects of the Person of Christ. And, as though it had been ordained that Christendom should make attempts in all possible directions, we find amongst the Monophysites also, an interesting and internally progressive variety of opinion. To this the more attention should be paid, as it was perhaps necessary to the formation of a more satisfactory Christology, that the process, whose direction was from duality to unity, should also take the direction from unity to duality; although the direction taken by the Church, under the leadership of the Council of Chalcedon, from

[1] The inexpressible confusion introduced into all the Churches of the East and the West by the monophysitic controversy, and its changing phases, are depicted with special vividness by Nicephorus in his Church History, vol. xvi. 25.

[2] Both Gieseler and Baur have recently done much to throw light on the history of the Monophysites,—the former in his "Commentatio qua Monophysitarum veterum variæ de Christi persona opiniones imprimis ex ipsorum effatis recens editis illustrantur," T. i. ii. 1835, 1838; the latter in his "Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung," vol. ii. 37–59.

duality to unity, must probably take the precedence and first arrive at a fixed result.

The most notable men of the Monophysite party were, on the one hand, Dioscurus, Timothy Ailuros, Patriarch of Alexandria, Julian, Bishop of Halicarnassus, Stephen Niobes, and Theodosius;[1] on the other hand, Severus from Pisidia, Patriarch of Antioch, and Xenaias or Philoxenus, Bishop of Hierapolis or Mabug, both about the year 500.[2] The former demanded that the unity of the Person of Christ should be so maintained as to involve, not indeed the total extinction of the human nature, but still its ceasing to be of the same substance with ours. They clung, therefore, to that doctrine of transmutation which represents the human as converted into divine. On the other hand, they asserted that the divine suffered only according to grace, as Dioscurus says, not according to nature; supposing that thus they preserved intact both the unchangeableness of the divine nature, and the power over its own actual condition. Each nature in this way undergoes an alteration by means of the other: the divine communicates its own nature to the human, and the human gives its own attributes, as it were, in exchange to the Logos,—in whom, therefore, its existence is thenceforth guaranteed. This view is directly allied to the teachings of Eutyches. The point of view of Dioscurus is most clearly seen from his relation to the sufferings of Christ. He was very far from wishing to deny the sufferings of Christ: he meant, on the contrary, merely to teach that the blood of Christ is the blood of God,—and that, not in consequence of the intervention of the divine person, but in its own nature. Unless this were the case, it would not be heavenly and imperishable. It would be profane, Dioscurus considered, to say that the blood of Christ was of the same substance with anything merely natural. Similar also is the remark of Timothy Ailuros: Christ has homoousia with us, only so far as He was

Compare the fragments of Dioscurus' letter in A. Mai's "Nova Coll." Tom. vii. 289, and of Timotheus Ailuros, in Tom. vii. 35, 277, 304, 305 of the same work; Evagrius iii. 14, iv. 39; Photius, cod. 162, 227.

[2] Philoxenus wrote a work, in three books, on the Trinity and Incarnation; compare Assem. bibl. or. ii. p. 25. A series of fragments of Severus is also extant. Ang. Mai, Tom. vii.; Leontius, "Apology for the Council of Chalcedon," Gallandii Bibl. Tom. xii. 719 f.; Mansi, vii. 831, viii. 817; Photius, 108, 230.

conceived by His mother from our common substance. But this resemblance is merely the starting-point; and had He been born from Mary like any other child, her virginity could not have been preserved. By the act of the Logos, therefore, Christ received a humanity different from ours,—a humanity which Dioscurus unquestionably held to have been from the very beginning the same as it was after the resurrection. This aspect of Monophysitism chimed most in with the feelings and notions of the mass of the people. Monophysitism kept its ground with such firmness, that the Emperor Zeno made an effort to reconcile it with the body of the Church by means of a formula in his Henoticon of the year 482, in which the Council of Chalcedon was not only treated as though it had never existed, but a slur was cast upon the Fathers who assisted at its deliberations. In this formula the Emperor was not content merely to make both the unity and the duality of natures an open question, and to let the dispute take its own course, as one that had not yet been decided; but unmistakeably espoused the cause of the Monophysites (of course with the repudiation of the Eutychian doctrine of the mixture of the natures) by expressly recognising the Council of Ephesus as authoritative, and joining even in the anathemas of Cyrill. Zeno's Henoticon would thus have secured for the unmodified doctrine of Cyrill a position which Cyrill himself could never have realized. The attempt, however, was in vain. The adherents of the Council of Chalcedon were by no means inclined so readily to renounce the advantage they had gained. The influence of the Council of Ephesus had indeed been paralyzed by the Chalcedonian decisions; but still, there could be no hope of effectually preventing Monophysitism, in the form in which it was taught by Cyrill, from attaining to supremacy, unless, at the very least, a demand was made that the decisions of Ephesus should be formally pronounced null and void. The misfortune was, that at Ephesus the Council went too far in the direction of Cyrill's views,—at Chalcedon, in the direction of the views of the school of Antioch. To treat two Œcumenical Councils not free from blame, or to declare them null and void, would have been, in the estimate of that period, equivalent to shaking the whole foundations of the Church: both, therefore, continued binding. But as the two Councils were animated by a very

different, yea, an opposite spirit, the Church was bound by self-contradictory decrees. This showed itself with special clearness in the fact, that the friends of the Council of Chalcedon did not venture on repudiating the Council of Ephesus, and yet, on the other hand, rejected the Henoticon, whose sole intent was to enforce the doctrine of Cyrill, as inconsistent with the Council of Chalcedon. Again, the Monophysites refused to be satisfied with anything less than the decrees of the Council of Ephesus and the Henoticon;—no other course, therefore, was open to the Church, than to accept, not only both Councils, but also their consequences.

Monophysitism now entered on a long and more independent course of development, principally in two directions: one of which may be regarded, according to a previous remark, as an evolution of Eutychianism; the other inclined inwardly towards the Church, and carried out Cyrill's views and spirit. The entire history of the Monophysites down to the 7th century, shows how widely and deeply their roots had struck into the soil of the Church; and how not only they were unable to break loose from the Church, but the Church also to break loose from them. Monophysitism cannot justly be termed simple and pure Docetism; it was rather a refined, reflective form thereof, and as such contained within itself an element of ferment the very opposite of Docetism. Should it happen therefore that life was infused into the anti-docetic element in Monophysitism, as would be most clearly evinced, when forms of doctrine developed themselves out of it which contained the docetical element in a pure state, and thus set before it, as in a mirror, a caricature of itself, instead of that image which it desired and supposed itself to present; then would there be a possibility of Monophysitism approximating to the doctrine of the Church. And, on the other hand, should the Church not merely talk about a unity of the person, but really strive, in some way or other, rationally to connect the two natures together, it might easily fall into monophysitic principles,—nay more, it might even outdo a Monophysitism which made earnest efforts to show how distinctions could exist in the one person of the God-man. There was, therefore, an inner necessity for the interaction of the adherents of the decree of Chalcedon and the Monophysites; and however certain it may

be that the changing political interests of the Emperors interfered with and disturbed the process by which the two were supplementing each other, through the favour bestowed at one time on the view laid down by the Council of Chalcedon, at another time (as, for example, under Zeno, and partially under both Justinian and Heraclius) on that of the Monophysites, and partially also through the premature construction of formulas of concord under external influence, and the enactment of laws binding to silence; yet the dialogue between the Church and the Monophysites continued, on the whole, its course (Note 29). So long as the heretical character of Monophysitism had not yet plainly manifested itself, the Church continued to experience its influence: nay more, during the immediately following stadia of its development, the Church adopted not a few monophysitic principles;—the resultant Christology, however, was but a composite of very heterogeneous elements.

Monophysitism found a strong support in the predicate of "Mother of God," which had been applied to Mary even in the earlier doctrinal writings of the Church, but especially since the time of the first Council of Ephesus: of this its advantage it was very well aware. The ever increasing cultus of Mary well discharged the office of deputy and representative of Monophysitism within the fold of the Church. In agreement with this cultus, the birth of Christ was conceived as the birth of God. This was natural enough, in that the divine nature was held to be the only and proper subject of the predicates applied to Christ,—even of that of birth, amongst the rest. If this were right, then were the Monophysites justified in requiring the predicates of suffering and dying to be applied to the divine subject, and in insisting on the use of such words as, "The Second Person of the Trinity endured suffering." This claim was also made by Peter Fullo (The Fuller), the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch, and the originator of the Theopassian controversy. He propounded the formula, "Holy God, holy Strong One, holy Immortal One, who for our sakes wast crucified, have mercy on us!" The triple invocation seemed to the orthodox to point to the Trinity, and therefore to imply that the divine substance was common to the three Persons. Patripassianism had, consequently, returned in an exaggerated trinitarian form. And

although it was affirmed that the essence of the Son alone, and not that which He had in common with the others, suffered; still, as the Son was consubstantial with the Father and the Spirit, Theopassianism in this form must unavoidably follow, unless a difference of essence between Father and Spirit on the one side, and the Son on the other, were admitted, bordering on Arianism. It is, of course, quite possible that Peter may have been led by religious considerations to form such a conception of the divine nature of the Son as permitted of His entering, out of love to men, into their suffering condition: but we lack more accurate information. His conception might also have been an Eutychian one. But against this supposition there is the circumstance, that Monophysites who repudiated Eutychianism, took the formula to mean that suffering is to be attributed to the Son of God solely on the ground of the union with humanity, and defended it as such. Only after prolonged resistance, however, and through the influence of John Marentius, who came to Constantinople with Scythian monks in the year 519, and demanded its recognition, did this formula, in the sense that one of the persons of the Trinity suffered, gain a lodgment within the Church. Marentius himself, indeed, made no way in Constantinople, and therefore he addressed himself to Hormisdas of Rome; but Hormisdas regarded the formula as heretical.[1] Still the formula found many supporters among the monks,—in part also among theologians; of the latter, the Deacon Fulgentius Ferrandus is specially worthy of mention;[2] it was received also with the greatest applause by the people. The Emperor Justinian therefore issued an edict, prescribing it to the Church; and its rejection was anathematized by the fifth Œcumenical Council, in the year 553.[3] The chief interest of the question lies in its involving a demand that Christology should again be intuited and examined in conjunction with the doctrine of the Trinity. If the Son of God be indissolubly and eternally united with humanity, nay more, if humanity is a constituent

[1] Mansi, T. viii. 498. Otherwise John II. Compare Baur's "Dreieinigkeitslehre," ii. 72.

[2] Compare Fulgentius Ferrandus' (of Carthage) "de duabus in Christo naturis et quod unus de Trinitate natus passusque dici possit," Bibl. Max. Lugd. ix. 502 f.—Confessio Maxentii, ib. p. 534 f.

[3] Mansi, T. viii. 765 ff., ix. 384. Anathemat. x. Compare Baur l. c. ii. Walch "Histor. der Ketzer," vii. 248 ff.

of His person, then humanity is introduced within the sphere of the Trinity; for the incarnation is represented as an expression, not merely of the activity, but also of the very being of the Son of God. An alteration cannot by any means be said to have been thus imported into the inner nature of God, for the Son, as such, is not affirmed to have suffered: but still the Son undoubtedly became, by means of the incarnation, what He had not previously been,—although that which He had previously been did not undergo any change. Now, that which He is represented to have become, was either something merely accidental and external to Him,—with which would be incompatible that it should be impossible from henceforth, for ever, to form a true conception of Him apart from humanity,—or, it must be referred back to an eternal purpose of incarnation, arising out of the very nature of the will of God, in order to exclude the appearance of change even in reference to the Divine determination to become man. Thus far, however, they did not advance; but still, the position in which the question stood, shows the need that existed of connecting the external œconomy of God with His immanent and eternal œconomy, by referring the former back to the latter. Religious considerations unmistakeably operated in this connection, and that even at an earlier stage than logical considerations. It was meant that the Godhead of the Son, in all the majesty with which we behold Him clothed as a member of the Trinity, should participate in the work of propitiation, in the sufferings on behalf of the world (Note 30).

Theopassianism aimed to further the intimate unity of the Person of Christ by importing the likeness of the human as much as possible into the divine; and from the same motive, endeavours were made to bring the human aspect of the Person of Christ nearer to the divine by representing the Unio as having given rise to a resemblance of the former and to the latter. In general, indeed, not a doubt was entertained, that the humanity of Christ was, somehow, not merely honoured, but even exalted by its connection with the Logos,—at all events subsequently to the resurrection: and as the principle laid down by John Cassian in the words, "nec quasi per gradus et tempora proficientem in deum, alterius status fuisse ante resurrectionem credamus Christum, alterius post resurrectionem sed ejusdem

plenitudinis atque virtutis,"[1] was universally taken for granted, in all consistency the humanity of Christ ought not to have been regarded as any longer in the state of humiliation; unless, by its own will, or by the will of the Deity, that servant's form had been again imposed with which the Unio in itself was incompatible. But the opinion that the incarnation was immediately, and at once, an absolutely and perfectly accomplished fact, had not been, as yet, by any means so logically and definitely worked out, that, in opposition thereto, the humanity of Christ could not be represented as at the commencement in its natural state of imperfection and weakness, and as needing development. The monophysitic tendency was destined to aid in bringing the Church to a decision on this point also. One party of Monophysites, founded by Julian, Bishop of Halicarnassus, and thence designated Julianists, deemed it necessary, for the sake of preserving the unity of the Person of the God-man, to teach that the body of Christ, having been essentially united with, shared the indestructible life (ἀφθαρσία) of, the Logos; that it possessed this life, by a physical necessity, as a gift conferred upon it by grace; and that it constituted, as it were, a higher second nature, through which the first had been abolished, even prior to the resurrection. Their opponents termed them, consequently, Aphthartodocetists (ἄφθαρτος, δοκεῖν); and they retorted with the name Phthartolatrists (φθαρτός, λατρεία). On one point all were agreed, namely, that the humanity of Christ also possesses quickening power; and that the Logos, who is the life, is its life. But, in the first place, the teachers of the Church would not allow that the human nature underwent any alteration in consequence of the communication of Divine power; or that, in consequence thereof, it ceased to be, as truly as before, of the same substance with us. They preferred rather to define this communication as an increase of its power (according to Leo, "augmentum;" see above). In the second place, they would not grant that these higher predicates became the natural possession of the humanity of Christ. These two things were manifestly self-contradictory. If the Divine communication has merely

[1] See his work, "De Incarnatione Domini," editio Cratander 1524, page 17. The passage is cited from Leporius: compare Cassian's own work, pp. 47 and 137.

the effect of perfecting the nature itself, then, what is communicated, must be held to form part of the nature, in its full and true condition; if, furth,er what is communicated to the nature does not really belong to it, then, notwithstanding that it is communicated, it is evolved by the nature from its own substance; and thus the very removal of the human imperfections would consist as it were in a permanent extasis or transport of the humanity out of its own strict and proper essence, instead of being the perfection of the humanity.[1] And, inasmuch, as the magical view of the operations of grace had already gained a strong enough hold on the Church, the Monophysites were the more justified in demanding assent to their doctrine, that the humanity of Christ ceased from the very commencement of, and through, the Unio, to be of the same substance with ours, having been rather transfused into another being. They therefore further developed the propositions laid down by Eutyches and Dioscurus, and maintained, that the humanity of Christ, according to the φύσις which pertained to it subsequently to the Unio, could not be said to be susceptible of human weaknesses and sufferings; and that, on the contrary, the body of Christ, equally with the Godhead, was in itself, or by its very nature, raised above even innocent physical needs and weaknesses (πάθη ἀδιάβλητα). It was ἄφθαρτος, and was of the same nature as the body of Adam before the fall, which also would never have died had not Adam sinned. In asserting the supernatural character of the body of Christ, they did not intend to deny its actual reality; they did, however, aim at giving greater prominence to the love of Christ, by tracing, not merely the sufferings themselves, but even the possibility of suffering, to a free act of love, by which Christ renounced the impassibility which previously characterized His body, and undertook both our capability of suffering, and the sufferings themselves. We have seen above that Hilary of Pictavium came near taking up the same position, although, by his doctrine of the self-abnegation of the Logos, he qualified that of the immediate and direct deification of the human nature. And had not the Julianists attributed a physical character to the process in connection with the results of the Unio, the religious interests involved, would have been completely satisfied by the proposi-

[1] See Note D. App. ii.

tion,—That Christ's humanity was not, indeed, free from the weakness and capacity of suffering natural to it, but that the spiritual energy of Christ could have overcome every external cause of suffering, and even mortality itself, had His moral nature made it its task. And, in point of fact, according to the account of Timotheus,[1] some Julianists did say that Christ's body remained potentially (*δυνάμει*) *φθαρτὸς*; but that by the power of the Logos it was raised above actual *φθορὰ*. Not that they by any means intended to take a docetical view of the matter: they only sought to give greater prominence to the loving act by which Christ not only shut out His body from the deificatory influence of the Logos, but even gave it up to actual suffering. After what has been advanced, we can well conceive that such expressions, being glorifications of Christ, His majesty and love, would find an echo also in the Church of that period. And, in point of fact, Justinian made another effort to secure to the doctrine of the Aphthartodocetists authority in the Church, by a religious edict. But it failed to gain the approval of the Church: its teachers saw that to acknowledge such a transport of the common human *φύσις* of Christ into a supernatural nature, in virtue of the direct physical action of the Unio, would involve the abolition of the humanity itself, as to all its essential determinations of quantity and quality, of tactility, visibility, and limitation, and the substitution of another, that is, in reality of a Divine essence. By consequence, the Unio, in its most perfect operation, would involve the denial of the incarnation itself. Only for single moments, and for distinctly practical purposes, could the humanity then be said to have had a real existence: usually, it would either be non-existent, or, at the utmost, would have a merely potential existence, either in the will of the Logos, or in the supernatural corporeality of Christ. One party of the Julianists went so far as to maintain, that after the incar-

[1] De recipiendis hæreticis Cotelerii Monum. eccl. Græc. T. iii. 397. This was probably also the opinion of Philoxenus, although he asserted the identity of the body of Christ with that of Adam:—"potuit non mori," he says, but not "non potuit mori." With regard to the Julianists or Gajanites, compare Leontius, de Sectis, Actio v. 3, in Galland. Bibl. xii. 640; Nicephorus l. c. xvii. 29; A. Mai Coll. N. l. c., and Assem. Bibl. Vatic. Catal. T. i. 3, p. 229. f.; Giesceler, l. c. P. ii. 4–10.

nation, Christ ought not to be spoken of as a created being, even in respect of His humanity; but that, even as a man, He should be designated God and Creator, and must therefore have been a proper object of worship from the very beginning.[1] This party,—themselves called Actistetes (ἄκτιστος = uncreated), whilst they designated their opponents Ctistolatrists (κτιστός = created; λατρεία = worship),—was ready to go even to the extent of representing everything human in Christ as divine from the commencement. Yet they appear to have had as little intention of teaching pure Docetism as the Apollinarists, when they put forth the doctrine of an eternal humanity in God. It is more probable that they started with the doctrine, universally held by Monophysites, that the incarnation was accomplished by the entire negation of every substratum and vehicle of human predicates, and thus arrived at their view. Inasmuch now as the Logos employed human predicates alone as characteristics of Himself, and from the very commencement disowned all predicates which bore reference to a human development, the substratum necessary to creaturehood seemed to be wanting,—nay more, this predicate seemed no longer to admit of Christ's being included under it.[2] We may, however, well be permitted to say, that if the continued existence of the human as such is consistent with its losing, from the commencement of the Unio, all predicates which

[1] Timotheus de recept. hæretic., Cotelerius Monum. Eccl. Græc. T. iii. 398; Assem. Bibl. Orient. T. ii. The Julianists had their seat especially in Armenia: the Gajanites were the corresponding party in Egypt. Their opponent was the Monophysite Patriarch Damian, who himself was an adherent of Severus. In the eighth or the ninth century they appear to have utterly disappeared from Syria, and, in general, from Asia, with the exception of Armenia; as also from Egypt. A portion of them, however, pushed their way to Ethiopia and Nubia, where they had a patriarch of their own.

[2] All the Monophysitic propositions in which, for the sake of asserting the inward unity of the Person of Christ, human features are on the one hand partially attributed to God, and divine features on the other to man, were adopted in the Lutheran doctrine of a "communicatio idiomatum:" the Lutheran Church, however, maintained an abiding duality of substances as the basis of this "communicatio." Regarded from this point of view, the Lutheran doctrine is a combination of the Chalcedonian and Monophysitic types. The two types, however, are not so brought together as to be mutually inwardly permeant; but rather follow upon each other like two different doctrinal formations.

would be incompatible with the divine being, with its incorporation with the divine substance; then the difference between the human and divine natures is not one of essence, but solely of accidents; and these accidents are abolished by the Unio.

The position, that the divine and human are not merely fundamentally, but even immediately, primitively, the same in essence, was taken up by one of the most eminent Monophysites, Stephen Barsaduili, about the year 488.[1] He is said to have taught that, as Father, Son, and Spirit are one nature, and the body of the Word is of the like substance with Himself, so must every creature be of the same substance (consubstantial) with the Godhead.

He does not, however, appear to have assumed the immediate actual divinity of all things; for he gives, of the passage, "To-day and to-morrow I work miracles, and on the third day I shall cease," the following explanation:—With us it is now the sixth day of the week (Friday), which denotes the present period of the world, and which Christ calls also the evil period. The Sabbath, Christ's day of rest after death, he appears to have explained chiliastically, as a Sabbath-period, followed by the perfectio, when God will be all in all, and everything be of the like nature and the like substance with God. The charge of abolishing baptism and the sacraments, brought against him by Xenaias, may therefore imply, not that he entirely let go the distinction between nature and grace, but perhaps that, after the manner of Origen (conf. Assem. i. 303), he assumed the restoration of all things through the medium, as of punishment for the wicked, so of the manifestation of Christ for the right-

[1] Barhebræus or Abulpharagius reports that he laid down his views in a work, published under the name of Hierotheus, the teacher of Dionysius Areopagita. Compare Assem. Bibl. Orient. T. ii. p. 30 f. 290, 291. According to the testimony of Xenaias, Barsudaili was a learned man and writer, especially a commentator on the Holy Scriptures, and a native of Edessa. Against him, Xenaias wrote a letter of warning to Edessa. In that letter he represents him as teaching that future punishments are not eternal, but that both the ungodly and demons will be purified by fire and obtain mercy. In the end, as Paul says, God will be all in all, and all things will be transformed into the divine nature. A related phenomenon were probably the Ισόχριστοι, Origenistic monks in Egypt. See the Church History of Evagrius, iv. 38; Baumgarten-Crusius's "Comp. der Dogmengeschichte," p. 207.

eous. With this it would be quite compatible, that he should regard all things as potentially of the like substance with the divine. Well-accredited men, says Xenaias, have reported to me, that they found in his cell the inscription, "All nature is consubstantial with God;" but that, from alarm at the excitement it caused, he had afterwards blotted out the inscription. It may not perhaps be just to attribute to him a coarse Pantheism, but still he must have developed in a more logical way the germs of Pantheism, which, as we have previously shown, slumbered in Monophysitism; and there is no reasonable ground for doubting, that he taught not merely that the divine and human natures were brought to sameness of essence in Christ, but that humanity in general is essentially divine. He does not appear, like Origen, to have ever acknowledged the existence of freedom; what he conceded, was rather a kind of fate.[1]

The Monophysites hitherto brought under consideration, may be regarded as the continuation of Eutychianism; and they gradually more and more lost sight of the distinction between the human and the divine. There now remains to be considered the second and more important principal class. The most eminent Monophysites, Xenaias or Philoxenus, and Severus, endeavoured to show that, in the unity, a distinction was preserved between the divine and human.[2] Xenaias, it is true, still firmly maintained that one of the Persons of the Trinity was crucified:[3] he also recognised solely voluntary, not natural, sufferings of Christ.[4] By the latter expression, however, he might mean, even though he did not employ it solely with respect to the Godhead, that there was no inherent necessity for the suf-

[1] Assem. ii. 32.

[2] With regard to Xenaias, compare Assem. ii. pp. 10–46; with regard to Severus, Leontii Monachi Hierosol. Apolog. Conc. Chalcedonens. (about 610); Galland. Tom. xii. 719–750; Leontii Byzantini solutiones argumentationum Severi, ibid. 708–715; Ang. Mai, Tom. vii. pp. 8, 9, 71, 73, 123, 136 ff., 151, 277–281, 283 f., 285–290, and 307. Both flourished during the first quarter of the sixth century, had adopted Zeno's Henoticon, and lived in the enjoyment of episcopal dignity till the persecution of the Monophysites under Justinian, about the year 522. Both together may be designated the founders of that form of Monophysitism which the Jacobites still profess to the present day, and which rose to supremacy in Egypt, probably subsequently to Damian. The Copts hold the same views at the present time.

[3] Assem. l. c. p. 28.

[4] Assem. p. 4.

fering of the humanity of Christ, apart from the voluntary determination of the Son of God to subject Himself thereto. His doctrine he laid down in eight propositions;[1] and he repudiated the Eutychians, whom he designates Phantasiasts. The very personality of the Son,—that is, God the Word,—he remarks, descended from heaven, and dwelt personally in the Virgin: He became a man, of the Virgin, of her flesh and of her bone, personally without conversion: He became a visible, tangible, compound man; and yet as God, He continued to possess that spirituality, subtilty, and simplicity, which became Him.[2] He who is God, became man; hence the same who is God was born of the Virgin, and from her derived His true body. He is not another and another (ein Anderer und ein Anderer): the child that was born was no other than the exalted highest God, even the Word. Nor did that one Person of God which became man grow into a duality, but in all words, deeds, miracles, and sufferings, however diverse they were, there was only one and the same God the Word, who became man without change; and as the work of suffering and death is ascribed to Christ, or to the Son, so is it unblameable to say that God or the Word was crucified or died. For, that one only-begotten One who appeared in the world, and was tried in all that is human, with the exception of sin, is Christ, the Son by nature. But He who is Son by nature, must also be God by nature: if, then, the Son suffered, who is not a Son by favour, but by nature, then God suffered and died, and not a man who was separated from, or obedient to, Him, or in whom He dwelt, as one may dwell in another. In asserting the unity of the nature, he did not mean to teach an absorption, either of the deity or of the humanity, by the conversion of the one into the other; nor, further, did he hold that a double transformation or mixture took place, resulting in the evolution of a third, and, as it were, chemical product: he intended to teach the existence of one nature which was constituted out of two, which was not simple, but twofold. The technical term for the unity, in his view of it, would be, μία

[1] In a book, "de Trinitate et Incarnatione," Assem. 25 ff. Compare especially p. 29.

[2] Xenaias, like many of the Monophysites, set his face against image-worship, yea, even against representations of incorporeal beings. God must be worshipped in spirit and in truth. Assem. ii. p. 21.

φύσις σύνθετος or μία φύσις διττὴ. The image in greatest favour both with Xenaias and his followers, was that of the body and soul; only that these two cannot have been regarded by them as two distinct and particular parts or substances. In order to make this image harmless, the teachers of the Church made the remark,—Man also consists of two substances, and it is simply a misuse of terms to speak of *one* human nature.[1]

Although Xenaias enjoyed so great a reputation for orthodoxy among the Monophysites, that Severus, in his controversy with Julian, begged him for his judgment in the matter, still Severus, who became Patriarch of Antioch in the year 511, was, strictly speaking, the scientific leader of the most compact portion of the party, and was treated as such in later times: against him also were mainly directed the more important polemical writings of the Church. According to the accounts we have of him, great difficulty was experienced in gathering up, and forming a connected view of, his opinions. This may, perhaps, have been partly attributable to the relation in which he stood to the Henoticon of the Emperor Zeno, of which he approved, and on the ground of which he and his party regarded themselves as still forming part of the Church. A further reason of the difficulty—one, too, connected with the last mentioned—was the relation in which he stood to Cyrill of Alexandria, with whom he, in all principal points, wished to be and actually was one, and whose pliancy in regard to the Oriental symbolum had also to be taken into consideration.[2] Matters being in this state, we must pay special attention to the precise words em-

[1] So taught the Roman Bishop Gelasius I., in his work, de duabus naturis in Christo adv. Eutych. et Nest. Bibl. Man. PP. Lugd. T. viii. 699 ff., 702. This was connected with, or even gave rise to, the doctrine taught in the Church of Spain, that Christ was one person compounded of three substances (or natures): see below. Gelasius, like Leo, made use, in this connection, of the Holy Eucharist. As the elements remain in "suæ proprietate naturæ," although they are transfused by the Holy Spirit into the divine substance, so also the human nature of Christ.

[2] Timotheus (not, as Leontius of Jerusalem thinks, Ailuros; compare Gieseler l. c. i. 7) says, according to Galland. T. xii., and A. Mai l. c. 138, that, like Noah's sons, Severus tried to cover the nakedness of his father Cyrill, and exposed himself in consequence to the charge of self-inconsistency. But that his self-contradictions were not merely apparent, is evident from the constant reassertion of the fact by those who conducted the Church's polemic against him.

ployed by him; for, in accordance with the conciliatory position he aimed at occupying, he followed the traditional formulas of the Church as closely as possible, although at the same time indicating the sense in which he accepted them.

Cyrill, says he, was right in teaching, "of two natures:" but out of his expression the Council of Chalcedon made, "in two natures;" assuming also the continuous existence of an *ἐνέργεια* of the humanity, even subsequently to the incarnation. Leo also went so far as to say that Christ performed human acts in His human nature, and divine acts in his divine nature: whereas, on the contrary, after the Unio, everything must have been the act of the God-man. But, as a purely human *ἐνέργεια* presupposes a purely human substratum, or a purely human monas, side by side with the divine—that is, a second focus, as the active cause of the pure human activity,—the unity of the life is destroyed.[1] If such a duality of substrata or subjects (*ὑφεστῶτα*) be objected to, we must not assume a duality of activities. Again, if we aim to preserve the unity of the activities, we must not admit a duality of natures in the sense of special and independent foci (*μονάδες ἰδιοσύστατοι*). He thus argues from the fact of the redemptive activity having been at once divine and human (divine-human), that there can have been but one nature.

On the other hand, however, he is ready to speak of *οὐσίαι*, *φύσεις*, *ἰδιώματα*, within the Person of Christ. He not only repudiates the opinions of Eutyches, but, equally with Nestorius, affirms that the attributes of the human aspect continued to exist even after the Unio, and that, in distinction from the attributes of the divine aspect. He spoke most decidedly against a Julianistic Monophysite, the grammarian Sergius; condemning not only the idea of the annihilation of the one nature by the other, but also the mixture or blending of both by means of a compromise.[2] The two different natures, he urged, con-

[1] A. Mai vii. 71. *Ἡ σύνοδος καὶ Λέων—δύο φύσεις ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ καὶ δύο τούτων ἐνεργείας (φυσικὰς, καὶ δυτὰ θελήματα*; compare the following fragment) *ὁρισάμενοι μετὰ τὴν ἄφραστον ἕνωσιν, δικαίως ἀναθεματιζέσθωσαν, ὡς τὸν ἕνα Χριστὸν εἰς δύο πρόσωπα καταμερίσαντες, οὐ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ποτε φύσις οὐχ ὑφεστῶσα.*

[2] Galland. xii. 736. Epist. ad Serg. II.: *ἆρα γὰρ ἤρχθη μὲν* (both, in the view of Sergius) *ἡ ἕνωσις ἐκ συγχύσεως, καὶ πέπαυται ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν μετεχώρησεν; ἵνα, ὡς λέγεις, ἡ ἁγία τριὰς φυλαχθῇ τριὰς, καὶ μὴ περιττὸν πρόσωπον παραδέξηται.*

tinued rather to enjoy an uncurtailed and unaltered existence in Christ—remaining, as Leontius of Jerusalem said, the same both in quantity and quality.[1] And yet he speaks in the most decided terms against the doctrine of a permanent duality of natures, of the divine and human, and anathematizes the Synod of Chalcedon. How are we to reconcile these various statements? Did he perhaps merely mean, as we found in the case of Cyrill, that we can discriminate the two natures in thought even after the Unio, but that there was nothing in reality answering to the discrimination, although the unity, as it actually existed, was constituted out of two veritable and different factors? Or, in consideration of the fact of the person having been constituted out of two natures, did he sometimes admit of a plurality of *οὐσίαι*, in the sense in which causes can be said, in some way, to continue their existence in the effects? He undoubtedly did employ these distinctions (the one of them may be found in A. Mai vii. 136[a], 278[b]; the other, 280[b]), but they are not sufficient, because he was really and seriously anxious, especially in his controversy with the Julianists, to maintain the permanent existence of a *plurality* of natures even *in* Christ; and yet, on the other hand, he was quite as persevering in his opposition to the *duality* of natures in the Person of Christ. The only explanation that we can find of this apparent incongruity is the following,—that he used the word nature in the sense which it bears, when we speak of the nature or essence of righteousness, or of any other *quality*. In this sense, he might, of course, admit of a plurality of natures in Christ, even after the Unio—of natures which all unite in one focus, and which, in the higher signification of the term nature, constitute *μία φύσις* or *ὑπόστασις*; but against the duality of natures he unremittingly protested, because in that connection the word

[1] Severus contra Joannem Grammaticum, lib. II. cap. i., in Galland. Bibl. xii. 735. Καὶ τῶν ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἕνωσις, μενόντων ἀμειώτων καὶ ἀναλλοιώτων ἐν συνθέσει δὲ ὑφεστώτων καὶ οὐκ ἐν μονάσιν ἰδιοσυστάτοις, ib. 736. In the Ep. iii. ad Sergium, he says, "I have proved to the Julianists, by many testimonies, that it is not allowable to call the Immanuel, *μιᾶς οὐσίας τε καὶ ποιότητος καὶ ἑνὸς ἰδιώματος*. No reasonable man will say that the nature of the Logos and the besouled rational humanity hypostatically united with Him, became *μιᾶς οὐσίας καὶ ποιότητος*." The word *φύσις* he employs less willingly within the Unio; though, in the sense of *οὐσία*, he does not altogether object to it.

"natures" had acquired the meaning of two separate monads, foci or centres; whereas he was unable to see his way clear to conceding the existence of more than one such focus in Christ.[1]

Severus' conception of the incarnation was, therefore, the following,—that all the human qualities remained unchanged in their nature or essence, but were so amalgamated with the totality of the hypostasis, that they had no longer any kind of centre or focus of their own, no longer constituted a separate monas. The foci, on the contrary, had become one; the monads were conjoined, the substrata, in which the qualities of both natures inhered, no longer had an independent subsistence (*μονάδες ἰδιοσύστατοι*), but formed a synthesis,[2] and all the idiomata or attributes subsisted in this composite hypostasis or nature. We must therefore follow the example of Dionysius Areopagita, the Wise, and make use of the expression,—through the humanification* of God (*ἀνδρωθέντος Θεοῦ*), there arose a divine-human, a theandric (*θεανδρικὴ*), that is, a composite nature and hypostasis; and this composite hypostasis has put forth a new divine-human, that is, a composite activity (*θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια*).

A favourite argument adduced by Severus for his view, was the walking of Christ on the sea. This cannot be termed a simply and strictly human act; and yet, on the other hand, it is quite as incongruous to attribute walking to the divine nature in itself. The act was, therefore, divine-human.[3] How, then, can we still say, with Leo, that "the Logos worked what pertained to the Logos, and the body what pertained to the

[1] The above explanation is supported by the fragment, ibid. 736: *ἀναθεματίζοντες τοίνυν τοὺς διαιροῦντας τὸν ἕνα Χριστὸν μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν τῇ δυάδι τῶν φύσεων, οὐ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ λέγειν φύσεις ἢ ἰδιότητας ἢ ἐνεργείας ὑπαναθεματισθέντες τοῦτο φαμὲν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ λέγειν δύο.* These Monophysites said, *πᾶς ἀριθμὸς ἰδιοσυστάτων ἐστὶ δηλωτικός.* A. Mai vii. 64[a] and 278[b]. From the work against the Grammarian, the following: *ἰδοὺ, τὸ μὲν δύο σκοπεῖν, τῇ φαντασίᾳ τοῦ νοῦ μόνον ἐφίεται διακρίνοντος τὴν διαφορὰν τὴν ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ.* Ibid. 279: *πῶς οὐ καταγέλαστον καὶ τὸ λέγειν δύο ἰδιότητας ἢ δύο ἐνεργείας; πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι καὶ οὐ δύο μόνον ἑκάστης φύσεως.*

[2] Galland. xii. 735. Ep. ad Solonem.

* Generally, I have rendered the German word "Menschwerdung" by "incarnation," though it is not an exact equivalent. In this connection, however, I have coined a word for the sake of expressing more precisely both the German and the Greek idea. "Humanization" (not so legitimate a form) has another meaning, or I might have adopted it.—Tr.

[3] A. Mai, pp. 285, 286.

body,—that the former shone in the miracles, and the latter submitted to suffering?" In that case, there would only have been a relative community of natures, a unity of relation (σχετικὴ κοινωνία τῶν μορφῶν καὶ ὑπὸ γνωμικῆς διαθέσεως), such as was advocated by Nestorius. To say that the Logos raised the human nature to His own glory and power, may be true; but it is irreconcilable with Leo's assertion, that "each nature retained its peculiar characteristics unaltered." So far from that, the Logos did not permit the human nature, in some cases, to act according to its own laws; for example, when Christ walked on the sea, and when He rose from the dead. Both acts transcended the laws of human nature, which, therefore, were so far partially abolished. For death befell the body by a physical law (this against the Julianists; see A. Mai, vii. 287), and the lance inflicted a physical wound on Christ, because such was the free determination of the Logos;—even so did the resurrection transcend the law to which the dead body was naturally subject. The teachers of the Church tried to escape from the perplexity by discriminating between what is opposed to, and what is above, nature; between the contra-natural and the supra-natural. Such a communication of power on the part of the Logos may indeed transcend human nature; but it is simply an exaltation of its essence, and neither a spoliation nor an annihilation. We have already remarked, however, that such a communication is incompatible with the doctrine of the essential difference of the two natures, elsewhere taught. For, if we conceive this communication of power to have been without measure, then did human nature possess as its own, and as constituting its true, nay more, its truer essence, the very divine qualities which constitute the divine essence. One would almost have expected, that in his controversy with the Julianists, Severus would be forced, after all, to substitute for the divine-human activities which he upheld, a distinction between the divine and the human activities. But it was in his power to reply,—Although the qualities of the divine and the human natures remain unaltered in Christ, still both are qualities of the one composite nature or Person of the Logos. The Logos appropriated these qualities and sufferings of human nature, and, according as His work required it, left the body over to its physical laws and assumed

human sufferings, or displayed His divine energy and allowed His body to participate therein. From Julian, therefore, he discriminated himself, by representing the laws of the human body as suspended merely for the moment, and as potentially continuing to exist: Julian, on the contrary, regarded even a momentary στέρησις of the human aspect, as a proof against the unaltered continuance of the human qualities, and held it, consequently, to be more consistent, instead of contending for the unchangeableness of each, to maintain that the flesh of Christ was converted into the divine immortality through and after the Unio.

Following the general example of the Monophysites hitherto mentioned, Severus neglected to submit the human *soul* of Christ to a closer examination. The passage, "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt," he remarks, does not prove the existence of a will distinct from the divine; nor do the words imply either that the will of Christ grew faint, or that a struggle took place in Him: the passage is simply a word of instruction (for us). The Logos could neither have feared death, nor have made the human unwillingness to die, His own; but freely permitted the flesh to undergo the sufferings to which it was physically susceptible (l. c. 288): so that here also, no act can be said to be either solely human or solely divine, but all are alike divine and human.

The adherents of Severus then endeavoured to demonstrate the rightness of this view. No one objects to call man μία φύσις, although he consists of soul and body, which are two different substances: just so must it be possible to designate Christ μία φύσις, although divine and human elements are united in Him without alteration. If we teach that there are two natures in a state of union, we ought also to teach that there is one, and that a composite nature (A. Mai, vii. 62 ff.). But if we object to that, we must necessarily further posit two substrata, ὑποστάσεις,—nay more, two πρόσωπα. For, even when we discriminate natures or substances merely in thought, we at once posit, also in thought, two persons (πρόσωπα): no sooner is the distinction established, than each assumes to itself a separate and independent form. On the other hand, the duality of hypostases and persons posited in thought and phantasy, disappears the moment we conceive the natures which

constitute the one hypostasis and nature of the incarnate Logos as subsisting in synthesis; the supposed dyad converges into a unity (εἰς ἕν τι), that is, into the one hypostasis which consists of two, and which is then consistently termed, the Person (A. Mai, 279[a]).

Although the Monophysites in general, admitted that Christ had a human soul, still the first class, whose doctrine was of a more physical cast, and which culminated in the Aphthartodocetists (ἄφθαρτος, incorruptible; δοκεῖν, to seem) and Actistetes (ἄκτιστος = uncreate), spoke almost exclusively of the body of Christ, and of its glorification by the indwelling Logos. Severus, as we have seen, taught, in reference to the will of Christ, that the divine and human wills were one, not merely in virtue of the identity of their aim, but also in virtue of the identity of the volitional principle; and, however earnestly he tried to discriminate himself from Eutyches, Dioscurus, and Timotheus, by supposing that the difference between the divine and human aspects was somehow preserved in, and along with, the unity of the nature or Person of Christ,—relatively to the soul, he was unwilling to admit the existence of a difference between the human and the divine, in the matter either of volition or knowledge. But when he placed the imperfection of the body, its mortality and so forth, to the account of the general laws of human nature, which could only be momentarily suspended, consistency would have seemed to demand a similar admission with respect to the soul of Christ—the admission, namely, that though, through the action of the Logos, the spiritual energy of the human soul of Christ might, for the time, or at all events in part, lose its limitation, the said limitation, however, continued to exist potentially. Accordingly, we find, that after the death of Severus, the Deacon Themistius, in Alexandria, came forward as an advocate of the doctrine, that the human soul of Christ was like ours in everything, even in ignorance—a doctrine which had been repudiated by the other followers of Severus (in Egypt, designated Theodosians).[1] Even in the Gospels Jesus says, that "no one, not even the Son, knoweth the hour, but the Father only;" and He asked also, "Where have ye laid Lazarus?"—a question involving ignorance.

[1] Galland. xii.; Leont. Byz. 2, de sectis, Actio x. cap. iii. p. 654, Actio v. cap. vi. p. 641. Compare Photius, Cod. 230.

By their opponents among the Monophysites they were termed Agnoetes (ἀγνοέω), and were assailed especially by the Severian Bishop of Alexandria, Theodosius, the successor of Timotheus. He, however, was soon ejected by the populace, to make way for Gajanus, a Julianist; then he was restored by Justinian, and finally was banished to Byzantium. Like Coluthus,[1] Themistius aimed to represent both the will and activity of Christ as one, and His knowledge as one; for, he urges, the knower was as truly one as the willer and actor. Whether he supposed the Logos to have emptied Himself in regard to knowledge also, or that, for the sake of preserving the unity of His person, He appropriated also the human predicate of ignorance (words to which it is scarcely possible to attach a distinct thought), cannot be clearly ascertained owing to the lack of sources of information. This question had, however, as yet, by no means been decided by the Church.

It might have been expected, that as the doctrine of two natures had received the sanction of the Church, the doctrine of the Agnoetes, who constituted simply a small branch of the great party of Severus, would meet with a large measure of approval amongst the teachers of the Church. And some, in fact, were favourable to it. Amongst these, at a later period (about 610), may be specially mentioned, Leontius of Byzantium, who, from the fact that ignorance is attributable to us, and that Christ was of the like nature with us; further, from the circumstance that in Luke ii. He is said to have grown in wisdom; and finally, "on the basis of the testimony of many, nay, almost all the Fathers," concludes that a certain kind of ignorance must be ascribed to Christ. But although it was an universal doctrine that Christ grew on earth in respect to His humanity, it was considered better—for example, by Jerome (ed. Vallars. T. vii. 34, on Ps. 15)—to refer the passages which imply ignorance, rather to the Church, than to its Head. Similarly also, Ambrose (on Luc. ii. 52) was of opinion, that "nostra ignoratione nescit, non quia aliquid ipse nesciret;" and that, to assume the duality of the principles of intelligence, or a twofold knowledge, would be to run the risk of dividing Christ Himself. Fulgentius characterizes it as an error, to suppose that the soul of Christ had not the full knowledge of

[1] A. Mai, l. c 72ª; Cotel. Monum. l. c. 399, 406 ff.

the Godhead, in common with which it had one personality. Beda (on Luc. ii.) says, that "growth is the sign of a human soul;" but, at the same time, also remarks, that "from the hour of His conception, Christ was full of wisdom; for this man was at no moment anything other than God." Similarly Alcuin observes (ad Carolum, l. ii. 11), "The soul of Christ may not be held to have lacked any part of the Divine knowledge, inasmuch as it formed in the Trinity one person with the Word, that is Christ." And this doctrine attained to ever greater predominance, its advocates not failing to resort to the most violent expedients. The most common of these was to say, that Christ did not wish, on œconomical grounds, that is, for men's sake, to appear to know: He merely meant that, *for His disciples*, He did not know that which they could not bear, and concerning which they inquired of Him. Nor was His asking a question a sign of ignorance, but merely an incitement to discourse, an introduction of conversation.[1] In this matter, therefore, the rôles were completely exchanged: Monophysites became Agnoetes; and the adherents of the Council of Chalcedon, who took their stand on the duality of the natures, approved of that which we should have expected to find defended by the Monophysites: so that, even internally, there was no distinct line of demarcation between the two parties, whose respective outward boundaries, in consequence of the Henoticon, had for some time ceased to be recognisable (Note 31).

From the time of Justinian, who first treated the Monophysites with mildness, and then persecuted them hotly, the hitherto so lively intercourse between that party and the Church was broken ever more completely off.[2] Robbed of their patriarchs and directors, they were now held together principally by James Baradai, who travelled through the districts inhabited by Monophysites under the disguise of a beggar, ordained bishops, and

[1] Compare Beda Venerab. ed. Colon. 1688, Tom. iii. 245–247. In reference to the passage, "Neither also does the Son know the day of judgment," Gregory of Tours remarks, "The Son who here speaks is the adopted son, that is, humanity: hence also the angels are mentioned before him."

[2] The only effect of which was to prepare the way for the adoption, by Monotheletism within the Church itself, of a Monophysitic view of the Person of Christ.

established a church union, especially in Syria. But the flourishing period of Monophysitism, in a scientific point of view, had now passed. Amongst its adherents who had received a philosophical culture, doubts arose whether the middle position taken up in reference to Christology, by Severus and the followers of Baradai, by Damianus the Monophysite, Patriarch of Alexandria, and Peter the Younger of Kalliniko, was a tenable one. Stephen, an Alexandrian Sophist, with the surname of Niobes,[1] taught, that the distinction in the natural essence of the things, out of which Christ was constituted, cannot be held to have continued (as the party of Severus asserted) after the Unio; and thus made himself the representative of the stricter Monophysite doctrine which now began to show itself. When opposed by Damian, he assigned as the ground for his view, that if there remain a distinction in the things out of which Christ is constituted, it is impossible to avoid separating and numbering the natures in accordance with the constant assertion of the teachers of the Church. Damian condemned his teachings. About this time, two learned and eloquent Monophysites, Probus and the Archimandrite John Barbut, came to Alexandria with Peter, the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch. Probus decided on refuting Stephen in a writing: but, whatever the reason may have been (the Patriarch Peter is said, at an early period, to have remarked an inclination on the part of Probus and John to the view of Stephen), after the work had been composed, Probus, without informing John, openly adopted Stephen's view of the untenableness of the middle position between the doctrine of the Council of Chalcedon and Monophysitism, taken up by Severus and his party. By means of letters and discourses they diffused their views in Alexandria, until they were driven out by Damian. Probus, further, having been deposed and excommunicated, they betook themselves to the East, where they laboured with such great success amongst the monks, that, at their pressing invitation, the Patriarch Peter was induced to convene a Synod in Guba, at a later period the seat of the Jacobite patriarchs. At this Synod, John endeavoured to show that Probus had been unjustly deposed. But both of them, and all their adherents, were excommunicated. In the name of the

[1] Assem. Bibl. Orient. ii. 72–77. From the Church History of the Monophysite Patriarch Dionysius; compare Photius, Cod. xxiv.

Synod, Peter wrote a work laying down the doctrinal system of Severus as the orthodox one: he especially maintained the orthodoxy of the opinion, that the natures out of which Christ was constituted, continued to be distinct even after the Unio, though without being separated or numerically dual. John and Probus now changed over to the Confession adopted by the Council of Chalcedon. In part, without doubt, this resulted from fickleness; at all events, before his death, Probus, who afterwards became Bishop of Chalcedon, is said to have returned to Monophysitism. Still, one can well conceive that men who had received a dialectical culture found it impossible to remain in suspense, as did the adherents of Severus; that they then attempted to follow out the Monophysitic idea to its logical results, and to justify their continuance as a separate ecclesiastical party; and that subsequently, not merely failing therein, but seeing Docetism to be the necessary result of the abolition of all and every distinction, they felt the Chalcedonian doctrine to be really more self-consistent, although not calculated to be permanently satisfactory. At all events, after the death of Peter in 591, they laboured with great zeal in and around Antioch, advocating the cause of the Council of Chalcedon, both in writings and in disputations with monks out of all the Monophysite monasteries, and endeavouring to show the inconsistency of accepting a difference, and yet rejecting the duality, of natures. They even succeeded in bringing over many, particularly entire towns, in the neighbourhood of Antioch, to the Chalcedonian doctrine. The result of the Niobite Controversy, as respects the remaining Monophysites, was to bind them more firmly to their traditional views, especially as the sanction of an Oriental Synod might now be pleaded on behalf of the doctrine of Severus.

In the history of the Monophysitic Party, we find displayed a fruitfulness and acuteness of mind, and a vigour in attack, which could not be overlooked or lightly valued by the orthodox teachers of the great body of the Church. Let us now glance at the principal arguments employed by the defenders of the Council of Chalcedon, in opposition to the Monophysites, and especially to the Severians (Note 32). If the two natures are entirely one, then are they one nature. But now the Severians themselves say, that that which is not in reality completely one, constitutes one nature in Christ; consequently, their one nature

is, after all, not one nature.—If the two aspects form one nature, then are they of the same essence, of the same substance; and the deity of Christ has, therefore, the same essence as His humanity. But this the Monophysites themselves deny; and, consequently, they hold not one nature, but diverse natures.—They grant that Christ was constituted *out of* deity and humanity, and that, after the Unio, He consisted of deity and humanity. But, as certainly as the former denotes two different natures, so certainly must a duality of natures be conceded in the latter case, especially as they disapprove of a Unio by mixture, and only believe in a conjunction of two natures.—When they allow that Christ was constituted out of two natures, and yet deny that there are two natures in Him, we are compelled to ask, whether that of which a being is and consists, is not in it. In what being then is it, if it is at all? They protest, however, specially against the duality, saying that "what we count, we divide," as if one could not count what is united, and unite what is counted. Number, in itself, denotes neither separation nor union; it only expresses the quantum, not the essential nature of a thing. They, therefore, lay too great stress on the matter of number.—If the Logos and the flesh are in no sense two, they are in every sense one. But then the Word itself is flesh, and the flesh is the Word, not less eternal, and not less consubstantial with the Father, than the Word. For, if the Word and the flesh are one nature, and if the nature of the Word and the nature of the Father is one and the same, then is the nature of the flesh and of the Father the same; and, inasmuch as the case is the same with the Holy Spirit, we should have to conclude not only the Word, but even the Trinity, to be man.—The Severians say that even the one nature is composite. Now, as the nature of the Logos is simple, it is for them to show how the simple nature of the Word is discriminated from the composite nature of Christ. Its discriminating characteristic is plainly the humanity which is added to the deity. If, then, that which is composite is not simple, the nature of Christ must be dual; and the doctrine of two natures ought to be taught.—If Christ never had a twofold nature, it is, of course, absurd to speak about a Unio: but if He ever had a double nature, when did the double nature become one? and what is this one to be supposed to be? Is it the nature of the appropriator, or that of the appropriated?

We must then ask, what has become of the other? If both continue to subsist, how are they one? Or, is Christ's nature a new, third something, compounded of both? In that case, however, Christ would be of a different substance from the Father, seeing that the substance of the latter is not compounded.—The union between the Logos and the Father cannot possibly be less close than the union between the Logos and the flesh, and yet the Father and the Word are two: why, then, cannot the Word and the flesh be in any sense two? (This argument was directed specially against the Tritheites among the Monophysites.)—The Monophysites said: The nature is never less than the person, and, in the case of rational beings, involves personality; so that whosoever assumes the existence of two natures, must posit also two personalities. Plurality separates; whereas the monas is without quantity, and is, therefore, in itself ἰδική. The orthodox replied,—The ἰδικὸν is denoted by the hypostasis; the nature, on the contrary, is the expression for the κοινὸν (the general). If the two natures are not one as to their hypostasis, still they are one as to their nature. But if deity and humanity are one nature, this one nature is the generic term under which are comprehended deity and humanity, both of which must somehow be held to continue to exist in the composite nature of Christ. Now, if deity and humanity are two species or individuals of the same genus, then the deity and humanity in Christ stand in the relation to each other of two individuals: at this point, therefore, Monophysitism passes into Nestorianism.[1] The simplicity of the nature of Christ cannot, therefore, be any longer maintained. Such simplicity is predicable, indeed, of the Trinity, when it denotes that general divine substance in which the particular foci of characteristic peculiarities inhere, so that, along with unity of nature, there is difference of hypostases: But in Christology the situation of things is just the reverse. There, unless the doctrine of Nestorius be followed, we must posit unity of hypostasis along with difference of natures. In both dogmas, however, substance or nature designates that which is general or common to several (the divine nature of Christ is the nature both of the Father and the Spirit,—the human nature is the nature of all other men): person, on the other

[1] Galland. loc. cit. 714ᵇ.

hand, denotes the individual, the ἰδικὸν, that which discriminates the Son from the Father and Spirit, and the God-man from other men. Person is distinguished from nature, as the accident, the superadded, from the substance. In God, of course, this accident, which is at the same time hypostasis, is inseparably connected with His essence; nay more, not in relation to His substance is it to be called an accident, but merely in relation to the other persons. The Monophysites, on the contrary, use the word "nature," as we use the word "essence," to denote not merely the general, but also the special or individual. According to them, everything *actu* existent, must also exist as a particular individual: we must not suppose that the general exists merely also in the individual,—it exists merely as that which particularizes or individualizes itself.[1] Hence the Tritheism of John Akusnages and John Philoponus amongst the Monophysites (Note 33).

Where the controversy was conducted scientifically, the question as to the relation between nature and person was constantly brought under discussion. The Nestorians and the Monophysites expressed themselves in the same way regarding it, and raised the same objections to the definitions and ontological propositions laid down by the teachers of the Church, maintaining that the nature cannot be impersonal, and that where there is a φύσις, there must also be an ὑπόστασις. From this it followed, according to the Nestorians, that because there are two natures in Christ, there must also be two independent hypostases; although somehow united to form the one Christ. As the Monophysites, however, absolutely repudiated the duality of persons, they repudiated also the duality of natures, which seemed to them to involve the duality of persons. That every nature is also an hypostasis, they endeavoured to prove as follows:—The essence or nature is that which is common to all the individuals of a genus (the κοινόν); this, however, never exists by itself alone, but solely in an individual. Consequently, the essence can be conceived as independent, solely in thought; actually, it never exists by itself, independently. Whether it is a reality in itself, or is merely a nominalistic notion, remained herewith quite undetermined. It did, however, follow from this position, that a

[1] See Note E. App. ii.

real humanity can only subsist as ἰδικὴ; as is the case also with deity. But everything ἰδικὸν they term ὑπόστασις: in their view, ὑπόστασις is the essence or nature itself, in the form of a particular individual; οὐσία or φύσις is, therefore, essentially an individual. Every definite ἰδικὸν, or the ὑπόστασις, is an accident in relation to the universal, to the essence (or genus)—it is that which is superadded to the essence: at the same time, an ἰδικὸν *must* be superadded, in order that the essence may really exist. The ἰδικὸν is further discriminated from whatever else is of the same substance with it, by marks which are peculiar to it amongst all others. From this the Monophysitic Christology drew the conclusion, that the natures of Christ cannot be conceived as real, unless they are also conceived as hypostatic or as ἰδικὸν. The problem, then, would be to effect the union of the divine ἰδικὸν of the Son and the human ἰδικὸν of the individual man Jesus (the essence of each involving the ἰδικὸν of each). Now, as it would be impossible to constitute one hypostasis out of two hypostases, of *the same* φύσις or genus, the question must of necessity be one of the union of two *different* natures. This cannot, of course, be effected by uniting the twofold ἰδικὸν of both, whilst the essence of each remains separate; for then the essences would be able to subsist alone, separated from the united ἰδικοῖς: they cannot, however, subsist alone, but solely in individuals. The unity thus effected would be one merely of the accidental, the ἰδικὸν; in the principal matter, namely the φύσις, no result would have been arrived at. If the φύσεις continue in their duality, they must necessarily, in order to exist at all, tend towards a twofold ἰδικὸν, each in its own kind. It would, therefore, be well to begin from the opposite direction, and first to endeavour to effect the union of the φυσεῖς. Should this attempt succeed, and should the two φυσεῖς be constituted to one new and unique φύσις (the Χριστότης, the theandric or divine-human nature), then, relatively to this οὐσία or φύσις also, it must be maintained that it can only exist as ἰδικὴ, or in an individual. The danger that this nature would necessitate the assumption of two hypostases in Christ is thus obviated. Christ is accordingly an individual person of divine-human essence.[1]

[1] The Monophysites regarded Christ as a thoroughly distinct, living, indissoluble synthesis—a synthesis which had become an ἐντελέχεια; and

Over against this deduction, the teachers of the Church were not in all cases and at once able to take up a safe and intelligible position. They at once, it is true, manifested suspicion of the union in the sphere of the natures, and their fear that an irreverent doctrine of conversion or mixture would be the result. But they did not at first know whether they ought to allow or not, that no φύσις really exists, except as an ἰδικὸν. Not a few supposed, at the outset, that they ought to deny the existence of an individual humanity in Christ, because, from the existence of an individual humanity, the Monophysites immediately concluded the existence also of a human hypostasis in Christ. They also thought that they ought to maintain that the general substance of true humanity, considered not as an idea, but as a congeries of real powers, was assumed by the Son of God. With this there then readily connected itself that form of the mystical Christology which taught that humanity, in its totality, was included in Christ, as in the second Adam (Note 34).

The Monophysites, however, replied that that would lead to a species of Nihilianism; for, if Christ assumed humanity in its entirety, but without appropriating anything definitely human, He did not in reality become anything; and if He is not anything, He is nothing. Further, Christ would then be the universal generic human being; but, as it is essential to the generic substance to pertain to all the individuals of the same genus, all men must consequently be Christ. The teachers of the Church then withdrew from the position which they had assumed, and conceded the existence of an individual human essence in Christ (Note 35). Until far into the Middle Ages, very different views were, of course, taken of the "Principium Individuationis:" sometimes it was conceived quantitatively, either as a negation (στέρησις) or limitation of the collective contents of the genus, or as an enrichment of the universal generic idea; whether as effected from without by the material element (σὰρξ), or as a qualitative inner principle.

A special epoch in the relation of the Church to these

maintained, that to analyze Him into His constituent elements, was not to comprehend Him. Through the analysis, that which was characteristic of Christ, that which discriminated Him both from the simply divine and the simply human, to wit, the Χριστότης or the *Christhood*, would be done away with.

questions, was constituted by the work of Boethius against Nestorius and Eutyches,[1] with its definitions of the terms, natura, substantia, persona, which he declares to be equivalents for the Greek words, φύσις or οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, and πρόσωπον.[2] He admitted that every essence or every nature exists as an individual; but questioned the validity of the Monophysitic conclusion, that, therefore, he who teaches the existence of two natures in Christ, teaches also, in effect, that there are two individuals or persons in Christ. Not two persons; for there may exist a nature which has not an hypostasis or person, as the entire irrational creation proves: the Monophysitic conception of person is therefore too physical, and makes it equivalent to physical individuality. Spiritual natures alone can be also endowed with personality. It is true, then, that, as an actual man, Christ must have been, in the physical aspect of His being, a human individual; but this does not necessarily imply that there were two persons in the one Christ. Nor did it even imply, as later writers added by way of making the statement complete, that there were two individuals. Two individuals of the same substance (Paul, Peter) cannot, indeed, become one; but here we have to do with individuals of a different substance. Besides this, it must be remembered that the divine nature of the Son is not an individual or part, and that God is not a genus,—which would lead to Tritheism. That undoubtedly signifies,—towards the Son of God, who is not a part of God, but the whole God, the human individuality

[1] Boëthii opp. ed. Basil. 1546, "De duabus naturis et una persona Christi adv. Eutychen et Nestorium," pp. 948-957.

[2] P. 951: "*Natura* est cujuslibet substantiæ specificata proprietas; *persona* vero rationabilis naturæ individua subsistentia. 960: Hujus (Eutychetis) error ex eodem quo Nestorii fonte prolabitur, nam sicut Nestorius arbitratus non posse esse naturam duplicem quin persona fieret duplex, atque ita cum in Christo naturam duplicem confiteretur, duplicem credidit esse personam, ita quoque Eutyches non putavit naturam duplicem esse sine duplicatione personæ." He then puts the question, and with special interest,—How can two natures be constituted one? It is only possible on the condition, either that one of them cease to exist by being converted into the other,—as, for example, when a drop of wine is poured into the ocean; or, that the two things commingle, and modify each other, so as to produce a new third thing which is neither the one nor the other, in that each is determined by the other, agendo et patiendo,—as, for example, honey and water are combined to form a new third thing, which we term mead.

cannot stand in so independent and exclusive a relation as towards another human individuality. They then proceed to say:[1] Of course, no spiritual nature, consequently not even that of Christ, can be destitute of personality; but we are not therefore necessarily compelled to say that it must be personal in itself, in order to have an actual existence. The spiritual human nature may have been incorporated with the Person of the Son; and thus it would not be without personality. By the assumptive act of this divine person, an individual human nature, both as to body and soul, was formed, which, although a mere individual part of humanity as actually existent, was nevertheless so constituted as to contain in full perfection and purity all that is required by the general conception of human nature. The Monophysitic doctrine, on the contrary, by assuming the existence of a new φύσις in Christ, and by representing it as ἰδικὴ, leads to the conclusion, that, as in all other cases, so here, the φύσις of the Χριστότης may undergo a manifold individualization; and thus involves the destruction of the distinctive and unique character of Christ.

This polemic against Monophysitism shows clearly enough that the teachers of the Church must not only have distinguished between nature and person, but must also have held that human nature might exist in a sense by itself, without a personality of its own:[2] it shows further, that when their aim was to effect the union of the two natures, they were only able to accomplish their object by declining, after the example of Apollinarism, to assert the completeness of the human nature of Christ, and by assuming a mixture, or transubstantiatio, in the sphere of the *persona*, similar to that which Monophysites assumed in the sphere of the *natura*. Only its human individuality did they preserve to the human nature of Christ.[3] For the rest, notwithstanding

[1] Compare, for example, Leontius' "de Sectis," Act. vii., in A. Mai l. c. T. vii. p. 52 ff.; pp. 13 f., 19, 20.

[2] The teachers of the Church were, in like manner, moved to distinguish more definitely between the ὑπόστασις and the φύσις or οὐσία, even in the deity of Christ, by the objection with which they were met, that if the *nature* of the Son, which is also the nature of the Father and the Spirit, became man, the Father and the Spirit must also have become man, as to their nature.

[3] Though, if the Logos be the persona in Christ, and if Boëthius' definition of persona given above were adopted, even this would not be quite certain.

the zeal with which they asserted the existence of a human nature permanently discriminated from the Son of God, they left it no real independence: it subsisted solely in the Logos. The Logos was the substantial: human nature was merely the selfless accidental; and the individual human element in Christ was not conceived to be related to the human genus, as the manifestation of its true and genuine nature, but as the manifestation of the accidental. There is no mistaking, however, that the teachers of the Church did not continue to attach quite the same meaning to the terms "natura" and "persona." On the one hand, they said, "persona non subsistit præter naturam;" that "natura" is that in which "persona" inheres; that the "persona" subsists in the "natura," which, so far therefore, is rather "substantia" than "accidens;" and that, in relation to the "natura," the "persona" is the accidental (*συμβεβηκός*). Such are the terms they employ, when the human is the subject of consideration. But when the endeavour was made to apply these distinctions to the deity, the reply was made,—In God nothing can be said to be "accidens:" the Person of the Father, for example, does not inhere in something else as an "accidens," but subsists in itself; and this is the true definition of substance. Further, the Divine Person or hypostasis in Christ, was the substance in which the human nature inhered, or had its subsistence.[1] But, whatever may be said regarding the relation of *οὐσία* or *φύσις* to *ὑπόστασις* in general, or in connection with one of the natures, such a representation reduces humanity to the position of an "accidens" of the deity in which it inheres, as in its substance.

The Monophysites were willing, indeed, to allow that a union had been effected in the sphere of the "natura;" they did not, however, consider human nature to be a determination of the divine essence (as Apollinaris did), and thus ensure it an eternal existence. Whatever persistency might be displayed in holding that the divine nature, subsequently to the Unio, belonged quite

[1] Leontius in A. Mai l. c. p. 52 (and similarly Gelasius): the *ἀνυπόστατον*—the human *οὐσία*—is that which *ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεωρεῖται*; the *ὑπόστασις*, on the contrary, *καὶ τὸν τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι λόγον κατέχει*. *Ἀνυπόστατος*, indeed, the (human) *φύσις* cannot be termed; but it does not therefore follow that it is an *ὑπόστασις*, for it may have its subsistence in another—even in the divine hypostasis.

as truly to the human as the human to the divine, they still treated the human as a mere selfless "accidens" of the divine nature.[1] We thus see clearly that the two parties were not in reality so far removed from each other as they themselves supposed. The Monophysites, on the one hand, represent the *Nisus* to attain a more intimate union of the natures than was attained by the Chalcedonians; but did no more than the latter to exhibit the inner connection between the divine and human. The Chalcedonians, on the other hand, represent the *Nisus* to preserve to the human element a relative independence without mixture or conversion; but they did not, in reality and logically, get beyond the Monophysite notion of the insubstantiation of the humanity in the deity, although they confessed it not to themselves. Nor is any essential change made in the relation of the deity to the humanity, by designating the substance in which the humanity has an impersonal subsistence, hypostasis. This was the chief reason why Monophysitic elements constantly made their appearance afresh within the Church itself. And accordingly, despite the long and fruitless struggle carried on by the victors at Chalcedon with those who, though vanquished, refused to surrender, about the middle of the sixth century the stream of Monophysitism within the Church itself became again so powerful, that the Three Chapter Controversy may be taken as a proof of the withdrawal of the favour which had been predominantly bestowed on the school of Antioch at the Council of Chalcedon. Indeed, at the Synod held in the year 553, Justinian succeeded in carrying through the formula which forms the complementary counterpart to the θεοτόκος—namely, that one of the Holy Trinity was crucified for us. With this revival of Monophysitism was connected the Monotheletic movement in the following century. At the same time, the feeling that Monophysitism must lead to the annulment of the reality of the incarnation, retained its life, and gave rise to a reaction against Monophysitic elements on the part of the adherents of the Council of Chalcedon, which daily gained new force. Against the full victory of such elements they were

[1] The Monophysites affirmed also, that, according to the Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon, the unity of the person was not a substantial reality, but merely an accident, an attribute. Compare the interesting discussion of Barhebræus (sec. 13), Assem. l. c. ii. 288 ff., and of Elias, sec. 8, Ass. ii. 96.

protected, by the existence of a Monophysite counter-Church, so long as the Greek Church continued to be the main arena of dogmatical controversies.

Following in the footsteps of the Nestorians, the Monophysites sought refuge, after they began to be persecuted by the Emperors, outside of the boundaries of the Greek Empire. Powerful in Syria, Armenia, and Egypt, they kept up a lively connection amongst themselves, especially through the medium of the monks; until the danger arising from Mohammedan incursions, and the weakening of the Empire by the schism of the Monophysite party, induced the Emperor to try new conciliatory measures (Note 36). At this point, however, our attention is called to the Monothelete Controversy.

CHAPTER SECOND.

THE MONOTHELETE CONTROVERSIES OF THE SEVENTH CENTURY. THE ŒCUMENICAL SYNODS OF THE YEARS 680 AND 693.

How far the Monophysitic mode of thought was from having been fully overcome at the date of the Synod of Chalcedon, is sufficiently clear from the immense compass of this long-enduring and not hitherto terminated controversy:—indeed, down to the time of Justinian, it may be regarded in more than one respect as a controversy within the Church itself, to the doctrinal efforts of which, it in several instances gave a new direction. Not before the time of Justinian was a decided blow struck at the influence of Monophysitism in the Greek Church. This result was due, partly, to the continuous schism which existed in the party, side by side with a retrograde movement towards a species of Dyophysitism; partly to the circumstance, that the Monophysites, after they began to be persecuted, made the countries which lay outside the Roman Empire the principal scene of their operations, and that, in the following century, they were for the most part shut out from the influence of the other Churches, through the inroads of Mohammedanism. Considered in relation to the Council of Chalcedon, the matter

may be said to have stood as follows:—the unquestioned and sole supremacy of the doctrine of the two natures, in the Greek and in the Latin Church, dates from Justinian; and all attempts to call again in question the authority of the Chalcedonian decrees, or to obtain for the Monophysites some sort of a place in the orthodox Church, were, from that time onwards, entirely dropped.

But with all that was blameworthy in it, the fundamental intuition of Monophysitism had struck its roots so deeply into the Christian consciousness, that even after it had been formally proscribed the Monothelete Controversy arose within the very limits of the Church.[1] On the part of its chief teachers—the Patriarch Sergius, and Pyrrhus of Constantinople, Cyrus of Alexandria, Theodorus of Pharan, and Honorius, Patriarch of Rome—Monotheletism may be considered as an attempt to effect some kind of solution of the problem of the vital unity of the Person of Christ, which had been so seriously proposed by Monophysitism, on the basis of the now firmly established doctrine of the two natures. Nor, looked at in this aspect, can it be denied that the Church had now arrived at a stadium in its development, when, even on internal grounds, this attempt required to be made; although political motives and plans induced the Emperor to attempt to turn the rising impulse to an irenical (εἰρηνικός) account—to use it as a basis for the reconciliation of Monophysitism with the main body of the Church. Regarded in connection with the Council of Chalcedon, on the contrary, the result of the controversy was the logical and consistent evolution of one important aspect of the Chalcedonian doctrine. This evolution was, however, of such a character, that another solution of the problem referred to was the more imperatively required, when the Monothelete solution had been condemned by the Church. The most prominent representatives of this aspect, were Sophronius, at a later period Patriarch of Jerusalem, the monk Maximus, and Agathon of Rome.

Let us now examine these controversies more closely. We have spoken before (p. 52) of the great influence of the Egyptian monks, which had made itself felt from the end of the fourth century. From the fifth century onwards, we find a connection of varied character existing between them and the

[1] The Monophysites persisted in maintaining that two natures must also have two wills or modes of expression—that one will demands one nature

Syrian monks, especially that part of the Syrian monks which shared the mystical tendency, which had originated with the elder Ephraem. To this connection must it be attributed that, despite the efforts of a Theodoret, and despite the more friendly tone assumed by the Council of Chalcedon, towards the old school of Antioch, Monophysitism attained to so wide-spread an authority in Syria and Asia. In these monasteries, also, was probably produced that peculiar mixture of Platonism or Neo-Platonism and Christianity, the most characteristic expression of which are the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, that oracle of secret wisdom, whose fame the Monophysites, indeed, were the first to proclaim, but who rose to great importance in the Church also, on account of the mystical nature of his teachings. His praise was echoed even during the Middle Ages, and his heavenly hierarchy may be said to have been the type of the earthly. These writings probably originated in the fifth century. It will be necessary to dwell for a time upon them, both because their mystical Christology formed an important link of connection between Monophysitism and the doctrine of the Church, and because they not only greatly aid in accounting for the rise of Monotheletism, but were even a prelude thereto. Moreover, the extended influence enjoyed by the name and the views of the Areopagite, may prove to be an important confirmation of the assertion previously made, that in the old Monophysitism there was a background of Pantheism: not that we mean to affirm that the Areopagite was a declared Monophysite; certainly, however, that his entire mode of viewing the world and God belonged to this family (Note 37).

In his work on the Divine Names (c. 2, § 10) he remarks, —The deity of Jesus, which is the cause of all things, fills all things, and preserves all the parts of the universe in concord with the whole,—is neither a part nor a whole, and yet again is both a part and a whole. For it comprises all the parts and the full whole in itself: it is perfect in the imperfect, for it is the prime originator of perfection; but in perfect things it is imperfect, for both as to dignity and origin, it transcends their perfection. In the things which are defective as to form, it is the forming form and the principle of form; but it is also, at the same time, destitute of form, in the forms, because it is itself above all form. It is the being which completely dwells

in all beings without stain, and is at the same time entirely exalted above all beings.[1] All the principles of things, and all ordinances, it determines, and yet stands above every principle and every ordinance. It is the measure of things, and their time (that is, their measure, as to space and time), and yet it is above, and prior to, time: it is full in needy things, and overflows in full things: it is unutterable, innominable: it is above understanding, above life, above substance, above nature; and so forth. Thus, on the one hand, the Areopagite represents every conception of God, every nominable Divine attribute, as absolutely swallowed up in the incomprehensible Divine unity in the Divine obscurity; and not even from the operations of God may any conclusions be drawn, according to the law of causality, respecting God Himself. "The causes are outside their effects, and are exalted above them, in accordance with the law of their own original, primal ground."[2] The very strongest expression is thus given to the exclusiveness which characterized this conception of God, in relation to everything finite and human;—a conception which lay also at the foundation of Monophysitism. From this point of view there is absolutely no resemblance between God and even man,—there is not even an objective relation between the two: God is too highly exalted. But the converse aspect of this matter is also necessary,—namely, that the world has no real existence as a world; that, so far as it can be said really to exist, it is simply the existence of the divine in it. In so far as it really is, God is the unity of that which is divided, the essential being in that which is, the one power uniting the powers, the life of the living; in such a way, however, that whilst He is allowed to be all this, He is conceived as transcending it,—as an absolutely peculiar, and absolutely incomprehensible, supersubstantial (überseiend, ὑπερούσιος) being. We are here carried back, in all essential respects, to the point of view of Philo; with the difference, that Philo sums up and

[1] See Note F. App. ii.

[2] There may have worked here a precognitive feeling, that a free causality is out of the question, so long as the law of causality takes only a physical form,—that is, so long as certain conclusions can be drawn from the nature of the effect to the nature of the cause. But a free causality, such as he describes, which bears no resemblance whatever to its operations, is in reality physical, because it is arbitrary, notwithstanding its apparent loftiness, and its absolutely supernatural character.

comprises the positive relation of God to the world in the Logos, the negative relation in the ὄν. That out of this ὄν, the idea of the supersubstantial (ὑπερούσιον) should have been formed, may have been due, partly, to the transcendental character of the Christian conception of God,—a transcendence in which the Son also, according to the Areopagite, must participate. A difference in the positive aspect of the Divine relation to the world could not fail to be brought about by the idea of the incarnation,—an idea which the Areopagite took also into consideration. But this step in advance, as we at once find, was, in both aspects, but uncertain and precarious, for precisely the same reason, and because of the very defects, which we remarked in Philo. Both the religious and philosophical consciousness here made their boldest flight towards that absoluteness of the Divine nature which is fitted to attract a pious spirit, or to fill it with reverence, and to give to thought the appearance of infinite depth: in reality, however, these attempts did but reveal the inner poverty and emptiness of an idea of God which can only be defined by categories borrowed from the domain of the physical. As though intoxicated with nature, and given up to ecstasies, these men ignored the ethical nature of God; and yet at the same time imagined themselves able to advance an infinitely more sublime conception of God.

But, seeing that God is the one, who is at once in all and above all,—yea, outweighs the negation of the many by the Divine unity,—all idea of distinct hypostases in God ought consistently to be renounced: in the superessential God everything sinks down into a unity without distinctions. Much is said, indeed, of the Many, along with the One; but the trinity in God retains merely a completely precarious position.[1] The Areopagite aims at beholding the One in motion, in process. But a process is only possible where there is a real distinction of *momenta;* whereas, in this case, the distinctions are not deduced from the unity itself, but are empirically or traditionally adopted, and are then again allowed to disappear in the undiscriminated unity. Importance and significance could, therefore, attach to the distinctions only so far as they mark a lower stage of consciousness, which had not yet advanced to the highest unity.[1] By the distinctions or the many, the Areopagite signified the

[1] Compare Baur, a. a. O., Band ii. S. 235–239. [2] See Note G. App. ii.

world. For the reason just assigned, however, the world could have merely a docetical existence; for it is quite as truly nothing as something, inasmuch as all that it is, God is; and yet God, again, is quite as truly not in all, but above all. The result, as far as Christology is concerned, is very plain: after laying down such premises, it was impossible for the Areopagite to justify, either anthropologically or theologically, a specific incarnation in one. If he taught it at all, it was because he had adopted it from the creeds of the Church, and he was quite unable to put himself into a sincere and true relation towards it. He says,—Inasmuch as the deity of Jesus, in its exceeding goodness, came even to nature (bis zur Natur), and truly assumed the substance of our flesh, so that the Highest God could be called "man," the supernatural and supersubstantial essence shone forth out of humanity. Not merely because He communicated Himself to us without mixture or change (for in His overflowing fulness He suffered no harm from His unspeakable humiliation), but—and this is the most marvellous amongst all marvellous things—He was supernatural in our natural; He was superessential (überseiend) in that which belongs to our being (Sein); and He possessed in an unique manner all that is ours, of us, and above us.[1] "How can Jesus," he asks, "ὁ πάντων ἐπέκεινα (ultra) be essentially united with all men; that is, not merely in the sense in which He who is the Author of man, can be designated man (in accordance with his notion that God may be named with the names of all His creatures), but in the sense that He was truly man as to His entire nature?" We call Him, he replies, not "man," for He is not merely man: nor is He merely above our substance (ὑπερούσιος); but He is actually man, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπους καὶ κατὰ ἀνθρώπους. The superessential One is ἐξ ἀνθρώπων οὐσίας οὐσιωμένος: but He does not, therefore, the less overflow with superessential essence, seeing that He is always beyond and above all being (Sein). He remains concealed even after the revelation of Himself; or rather, to speak more divinely, He remains concealed even in the revelation of Himself. For this reason, even when He entered into being, He was invested with a being above being (ὑπὲρ οὐσίαν οὐσιώθη). In a manner above the human, He performed human acts. In

[1] De div. nomin. ed. Paris, pp. 271–273; compare also Euthym. Panopl. I., Tit. vii., pp. 39, 40.

short, He was not a man, not as though He were not man, but because, though born after human fashion, He was, notwithstanding, really man above the human mode, and above man. Not as God did He perform divine acts, nor human acts as man; but inasmuch as in Him, God had become man, He developed a new, that is, a divine-human, a theandrical activity (*θεανδρικὴν ἐνέργειαν*).[1] From what has been advanced, it is clear enough that the Pseudo-Areopagite could not really acknowledge the duality of the natures. It is true, he further suggests, in the words last quoted, that the entire activity of Christ was neither purely divine nor purely human, but in all cases theandrical (*θεανδρική*); and he accordingly approximated towards the view of the human in Christ as the mere form of the divine, or as the configured divine; but it was out of his power to set it with distinctness before the mind. The superessential, formless essence of the divine, which remains the same even during the incarnation, presented a constant hindrance in the way of his conceiving the Son to have been really and actually present in Jesus. And, inasmuch as he sought to unite the human with the divine, by representing the former as participating in the superessential essence of the latter, the human is again reduced to a something vague and general, and acquires a Docetic character. His whole view of the world, as set forth in his heavenly hierarchy,[2] owing to the pantheistic and universalistic nature of the deificatory process on which it rests, rendered it still more difficult for him to assign to the God-man Jesus any distinctive and integrant place in the universe. What place can Christ occupy in this order, which is divided into two parts,—the heavenly, and its symbolical antitype, the earthly? Does He occupy a place in the earthly? But then He is on a stage lower than the very lowest of the heavenly order. Or, does He occupy a place in the heavenly? But then His earthly existence is an illusion: He must, further,

[1] Epist. ad Cajum Medicum, 3, 4; compare the Schol. of the Confessor et Monach. Maximus, as appendix to the Oxford Edition of the Opera of Joh. Scotus Erigena, 1681, p. 58 ff.

[2] The divine nature is represented as diffusing itself in multiple forms through all that is, in that it descends from the highest to the lowest stages, and becomes ever more and more disintegrated; but, through the purifying, consecrating, and perfecting action of these same stages, it returns upwards again into the simple unity which is in God, and which is God.

either be co-ordinated, or put on one level, with the heavenly spirits (whether they be the highest or not, is immaterial), and be held to be merely one of the High Priests of the universe, who collect divine life within themselves, and again diffuse it; or else He stands at the apex, as the highest unity. In the latter case, according to this system, Christ must be coincident with the Deity, the humanity must disappear, and either all beings must be in a graduated measure God-men, or there is no God-man at all. In point of fact, the latter is the truth: for God, as God the Superessential One, in the view of the Areopagite, is by His very idea incommunicable, like the God of Philo, and can neither reveal Himself nor be known. For Christ, consequently, there would only remain a subordinate place: His appearance and revelation is not a purely positive thing, but is as necessarily marked by negation and limitation, as everything else that is finite. Dionysius knew no other way of escaping from that Hellenic Ebionitism into which, at this point, he might easily have fallen, than by calling the Logos Himself Jesus: thus confessing, by implication, that he only retained an eternal Christ, and that the historical Christ had faded away before his eyes.

The Monophysites were the first to regard the teachings of the Pseudo-Dionysius with favour, and to concede to them authority:[1] from the Nestorian party they met with a different reception. But, even in the Church, they soon came to be regarded with not a little consideration. This was due, partly, to the wider diffusion of an acquaintance with Platonism, to the revival of Origenism amongst many of the monks, especially those of the monastery of Laura, to the transcendental character and apparent loftiness of the conception of God contained in the works of the Areopagite, and, finally, to the favour with which his idea of an hierarchy was regarded. A physical conception of God, such as these writings set forth, could not but be felt to be favourable to the idea of magical

[1] Even if these writings did not proceed from the Monophysite party (see above, p. 196). In the religious colloquy opened at the instance of Justinian, the Monophysites appealed to passages from the Areopagite; but their orthodox opponents declared that they had previously had no knowledge of those writings, and therefore refused to allow them to be quoted as authoritative.

powers, administered by a regularly graduated hierarchy: and, inasmuch as the teachers of the Church represented, on the one hand, the divine and human natures as absolutely different substances;[1] and yet, on the other hand, could not avoid regarding God as the prototype and goal of man; the necessary consequence was, the adoption of a doctrine of redemption which made it necessary to the perfection of man, that he should relinquish his own nature and be raised to another and higher nature. When man corresponds to his true idea, he is good: but there is a higher goodness and virtue than the common, and this higher goodness becomes the portion of him, who either raises himself, or is raised, above human life, by means of those magical forces. Hence the distinguished position assigned by the Areopagite to Monachism. The highest virtue is not genuinely human, or the human in its true form and condition, but the negation thereof. An ethical system of this nature necessarily leads to the conclusion, that man, in order to attain to perfection, must cease to be—must be absorbed or transformed into God. The principle was not followed out to its logical consequences; but there was an unsteady alternation between the ethics of ecstasis and ethics proper. The latter, namely, ethics proper, contented itself with the conclusion, that so long as man is quantitatively different from God, he cannot be perfect; and accommodated its requirements to this conclusion. That such views necessarily admitted only of a negative conception of evil, does not need to be expressly shown.

In all these respects, the system of the Areopagite did but give a general expression to the real secret of the point of view of the Western theology of that day. Accordingly, in the following century, the genuineness of these writings was defended even by the teachers of the Church, and the champions of orthodoxy went to the extent of lauding Dionysius as the Divine. At first, indeed, the Church probably felt that they had a strange and unfamiliar sound: but the heathen schools of the Neo-Platonists having been closed, and Christianity having been, outwardly, universally recognised, these writings,

[1] See above, p. 144 ff. Compare also Boëthius l. c. p. 952, against the Nestorians: "Deo atque homini *quid non* erit diversa ratione disjunctum, si sub diversitate naturæ personarum quoque credatur mansisse discretio?"

with their high-flown rhetorical tone, must have had the more overmastering a charm for a perversely cultivated age, as they clothed with the appearance of deepest divine knowledge views of God and the world which had really an heathenish origin, and which the Church did not allow to become influential in its midst, without experiencing at first great scruples of conscience.

The Pseudo-Areopagite played an important part in the history of Christology from the circumstance that the expression employed by him, θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια (divine-human activity), appeared a formula happily fitted to meet the demand for unity, whilst leaving untouched the doctrine of two absolutely opposed substances. With regard to one point, no doubt whatever seemed to be entertained,—to wit, that if the man Jesus acted for himself, and the Son of God in like manner for Himself, no result was attained by the incarnation, and that, consequently, the unity of person must express itself, at the very least, in the activity. Accordingly, in Christ, God and man were held, not merely to will the same thing, but to will the same thing in the same manner; and, consequently, both the form and the contents of the will of the two natures interpenetrated and constituted a unity. Hitherto, also, there had been no lack of teachers of the Church who taught, without hesitation, that in Christ there was unity of action and unity of will. Besides all, the hope was entertained of a possible reconciliation of the Monophysites by means of the doctrine of one will:—a consideration to which the Emperor Heraclius especially, attached great importance, on account of his difficulties with the Mohammedans. The older authorities do not inform us whether the Bishops Athanasius and Cyrus, who first brought this matter before the attention of the Emperor, had been led to the view they took by political reasons, or reasons connected with the peace and unity of the Church. We should suppose the former not to have been the case, so far as, in the natural course of things, we should be justified in expecting the will of Christ to be now made the subject of inquiry;—the corporeal and intellectual aspects of His Person having been hitherto so frequently discussed. That Monotheletism could not have owed its rise to any merely external considerations, and that the decision of the Council of Chalcedon did not by any means, as a matter of course, include the doctrine of two wills, was due, partly, to

the conviction, that two wills in one person seem most decidedly to presuppose two centres or Egos,—the will being most intimately connected with the personality; partly, to the circumstance, that the doctrine of two natures and one will in Christ had, at first, been received with very general favour, because the Patriarchs Sergius of Constantinople and Cyrus of Alexandria, and even Pope Honorius, had distinctly expressed their approval of Monotheletism. The Emperor Heraclius, therefore, did not hesitate to lend it the force of his authority. And the Monophysites in the Patriarchate of Alexandria were actually reconciled to the Church by means of this doctrine, including as it did the formula of Dionysius. Cyrus and the Alexandrian Synod of 633 (Neander says, 630?) repudiated the notion both of mixture and separation; aimed, however, at the same time, not merely at an hypostatical, but also at a physical union, the two factors of which should not be mixed in thought, but continue to exist and act distinctly, though co-operating in a divine-human operation. Before entering into the details, it will be advisable first to endeavour to find the bearings of this confused controversy, which hitherto has not been sufficiently cleared up or understood.

The Monotheletic Controversy went through three stadia. In its first stadium, which may be considered to extend from the year 623 until towards the year 638, the controversy bore chiefly on the question, Whether we are to assume only *μία ἐνέργεια* (*θεανδρικὴ*) in Christ, as did the Monophysites and Monotheletes, or *δύο ἐνέργειαι*? Theodorus of Pharan, Sergius, Cyrus,[1] the Synod of Constantinople of the year 626, and the Synod of Alexandria in the year 633, took the first view; Sophronius the second.[2] The volitional power was, as yet, not at all brought under special consideration. In consequence, however, of the ambiguity even of the word *ἐνέργεια* (operatio),—an ambiguity which allowed it to denote, on the one hand, the actual volition, or, the activity and mode of operation, and, on the other hand, the deed or effect of the volition (*ἀποτέλεσμα*),—the controversy still continued to be marked by indefiniteness. If *ἐνέργεια* were taken in the second sense, the majority must have been disposed to acknowledge that there was but one *ἐνέργεια*. This

[1] Mansi x. 585, 603, 744; xi. Conc. Cstp. Act. 13, pp. 558–579.

[2] Mansi xi., Act. 11, pp. 461–485. His "Ep. Synodica ad Serg."

position was the most favourable one for the defenders of the unity, though it was at the same time the position of least importance as regards the idea to be formed of the Person of Christ; for, in itself, the doctrine of two natures and wills was quite compatible therewith. In this first stadium, the question of one or two *wills* was not at all agitated: the principal and only question was, "Are the two natures to be conceived as active and efficient or not?" The one party, at a later period designated Monotheletes, were disposed to represent the deity of Christ alone as active, and not the humanity. So, for example, Theodore of Pharan. Dyophysitism was thus reduced to a dead, impotent proposition; and, by assigning to the humanity of Christ, at the utmost, a passive position, they took a most decided turn towards Monophysitism. But when their opponents —for example, Sophronius, and in part also, at a later period, Honorius—maintained that both natures were active, from a fear of opening the door to Monophysitism, they were still far from conceding the duality of wills, along with the duality of natures. They rather conceived the two potences, each acting in its own way, to be reduced to unity in the personality, and assumed for this purpose the existence of an *hypostatical* will in Christ, with which the final decision rested. Naturally, therefore, they held the deed or effect to be one, to be divine-human. Accordingly, the one Christ, or His one deciding will, accomplished the one divine-human work (*ἀποτέλεσμα*), through the medium of the two powers, or congeries of powers (natures), each of which acted in its own way. Examined in the light of the later Dyotheletism, these also must be classed with the Monotheletes: in fact, some of them were actually classed with the Monotheletes (for example, by the Council of 680), especially Honorius. Sophronius, on the contrary, the originator of the controversy, whose teachings, as we shall see, were essentially the same as those of Honorius, was, marvellously enough, recognised as orthodox by the Sixth Council. In consequence of the mistakes which have prevailed relatively to this matter, the greatest confusion has been introduced into the course and history of this controversy.

The second stadium was inaugurated by Honorius. He asserted that there were two natures, each working in its own way, not one *ἐνέργεια*; but one will, which he assigns to the per-

sonality. Now, for the first time, was a definite doctrine of one will laid down: the occasion thereto was given by the work of Sergius. (Sergius, however, appears to have reserved to himself the right to apportion this unity of will to the natures instead of to the person; and thus also to teach *μίαν ἐνέργειαν*.) The *Ἔκθεσις πίστεως* of Heraclius in 638, the successors of Sergius—Pyrrhus, Paulus, Petrus, maintained the same view; and the expositions given by these men, determined the form which Monotheletism bore in the eyes of those who assailed it. Acceding to the desire expressed by Honorius, through the medium of his envoy, Sophronius composed himself: and, indeed, there cannot have been any great difference between the views of Sophronius and Honorius. But this doctrine of one will, whether the will were attributed to the natures or to the person, was most hotly controverted, both by Sophronius' pupil Stephanus, and by the succeeding popes,—especially by Martin I. One reason for this opposition was, that its defenders, from a desire to favour Monophysitism, refused to combine with it the doctrine of two natures, which, though acting in conjunction, were yet distinct. Another reason, and one which especially influenced St Maximus, whose doctrine had considerable weight with the Lateran Council of the year 649, was, that the reality of the humanity of Christ was not believed, and that with justice, to be ensured, unless it were allowed to possess freedom—the ability to move for itself, and to take independent initiative;—which ability seemed to be curtailed, if, as Honorius taught, the will of the divine hypostasis or nature had deciding, and, as it were, arbitrative power. But, for the preservation of the unity of the two series of activities and of the two wills, which run parallel with each other, little or no care was, in this connection, taken. Dyotheletism, as laid down by Maximus and the Lateran Council, started with the *ἐνέργεια*, or mode of action of each nature, and thence passed to the "potentia," to the capacity possessed by each nature (including therein the intellectual faculty): it distinguished, further, between the *ἐνέργεια* as activity (will "actualiter"), and *ἐνέργεια* as deed, effect (*ἀποτέλεσμα*); and endeavoured to carry out the duality in all these three respects.

Monotheletism gained thus, for the first time, a clear understanding of its own nature and tendencies. In the course of

the third stadium (from the year 649 to 680), it perceived that it must attach more importance to the preservation of the unity of the volitional faculties, in the inmost centre of the person, than to the assertion of an undiscriminated unity of activities and effects. For even Monophysitism had been accustomed, since the time of Severus, to allow room for distinctions in both those aspects. The Monotheletes, accordingly, still asserted the unity of the will, but were induced, even previously to 645, by the charge of denying the reality of the humanity of Christ, to assume a will, in some way or other *composite*, which admitted of, or comprised, distinctly acting powers (natures). This was specially the view of the Antiocheian Patriarch Macarius, who no longer insisted on one "operatio," but merely on a θεανδρικὴν ἐνέργειαν (without the addition of μίαν): he still adhered, however, to the unity of the θέλημα of the hypostasis. The Synod of Constantinople, however, in 680, maintained that the two natures had two wills; and tried also (see their letter to the Emperor, xi. 664) to make it appear that they had established a free human will in Christ; but we shall find that they again contrived, by means of unexpected addenda, to give to the will of the divine aspect such a predominance, that the human will was degraded from the position of a free, to that of a merely operative, power (conceded to it even by Monotheletism), constituting little more than a point of transition for the all-decisive divine will. Thus, at the very moment when Honorius was ranked among heretics worthy of anathema, and his writings were burnt by the hand of the Synod, his view was in all essential features adopted by the Council.[1] After this general survey, let us now enter on the details.

FIRST STADIUM.

From the year 623 *to* 638.

Previously to this controversy, many had unhesitatingly adopted the formula, μία ἐνέργεια; partly on the authority of the

[1] Mansi xi. 621, 636, 684, 582, etc. The defence of Honorius put forth by Maximus (Mansi x.) is poor, and contradicts the second letter of Honorius. A better justification of him may be found in the decrees of the Œcumenical Council. See below.

Areopagite,[1] and partly because, notwithstanding the duality of the natures, they were anxious in any case to preserve the unity of the work, of Christ. But the term *ἐνέργεια* embraced both the activity and the result of the activity. The testimony of the Fathers was unquestionably not unfavourable,—Cyrill's fundamental view was in favour thereof,[2]—everything in Christ seemed split up, and the unity of His Person more completely dissolved than it was even according to the theory of Nestorius, who expressly taught the *μίαν ἐνέργειαν*, if the duality were extended even to the *ἐνέργεια*, instead of its being constituted the point in which, or by which, the unity of the person was preserved.

Accordingly, Bishop Theodorus of Pharan, the oldest and most important defender of the *μία ἐνέργεια*, although a Dyophysite,[3] taught that all the deeds narrated of Christ, even all that appertained to His soul and body, proceeded singly and undividedly from one principle (*ἀρχοειδῶς, μοναδικῶς καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως*), beginning in, and, as it were, welling originally forth from, the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Logos, though emerging through the medium of the rational soul, and of the body. Sleep, weariness, hunger, thirst, motion, and rest, he considered, should alike be referred to the all-wise and omnipotent activity of the Logos, who purposed to become man: everything, therefore, must be attributed to the one activity of the whole Logos, as One. In Christ, consequently, there was one will, and that will was divine.[4] Even His so-called sufferings, although they were the natural expression of human motions, must all be designated the one activity of one and the same Christ, put forth in order to bring us salvation. Natural motions also, were activities in Christ,—activities, that is, of the Logos. Our soul, indeed, is not master of the body in relation to density, or mass, or weight, or colour, and so forth; but it was otherwise with the body of Christ, possessed as it was of divine power and life. For He proceeded forth

[1] Sophronius was no doubt justified (as even Pyrrhus allows) in blaming Cyrus, for citing the expression *μίαν θεανδρικὴν ἐνέργειαν*, as though the Areopagite had employed it; whereas in reality he uses the word *καινὴν*, instead of *μίαν*. Substantially, however, Cyrus was right (see above, page 160), as is plain, both from the use of the singular, and from the word *θεανδρικὴ*.

[2] Compare Mansi xi. 533.

[3] See Mansi xi. 568, 569.

[4] L. c. 568. *Αὐτοῦ γὰρ τὸ θέλημα ἓν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο θεϊκόν.*

from Mary, and from the grave, and passed through doors, as one who had no body; He walked on the sea, as on a solid road. If, then, such an one was, notwithstanding, affected by sufferings, it must have been due to the action of the will of the Logos, who purposed it.[1] Body and soul in Christ were simply the ready organ of the alone-dominant Logos, the medium for the evolution of His ἐνέργεια, which he designates the μία Θεοῦ ἐνέργεια. The motions which pertained to the human nature, did not penetrate to the upper sphere: the Logos, *with* His nature, is represented as having occupied the place of the personality, and the humanity is thus reduced to the rank of a mere garment, or means of revelation, which stands in a completely passive relation to the divine nature,—the divine nature being, at the same time, also the personal element. When Theodorus speaks of the ἐνέργεια in the sense of effect, he does not fear to describe it as both divine and human (as it were, composite);[2] but when he understands by it the activity, the principle itself as active, he can only attribute it to the Logos. The question,—Whether we can speak of one will of the natures, did not at all suggest itself to him.

In a very similar way, Cyrus of Alexandria also clung to the μία ἐνέργεια, both in his transactions with the Egyptian Monophysites,—thousands of whom he gained over by his formulæ of concord,—and in his letter to Sergius. He makes no mention whatever of the will, or of the unity of the will,[3] as a faculty, but confines himself to requiring μία θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια,—understanding thereby both the effect and the activity. In point of thought, therefore, he certainly does assert one *actual* will,—a one will, however, of such a character, as not totally to exclude living movements on the part of the two natures (which

[1] This reminds us of Aphthartodocetism. His principal object, however, was to represent everything as the act of the Logos. For this reason even sufferings are converted into acts: a thought which, in itself, is important; but he does not employ it to the advantage of the humanity or soul of Christ also, but only to that of the Logos.

[2] L. c. 568 below, compare with 569 above.

[3] Compare his first Letter to Sergius, Mansi xi. 560, 561, and especially the Deed of Union (Vereinigungsurkunde), p. 565, can. 7, where he appeals to Dionysius, and recognises the formula, μία θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια: he also recognises the Chalcedonian formula, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν,—inserting, however, various clauses.

it was his wish to preserve); provided only that the duality either terminated in a synthesis, or even, as Theodore maintained, took its rise in the unity of the all-determining Logos. Very similar expressions are used by Sergius in his reply.[1] Leo's letter to Flavian, with regard to which Cyrus still betrayed certain doubts, he remarks, in order to put him at ease, does not teach that there were two modes of operation; nor was it so understood by Eulogius of Alexandria. Many Fathers, on the contrary, have taught that there was but *μία ἐνέργεια*. He himself, he says, had begun a collection of the testimonies of the Fathers, which he was in the habit of sending to his friends: amongst them, it would appear, indeed, that there were some spurious ones. For the rest, he praises the wisdom and zeal developed by Cyrus in reconciling so many to the Church.

Sophronius, however, a learned monk, who was in Alexandria whilst the negotiations with the Monophysites were proceeding, appears to have had his suspicions awakened, precisely by the mixture of conciliatory aims. He feared a revival of Monophysitism, unless a duality of activities, correspondent to the duality of natures, were accepted.[2] In what sense, we shall shortly see. The matter was laid before Sergius, as the principal Patriarch in the East,[3] who prevailed upon him to promise to cease the controversy which had been begun. Shortly afterwards, however (in the year 634), Sophronius was made Patriarch of Jerusalem; and at his entrance on office he issued a circular letter, embodying a very detailed confession of faith, written in a very turgid and bombastic style, and characterized by a spirit of hatred towards heretics, reminding one of an Epiphanius: he especially revived the controversy concerning the *ἐνέργεια* of Christ, which had been allowed to die out.[4]

He first advanced the usual statements against Monophysitism. The Logos cannot be circumscribed in the flesh, for He is omnipresent; whereas the flesh is circumscribed. Christ's body went from one place to another, but not the Logos: the former was tangible, the latter intangible; the latter is eternal, the son of Mary was temporal. But the Son of God, who was

[1] Mansi xi. Act. 12, pp. 525, 528. [2] Ib., pp. 572, 532.

[3] According to the letter addressed by him somewhat later to Honorius in Rome, Mansi xi. 529–537.

[4] Mansi xi. Act. 11, pp. 461–488.

eternally the One, became the other, without change, by the assumption of humanity. If the unity is, and remains, unchangeable and undivided, so also must the duality of that which presents itself in unchangeable distinction, and shines together in undivided altereity (Anderheit), remain unchangeable. They are natures, essences, forms (*μορφαὶ*), *out of* which the mysterious union was constituted, and *in* which one and the same Christ is beheld. The one remains one,—to wit, the result produced from the natures,—which result is no longer divided into two, but without conversion or separation still shows that, of which it consists.[1] That is the hypostasis, the composite person, which subsists by means of a mixture without confusion, and of a conjunction which knows no division. The hypostatical union it is, which does not involve the identification of the natures (*ταυτότης*), but preserves the distinction between them.[2] Both natures act, each in its own way; after the Unio, they have neither precisely the same conterminous modes of action, nor merely one mode of action. But they do not therefore separate: they rather pursue a mutually correspondent mode of action,—they work in conjunction (*κατάλληλος ἐνέργεια, συνέργεια*), that is, for the one result or work (*ἀποτέλεσμα*). This conjointness of action is theirs through the hypostasis of one and the same Christ, who is beheld in the two natures, and who *works* what pertains to each of them, in accordance with the essential inborn characteristics of each. Sophronius, consequently, attributes to each of the two natures its own mode of action or its own activity: to the hypostasis (or the Ego) of Christ also, which he terms at once composite and monadic, and which stands alongside of or above the natures, he attributes an activity of its own. Nay more, this one Christ has the power of decision. When it was *His will*, He gave the human nature time or space to suffer, or to work, or to grow, and so forth. For He did not allow Himself to be the involuntary or constrained subject of such things, although they were congruous to human nature; but God consented to suffer as to the

[1] See Note H. App. ii.

[2] Yet he also terms it *φυσικὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν*, p. 477. P. 481: *φυσικὴ καὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσις*. The preceding quotation runs in the original text: *Μένει τὸ ἓν ἕν, τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν (φύσεων) γεγονὸς ἀποτέλεσμα, μηκέτι δίχα διαιρούμενον.*

flesh: and yet He neither worked nor suffered because, and when, the natural or fleshly motions called for it, and stirred up to action or suffering, but only when it was His own will. Human sufferings and activities were, as it were, collected and stored up in His Person: nay more, He was not merely their living storehouse (*ταμίας*), but also the arbitrator (Schiedsrichter, *πρύτανις*), who presided over their distribution.[1] For this reason (because the divine Ego, strictly speaking, both decided and acted), what was human in Him was superhuman, in that it was not His by nature, but was freely, voluntarily assumed. Nor did He work under constraint or coercion (*τυραννικῶς, ἀναγκαστῶς*); nor, again, was there ever in Him, as there is frequently in us, any lack of willingness; but whenever and in what degree He willed, He gave opportunity both to those who sought to inflict sufferings on Him, and to the sufferings themselves which acted naturally (*κατὰ φύσιν*). All the miracles, indeed, were wrought by the person, but through the human nature, *in* order that the divine nature might be recognised in them, as the human nature was recognised in and through the sufferings. And so was the one Son known, who evolved every activity, both divine and human, out of Himself. Divinely enlightened men admonish us to draw a distinction between some biblical words and others—to refer the one to the divine, the other to the human nature: and so also do they say regarding the same Son; they affirm that no one can divorce the collective activity, from the one Sonship.[2] From what has been said, it is clear that Sophronius, with whatever zeal he might assert the duality of the *ἐνέργειαι*, placed above them the will of the hypostasis, and *in* the strict sense, attributed to it the sole decision. In reality, therefore, if not in words, he posits one will, which carries out its volitions by means of the modes of action of both the natures, and allots this will to the one Christ. A duality of wills he never mentions; nor could he in any case have regarded a will of the human nature as, strictly speaking, a free will,—he could only have viewed it as an active power, which derived its impulse from another source. The sole difference, consequently, be-

[1] L. c., p. 485.

[2] P. 488: *Εἷς υἱὸς ἐγινώσκετο ὁ πᾶσαν ἐξ αὐτοῦ* (l. *αὐτοῦ*) *προφέρων ἐνέργειαν, θείαν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην. Ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς υἱοῦ φασιν* (*οἱ θεόφρονες*), *πᾶσαν—ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἄν τις χωρίσαι τῆς μιᾶς υἱότητος.*

tween him and Theodorus is, that the latter always speaks of humanity as passive, and distinctly describes the Logos as the sole actor; whereas Sophronius, whilst representing the humanity over against and in relation to the hypostasis (to which he goes back rather than to the Logos) as altogether determined, and as, therefore, so far passive, conceives it also to be in itself endowed with its own law of motions.[1] For this reason, the Areopagite also, he supposes, spoke of a new theandrical mode of action, because the one divine-human person, in reality, works everything, though by means of the two natures (see p. 160 f.).

The position thus taken up by Sophronius towards the Alexandrian work of peace, and to the *μία ἐνέργεια*, induced the Patriarch Sergius to apply, by way of precaution, to Honorius. Sergius feared the approach of a storm, especially as he understood Sophronius to intend also to assert a duality of wills in Christ, and not merely the duality of the modes of action under the one will of the one Christ, who Himself did everything. In his letter to Honorius, he expresses himself to the following effect:—

After his victory over the Persians, Heraclius held a conversation on matters of faith with a follower of Severus, and successfully defended the orthodox faith against him: in that conversation, too, he spoke of one *ἐνέργεια* of Christ. Of this interview he afterwards gave an account to Cyrus, then the Bishop of Colchis. Cyrus, however, being uncertain whether it were right to speak of one *ἐνέργεια*, had applied to him (Sergius) for instructions. Meanwhile, Cyrus had won over almost all Egypt, Thebais, and Libya by propositions, of which the *μία ἐνέργεια* was one; and, in consequence of this condescending adaptation, which the Fathers not only had not forbidden, but had often exercised themselves, he had brought the Monophysites to recognise the doctrine of two natures, laid down by the Chalcedonian Council and by Leo. Sophronius, then a monk, very recently chosen Patriarch of Jerusalem, is opposed to this adaptation. This circumstance Sergius wished to lay before Honorius. In his view, it would be cruel, disputatiously to disturb the union which had been scarcely established, for the sake of a question which did not endanger pure doctrine, as must be

[1] The doctrine of Sophronius is designated orthodox, Conc. vi. Mansi xi. 556.

the case, should the words *μία ἐνέργεια*, be again struck out of the formula, agreeably to the demand of Sophronius. Sergius had discussed the matter at large with him, and Sophronius had not been able to prove the doctrine of a twofold *ἐνέργεια*, either by patristic or synodal testimonies. To Cyrus he had written, advising him, in consideration of the peace which had been established, to allow no one to teach either the unity or the duality of the *ἐνέργειαι*, but to limit them to setting forth one and the same only-begotten Son, who worked everything—both that which befitted God and that which befitted man,—the incarnate God, out of whose unity everything undividedly proceeded, and back into whose unity everything must be referred. The formula, *μία ἐνέργεια*, although employed by some of the holy Fathers, wears still a strange face to some, and excites the suspicion that there may be an intention of leading them into Monophysitism: it would, therefore, be better avoided. The formula, *δύο ἐνέργειαι*, had never been employed by any recognised teacher of the Church, and is a stumbling-block to many; and it should be the more strictly avoided, as the assumption of two *ἐνέργειαι*, necessarily involves the positing of two wills, and that, of two opposed wills. It is, for example, as though the Logos partially willed the sufferings, and the humanity resisted His will, which would end in the recognition of two subjects, choosing opposite courses; for there cannot be two wills, in reference to the same thing, at the very same time, in one and the same subject. To assert that, would be to separate the humanity of Christ from His deity, and to abolish the incarnation. The doctrine of the God-taught Fathers tells us plainly enough, that the flesh of the Lord, animated by a rational soul, never accomplished its natural motions separately and of its own impulse, or in opposition to the suggestions of the Logos hypostatically united with it; but merely when, as, and in the measure, in which God the Logos willed it. As our body is governed by the soul, so was the entire human life-system of Christ, always and in all things, impelled by God. Gregory of Nyssa also allots the passive to the flesh, the active to God. Sergius, therefore, counselled him against the use of the formula of unity or duality, although the hush-word *μία ἐνέργεια* ought not to be quite repudiated, as some demanded; and Sophronius had expressed himself satisfied therewith, had

promised to keep the peace, and had only required a written declaration, which Sergius had given him. To the like intent, he had also recently expressed himself to the Emperor, warning him against too subtle investigations, and counselling him to be content with that which had been handed down from of old,—namely, with maintaining that every divine and human act proceeded, undivided and unseparated, from one and the same incarnate Word. Leo also had evidently taught the same doctrine in the words: "Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione, quod proprium habet."[1]

SECOND STADIUM.

The Dominance of Monotheletism in the Church; and the opposition made to it, especially in the Western Church, from the year 638 *to* 648

Honorius answered Sergius, on the whole, approvingly.[2] Both formulas he regarded as equally and solely fitted to stir up useless school controversies; but differed from Sergius, who evidently gave the preference to the μία ἐνέργεια, in not finding it suitable, whether it be referred to the natures or to the personality. For the personality has not merely one or two, but many activities; and the natures act, each in its own way: it is, therefore, right to take no account of the ἐνέργεια (the activity, mode of action), but, on the contrary, to go back to the will of Christ. He treats as almost self-evident, what Sergius had scarcely hinted, regarding this will of Christ: "Inasmuch as the humanity was naturally united with the Logos (naturali unitate copulata), and Christ is therefore One, we acknowledge one will of Christ (he does not say one will of His humanity,

[1] The Latin text has "forma utraque" in the nominative; whereas the Monotheletes took these words as the ablative μορφῇ; in consequence of which the subject of the verb is "the person," instead of "the natures," and the one person appears as the sole actor and willer (even though through the medium of the natures).

[2] Mansi xi. Act. xii. p. 537 ff., gives a fragment of a second letter to Sergius (Act. xiii. pp. 580, 581), written after Sophronius had sent an embassy to Honorius. Through this embassy, Honorius instructed Sophronius not any longer to insist on the formula of δύο ἐνέργειαι. This the embassy promised in the name of Sophronius, provided Cyrus would desist from teaching the μία ἐνέργεια.

as Maximus subsequently tried to explain his words). It was owing to the supernatural mode of His birth, that there were not different or contradictory wills in Him; and when He said, 'I do not mine own will, but the will of My Father,' it was out of condescension to our state and position, for whom He desired to be an example." In his second letter he says,—"Instead of teaching one operation or mode of operation (operatio), we ought rather to teach that there is one Operator (unus operator), Christ, who works by means of both natures; and in place of teaching that there are two 'operationes,' we should teach that in the one person there are two natures, each performing what is appropriate to it."[1]

At this moment, when, for the first time, all the patriarchs—Sophronius even, who kept silence, scarcely excepted—were one, Heraclius issued his Ἔκθεσις πίστεως, in which disputes regarding the unity or the duality of the ἐνέργειαι, were forbidden, and the unity of the will expressly taught,—partly on the ground, that not even Nestorius himself had ventured to maintain a volitional duality.[2] The Ἔκθεσις, therefore, did but keep close to that which had received the approval of Honorius (Note 38).

We may describe the Monotheletes as, more or less consciously, striving to prevent the Chalcedonian doctrine of two natures from being made the basis of a doctrine of two parallel life-systems in Christ,—which would have abolished the unity of His Person. At the same time, however natural it might be, for even orthodox Chalcedonians and sincere Dyophysites, to be seized by a fear of assuming two such parallel series of intellectual activities in Christ,—such an assumption appearing to

[1] "Utrasque naturas in uno Christo unitate *naturali* copulatas cum alterius communione operantes et operatrices confiteri debemus,—Pro una operatione oportet nos unum operatorem confiteri et pro duabus operationibus, ablato geminæ operationis vocabulo, ipsas potius duas naturas—in una persona unigeniti—prædicare propria operantes:" compare xi. 582, 636, 684.

[2] Even Sophronius substantially allowed the unity of will. The unity of the ἐνέργεια was not taught in the Ἔκθεσις. At the utmost, therefore, Sophronius could only be dissatisfied that the unity was not expressly repudiated, and that the duality of the ἐνέργειαι, in the sense of two powers under the sway of the one will, was not expressly taught. Rightly viewed, however, he scarcely needed to be dissatisfied even with this, seeing that there was scarcely any one, not even a follower of Severus, who could deny *the* duality of modes of operation to which Sophronius still clung.

involve the lowering of the idea of the incarnation to an empty word, and its entire suppression, especially as the Logos was, in addition, always held to be "extra carnem,"—it cannot be doubted that the decided victory of Monotheletism would have reduced the doctrine of two natures, to a dead and impotent thesis; nay more, that it would have led to the construing of the entire actual life of this person, as though there existed no doctrine of two natures, but the very contrary. In other words, and considered historically, Monotheletism, and especially Honorius, were not in harmony with Leo's letter to Flavian, and its whole point of view. Notwithstanding the decision of Honorius, this was first felt in the West.

First, a few words touching the external history of the controversy, in its second stadium. After the death of Honorius, in the year 638, the Roman See began to pursue a totally different tendency: in taking this course, it and its friends in Africa were encouraged, by their knowledge of the intention of several prefects to revolt against the Emperor, and to adopt an opposite line of policy. Rome itself was influenced both by the memory of Leo, and by its dislike of the manner in which the Patriarchate of Constantinople fell in with the favourite ideas of the imperial policy: Northern Africa, Libya, Numidia, Mauritania, were influenced by their ancient connection with Rome, and by the warm interest still felt in those countries for the school of Antioch. The now commencing Dyotheletic movement leaned for support mainly on the Romish bishops, John IV., Theodore, and especially Martin I. Its intellectual champions, however, were Stephen and the Greek Abbot Maximus. The former, as he himself narrates, had vowed to Sophronius, whose confidant he was, and whose attention was then fully engaged by the inroads of the Saracens, with a fearful vow to carry on the struggle. He did so in a decidedly dyotheletic manner. He succeeded in silencing his opponents by journeying himself to the Synods in the above-mentioned districts of Africa.[1] Maximus, however, was the most able and successful defender of the doctrine of two wills for the West and the East, especially for Egypt, the principal country; and displayed a zeal in the assertion of his convictions that drew upon him martyrdom. He gained particular fame by his disputation with Pyrrhus,

[1] Mansi x. 892 ff. Concil. Rom. Later. 449.

who had been Patriarch of Constantinople. Pyrrhus—not without a hope of being reinstated in his patriarchate—acknowledged himself vanquished, and sought and found peace with Rome.[1] When, therefore, Synods in Africa and Rome had demonstrated that the hope was vain, of a union on the basis of the Ἔκθεσις of Heraclius, which had already been so variously condemned, the Emperor Constans allowed it to drop, and in the year 648 substituted for it the Τύπος τῆς πίστεως.[2] The aim thereof was to establish concord by prohibiting controversy regarding the question either of the duality or unity of activities and wills: the unity of the will was not yet surrendered. Now, however, the controversy began to rage afresh, with even greater violence. The Lateran Council of the year 649 condemned even the Τύπος, under Martin I.; and the sole result was, that Dyotheletism now underwent revival in the East also.

In connection with the inner history of the controversy at this stadium, special mention must be made of the disputation of Maximus with Pyrrhus,[3] of the treatise prepared by Stephen for the Romish Council of the Bishop Theodore, and the Lateran Council under Martin I.[4]

In that disputation the prime objection urged by Pyrrhus was, that two wills presuppose the existence of two who will; whereas there cannot be two who will, in one person. Maximus answered,—The Church teaches that there are three who will, in the Trinity, and yet but one will,—clearly showing that the will pertains to the nature, and not to the person: otherwise there must be three wills in God. According to the principle laid down by Pyrrhus, we should have to assume three wills in the Trinity. But if the will pertain to the nature, it follows that two natures have two wills. The duality does not necessarily denote antagonism. Besides, what could give rise to an antagonism? Could it arise from the nature, or from evil? But God creates no evil natures, and there was no evil in Christ. Pyrrhus retorted,—Granted that volition pertained and corresponded to the nature;—in that case holy men would be of a divine nature (that is, equal to Christ), because they are of a divine will. Maximus replied,—The object of volition is

[1] He soon fell away again, it is true, when the Emperor had reinstated him in his patriarchate.

[2] Mansi xi. 1029. [3] Mansi x. 710–759. [4] Mansi x. 897 ff.

in their case, divine, not the volition itself. But now Pyrrhus raised objections directly to the position itself, that the will must correspond to, and characteristically denote, the nature of any particular thing. Inasmuch as our volitions undergo unnumbered changes, our nature also, on this view, must undergo unnumbered changes. Maximus again refers to the distinction between form and contents: The contents of volition may change, but volition remains, and corresponds to the nature of him who wills. Pyrrhus then attacked the idea of the *natural* will,—that is, of a will which necessarily corresponds to the nature of him who wills. Everything natural is subject to necessity; accordingly, there would be left no freedom (*ἑκούσιον*). His opponent, however, reminded him that the fullest freedom is possessed by the nature of God, and that in rational natures nothing is involuntary: it is, therefore, possible for freedom to pertain to the nature. Pyrrhus, he urges, allows that rational natures are also endowed with will, and that Christ's two natures consequently possessed two natural wills. But one may also further say that the one will of Christ was *compounded* of two natural wills; even as Christ has been termed one nature, though His one nature was compounded of two. Maximus said: All philosophers and Christian theosophers have granted that a synthesis is only possible in the case of things which have a certain self-subsistence, but impossible in the case of things which only subsist in another thing (as accidents, qualities, which are altogether selfless, and destitute of independent existence). On this ground alone, there can be no word here of a composition (inasmuch as the humanity of Christ has no independent subsistence of its own). Besides, how could a synthesis be effected between a limited and an unlimited nature —between the mortal and the immortal? And how could the will of Christ, as a composite will, still remain one with the will of the Father? Whereupon Pyrrhus asks: Have, then, neither the wills nor the natures in Christ, anything in common with each other? Nothing, answered Maximus, except the bare hypostasis of the two natures (p. 717). And against the objection, "But did not the Logos move the humanity of Christ?" Maximus urges, that such an assumption would have the effect of introducing a division into Christ. Moses and David, it is true,—as, in fact, all who have become susceptible of the work

of God by the renunciation of their human qualities,—were unquestionably moved by His suggestions; but what distinguished Christ was, that He willed not merely as God, but also as man, —that He willed, moreover, in such a way, that the human will, which is here, was not blameworthy. The Logos created the humanity out of nothing, that it might have a real being, and not be a mere nonentity; but it could not have a real being and existence without will, without the power of self-assertion and of resistance, for example, to hostile elements. To Christ, therefore, must have pertained actual human volitions and human motions: for example, He experienced fear, not against His nature, but by way of notifying to the natural capacity that it should offer resistance. But, whereas in us, nature and its movements precede the will, in Christ everything, even suffering, was determined, not by His nature, but by His will. This will, moreover, was a power above His nature, and was therefore supernatural; though it was exerted for the purpose of confirming the existence of the nature and the full reality of the incarnation. But, according to Maximus, the will, which in Christ alone possessed such power over its nature (the body), forms an essential part of the idea of a rational being. For there are three kinds of beings possessed of life—organic, animal, and rational. All of them are capable of motion, and not merely of suffering; but to the rational pertains, free motion (κίνησις αὐτεξούσιος). The expression, "natural will," need therefore awaken no hesitation, as it denotes merely that which pertains to the human nature, to wit, the free will. Animals are moved: men move themselves by their own will; man is God's image, and God is free. All men possess will: it is not merely one that has it, and another not: a human will, therefore, is one of the characteristic common signs of man. Consequently, when the Logos purposed to become flesh—flesh, too, animated by a rational soul—He was, even as a man, essentially a voluntary being. The saying of the Fathers, that Christ moulded our will, does not mean that the Logos determined the will of Christ; but that He, as a man, subjected humanity, in Himself and through Himself, to God the Father, —thus setting us an example of a perfect kind, that we also may voluntarily submit ourselves.

What a wide difference between Maximus and the teachers

of the fourth century (see Part I. p. 1071 ff.), who left no place for freedom in Christ! By freedom, however, he understood, not mere freedom of choice, but divine freedom, which the humanity of Christ, because it was the true humanity, so possessed from the very commencement, that it was able to repel and overcome every ungodly element that approached it. In this way, Maximus established a duality of wills, which run parallel with each other without coming into contact, and both of which, notwithstanding, will that which is divine. Indeed, he carries the distinction still further, maintaining not merely that there were two volitional faculties in Christ,—not merely that there was a double series of volitional activities; but even that the result (*ἀποτέλεσμα*) was a twofold one, in so far as it was not external to Himself, but bore reference to His own person, although the activity on the part of both the aspects might meet in the same object.[1] He discriminates even so far as to say that one thing which is reported of Christ proceeded solely from the will of the Logos, and another solely from Christ as a man; and adduces, by way of illustration, John vii., where, he affirms, the purpose to go could only have pertained to His humanity; and Phil. ii., Gal. iv., where the subjection to the law cannot be referred to His deity.

The chief argument brought against the Monotheletes by Stephen, in his memorial to the Lateran Synod of the year 449, was, that Christ would have been no longer by nature perfect God and by nature perfect man, but rather *ἀτελὴς*, or, as Maximus says, *ἐλλιπὴς*, if He had not had both an essentially human and an essentially divine will. God is no longer God, and man is no longer man, if we do not attribute to God the essential or natural (*οὐσιώδη, φυσικὴν*) divine will, and to man the essential or natural human will. The like holds good also of the *ἐνέργεια*. The Chalcedonian formula, "perfect as to His deity," "perfect as to His humanity," was thus set up as the standard; and to it not even a Patriarch of Constantinople durst venture to raise opposition (Note 39). The Monotheletes probably felt themselves cramped by the Council of Chalcedon; but, strictly speaking, their opponents also must have had the same feeling, for its decrees taught the unity of the person, quite as decidedly as the duality of the natures. The advocates

[1] See Note I. App. i.

of Monothelitism, within the Church, were also disposed to maintain this duality in Christ (Mansi x. 1024); but they made the unity of the person their starting-point, and deduced therefrom the unity of the will, with no less force than their opponents deduced the duality of the will from the duality of the natures. Both parties, therefore, could with equal right appeal for countenance to the Council of Chalcedon. This is shown with peculiar ability, in the letter addressed by Paul, Patriarch of Constantinople, to Theodore of Rome.[1] The Logos who became flesh, says he, remained what He was, and became that which He had not been; consequently, all the activity which befitted God and man proceeded from, and is to be referred back to, one and the same incarnate Logos. He remained undivided, unmixed; the one and the same God the Logos, who became flesh, worked the miracles, and voluntarily undertook to suffer on our behalf: it is, therefore, permissible to say, in agreement with the indissoluble personal union effected between the two natures, God suffered, and the Son of man descended from heaven. We teach, consequently, that our Lord had one will, in order to avoid attributing an antagonism or distinction of wills to this one and the same Person of Christ, or conceiving Him as in conflict with Himself, or introducing a duality of willers. Lest he should be suspected of giving such a definition for the sake of introducing a commixture of the two natures, or of doing away with one of them, Paul declares his meaning to be simply, that the humanity of Christ, animated by a rational soul, being divinely enriched by the absolute union, gained through the Logos a divine and undiscriminated will; and that it was always impelled and moved by the Logos, never accomplishing its natural motions separately, or purely of its own impulse, and against the mind of the Logos personally united with it, but when, as, and in the measure in which, the Logos willed them. In this way he hoped to avoid subjecting the Logos to any natural necessity. The words, "I do not Mine own will," and, "not as I will," he considered (as we have found to be frequently the case), with Gregory, to have been spoken by Christ in our person, and not in His own person: he further reminded the Romish Pope of the contradiction into which he had fallen with Honorius.

[1] Mansi x. 1020 ff.

Martin I., however, and the Lateran Council, taught that there were really and truly two natures, which were preserved unmixed and undivided in the person; and threatened those with anathema who should teach otherwise. They also asserted the continued existence of the divine and human attributes, "indiminute" and "indeminorate" (Can. 7, 9). Specially had our Lord and God Christ "duas voluntates cohærenter unitas;" equally also, "duas operationes" (Can. 10, 11). Therefore, whoso teaches one will, or one "operatio," or refuses to confess that there were two wills and two "operationes," denies the reality of the incarnation (dispensatio).[1] Lastly, the *Τύπος* was condemned, because it aimed at silently suppressing the truth. The formula of a *θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια* was treated as doubtful, and only admitted in a sense which excludes what it purposed to affirm, namely, in the sense that the *ἐνέργειαι* so intimately interpenetrated each other, as to constitute a unity. Maximus and Sophronius supposed themselves to be able to use the formula, provided the *μία* were omitted; but, as we found in the case of Honorius, its omission made no essential change in the formula, for the simple reason that the unity lies in the combination.

THIRD STADIUM.

From the year 649 *to* 680.

In this stadium, the Emperors tried to break down the opposition raised to the *Τύπος*, by resorting to violent measures, and treating it as political insubordination. The champions of Dyotheletism died as martyrs in banishment, and after shameful treatment,—Martin in the year 655, Maximus in 662. Terrified, the following Popes, Eugenius and Vitalianus,

[1] This Synod said further:—"Even if only some one portion of the divine attributes could inhere in a person who is not of divine substance, and if it should be possible for this person to be, to that extent, as God Himself—say, what is to prevent all that is God's from ceasing to be (cedant)? what would be the consequence? That everything would be thrown into confusion; that everything would be turned upside down—the uppermost becoming the undermost, and the undermost the uppermost?" How far removed is all this from a real "communicatio idiomatum!" They further added: "This is the constant doctrine of the Fathers."

silently conformed to the imperial will. But when Adeodatus became Pope, in 677, he excommunicated the Greek Patriarchs; and as they retorted with an excommunication from the East, the consequence was a formal schism. From the time that he ruled alone, this state of things was intolerable to the Emperor Constantinus Pagonatus; and as early as the year 678, he entered on negotiations with Domnus of Rome, for the summoning of a new Synod. Domnus' successor, Agathon, also fell in with the proposal, and after holding a Council at Rome, for the purpose, as it were, of giving the proper tone, he addressed to the Sixth Synod of Constantinople, held in 680–681, a letter, which was intended to have the same influence on its decrees as Leo's letter had had on the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon.

And now, as to the inner history of the controversy. Both parties started with recognised principles. The Monotheletes took, as their starting-point, the unity of the volitional subject, and thence deduced the unity of the will: their opponents started with the duality of the natures, and thence deduced the duality of the wills. The conclusion of the former was only valid, in case volition pertains solely to the Ego or subject, and is not also a matter of the nature; and the conclusion of their opponents, only in case the will is a matter solely of the nature, but not directly of the hypostasis. Herein might be concealed, therefore, an ethical antagonism between nature and personality;—the main point, however, was, that the Monotheletes made the unity of the willing personality their starting-point, representing the antagonisms of the two natures as having been so conciliated and adjusted in it, as to constitute an unity (whether their doctrine were in other respects dyophysitic or monophysitic):—whereas their opponents, starting with a duality of willing natures or of natural wills, arrived at no unity, save one that consists, partly, in the two volitional series, which proceed from the opposed natures, having the same volitional content, each after its own manner; and partly in these volitional series being conceived to be held together by one and the same hypostasis. The characteristic expression employed by the Monothelete party was, that the one will is the hypostatic will of Christ: characteristic expressions of their opponents were, that the will is a matter of the nature, and

always corresponds to its substance,—that whatever has one will, has also one substance,—that there is one will in the Trinity, because there is one substance. Because in the Father, Son, and Spirit there is one will, it follows that in them the nature is the common, the volitional element. According to the Monotheletic doctrine of the hypostatic will, we ought to assume, tritheistically, three wills; or, in order to preserve the unity of the will, we ought to deny the plurality of the hypostases. To say that the Son Jesus Christ could have but one will, would be either to disregard His humanity and deny the incarnation, or to accept an incarnation of the Father and the Spirit, in order to avoid setting up a difference between the one divine-human will of Christ, and that of the Father and the Spirit. Such propositions as,—Natures are not dead, motionless powers; every living power must have a mode of utterance; and every being expresses itself agreeably to its nature; as is the nature, so also is its will and its activity,—were regarded as axioms by the Dyotheletes, and were constantly used as such.

As the Monotheletes persisted in maintaining that two wills lead to the (Nestorian) doctrine of two persons, their opponents tried to show that to assume one will in Christ, must necessarily end in the acceptance of one nature, and consequently lead back to Monophysitism. Older Monotheletes also, such as Theodore, Sergius, and Honorius, rendered it easier for them to prove that Monotheletism necessarily curtailed the full reality of the human nature, and left no place for those declarations of the New Testament which attribute a special human will to Christ during His earthly existence, but groundlessly referred them rather to us than to His own person.

The Monotheletes replied, indeed, that if the flesh is solely the flesh of God the Logos, and if, as Cyrill taught, both the sufferings and miracles belong thereto; then, of necessity, both the human and divine operations are the operations of the one Logos who became flesh, and there is accordingly but one activity in the one Christ. Even the changes affecting the human aspect did not become actual and real changes, except as the Logos permitted them, in accordance with His wise almighty will, which was the monadic principle of unity of the humanity, although it employed the rational soul, and the body

as its instrument. In Christ, therefore, we can only assume one will, namely, the divine will, which willed what was human also, as its own; and of this will, even the sufferings of the human aspect, considered in their ultimate relations, were activities. The humanity was, in every respect, the dependent or passive organ of the divine nature. Such is the view of Theodore of Pharan, and especially of Macarius of Antioch.[1] Along therewith, it was quite consistent, in the view of Macarius, to maintain the Chalcedonian doctrine of two natures which remain unmixed; inasmuch as the humanity is the passive element, and the deity the active. By suffering, the latter was not affected; the natures must, therefore, have been different, though related to each other as correlates; and the will of the Logos alone acted, and alone determined that suffering should be undergone. But he advances a step further in order to assail his adversaries' position, and follows up hints thrown out by Pyrrhus and others. Assuming the existence of two wills in the one Christ, they must either be like each other or different. In either case, they would be outside of each other, and thus the incarnation would be dissolved. In either case, we should fall into inconsistencies. There could not be two wills, precisely the same, in Christ; they would necessarily converge into one: otherwise we should have to assume, either a second will precisely the same as the human will, whereas the will of the Logos is unchangeable; or we must assume two absolute wills, neither of which could possibly pertain to the human nature; besides, that the doctrine of the Church does not admit of two absolute wills. Seeing, then, that the two wills, even on these grounds, must be unequal, if the divine will of the Logos be good, the human will cannot have been good, and we must necessarily advance, from the assumption of a duality of wills, to the acknowledgment of a will of the flesh, which, according to the Apostle, is not subjected to the law of God, is enmity against God;—in a word, we should have to assume the existence of two opposed wills,—the one good, the other evil. At the very least, the motion of fear belongs to human nature, and is something blameworthy, which it would be improper to suppose cleaving to Christ. Such a consequence can only be avoided by denying altogether, as the Fathers did,

[1] Mansi, Tom. x. 743. Compare Baur's "Geschichte der Dreieinigkeitslehre," vol. i. pp. 108 ff.; Mansi, Tom. xi. 533; Ang. Mai vii. 194.

that the flesh of Christ had a special will of its own. The humanity of Christ was related to the Logos, precisely and only as the body is related to the soul. It is, accordingly, both unnecessary and inadmissible to assume the existence of two wills, each separate and distinct from the other.

The Dyotheletes, on their side, especially Maximus and Anastasius, who continued active until the year 662, endeavoured partly to reply to these objections, and partly to show that a humanity so completely passive, moved only from without, and robbed of a volitional centre of its own, would not be a real humanity, and that such a doctrine would prevent Christ from being fully and truly an example to us.

In answering those objections, they appealed to the double sense in which the word flesh is used in the New Testament.[1] Anastasius and Maximus, connecting Christology with the doctrine that man is the image of God, affirmed that flesh in itself, as it proceeded from the hand of God, in the case of Adam, was not undivine, was innocent (*ἀδιάβλητος*); and that evil is contrary to nature. According to Anastasius, the soul, with its faculties of thought and desire, is derived from God (*θεόφυτον*).[2] Adam's soul was produced in an unutterable way, out of the substance of the Logos by His will, and was consequently *ἔκθεος*, *θεόμοιος*, pure, unspotted, immortal:[3] nay more, even after the Fall it remained inwardly possessed of Godlike immortality. The soul, therefore, does not need so thorough a transformation as the body; but simply a spiritual rectification. Now this Godlike soul, which was extruded at the time of the creation, the Logos incorporated again with Himself by the incarnation; so that the pure human soul, as conferred on

[1] Anastasius Presb., Ang. Mai vii. 195; Mansi x. 737.

[2] *Τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικὸν οὐσιῶδες θέλημα.* He afterwards speaks of a *θέλησις λογιστική*. This, as well as the doctrine of the gnomic will of Christ, shows that in the Monotheletic Controversy *θέλημα* was understood to include the actuality of the intelligence,—specially at a later period; compare Baur l. c. p. 196.*

[3] We shall find similar views expressed by Maximus; whereas in the West, Monophysitism met with a far stronger opposition, and the absolute difference of the divine and the human substances was far more consistently asserted. Notwithstanding their Dyotheletism, Maximus and Anastasius show traces of the influence of the Areopagite.

* See Note J. Appendix II.

Adam at the very beginning, by the Logos, had its subsistence from, through, with, and in Him (ὑπέστη). This soul and the Logos are not strangers to each other. Moreover, says Anastasius, the rational will of the soul, according to the Areopagite, is nothing else than the power of the intelligence and of the desire to be united with God (συνάπτεσθαι),—a power which was made essentially the soul's own, by the gift of God. So also love, which is our task, according to the Areopagite, is nothing but the constitution of the soul, in virtue of which it tends to union.* Notwithstanding, the rational will is different from God. Accordingly, Anastasius supposed that there was in Christ a created and an uncreated divine element; for he did not connect the two natures merely by means of the unity of the hypostasis, nor of the moral concord of the wills. He deemed himself able to maintain the existence of two unblameable activities and wills: the one will uncreated, the other created. Even man, he considered, furnishes an analogy to such a duality. To love parents and relatives, is a natural, blameless will of the soul; but to leave and deny them for God's sake, is, in truth, a divine, supernatural, praiseworthy will: there may, consequently, be two blameless wills in one and the same man. In like manner, Christ was obedient to Joseph and His mother, and, as a child, in natural love allowed Himself to be loved and caressed by them, in order that He might be in all respects like us, sin only excepted. But again, when He said to His mother, "Woman, what have I to do with thee?" or when He said, "Whoso doeth the will of My Father, he is My father and mother," He reveals to us His divine and supernatural will, which purposed to be an example to us.

Does he not hereby arrive at three wills in Christ, whilst endeavouring to prove the possibility of two? The higher human will, Godlike, a created divine element, is represented, indeed, as the connecting link: in reality, however, it renders the divine will of the Logos dispensable; and it is difficult to see how Anastasius could keep the divine will separate from the higher human will. Another analogy, to show the possibility of a duality of wills, he takes from sleep. All the senses then cease from their activity, and yet the rational soul remains active. And as our soul does many things apart from the body,—for

* "Die einheitliche auf Verbindung gerichtete Seelenbeschaffenheit."

example, exercises love to God, and faith, and, in short, all the virtues,—so also the Logos in Christ, by His unbounded, all-mundane (allweltlich), and supramundane divine energy. On the other hand, the Logos in Christ ruled, animated, and developed His own body, by the God-given vital power of His rational soul; the same power He confers on other souls also. And as the Logos conferred on the soul, created in His image, the power of acting somato-psychically (seelenleiblich, ψυχανδρικῶς, σωματοψύχως), as a type of Christ; so did the Logos, prior to the incarnation, act without limitation indeed in heaven, but theandrically (θεανδρικῶς) in Christ.

These are ideas which, for the most part, may already be found in the writings of Maximus, the teacher of Anastasius; only that he, as we found above, displayed almost greater zeal in asserting the humanity to have been more than merely passive, and that a free will pertained to its nature: he further, and consequently, held that the humanity of Christ occupied an independent position over against the Logos, and His will, in that it willed what pertained to it of its own impulse.

But the question now more than ever suggests itself,—How Maximus met the Monotheletic objection, that in this way the Logos and man would be related to each other as strangers? It is not enough, in this case, to answer, that the first man, prior to the Fall, and the humanity of Christ, were created in the image of God, and were of the same substance with God;—not even, if we connect therewith, as Maximus did, the *theologoumenon*, that in God a distinction is to be made between the communicable and the incommunicable, and suppose the former to have become the property of man; or, in other words, that there was in man a created divine element. Pure humanity, Christ included, would then have constituted, as it were, a family of gods. But, apart from the inquiry as to the distinction between Christ and the regenerated, it would still be necessary to point out how it was possible for the highest incommunicable God, the Logos Himself, and His will, to be vitally united with the created divine element, or the humanity, in Christ. At present, however, we cannot dwell any longer on this subject: we shall take another opportunity of scrutinizing the mystical background of the doctrine of Maximus, and considering its relation to Christology. We are the more

disposed to take this course, as he kept the background referred to out of sight (probably not undesignedly), during his struggle to secure for the doctrine of Dyotheletism an ecclesiastical sanction. When asked what bond of unity remained between the two natures and wills, if, as he supposed, they run in two parallel series which exercise no determining influence on each other, he answered, "The personal union (ἕνωσις ὑποστατικὴ); for the soul of Christ subsisted in the Logos." Conjoined into one, in this way, the natures effected a mutual interchange of that which was physically predicable of each, so that, in consonance with the mysterious union, these predicates pertained alike to both, though without involving the conversion or confusion of their natural substance. For this reason, it is right to speak of a will *common* to both, but not of one will. The communication assumed to have taken place, rather of itself indicates that the two natures were not one, but unequal. Each of the natures acted for itself, although it appropriated the will of the other. This he terms the τρόπος ἀντιδόσεως (Note 40). A further result of the hypostatical union, was the mysterious mode in which the natures of Christ revolved within each other (περιχώρησις, circumincessio). Taken together, these things, he supposes, do full justice to the expression, θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια: and whilst it is true that Christ by no means put forth one activity alone, it is equally true that He manifested the two activities in a unity of a new and mysterious kind (Note 41).

That Maximus should have attached such great importance to a humanity possessed of a capability of relatively independent motion, to the αὐτεξούσιον of the humanity of Christ, is an evidence that the doctrine of the will of Christ had made considerable progress since the fourth century. Instead of upholding a Christology which required the human to be simply a passive organ and point of transition for the almighty will of the Logos, the efforts of Maximus were directed towards an ethical Christology. He aimed at vindicating to the humanity of Christ an independent focus of volitional impulses, virtues, and good actions: Christ was not to be merely a God acting in the garb of a man. A new light was thus, for the first time, thrown on the relation Christ holds to men as an example; and the blows which were aimed at the same time, from this vantage ground, at Monotheletism in its older form, did not fail

to take effect. Anastasius gave them additional force, in the following manner.

Were Christ's soul, says he, a dead, stagnant power, it would be a proof of its never having really existed. Were it destitute of will, it must have been involuntarily subjected to the Logos, as Apollinaris taught (vol. i. 993 ff.), and must have resembled the clouds or the stars, which are governed without having any will of their own. In Hades, therefore, Christ's soul had no real will, and performed no real acts; but was a mere spiritless organ, lacking language and thought of its own (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος), through which the Logos spake. According to this representation, the Logos must have annihilated the will and activity of the blameless soul called into existence by His own breath. But faith and love, and all other virtues, can only be realized by the free will (ἑκούσιον) and independent activity of the soul. If, then, we deny to Christ the attributes which constitute our nature (τὰς συστατικὰς τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως ἰδιότητας),—that is, the proper will, and the activity of the soul (θέλησις καὶ ἐνέργεια),—His humanity would be on a level with irrational creatures. And this leads us to the principal point. It is to the *work of Christ* that he specially refers. Part of His work, he says, was to exercise obedience, and to fulfil the will and law of His Father. "I came down from heaven not to do Mine own will," says He, "but that I may accomplish the work and keep His commands." Now, if the rational soul of Christ had no will at all, in accordance with, or by means of, what will, did He keep the Father's commands? According to the will of the Divine Logos? But the will of the Logos is a will that commands and rules; and the will of the Father is one and the same with the will of the Son. By means of what will, then? For the will that commands is one thing, the will that obeys, another. We are thus reduced to the alternative, either of saying that the will of obedience was the will of the Logos, or of granting that there was a true human will in Christ. The former alternative makes the divine nature of the Logos a subject and servant, after the manner of Arius;—an error which needs no refutation. Besides, freedom (ἑκούσιον) is a necessary condition of virtue, and of the fulfilment of the law. No course, consequently, is open but to assume the existence of a will, distinct from that of the Logos, and yet pure,

good, and free—of a rational, deliberative, and reflective will (*θέλησις λογικὴ, βουλευτικὴ καὶ διανοητικὴ*). Only on this supposition can due significance be attached to His assumption of the form of a servant; the end of which was, that He might fulfil the commands which the servant Adam had disobeyed, by obeying them Himself in the form of a servant; and that He might discharge the debt which the servant had contracted for himself and us—even the debt of death, which the servant (Christ), in virtue of His being in the form of God, paid by obedience even unto death (Note 42).

The advancing of such arguments, and the charge of holding a docetical, or at all events an imperfect humanity,—a charge which we find constantly repeated by Maximus, Stephen, and Anastasius,—gave rise to a phenomenon in connection with Monotheletism, very similar to one in connection with Monophysitism, traces of which may already be perceived in the writings of Pyrrhus. To this conjuncture may be partially referred the development of the doctrine of one will, into the doctrine of a *composite* will; partially, also, and even more truly, the doctrine of the so-called *gnomic wills* (gnomisch).

At a subsequent period, Monotheletism allowed the justness of statements from the Fathers, such as, that every nature that exists must also have its operation; that the mode of operation is conformed to the character of the nature; and that, accordingly, two natures in Christ necessitate the recognition of two natural wills. It endeavoured, however, to constitute an unity out of this duality,—an unity, too, consisting not merely in the unity of the personality, which might in itself be but a very formal tie;—it represented this higher unity of the two wills as itself a will, that is, as a composite will (*ἐκ τῶν δύο φυσικῶν θελημάτων ἕν τι σύνθετον*). By such a guarding of the human factor, Monotheletes hoped to diminish the importance of their difference from the Dyotheletes, and yet at the same time to preserve the unity of the activity, or even the unity of the power. Originally they had taught that the humanity stood in a purely passive relation to the deity, as that which was moved to the mover (*θεοκίνητον*), if not even as accident to substance; now, however, they departed from that representation, and conceived the personality, not indeed to be purely divine, nor even (with their opponents) as the common place in which both natures meet, but as pos-

sessed of will, and as divine-human (theandric) in its volitions. The will, in which the two natures interpenetrate and form a unity, is the hypostatical Will, which has its human aspect no less than the hypostasis. Nothing, however, was herewith done to secure the recognition of the will as a distinct and integrant element; nor could anything be done, until the human aspect had been confessed to be the subject of a real vôlitional process, in which the divine nature could not directly participate. These Monotheletes were therefore driven to say, that whilst the will of the Logos remained ever the same, the human will, although essentially united with the divine, ran through a volitional process. In its first stadia, the human will was not yet adjusted to, or even came into conflict with, the eternal divine will; but on each occasion the process in the human will ended in a determination, and an activity or deed, which was fully identified with the divine will. The concrete result was on all occasions one will, which was at once divine and human; it was an activity, a work of a divine-human kind (Note 43).

To this entire theory of composition (which implied, of course, that the two, essentially suited or belonged to each other), the teachers of the Church objected, the incompatibility of the created and the uncreated, of the unlimited and the limited;—an objection, by the way, which might be urged with equal justice, or rather injustice, against any Christology whatever. They drew a further objection from the Trinitarian doctrine of one and the same will in Father, Son, and Spirit; urging that, inasmuch as the will of the Son was united with the human will, either it would be different from that of the Father and Spirit, or Father and Spirit must also have a divine-human will; and characterized the synthesis of the divine and human as a monstrosity (*τραγέλαφος*). Lastly, they deemed the doctrine of a gnomic will ebionitical. A unity which could be attained through the medium of a gnomic, choosing, deliberative, self-determining will, they considered not to be a unity of essence, but merely of attributes, which is nothing more than a Nestorian unity (that is, a moral unity, or a unity *κατὰ ἐξουσίαν, αὐθεντίαν*).[1]

The argument derived from the Trinity was not indeed conclusive; for, if the *three* Persons of the Trinity can have one and the same will, much more must it be possible for *one*

[1] So Maximus, especially in his disputation, and John Damascenus.

Person to have one will, notwithstanding that it is compounded of two natures or substances. The Dyotheletes do, it is true, say that in the Godhead the three Persons have but one nature, and that the three Persons consequently have but one will, inasmuch as the will always pertains to the nature. Here, however, the Monotheletes might have replied, not only that from such a point of view we should necessarily arrive at one will in different human persons, but also, that the duality of substances in the God-man does not necessitate the assumption of a duality of wills; in that even man consists of two substances, body and soul, and yet we never attribute to him more than one will. They might further have urged, that the collective activity of Christ, as a whole, was one; that the whole was the personality; that all His activity was personal, hypostatical: but if we represent the activity of this Person as twofold, because of the duality of substances, we shall be compelled to concede a triple activity, because soul, body, and Logos are three substances.[1] When Maximus retorted, as he did,—Unquestionably; but only if we assume that there were three natures in Christ, which the Monotheletes do not intend to do; moreover, body and soul together first constitute the idea (εἶδος) of man, and this idea is destroyed if either the one or the other be missing: consequently, the human essence or substance is one, that is, it is the unity of the two;—Pyrrhus was justified in applying the same rule to the God-man, whose peculiar and indivisible essence or idea (εἶδος) consisted in the unity of the Logos and man, even as the distinctive idea of man consists in the unity of body and soul.

But with the Christology opposed to them by such men as Maximus, the Monotheletes were justly dissatisfied. Recognition it undoubtedly deserved, for laying great stress not only on the human aspect in general, but especially on the human ethical, on the *αὐτεξούσιον*. In this respect, Maximus and those like him preserved what was true in the doctrine of the school of Antioch, giving it greater depth, however, by regarding it from the religious point of view. But they failed, unfortunately, to follow it out to its logical results. No trace whatever is discernible of a process of absolute union, which the duality was intended to further. Christ is rather supposed to have had

[1] L. c. x. pp. 744, 745.

simply the pure Adamitic soul, which was from God, which was immediately holy and divine, and which was in no point the subject of an actual development. Hence also the *αὐτεξούσιον* is represented as a spiritual power, absolutely complete from the moment of its creation, and neither needing nor capable of a development.—Side by side with this holy, ready-made and complete soul and its will, was supposed to be the Logos with His will; the latter holding the relation of ruler, the former of subject. With the *αὐτεξούσιον* of the humanity of Christ, this situation of matters is brought into agreement, solely by supposing that the human nature freely imposed upon itself obedience to the will of the Logos,—in doing which it not only acted with freedom, but also with necessity, in so far as such a course was consonant to the purity of its own nature. In this case, however, we should have two series of volitions, which move onwards of themselves, indeed, in the concord of a pre-established harmony; but, as they do not determine each other, and still less enter upon a process the result of which is union, far too little is done for the maintenance of the unity of the Person. The man Jesus was the *ἄνθρωπος κυριακὸς*, the "homo dominicus," united with the Logos solely by a tie which is not at all a distinctly Christological one,—the tie, namely, that the hypostasis of the Logos constituted the basis and root of his individual existence. The archetypal human will of Christ is represented as so thoroughly dependent on the element in Him which is held to remain eternally different from the Logos, to wit, the human *nature*, that the duality is eternized: not to mention, that it is not a very ethical procedure to make the will, considered in itself, and in all its activities, dependent solely on a nature possessed from the very beginning of a complete and ready-made holiness. No marvel, therefore, that an extreme Dyotheletism like this, into which the aforementioned men allowed themselves to be driven, should not have won over the Monotheletes, but that even the Church should have found it advisable to decline going so far. We now approach nearer to the decision at which the Church arrived, as the result of these conflicts.

Notwithstanding the persistent favour with which the successors of Heraclius also still continued to regard Monotheletism, the opposition against it in the Church became ever more organized, especially after the Lateran Council; and created

such a division, that the Emperor Constantinus Pagonatus, to whom the winning over of Rome must have been a matter of considerable importance, found himself under the necessity of making an entire change in his policy. This course he was further called upon to adopt by the Pope Agathon.[1] The Emperor convoked a Council to Constantinople in the year 680, to which Agathon addressed a circular letter.[2] Therein Agathon confesses,—one Lord in Jesus Christ, of two and in two substances (*οὐσίαι*), unmixed and unchanged, unseparated and undivided; the distinction of the natures nowhere abolished for the sake of the union, but the distinctive character of each preserved, and yet both concurring into one hypostasis or person; both natures so indissolubly joined together in Him, in virtue of the hypostatical union, that they can only be separated and distinguished in thought. This person is a composite of the two forms, each of which performs that which is peculiar to it, in fellowship with the other. The rule of piety requires, therefore, that Christ should have both two natures or substances, and also two natural wills, and two natural activities. In his letter to the Emperors, Agathon further adds:[3] Christ had from eternity the divine will and the divine activity in common with the consubstantial Father; the human will and human activity He assumed in time, from us, along with our nature; but these two wills were not opposed to, and did not conflict with, each other. The Emperor's ancestors, he urges, had never ceased to struggle quite as earnestly against this Monophysitic error (of gnomic wills), as against the heresy which in reality separated the natures, in that it connected them merely by means of the character of the will, or of a harmony of activity. When Christ said, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt," He revealed thereby, as well as in His prayer, a human will, different from the divine. We may say, therefore, with Ambrosius, that He assumed our will and our sadness; ours were both: out of love to us He assumed them. In like manner, also, the Lord said, "I have come from heaven, not to do Mine own will, but the will of the Father which sent Me;" and in Matthew, "My soul is troubled even

[1] Mansi xi. Act. iv. pp. 233–257.
[2] Mansi xi. Act. iv. pp. 285–297.
[3] L. c. p. 240.

unto death." Now, the Word or the Spirit cannot have said that; but Christ spake it in His human nature, which was subject to the will of the Father: the Logos could never have said, "Not as I will." Indeed, Scripture passages must in general be understood to refer, now to the humanity, now to the deity of Christ. To the deity must be attributed the miracles, and such expressions, for example, as John v. 26 ff., —"As the Father quickeneth the dead, so also the Son;" or Matt. xi. 27, "No man knoweth the Father, save the Son;" "What the Lord will, that doeth He in heaven and on earth." But as a man, He said, "My meat is to do the will of Him who hath sent Me." Concerning the man it was said, "He could not conceal Himself," and, "He commanded to be conveyed to the other side of the Sea of Galilee;" for, as the Logos, He was almighty and omnipresent. How erroneous is it, then, not properly to distinguish the two! But the human nature and will assumed by Him were purified by the very act of assumption, and could not be opposed to Him; for the Creator of all things could neither have created a contradiction to Himself, nor have assumed it in the incarnation. The duality of the natures and wills is taught with special clearness in Phil. ii. also; and whoso denieth the human will, must also deny the human soul: for, on the one hand, His deity did not by nature possess a human will, nor, on the other hand, did His humanity by nature possess a divine will; nor, finally, could another will, besides the natural one, proceed from the two natures of Christ. The human nature was rather merely exalted by the omnipotence of Christ's deity, and the divine nature revealed by means of the humanity. If we assume that there was but one will alone, we must either call it divine or human, or a composite and mixture of the two; or we must derive the unity of the will and activity from the one composite nature. He repeatedly adds, however, that the distinctions remain only for thought.

The Synod itself[1] substantially adopted the formula proposed by Agathon, extending the negative cautels of the Council of Chalcedon to the two physical wills and activities, and adding,—Two natural wills, not opposed to each other (which God forbid), but the human will following, not resisting, nay,

[1] Mansi, Tom. xi. Conc. Const. Act. xviii. pp. 636-640.

much rather subjected to, the divine and almighty will; for the will of the flesh must be moved, though in subjection to the divine will, as Athanasius said (See Note 42, Appendix I.). For, as the flesh of Christ was termed, and was, the flesh of God the Logos, so also was the will of His flesh designated the proper will of God the Logos Himself, and was such in reality. For, as His most holy, blameless, besouled humanity, was not done away with by the deification, but remained in its own rank and state, and within the limits of that rank, so also was His human will not done away with by the deification, but was preserved: as Gregory said, "His will was not opposed to God, but was completely deified." Thus, in the one hypostasis of Christ, our true God, may be discerned His two natures; and by this person, He both performed His miracles and endured His sufferings, in such a manner that each of the two natures willed and worked that which was distinctive of it, in conjunction with the other. After this manner do we teach that there were two natural wills and operations in Christ, which acted in correspondence (*καταλλήλως*) to each other, for the salvation of the human race.

Contemplating the Monotheletic Controversy in its historical connection, it may be characterized as an attempt to bring to a stand, and partly to drive back, the Dualism, which, since the year 451, had penetrated into the Church. At Chalcedon the unity of the person was affirmed, but nothing was done to show the compatibility of that unity with the premiss of two natures: nay more, the main stress was laid on this duality. Still, whatever might be the relation between the two natures, and however they might be brought into unity, all alike recognised the truth, that Christ acted and lived as one: and the common recognition thereof was a pledge of reconciliation. What was more natural than for the Monotheletes to seek to prevent the division going further, and to maintain, that, whatever might be the internal relation between the two natures, the product of the natures could not be self-contradictory; nay more, that there could not in any case be two series of operations and activities? A double series of simultaneous activities like this, was not taught even in Leo's letter, but rather an interchange of such activities (or, according to circumstances, sufferings) as the one person carried out by means of the divine nature, and of such

as the same person carried out by means of the human nature; the community of the latter nature with the former, however, not being abolished thereby. The Monotheletic doctrine, therefore, remained uncensured, so long as it did not enter into closer relationship with Monophysitism; but no sooner did that take place, than it was unavoidably felt to be an attack on the Chalcedonian doctrine of the natures, and the guardians of the tradition of the Church must be set in motion against it. Monotheletism, by itself, might never have originated an attack on the doctrine of two natures,—it might even have given up or forbidden controversy regarding the question of the duality of the activities or wills, and consequently have laid claim to nothing more than the toleration, which it had hitherto enjoyed in the Church, side by side with the other view; but when the traditional consciousness had once been awakened, and the formula of Chalcedon was thought to be endangered, nothing could quiet the Church but the condemnation of Monotheletism. The logical consequences of the decree of Chalcedon needed to be, and must be, brought to light. On the other hand, the Monotheletes could only preserve the unity of the person intact from that double series of activities, so long as they paid no heed to the decision arrived at, respecting the duality of the natures. Logically, therefore, the aim of the Monotheletes could not be merely to assert the unity of the divine-human activity and operation; for, in such case, they might have taught that the two wills of the two natures combined to produce one divine-human activity and operation, that is, they might have been almost Dyotheletes. Their aim was rather, if we pass over their beginning, to deduce the unity of the will from the unity of operations and activities, that is, as their name in fact implies, to establish the unity of the volitional faculty in Christ. That the Chalcedonian symbol was incompatible therewith, is clear at a glance; for how could there be a true human nature without a volitional faculty? And when once attention had been drawn to this point, the unity of the activity (ἐνέργεια) could no longer be assumed without consideration. The existence of a human volitional faculty might be acknowledged; but, if it were never energized, but remained as it were inactive, asleep, in Christ, the result would be Monotheletism, or even Monophysitism; for a motionless, dead human nature is as good as non-existent.

The duality of natures being taken as the starting-point, the goal reached was necessarily Dyotheletism; and accordingly it happened, that, through the influence of Monotheletism, the duality of natures, which had simply been affirmed by the Council of Chalcedon, was now carried out, and the living reality of the natures, or, in other words, the duality of the wills and activities, was recognised.

It is only too evident, however, that the problem of showing how the two natures of Christ could constitute one person, which had not been solved by the Council of Chalcedon, and which had been almost lost sight of during the controversy with the Monotheletes (for example, by Maximus and Agathon), was now rendered infinitely more difficult. Neither at the Lateran Council, nor in the person of Agathon, did the Westerns sufficiently consider the problem; but rather believed that all that was necessary, would have been effected, when once Leo's letter and its consequences had been established. The Orientals, on the contrary, who offered a less stern opposition to Monotheletism and Monophysitism, did not forget the question of the unity, but added a series of propositions to the conclusion of the Council of Constantinople, whose design was to form a counterpoise to the doctrine of two wills.

In consequence thereof, however, an irreconcilable contradiction crept into the symbolum: two opposed views, which do not combine with each other, are there coupled together. According to the one view, which we may designate the *Occidental*, the two natures were supposed to be sufficiently closely bound together by the unity of the personality;—this personality, although divine, being held to occupy the place of Ego in the human nature (which was not conceived to be personal in and by itself), and to pertain to the humanity. Had the traditional assumption of the Church, that the divine nature cannot in any way be separated from the divine hypostasis, been adhered to, the divine nature, as well as the divine Ego, must have been acknowledged to belong to the humanity; and even if the human nature were not supposed to have been supplanted or represented by the divine, it must be held to have possessed divine knowledge and volitions, as its own.[1] The question would then have arisen,—What place still remained for actual

[1] As the Lutheran Church taught at a subsequent time.

human knowledge and volitions? Those who declined to accept this consequence, were driven ever more and more to separate the divine nature and the divine personality from each other, to place the divine and human natures side by side, and to regard the personality standing in the middle of the juxtaposited natures, as the common place which comprises both, or which is filled out by both. In the West, the teachers of the Church (even Augustine, and at a later time a Council of Toledo) believed themselves necessitated to take this step by the following further considerations. According to the doctrine of the Trinity, the nature of the Son is the same as that of the Father and of the Holy Spirit; and He is discriminated from the nature which He has in common with them, solely by His hypostasis or person. Had His nature also assumed humanity, there would have been no escaping the conclusion, that the Father and the Holy Spirit had also become flesh, as to their nature. Stress was therefore laid on the fact, that not the nature, but merely the Person, of the Logos, assumed humanity. As the act of assumption was conceived to be the moment which constituted the person, the divine personality, without the divine nature, was, by implication, set forth as the chain by which the Logos bound humanity to Himself, in order, through the medium of Himself, to bring human nature into connection with His own divine nature.

The Ego might readily be regarded, even prior to anything else, as the link connecting the two; for, evidently enough, the two natures were together in the one person. But, as the conception of this Ego, was only arrived at by abstracting from the natures all the specialties and qualities which made the natures what they were, the result was something void, destitute of attributes and differentiated by no distinction; and this result being accepted as just, it might appear a matter of no consequence to humanity whether it had its own Ego or the divine Ego,—for both natures might, without difficulty, be combined in such an Ego. An Ego of this kind, which had no special qualities, was, indeed, nowhere to be found:—it was a mere abstraction. But the great point was in some way or other to couple the two natures, concerning whose inner connection and conciliation nothing was known; and the Ego seemed to offer, as it were, the welcome spot, the

neutral territory, in which both could meet, although it itself primarily originated with the divine nature.

Regarded in this aspect, therefore, nothing better resulted from this Christology than the *local union*, with which was afterwards combined the doctrine of the circling of the two natures within each other (circumincessio, περιχώρησις); in order that they might not appear to be merely laid down, as it were, in one common spot. But the fundamental view was in nowise affected by this addition.

The fundamental features of this view continued to mark the Christology of the West for centuries. It is plain, however, that in such a way the natures were by no means united, but were merely brought into external connection with each other. Indeed, an abstract Ego, so constituted as to be able to replace the human Ego, could have no combinative power in itself: with such an Ego, the natures could not be vitally and actually united. For an Ego destitute of attributes is a dead abstraction; and its only strength and life are traceable to the natures from which it is abstracted. This idea was not, it is true, usually followed out to its legitimate result: the Ego being held to be divine, was on that ground constantly conceived to be endowed with the πλήρωμα of divine powers. Plainly, however, a return was thus made to the notion, that the nature of the Logos, equally with His person, belonged to the human nature. An actual double series of knowledges and volitions could only be attained in one way,—to wit, by so divorcing the Ego of the divine Logos from His nature, that the divine nature shall not appear to be so directly appropriated to the human nature as the divine Ego. What pledge there may be, with this duality of wills, for the agreement of the human will of Christ with the divine, we are not here informed. To urge that the humanity is the pure Adamitic humanity, was not sufficient; for it might fall: and if it could not fall, on the ground of being perfect from the very commencement, as Maximus, for example, supposed, then the humanity lacked reality and truth.

The other Christological view, which may be designated the *Oriental*, took sufficient care to secure this concord of the wills. It regarded the Ego, not as an empty compartment in which the two natures were deposited, nor as a third something

in addition to the two natures, but simply, after the manner of the ancient Church, as the divine nature, which is, in itself and essentially, personal. Not something empty, but full; not a something indifferent to the distinctions of divine and human nature, but a something determinate in itself, was it, therefore, which assumed human nature;—and starting with this point, the Orientals aimed to bring clearly to view the living union with human nature. The problem then took this form,—How can a true human nature be one with the divine hypostasis and its nature? The task, in this case, was to show how the natures could directly belong to each other, how they were internally conciliated.

The Oriental portion of the symbol gave, as we have seen, the following answer:—The two physical wills were not opposed to each other, but the human will followed, that is, it never took the initiative, it had not to be an impulse to itself. It was, further, not hostile or rebellious, but *subject* to the *divine* and *almighty* will.[1] All decisive volitions proceeded, thus, from the inmost centre of Christ, from the divine nature which formed His personality. Originally, indeed, there were two wills conceived as capacities, and two natures; nay more, the capacities were also conceived as operative: but the divine will, by its *omnipotence*, carried the human will along with it in its course at every volition. On this view, however, the human will never existed but for a moment, and disappeared again as soon as it existed; and, in direct opposition to the Dyotheletic position, it was absorbed by, and so blended with, the divine, that the one divine will alone operated through the medium of the living human nature. But we are thus plainly led back, substantially, to Honorius and the Monotheletism which the Council had condemned.

So little harmony was there in the conclusions of this Council, so great was the confusion with respect to the true state of the matter: the German Reformers were right, there-

[1] The effort made during the second stadium of the Monotheletic Controversy, in the interest of the ethical aspect of the matter, especially by Maximus, to assert the truth of the humanity of Christ by attributing to it the *αὐτεξούσιον*, was frustrated by the Council of 680, and, to use the words of John Damascenus, the *αὐτεξούσιον* of the humanity was swallowed up in the *ὑπεξούσιον* (Joan. Damasceni, Opp. ed. Lequien, Tom. i. p. 520).

fore, in refusing to recognise the authority of this Council. The Fathers who composed it are chargeable with vacillation, not merely between the two opposed modes of considering the matter, mentioned above, but also between the Nestorian doctrine of a twofold series of wills and knowledges on the one hand, and a Monophysitic predominance of the divine nature, which left no room for the free activity of the human nature, on the other hand; and the positing of all these things together, proved but a very poor mode of reconciling the contradictions.

In the Dyotheletism of Maximus, indeed, who followed that doctrine out most closely and consequently, traces are discernible of a reaction against the notion, that the divine nature alone had and exercised power, in favour of the reality and freedom of the humanity of Christ. As we have seen, however, the unity of the person was greatly endangered by the course he took; and we cannot be surprised, therefore, to find that, in the last stadium of the Monotheletic Controversy, with a view to escaping this danger, a sudden turn was taken towards the view of the omnipotence of the will of the divine nature, against which Maximus had so decidedly protested. The Church was thus again, substantially, led back to the doctrine which had found an undisguised expression in the formula, "Unus operator filius Dei Christus," and His "una voluntas," during the first stadium of the controversy.

But the (so to speak) ostensible doctrine of the Church, the recognition of which in words, at the close of the Monotheletic Controversy, determined the ecclesiastical repufation of this Council, was henceforth Dyotheletism. And so we can understand how, in the following century, views could be diffused in Spain, and that professedly on a good Church basis, the main object of which was to save the independence and freedom of the humanity of Christ, whilst adhering to the traditional doctrine of the natures. Viewed in this connection, Adoptianism wears no longer the appearance of an historical riddle, of a strange rehabilitation; but is seen to be the natural continuation of the efforts of Maximus, the representative of a principle destined to be of importance in the future, and a protest against that dissipation of the humanity of Christ, to which so strong an impulse had been given by the appeal to the mere omnipotence of the Logos at the Sixth Council:—an impulse which,

as we shall see, determined, for the most part, the character of the Christology of the Middle Ages.

Monotheletism was once more revived in the Greek Church under the Emperor Philippicus (Bardanes),—and, through his influence, attained to supremacy in the year 711. He convoked a new Council to Constantinople, which condemned the decrees of the Sixth Council, and adopted a symbolum favourable to Monotheletism. The bishops fell in with this confession as easily as they had fallen in with the opposed one of the year 681. Two years afterwards, however, Anastasius II. restored Dyotheletism; and the bishops showed themselves again quite ready to alter their confession. This characterless changeableness of the Greek clergy was due not merely to their deep moral corruption, but also, as justice compels us to acknowledge, to the want of definiteness and precision in the symbolum of the Sixth Synod, which might be explained at once monotheletically and dyotheletically. Officially, however, especially subsequently to this renewal of the controversy, Dyotheletism was the authoritative view; and it was the fashion with dogmatical writers to attack Monotheletism along with Monophysitism. What meaning was to be attached to the term, "human will,"—whether it was to be understood to be the power of self-determination, or merely a volitional motion, back of, and above, which stood the determination of the divine will,—remained undecided. They contented themselves with having asserted the truth of the human nature, more perfectly than even the Council of Chalcedon, by means of their Dyotheletism; and the more confidently believed themselves able, openly and without prejudice, to maintain the impersonality of the human nature, which hitherto had been rather "implicite" than "explicite" conceded. (Note 44.)

We have now arrived at the point at which the development of the Christological dogma in the Greek Church remained standing, and came to a termination. From this time forth, the Greek mind aimed, without developing any further dogmatical productivity, simply to recapitulate and store up the results so far attained. We must dwell a little on this matter. John Damascenus (about the year 750) deserves a more careful consideration than the other writers of his Church; for he sums up, in the form of thesis and antithesis, with great clear-

ness, those results of the precedent movement which had received the sanction of the Church, and establishes them by the best arguments of the Fathers; especially, however, does he deserve attention, both for having laid the topstone to the dogmatical efforts of the Greek Church, by which he has ever since been regarded as the highest authority, and because his chief work, entitled, *Περὶ ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως* (Sec. 12, under Eugene III.), was translated into Latin, early became accessible to the Western Church, and was particularly studied by Peter the Lombard.

We shall do best to take our start from the last Christological discussions; for on them John Damascenus bestowed special attention, not merely in the work just mentioned, but also in a separate work, on the two wills, activities, and remaining natural attributes of Christ.[1] The same Lord Jesus Christ, says he, we acknowledge to be perfect God and perfect man. He had all that the Father had, with the exception of aseity; and all that the first Adam had, with the exception of sin. Whatever naturally pertained to the two natures of which He was constituted, was also His,—two natural wills, the divine and the human; two natural activities; a double natural freedom of will, a divine and a human; and twofold wisdom, and twofold knowledge.[2] These are the natural attributes, without which the natures cannot subsist. For the establishment of this double vital system, he advances, but with greater force and precision, the following main arguments, which we have for the most part met with already in Maximus. Whatever has the same nature, must have the same will, and the same activity: that which has a different nature, must be different in each of these respects. So, on the other hand, that which has one and the same will and activity, must be of the same substance; and a difference in the former, involves a difference in the latter. Besides the divine nature, there are three kinds of substances—organic, animal, and rational; each discriminated from the other by characteristics which belong to its nature. To the class of rational substances belongs the *αὐτεξούσιον*: now, so certainly as each of the other kinds has something distinctive of it,

[1] Opp. T. i. 529–54. He also assailed the Monophysites in a separate work.

[2] De fid. orth. lib. iii. cap. 13.

which constitutes its nature, so certainly does freedom of will pertain to the human class, as the element which is natural to it; but freedom of will is simply will (*θέλησις*).[1] Animals are ruled by their nature: in man, the nature is ruled by the free will; and he is, consequently, a voluntary being (*θελητικός*). What we do not first need to acquire, pertains to our nature: now, we do not learn to will; to will, therefore, belongs to our nature. God has freedom of will: human nature is in the image of God; to human nature, consequently, belongs freedom of will. What all have equally, and not the one more and the other less, pertains to their general essence. All men have will; will, therefore, belongs to their nature: were it not a matter of nature, it would be a personal thing, or against nature; and in the latter case, it would be a departure from nature. If we assume it to have been a matter of the personality in the case of Christ,—that is, if we assume His will to have been hypostatical, as the Monotheletes do, supposing will in general to pertain to the personality and not to the nature,—we should have to assume three wills, for the three Persons of the Godhead; whereas the Church only confesses one will.

But, in order to understand his conception of the duality of wills and activities, we must consider the more precise distinctions drawn by him. A distinction is to be made between the act of willing (das Wollen) in general, determinate volitions, and the subject of volitions. Willing in general is simply the faculty of volition (*θελητικὴ δύναμις*), in virtue of which the nature is capable of forming volitions (*θελητικὸν*). The determinate will is the will as related to an object, and denotes the content, that which is willed; this he designated *θέλημα γνωμικὸν*. Finally, the voluntary subject is he who actually makes use of the capacity of volition (*θέλησις*).

As there were two natures capable of volition, he holds that two wills also should be taught; and in maintaining his Dyotheletism, he plainly lays the chief stress, not so much on any continuous actual activity of the two wills, as on the fact of their positive dynamical existence:—indeed, he confesses that there was only one who willed in Christ,[2] the one and the same Christ. But this one and the same Christ willed both divinely and humanly; and, therefore, as far as the determinate will

[1] T. i. 226, lib. iii. cap. 14. [2] P. 226.

is concerned, the object or the content of the will (θελητὸν) is the same. In point of matter, there is no distinction or antagonism between the will of the divine and the will of the human nature. Christ did not will dividedly, but unitedly; and yet, in willing, He willed in correspondence with each one of the two natures: so that, regarded "formaliter," two volitional natures were directed towards the same object. He willed, namely, not merely that which He would have willed as God, according to His divine nature, for the divine nature in itself did not will to eat and drink; but He willed also that which was necessary to the subsistence of His human nature,—not in contradiction to that which God willed, but in accordance with the distinctive character of the human nature, which, when the divine will permitted it, willed, in the way appropriate to it, to suffer or to do that which was natural for it to suffer or do.

According to the Damascene, then, there were two abiding volitional faculties, both of which came into actual operation; and the human nature was not merely passive, but, considered in relation to the human soul, the flesh was dependent, and the humanity of Christ possessed of freedom of will. But the volitions of the divine and human natures were not therefore dissociated; for, in the first place, the object of volition was common to both, although each willed it in its own way, or in its own form; and, in the second place, the human nature had not freedom of volition over against the divine, but was determined by the divine, and was dependent on it, both for the form and the matter of its volitions. Even those actual volitions to which it was impelled by its own nature, were not executed, unless the will of the divine nature permitted or willed it.[1] According to this, the faculty and the activity of the human nature were encompassed and embraced by the divine, which alone ruled and determined the entire actual life. Despite all the pains which the Damascene takes to establish Dyotheletism, he in reality gets no further than one determi-

[1] Compare lib. iii. cap. 6. When the stronger (λόγος) permits it, the spirit of Christ shows its own supremacy (ἐκ νικᾶταί τε καὶ ἕπεται τῷ κρείττονι καὶ ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖ ἃ ἡ θεία βούλεται θέλησις). Cap 18, p. 241: εἵπετο καὶ ὑπετάσσετο τῷ αὐτοῦ θελήματι τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, μὴ κινούμενον γνώμῃ ἰδίᾳ, ἀλλὰ πάντα θέλον, ἃ τὸ θεῖον αὐτοῦ ἤθελε θέλημα.

nant will, that of the divine nature:—alongside of the divine will, the human nature is really selfless; and, however zealously he seeks to show that the will is a matter of the nature, and not of the personality, in order that he may be able to maintain the duality of wills, he is, in the last instance, led back to the one deciding will of the divine nature. And as the divine nature was at the same time the formative principle of the personality, the conclusion he really arrived at was,—that there was one, even a deciding, will of the person, above the will of the human nature; and he consequently reduced the human will to the position of a mere natural psychical movement, of a *momentum* in the will of the one Christ.

And yet, in respect of the abiding difference of the natures, the Damascene gave such prominence to the duality, that he failed to show that the wills and activities were actually one, even in the work of Christ. Nothing had been more objectionable to Cyrill, than the denial of divine power to the human nature of Christ; and he had insisted on it, for example, in his Anathemas, that the flesh of Christ is life-giving flesh. John of Damascus, on the contrary, supposed that, though the speaking and touching, and other the like acts, in connection with miracles, appertained to the human nature, the miracles themselves were performed solely by the divine nature.[1] So far was he from the idea of a divine-human life. The formula, *θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια*, he explained to signify, that there was both a divine and a human activity, each permanently discriminated from the other.[2] The composite term, *θεανδρική*, he took to mean nothing more than the formula propounded by Leo,—each of the two natures operated in Christ in conjunction with the other;[3] for there never was in Him, either naked deity, or mere humanity.

Still, he also took great pains to exhibit clearly the unity of the two natures. In pursuance of this design, he taught, firstly, that to the divine nature alone pertained the power of constituting a personality; secondly, the doctrine of the *τρόπος τῆς ἀντιδόσεως*;[4] thirdly, the doctrine of the *περιχώρησις*.

Not with a humanity already possessed of an independent existence, was the Divine Logos united; but the Logos became

[1] Pp. 231, 233, 235.
[2] De duab. volunt. § 44, i. 553.
[3] Lib. iii. 19, de duab. vol. § 44, p. 553.
[4] Lib. iii. cap. 3, 4.

Himself the hypostasis of the humanity.[1] No being, indeed, can exist without an hypostasis (L. iii. 9); for beings are known alone by their hypostases. The hypostasis is the individual (ἄτομον, μερικὸν, L. iii. 6), to which is opposed the general or the common (κοινόν). But the general and the individual are not external to each other: the general (εἶδος) has no independent existence, it exists only in the hypostases; and so, *vice versâ*, the individual contains the general within itself, —not merely a portion of the general, but the whole. For the general essence is simply that which remains after the individual has been deducted; the hypostasis, consequently, is the general, or the οὐσία, in conjunction with accidents, or distinctive characteristics. So in the Trinity; so in Christology. But then he proceeds to say (L. iii. 9),—"It is not necessary that each of the (personally united) natures should have an hypostasis of its own; for they may meet in one hypostasis: they may also so exist, that they are neither without hypostasis, nor each has its own hypostasis, but both have the same." It is characteristic, that the personality in relation to the nature or the substance is reduced by him to a mere accident (συμβεβηκὸς). This ancient view was for the first time uprooted during the Germanic period. But the Damascene appears thus to fall into contradiction with himself. For if, in other cases, the hypostasis of human nature is constituted by the individual human accidents, which are superadded to the general human substance, either there must be in Christ a human hypostasis, side by side with the divine, seeing that there is in Him an individuality, and not merely the general human substance; or there is not in Him a double hypostasis, and the human is excluded by the divine. In such case, however, Christ could only have possessed, and have been, humanity in the general sense: He could not have had an individual humanity. And this is not what John Damascenus desired; for he insists upon it, that humanity, in the general sense, cannot have a real existence, save in human individuals, and that Christ's humanity was not merely the general human substance, but an individual human body and an individual soul. We have here a fresh confirmation of what we remarked above, to wit, that the true conception of human personality was still lacking. It was

[1] Lib. iii. cap. 2 and 8.

not yet conceived as the Ego, as the inmost centre; but, on the contrary, the hypostasis was treated as the accidental, the individual, as that which is superadded to the inner portion, to the essence, in accordance with the definition given by the teachers of the Church, conjointly with the Monophysites. They did not, however, adhere strictly to this definition; but when their aim was to show that the divine and human natures were one, without conceding a double personality, they affirmed that the hypostasis of the divine nature might also be the hypostasis of the human. In this case, hypostasis was taken to denote, not the individually or accidentally human (for how could it be replaced by the divine hypostasis?), but the inner conjunctive principle of unity, the Ego, which, as we have shown before, when conceived to be separated from the divine nature and from the human, might, as an empty form, appear fitted to constitute the connecting tie between the two natures. He teaches, therefore, that the general human essence in conjunction with characteristic features of the individual man Jesus, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the general divine substance in conjunction with the characteristic features which constituted the hypostasis of the Son, were united in Christ. In such a manner, however, that the hypostasis of the Son is also designated the hypostasis of the human nature; which would imply, if hypostasis denote "the congeries of characteristic marks," that in Christ there was only human nature in the general sense, and not an individual man,—that the divine hypostasis took the place of the individual, the hypostatical, in His human nature. But the principle of the ἐν-υποστασία of the human nature in the Logos was plainly taken by him in another sense; namely, the divine hypostasis of the Son was the formative and connective principle of unity of this person, not merely in the sense in which the creative Logos universally discharges that function, but so that, through the Logos who became man, and for His hypostasis, those elements, which, apart from the incarnation, would not have sufficed to constitute a man, were united in, and formed, an individual man, of such a constitution, that the hypostasis of the Son was capable of being his hypostasis. Had he inquired more closely how this man must be constituted, in order that the hypostasis of the Logos might at the same time be his hypostasis; had he

especially made full use of an idea frequently advanced by him, —the idea, that this individual man must be regarded as having an universal signifiance, and as the head of men and angels; he would have arrived at a conception of the humanity of Christ, which would not have condemned it to be treated as impersonal, in order that the Logos might be its hypostasis or personality. On the contrary, instead of being obliged to represent the human nature as destitute of an hypostasis, he might have represented it as having an hypostasis, united and identical with that of the Logos. He did not, however, take this step; and, in consequence, the hypostasis of the Logos continued to be something foreign to human nature, and it became necessary to the maintenance of the unity, that something of the completeness of the humanity should be sacrificed.

The Logos he regarded as exclusively the hypostasis of the God-man: the consequence thereof was the peculiar method he adopted to reduce the natures, and especially the activities, to unity. He says, indeed,[1]—Christ had a power of volition (*θελητικὴ δύναμις*), corresponding to each of His two natures, and volition in general (*θέλησις, τὸ θέλειν*). Further, each nature, as far as concerned concrete volitions or the objects of volition (*τὸ πῶς θέλειν, τὸ θέλημα, τὸ γνωμικὸν θέλημα*), had by nature a different will; for the divine does not by nature require food and drink, as does the human. Nay more, Will he considered to be identical with freedom; and, following the example of Clement, he defined Will to be the free movement of a self-ruling spirit.[2] He explains very beautifully,[3] how, along with freedom, which was given to Adam without sin, we received the law; how both together were given, that we might attain to virtue; in that, though whatever we are by nature is beautiful and bestowed by the Good for good,[4] yet through the use thereof we first become virtuous or the contrary. As we are by nature under obligation to obey, and subject ourselves to, the law of God (*δοῦλοι*), we are possessed of freedom, which is the constitutive principle of virtue (*συστατικὸν*); for that to which men are constrained (*τὸ βίᾳ γερόμενον*), is neither a virtue nor an enjoyment. No less strongly does he maintain, that no such

1 "De duabus voluntatibus," pp. 529–554; specially § 24 ff.

2 L. c. § 28; *αὐτοκράτορος νοῦ κίνησις αὐτεξούσιος.*

3 § 19.

4 § 19.

thing as obedience could be attributed to Christ,[1] unless He possessed a human will, whose obedience must be a free and unconstrained subjection of the will to the will of another. But however distinctly he may here assert the full completeness and freedom of the humanity of Christ, it is rendered illusory by the mode in which he aims to secure the unity of the two wills and natures, or that the two wills should always harmonize both as to their objects, and as to their ethical form. He reminds, further, that will concrete, presupposes one who wills; but the volitional subject in Christ, says he, is one alone, to wit, the hypostasis of the Logos,—united, indeed, with the humanity, but still divine. Now, as it is physically impossible that actual volitions should arise in a being, if the volitional subject resists the impulse or tendency to a definite volition (for whatever takes place independently of the volitional subject, is not a volition, but an involuntary motion), the human nature of Christ, although endowed with the potence of freedom of will, could not possibly originate an actual volition, which was not at the same time, both in point of substance and form, the volition of the Logos; for, as the Damascene himself allows, even the form of a volition may be made the subject and matter of a volition.[2] In the last instance, accordingly, nothing remained for the self-ruling freedom of will of Christ's human nature, than to be the impersonal (as it actually is) transition-point and organ for the personality which takes its place. It could only hold to the Logos, therefore, the relation which the body of man holds to his soul, and the relation of the body to the soul, is that of a physical, subservient, dependent organ.[3] We can, accordingly,

[1] § 27. [2] § 23.

[3] § 16: *φυσικὸν δοῦλον*. This he expressly confesses in § 42, p. 553. The soul is *ὑπηρέτης* to the Logos (p. 552), whose will is decisive (*κυροῦται τὸ θεῖον θέλημα παρὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον*, as he says, following the example of Gregory of Nyssa, § 35, p. 549). Nay more, in § 40, he goes so far as to say, Adam's will did not continue subject to the divine, because it followed its own *γνώμη*, in opposition to God. For this reason the Logos assumed human nature and a human will, but by no means an *ἀνθρωπίνην ὑπόστασιν* in order that the natural human will might not live in accordance with its own gnomic and hypostatical will, in opposition to the deity, but obey God in free obedience (?). From this we may see that, in the last instance, he only posits *one* gnomic *Will*, to wit, the deciding personal will of the Logos.

only be surprised when we find him afterwards[1] objecting to call the humanity of Christ δοῦλος; and such an objection is only intelligible on the supposition, that he deemed the hypostatical designation given to humanity in this expression to be too strong. In the last instance, he, no less than the Monotheletes, represents humanity as a mere organ; though with such a representation, it is difficult to reconcile, what he otherwise says regarding a free obedience of the human will of Christ. For he excludes all choice, preference, consideration (ἐκλογὴ, προαίρεσις, κρίσις, and so forth; and the λογισμὸς ἐπαμφοτερίζων καὶ διστάζων), from the will and activity of Christ.[2] In the way of a metaphysical argument for this view of his, he endeavours to employ the distinction, undeniably existing in the world, between the predominantly passive and the predominantly active (παθητικὸν and ἐνεργητικὸν): for example, in relation to the soul, the body is passive; and, as rational, the soul has the power freely to govern the body. But its freedom, like everything else in the world, is purely passive relatively to God; inasmuch as the divine nature alone is not passively moved, and is without motion active.[3] This statement, however, is plainly not reconciled with the former ones regarding the necessity of freedom to virtue. Nor does he even adhere faithfully to the latter position; for, when he has occasion to speak of the first Adam,[4] he follows Irenæus, who held that Adam must have been created in mutable sinlessness, whereas God alone possesses freedom and sinlessness, without mutability.

We see, accordingly, that he who meant to assert the independence and completeness of the humanity so zealously, took away with one hand what he had given with the other,—and that he did so in the interest of the very method adopted to secure the unity of the person; for the hypostasis of the Logos, by means of which that unity was secured, did not permit of the existence of the human hypostasis.

On the other hand, it must be remarked, that as respects the independence of the human aspect, he gives again, half unconsciously, in his doctrine of the περιχώρησις and of the τρόπος

[1] Lib. iv. cap. 21. [2] § 28, p. 544, de fide orth. iii.

[3] § 18: πᾶσα κτίσις κτιστὴ παθητικῶς κινεῖται καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, μόνη δὲ ἡ θεία φύσις ἐστὶν ἀπαθὴς, ἀπαθῶς κινουμένη, καὶ ἀκινήτως ἐνεργοῦσα.

[4] § 28.

ἀντιδόσεως, with the one hand what he had taken away with the other. From the Unio καθ' ὑπόστασιν, which, in his view, should be held to have been complete from the very commencement (τελεία), he deduced, in the first place, the περιχώρησις of the natures in each other ("de fide orthod." L. iii. 3, 7, 17, 19). In like manner, Gregory Nazianzen (Or. 51) had spoken of the natures as περιχωρούσας εἰς ἀλλήλας τῷ λόγῳ τῆς συμφυΐας; and this "circumincessio" had long ago been applied, with a similar intent, to the Persons of the Trinity. The parts (μέρη) of which the person was composed, held a living relation to each other. They did not exist outside of each other, but lived and moved in each other. This, however, must be limited (according to lib. iii. 7) to the extent of saying, that the divine nature alone permeated the human; for the divine nature penetrates and permeates everything, as it chooses, whereas it is itself penetrated by nothing. This, however, was naturally not intended to signify, that the all-penetrating Logos was united with humanity only in the manner in which He is united with all other beings:—to describe the relation between them, frequent use was rather made of the image of iron which is heated by fire. The substances of the iron and the fire do not cease to be different, and yet they are united and work in union (ἡνωμένως οὐ διῃρημένως); even so, like iron and fire, the deity and the humanity performed different things,—each that which was peculiar to and became it. But the main point is, that this περιχώρησις brought about a communication, not indeed of the human elements to the divine nature, which remained untouched by suffering, but of the divine glory to the human nature (μεταδίδωσει τῇ σαρκὶ τῶν οἰκείων αὐχημάτων, c. 7). As the "Unio hypostatica" is at the foundation of the περιχώρησις, so the περιχώρησις is the foundation of the τρόπος ἀντιδόσεως.[1]

Many teachers before the Damascene had spoken of an interchange taking place between the two aspects within the Person of Christ, designating it, ἀντιμεθίστασις τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἐπαλλαγὴ, ὀνομάτων ἐπίζευξις. An ἀντίδοσις ἰδιωμάτων was taught by Leontius in his work against the Nestorians and the Eutychians, and the Damascene set himself to make the ἀντίδοσις available for the assertion of the unity of the person.[2] He remarks, that, according to it, the Logos communicated to the

[1] Lib. iii. cap. 23. [2] Lib. iii. cap. 3.

flesh that which pertained to Himself (*μεταδίδωσι*). But when this *ἀντίδοσις* came to be practically exemplified, it turned out to be a mere transference of names (*ἀντίδοσις ὀνομάτων*).[1] For the behoof of the unity of the person, names which strictly belong to the one nature, are transferred to the other also. Indeed, we are expressly warned against supposing the attributes of the one nature to be attributed, or to belong actually, to the other.[2] But what real difference is there between such a mere nominal communication of attributes, and the *ἀναφορὰ* of the school of Antioch, which Cyrill considered to be so objectionable?

John's doctrine of *deification* (*θέωσις*) and of *appropriation* (*οἰκείωσις*) carries us somewhat further. A deification of human nature, he represents as resulting even from the mere act of incarnation.[3] The divine nature permeated the human, and united it inseparably with itself, even as heated iron cannot be touched without the substance of the fire being at the same time touched. Hence, the human intellect of Christ, which was by nature imperfect (*ἀγνοεῖν*), participated from the very beginning in the all-comprehensive divine knowledge.[4] Logically, the same must hold good of the will also. When it is said in the Gospel, "He grew in years, wisdom, and favour," we must understand it to mean that Christ, as He grew in years (and He did really increase in years), manifested ever more and more the treasures of His wisdom, and more and more completely fulfilled the will of God. But whoso supposes that in these latter points He really and truly made progress, necessarily denies that the union of the Logos with the flesh was fully accomplished from the commencement, and, instead of confessing that there was an hypostatical union, does but allow a Nestorian *σχετικὴ ἕνωσις* and *ψιλὴ ἐνοίκησις*. For if the flesh subsisted in the Logos from the commencement of its existence, and was even hypostatically identical with the Logos (*ταυτότης ὑποστατικὴ*), must it not have been enriched by His

[1] Lib. iii. cap. 4.

[2] *Οὐ κατονομάζομεν αὐτῆς (θεότητος) τὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ἰδιώματα—οὔτε δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς, ἤτοι τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος κατηγοροῦμεν τὰ τῆς θεότητος ἰδιώματα—ἐπὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως, κἂν ἐκ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου, κἂν ἐξ ἑνὸς τῶν μερῶν ταύτην ὀνομάσωμεν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν φύσεων τὰ ἰδιώματα αὐτῇ ἐπιτίθεμεν.*

[3] L. iii. 17, 19.

[4] L. iii. 21, 22, de duab. vol. untatibus, § 38, p. 550. The Logos *κατεπλούτησε*, the human nature, *τὴν τῶν μελλόντων γνῶσιν.*

wisdom? The human soul became, in fact, the soul of the Lord, of the Logos. Hence this idea rendered it impossible for the Damascene to attach any real meaning to the prayers offered by Christ (L. iii. 24). In Christ, God was the personality; how, then, could He need to pray for anything? Considered in relation to its form, prayer is a rising of the soul to God; how, then, could He who was God need thus to rise? All he could say, therefore, was, that Christ had played our part in prayer, desiring to be an example to us, and to do honour to God. In other connections, also, the Damascene very readily resorted to the supposition that Christ assumed our rôle.[1] In opposition to the Julianists, he maintains, indeed, that the physical aspect of Christ shared the φθορὰ of humanity; alleging as the ground thereof, that the purpose of incarnation directly involved the assumption of the human capability of suffering: but he at the same time asserts that it participated also in the power of giving life,—it was, as Cyrill so energetically affirmed, ζωοποιός. Furthermore, since the resurrection it has been raised above all capability of suffering and all human needs, although it continues to be circumscribed, limited.[2] Christ's body was always limited, and will be limited when He comes again: God alone is unlimited; but humanity sits at the right hand of God:—words which are not to be explained literally, but simply signify that the honour and glory of the Deity, which the Logos had ever possessed and retained, are now shared by His humanity, and that one worship must be rendered to His person, inclusive of the humanity. "Iron heated by fire I avoid, as I do fire itself; and so, the humanity of the Logos I worship in conjunction with Him."[3]

[1] L. iii. 25. That is, οἰκείωσις; of which there are two kinds:—1. A real and true appropriation and assumption of our nature (φυσική, οὐσιώδες), in accordance with which His purpose was to share human experiences. 2. An οἰκοπροσωπική or σχετική appropriation, when, solely in virtue of a peculiar relation to us, for the sake of the love or compassion borne us, He spoke in the person of another, precisely as it became Him in the rôle He had undertaken; or rather, precisely as became, not Himself, but the other whom He represented. So does he explain Matt. xxvii. 46; Gal. iii. 13; 2 Cor. v. 21.

[2] L. iii. 28, iv. 1–3.

[3] What we have advanced above shows that he recognised no human development, save that of the body. And yet he only needed to extend

We should very much deceive ourselves, however, if we took this *ἀντίδοσις*, or even *θέωσις*, to imply that through it divine attributes were veritably appropriated to human nature. According to the Damascene, the divine attributes cannot be separated from the divine substance; every nature maintains itself only by retaining the essential qualities which constitute the idea of its nature (*συστατικὰ τῆς φύσεως*), and by excluding others which might be incompatible therewith. Through the deification (Vergottung), the humanity became merely the nature of the Logos,—a nature permeated by Him, and His by appropriation (*οἰκείωσις*). This flesh became the flesh of the Logos; this soul, the soul of the Logos—His property in the most special sense, because of its most intimate, that is, because of its personal, union with the Logos. But, in essence, the human nature remained unaltered; even the attributes of both natures remained uncurtailed, unmixed: solely for the sake of *fellowship*[1] (which in itself presupposes a duality) was the flesh of the Lord enriched by the divine activities (*ἐνέργειαι*). It did not receive divine attributes in and for itself (iii. 17, 18, 19). The human will, which had become the will of the Logos, was indeed almighty also, but not in itself; it performed divine acts,—not, however, by its own proper power (*κατ' οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν*), but solely in virtue of its union with the Logos, who manifested the power inherent in Himself through the medium of the flesh. Strictly speaking, therefore, he did not understand by the deification a real transference of divine attributes to the human nature, but simply the undivided co-existence and co-operation of the two substances,—an idea which necessarily involves the impossibility of coming into contact with the humanity of Christ, without at the same time coming into contact with His deity. And as far as concerns that perfect wisdom and virtue, which the God-man is said to have possessed from the beginning, they were not an independent possession of the humanity of Christ; but through

his doctrine of the *παραχωρεῖν* of the Logos, which left room for such human motions as had the consent of the Logos, a little further, and he might have conceded the possibility of a mental development of Christ. Like Maximus, he often quotes Mark vii. 28, but only for the purpose of showing that there was a human will in Christ, side by side with the divine: so also John vii. 8; Matt. xxvi. 39; John v. 30, viii. 50.

[1] Therefore is the expression *θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια*, a *περίφρασις* or phrase employed to denote that two things are combined in one *λέξις*: iii. 19.

the Logos, who became the hypostasis of the humanity, and who possessed them eternally, they became the property of the humanity.[1] He aptly remarks, also, with Maximus (iii. 18), that, to represent the saints and prophets as moved by the divine will, without their having the power, and being free, to move themselves, is the Old Testament type of the action of God on man. So, however, was it not with Christ: His humanity did not move merely at the nod of the Logos (*νεύματι λόγου*), as Sergius said, but had a freedom of its own, and freely willed what the Logos willed. And yet he goes on to say,—it was one and the same Personality of Christ that willed both according to the divine and according to the human will; consequently, the two wills of the Lord differed solely as to their nature, not as to their object and sentiment (*γνώμῃ*). We see again, however, that, in the last instance, the human will of Christ was not really complete,—that a humanity perfectly free, and freely determining itself to the good, was not manifested even in Christ, but merely a humanity determined by the *νεῦμα λόγου*. In a word, the human will, according to the Damascene, was simply the medium through which the Logos moved the man Jesus.

It is evident enough that the Christological result thus arrived at by the ancient Church, whatever may have been the extent of its traditional influence even down to recent times, was far from bringing the matter to a close. The human nature of Christ was curtailed, in that, after the manner of Apollinaris, the head of the divine hypostasis was set upon the trunk of a human nature, and the unity of the person thus preserved at the cost of the humanity. Further, and this is simply the reverse side of the same fault, the entire doctrine of the natures and wills taught by the ancient Church, admitted of nothing but an external union of the divine with the human;

[1] Lib. iii. cap. 15. He expresses himself similarly also in reference to the *ἐνέργεια* of the *φύσις*. He appeals to the words of Gregory of Nyssa (used by him in reference to the Trinity): *ὧν ἡ ἐνέργεια μία, τούτων πάντως καὶ ἡ δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ· πᾶσα γὰρ ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως ἀποτέλεσμα.* A created nature cannot possibly have the same *δύναμις* with the uncreated, nor the same *ἐνέργεια*; otherwise the Logos would have been affected by fear and sadness. The one *ἐνέργεια* of the deity and the flesh must have been compromised; and then, that of the Logos could no longer have been one with that of the Father.

and the two natures, continuing unchanged even as to their attributes, were but, as it were, inserted into each other in the Person of Christ. We can, indeed, discover the rudiments of something better; and they warrant us in supposing that the theory adopted failed, notwithstanding its rounded appearance, to give adequate expression to the image of Christ which hovered before the mind. The doctrine of the freedom of the humanity of Christ was plainly intended to play a more important part than it actually did, in the system of John of Damascus. He did not mean merely to teach that the humanity of Christ was passively carried and moved hither and thither by the Logos, that it lost its personality in the personality of the Logos; for it would have contradicted one of his fundamental postulates, which was, that nothing that forms an essential part of any nature—and the hypostasis must without doubt be counted essential both to the Logos and to humanity—can fail, without involving the destruction of that nature, nor be really communicated by another nature, especially if of a different substance (Note 45). And, on the other hand, when he laid down the doctrine of the ἀντίδοσις, περιχώρησις, οἰκείωσις, he had in view a much more intimate union between the divine and human natures than he arrived at in his systematic exhibition of the matter,—invariably ending, as it does, with denying that either the natures or the attributes were really interchanged.

Not that this resulted from his being bound by the decisions of previous Councils:—his own conception of God and man brought him into this situation. In endeavouring to arrive at the true idea of man, he goes to work inductively, assuming that the true idea of human nature must consist in that which remains after the abstraction of whatever belongs to this or that individual. Accordingly, he looks to humanity as it was before Christ, after the first creation; and that which was common to it, he concludes to be human nature in general, or to constitute the true conception of human nature. This course might be admissible if it were right to consider humanity as a mere part of nature, or as a merely natural being. It is, moreover, only right and fair to distinguish as carefully as possible between such a humanity and the deity, both in the interest of the idea of creation and of the ethical. But he over-

looked the circumstance, that the Christian doctrine of the second Adam implies that the true idea of man was not realized at the first creation, but solely at the second creation. He did not take into consideration that humanity, unlike beings which constitute a part of mere nature, and which are subject to its laws, is capable of a history; and that, therefore, its true idea can only be realized in the course of a history. To the realization of the true idea of man, it was necessary that God should progressively reveal Himself, and thus bestow a share of His divine life (2 Pet. i. 4). If such be the case, then, with the *true* idea of man, any idea of him must necessarily be very imperfect which is derived from the world of the first creation, especially in the fallen and sinful condition of man. Nay more, it cannot be enough even to go back to Adam; for, unless a mythical view be taken of his first condition, there could not have been in him more than the beginnings of a true human life: on the contrary, we must start with the conception of man which Christianity is at once capable of realizing and requires to be realized, and which was first truly realized in the Person of Christ. But the idea of humanity revealed and embodied in Christ, does not require us so to separate between it and God; and as this necessarily reacts upon the conception formed of God, the distinction between God and humanity will need to be otherwise defined than it was, when the natural Adamitic humanity was taken as a starting-point in estimating the nature of the humanity even of Christ.

This Person of Christ, he conceived to be compounded of two parts (*μέρη*), which were in turn independent wholes, but were united into a new whole, not by the divine nature, but by the hypostasis of the Logos. Other less definite terms to describe the unity are as follows:—He is the two natures; they are the one Christ, and Christ is the two natures (iii. 19). Even the Chalcedonian formula is more precise,—The two natures conjoin in Him to constitute one person. His most precise definition is the following:—The one *ὑπόστασις περιεκτική ἐστι τῶν δύο φύσεων* (c. iii. 3); or, Christ is one composite person: and he often employs the simile of man, who is compounded of body and soul. When the Monophysites objected, —This image teaches the contrary, teaches one compound nature or one compound substance; for if man is compounded

of two substances, body and soul, Christ should rather be said to be compounded of three natures or substances (Note 46);—he answered: Body and soul are only the parts, of which human nature is the whole; and with this whole, the divine, which was also a whole, was hypostatically united as a second nature. But, if it is not allowable to regard the body and the soul as individual natures, and as constituting, together with the divine, three natures; and if, further, as the Damascene maintains, the two substances, body and soul, whatever difference there may otherwise be between them, combine to form the one substance, which compound substance we designate human nature,—then he had no right to blame the Monophysites for following out the same analogy, and saying,—Man compounded of two substances, and yet, as every one allows, one substance, is a type of that which we see in Christ, namely, of the union of this human substance (nature) and of the divine into one substance, embracing both. John of Damascus saw very clearly how near such a conclusion lay, and replied,—Undoubtedly two substances do unite in man to form the one human nature (ἀνθρωπότης); but we cannot say that there was in Christ only one essence (or nature) resulting from a potencized (potenzirter) combination: for humanity (ἀνθρωπότης) is the common, the generic (κοινὸν, εἶδος); but there existed no such thing as a common generic Christhood or Christity (χριστότης), inasmuch as there was only one Christ (lib. iii. 3). But the εἶδος of a being cannot be dependent on the number of the individuals in whom it is embodied. Why then might not the Monophysites have answered, that the χριστότης was in Christ, and in Him alone? that He was the perfect and only representation of that higher compound unity, designated Christhood? Or, what was to prevent them from saying, that, as the natural man is neither merely an animated body, like the animals, nor merely spirit, like the angels, but his distinctive character consists in his being a compound of both substances; so the Christian is a higher being than the natural man, in that the natural compound unity enters into a new real union, an union with the divine (an union which is nothing more than a bare possibility in the case of those who are not Christians); and that, in this sphere, the χριστότης occupies an absolute and specific position?

If we take our start with the Monophysitic definitions of nature and hypostasis;[1]—*essence* or *nature* is the generic idea, which has no independent existence, but is merely that which remains behind in thought when the ἰδικὸν has been abstracted; and *hypostasis* is nothing but the independent subsistence of a nature for itself, or the circumscription of a nature by means of certain peculiarities:—the two natures must be allowed to be at the same time, also, two hypostases, inasmuch as otherwise they would be destitute of reality. For this reason, the Monophysites say, that through the union, the two hypostases and the two natures became one nature and one hypostasis; but that it is thoroughly inconsistent to teach, that after the Unio, there were two natures and one person, instead of that there was one nature, and one hypostasis. For, how could the two natures have an existence of their own, apart from the hypostases corresponding to them? how could Christ have humanity without having an individual man? As certainly as each of the united elements must have both φύσις and ὑπόστασις, because the one is not cogitable without the other; so certainly is the union an union of natures and hypostases, excluding the possibility of a separation of the latter from the former. Had two hypostases really become one, as the teachers of the Church assert, the union would have been perfect as to the hypostases, but imperfect as to the natures; whereas, both being inseparable, must have a like fate. From their point of view, therefore, the doctrine of the Church appeared inconsequent and discordant; and the union, complete in reference to one aspect (the ἰδικὸν) of the natures, but incomplete in reference to the other aspect.

The Damascene answered,—The representation, according to which two hypostatic natures, containing the universally human and the universally divine, each by itself inseparably conjoined with its correspondent hypostasis, unite as wholes to constitute a nature embracing both, and itself also having an hypostasis, would only be correct, on the supposition that each of the two hypostatic natures had had an independent existence prior to the incarnation. But, so far from this having been the case, the Logos alone gave the human aspect its

[1] Compare a fragment from the διαιτητὴς of Philoponus, opp. Joann. Dam. i. p. 101 ff.

existence; in Him alone it had its primal subsistence; and He therefore was its hypostasis. What has just been advanced, however, is quite sufficient in itself to direct attention to the fact, that here again a conception of hypostasis is adopted, completely diferent from that with which the definition given above started, —namely, the conception of hypostasis as the constitutive principle of the Person of Christ, and the ground of its existence.

Two points of view are discernible, therefore, in the writings of the Damascene also,—two points of view, moreover, which are not united. According to the *one*, the one personality pertains quite as truly to the humanity as to the deity, being, as it were, an indifferent middle thing, a χωρίον or territory, in which both natures participate. He took this point of view, when his aim was to assert the existence of a human will and activity different from the divine will and activity. For a volition is impossible without a volitional subject (θέλων): this subject of human volitions in Christ was furnished by the deity, in that it gave its own hypostasis; the divine nature, however, could not act in direct connection with its hypostasis, but was under the necessity of refraining from its natural operations and volitions, in order that the human aspect might have free play. Here, therefore, the divine nature is most distinctly discriminated from the divine hypostasis:—the former cooperating not as such and in its entirety, but solely by means of that constituent of itself which accommodated itself to, and was required by, the human nature, in order that there might be a proper subject for the volitions formed in its name.[1] According to the *other* point of view, he would seem to have been clearly aware that that middle thing, the personality, was, notwithstanding, of divine nature, and that the nature could not be separated from the personality. In this connection, he treats the divine nature as the focus and centre of the entire Christ; he assumes it to have been entrusted with the sole hegemony and decision, and does not hesitate even to represent the human nature as subjected to the divine, just as our body is subjected

[1] L. iii. 4, p. 209; cap. 9, p. 217; cap. 3, p. 206. To this connection belongs particularly, also, his designation of Christ's Person, with Maximus, as περιεκτικὴ ἡ μία ὑπόστασις τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν; further, also his representation of the divine and human natures as parts which were constituted into a whole, comprising both by means of the one hypostasis.

to the soul.[1] But to suppose the humanity in its totality to have been merely, as it were, a body for the divine nature, is irreconcilable with the assumption of an independent human will: and we thus arrive again at the Monotheletism of Honorius. It is true, that by the philosophy of this age, the will was held to pertain to the nature, and not to the personality, on the ground that to will, is characteristic of the genus Man. By a similar course of reasoning it might be shown, that subjectivity and personality appertain to the nature of man. And when he proceeds apagogically to argue,—"If the will does not belong to the nature, it either belongs to the personality or is against the nature. Now the latter is not the case; and were the former the case, the will of the Son would be another than the will of the Father. But inasmuch as in the Trinity the will belongs to the common nature, which is one, and therefore there are not several wills in it; so also in Christology is the will to be allotted to the nature, and therefore a duality of wills to be assumed in Christ:"—the reply readily suggests itself,—If the three Persons of the Trinity do not merely will the same thing, but have one and the same faculty of volition, much more must the personality, which in Christ is only one, be limited to one will; and if the Persons of the Trinity, to which particular wills should most decidedly be attributed, were such an attribution in any case possible, are, notwithstanding, combined in one will, how much easier must it have been for two natures, of which one was impersonal, to have one will, even though it were a will in which the divine and the human united to form a God-man! As we have remarked above, the reasonings of the Damascene conduct him to an unity of will of this latter kind. As a human will without a volitional subject is an impossibility; and as the divine subject, bringing with it, as it does, the divine nature, cannot be held to take the place of the human hypostasis, without giving to the divine aspect either a Monophysitic or Monotheletic predominance; the real duality of the wills and natures can only be established at the price of a duality of

[1] Lib. iii. cap. 15; cap. 6, p. 213; "De duabus voluntatibus," p. 549, § 35; p. 552, § 42. He even goes so far as to say, that the νοῦς of Christ was not a σύνοικος (fellow-inhabitant) of this person, but that, like the flesh, it was the χωρίον of the deity; whereas, from the first point of view, he regards the hypostasis as the χωρίον of the deity and the humanity alike.

personalities, or even at the price of a human subject for the human nature. In this case, we should have to acknowledge the existence of two hypostases in the one Christ,—a final conclusion which the Church has never drawn, although the premises of two essentially different natures and wills seem to render it unavoidable. In fact, we shall soon find an approximation thereto in Adoptianism (Note 47).

All the means supplementarily employed by this Christology (a Christology which put the finishing stroke to the efforts of the old period), on the basis of the doctrine of two natures of different substances, for the purpose of preserving the unity, along with the distinction, of the two aspects,—such means, for example, as the unity of the hypostasis, the *περιχώρησις*, and the *ἀντίδοσις*, *θέωσις*, and *οἰκείωσις* based on the *περιχώρησις*,—however ingeniously devised, were fruitless, and failed to set forth the Person of Christ in its living actuality and unity. An actual unity does indeed appear to be effected, but it is an "Unio absorptiva;" and in this case, the dualistic character of the view taken of the natures is evinced in the divine being represented as holding a relation of negation and exclusiveness to the human. At the bottom, however, the principle of two natures or substances of different essence, which is the ultimate ground of the schism just referred to, remains eternally immoveable and firm, applying even to Christ's state of exaltation. The doctrine herein involved is the following,—Ere the natures themselves are shown to stand in an inner relation of unity, so that they shall seek each other, in obedience to their own inmost essence, it is of no use to produce an appearance of unity by interweaving their essentially different being, their activities, and their operations. Such an union is only attained at the price of a curtailment of one of the two aspects. A real vital unity—an unity in which the distinctions are fully and justly recognised—can never be the result of this mode of procedure.[1]

We have now arrived at the point at which, in consequence of the failing productiveness of the Eastern Church in the matter of Christology, the dogma began to be treated scholastically, even before the rise of the Western Scholasticism. Of

[1] Nicolaus of Methone and Nicetas also, recognise no real "communicatio idiomatum."

this traditional theology, a picture is presented to us in the "Panoplia" of Euthymius Zigabenus, and in the works of Nicetas of Chone, but it will not repay us to devote further attention to it.[1] At the same time, there remained a green track even in the desert of Oriental theology, mainly unrecognised, it is true, by the official leaders of the Church, but still pursued by not a few; showing clearly how, even in seasons of dearth, the Christian heart continues to beat, and, regardless of the empty din raised about orthodox ideas, instinctively directs its gaze to the Person of Christ in its undivided totality. Even amongst the most zealous champions of the later formulas of ecclesiastical orthodoxy, nobler spirits, such as Maximus, John of Damascus, Theodore Abukara, and others, did not refuse to drink at this fresher fountain. The Christological ideas which we shall here have to discuss, are amongst the principal phenomena of that Greek Mysticism which took its tone from the so-called "divine Dionysius." They are the more deserving of attention, as they form the presupposition and foundation of the *Romanic* Mysticism of the West.[2]

In Maximus we have hitherto seen solely the dialectician, and the most important champion of Dyotheletism. This would at first sight seem incompatible with the mystical, Areopagitical elements, which now call for our attention, and to which he evidently clung with the whole intensity of his love. But it was as though he violently opposed Monotheletism and Monophysitism, because of the strong monistic, or even pantheistic, tendency he perceived in himself. Before his own conscience, he pleaded (we may imagine) his advocacy of Dyotheletism as a justification of his unrestrained devotion to the monistic tendency. He made it his aim to incorporate the principle of freedom with the system of the Areopagite, and therefore succeeded in further developing, at all events, its anthropology, and in laying the corner-stone of a system which required the world neither to be

[1] Compare Ullmann's "Nicolaus v. Methone, Euthymius Zigabenus, und Nicetas Chon., oder die dogmatische Entwickelung der griechischen Kirche im 12ten Jahrhundert;" in the "Studien und Kritiken" of 1833, iii.

[2] A more connected view of Greek Mysticism was first given by Gass, in his work, "Die Mystik des Nic. Cabasilas vom Leben in Christo," 1849; Einl. pp. 1-224. He was unfortunately unable to make use of the works of Maximus.

a mere illusion, side by side with God, and a symbol of God, on the one hand, nor a reality, that is, a God-emptied reality, on the other. Duality he considers to be the preliminary condition of all true unity: so in the Christology of the Church, so generally. In his Mystagogy, he describes everything in the world as a symbol of God,—above all, the Church. Typically, the world has, like God, the same energy as God.[1] However varied may be the antagonisms it includes, on all alike it confers a divine form. We see from this, that Maximus, whom we have found defending with all acuteness the doctrine of the duality of natures in Christ, in all its aspects, by no means intended the duality to be a dualism. His system rather tended to reduce the actual world to the precarious position of a mere symbol of the existence of God. But he further proceeds to say,—Not only are the Church and the world a symbol of God, but God and the world are also a symbol of the Church. Yea, man himself symbolically represents the Church, and the Church symbolically represents man: they are related to each other as the wheels of Ezechiel, being in each other. This plainly implies that they are not foreign to, but have an inward affinity with, each other; and yet, at the same time, they are discriminated from each other—discriminated in order to the possibility of their being in each other. Unity in distinction; distinction in unity. Hence also he says,—Sensuous knowledge is a symbolical knowledge of the ideal world (*νοητὰ*); and this latter world is in the sensuous world (*ἐνυπάρχει*).

The tendency to unity, to which he yielded himself as soon as he thought the distinctions securely established, recedes, as we may well understand, very much to the background, in those works which acquired ecclesiastical importance. That same tendency, however, gave him a decided superiority over the adherents of the Council of Chalcedon and the general sort of Dyotheletes, and was the link of connection between him and the Areopagite. Entertaining great reverence for Dionysius, he vied with him, especially in his Mystagogy, in representing the holy arrangements of the Church as symbolical of the mystical process through which divine powers descend on man, and the human spirit is raised to God. The Cultus and the Liturgy, in particular, were regarded by Maximus as both the

[1] ii. 493.

representation, and the rejuvenescence and real continuation, of that process. There is, however, an essential difference between his mode of uniting the divine and the human, and that of the Areopagite,—a difference which first brings clearly to view the distinctive characteristics of the system of Maximus.

The affirmative and negative (*καταφατικός, ἀποφατικός*) theology of the Areopagite—the affirmative method of causality, and the negative of "eminentia"—did not play so important a rôle in the system of Maximus:[1] he did not, like Dionysius, fall into the danger of instituting so strong a contrast between the nameless God, who is exalted above all names, and the many-named God, that the mind is at last drawn either into a whirlpool, which takes away both its power of vision and thought, or into a region of absolute ignorance, through which is supposed to lie the path to "Faith," but which may lead those in whom the theoretical impulse predominates, to thorough scepticism, and to the treatment of God and the world as a dream. In him, rather, as is indicated even by the zeal with which he asserted that Christ had a human will, the tendency to contemplation was so combined with the ethical tendency, as to preserve both in a healthy state. Like the Areopagite, he conceived God, at one time, as absolutely incommunicable and transcendent, and the world, therefore, as a mere shadow of the truly divine; at another time, on the contrary, he regarded God as communicable, and the world as full of the divine. Theoretically, his position was still that of the Areopagite, but the moral and religious character of his mind led him to lay down principles indefensible before the forum of the apophatical (*ἀποφατικὸς*) theology. He says, for example,—Love is the experience (*πάσχειν*) of a transport towards the beloved object (God): it presses onwards, and cannot rest, until the whole is united with the whole,—until the whole is loved in, and embraced by, the whole.[2] It is, further, the most perfect work of love and its activity, to bring about such an habitual interchange of limits,

[1] Still he was not merely acquainted with it, but says also, i. 494: *ὁ ἐκ τῶν θέσεων καταφατικῶς θεολογῶν, σάρκα ποιεῖ τὸν Λόγον*, in that he deemed the causality of God incognisable save from visible objects: whoso, however, *ἀποφατικῶς ἐκ τῶν ἀφαιρέσεων θεολογεῖ, πνεῦμα ποιεῖ τὸν Λόγον ὡς ἐν ἀρχῇ Θεὸν ὄντα*, and knows *καλῶς τὸν ὑπεράγνωστον*.

[2] Schol. on Gregory Nazianzen, pp. 18-21, in Scotus Erig. ed. Oxf. Love he defines to be a *πάσχειν ἔκστασιν πρὸς αὐτὸ ὡς ἐρατόν*.

qualities, and names, that they shall be the common property of the loving and the beloved,—to make man God, and to set forth God as man, in virtue of the one and unchangeable movement of the will.[1] Love is the final goal of all good; for it leads those who love to God, the highest good, and the source of all good, and unites them with Him. Faith is the foundation; Hope is the mediation: but Love is the fulfilment, for it embraces, in its entirety, the final desirable object with the entire force of its nature. Hence, also, it suspends the action of, and gives rest to, faith and love, in the enjoyment of the good, which, through it, is present to the soul. It is the prime, the choice good, to him who possesses it; for by it God and men are united, and its effect is to give the Creator of men the appearance of a man, in that it deifies man, and, so far as is possible, communicates to man the unchangeableness of God. Through God, he holds, we are to become God—by means, namely, of the *αὐτεξούσιον*. The mere capacity of choice he regards as an imperfect stage of freedom: the true and perfect form of freedom, on the contrary, is realized in him who preserves untouched that capability of good which is itself a kind of participation in the divine substance, and, by rejecting or repelling the possible opposite, makes sure the substantial good already possessed, and transforms it into proper Christian virtue. Such expressions occur frequently in his writings; but they have rather a soteriological and anthropological, than a Christological bearing. Still, they are not without significance, even in relation to Christology. With their ethical character, these thoughts only needed to be developed, and the idea of the God-man would have been seen to be the necessary, common goal, both of the descending divine and of the ascending human love—the marriage (*γάμος*) (to use a favourite expression of the later Greek Mysticism) of God and humanity; though this necessity might undoubtedly have been set forth in a form which would have led to such an universalization of the incarnation, as to allow little or nothing that is distinctive to the Person of the historical Christ. In fact, he does touch upon the idea of an universal incarnation of God as the goal of humanity, and draws an analogy between the deification of Christians and the Godmanhood of Christ, saying,[2]—The fulness of the Godhead,

[1] CC. Capita Theologica et œconomica, i. 517, §§ 27–29. [2] i. 489.

which was in Christ by nature, is in Christians by grace,—so far, namely, as their nature is capable of receiving it. So, also, when he describes the process of deification as a corporealization of the Logos (*σωματοῦσθαι*), through the medium of practical virtues, saying,—Man thus, on account of his love to God, becomes God for God, and God, on account of His love to man, becomes man for man. A beautiful interaction thus takes place between God and man—God becoming man by the deification of man, and man becoming God by the humanification of God. He conceived, also, that the will of the Logos and of God was to realize the mystery of His corporealization in all. In proportion as man deified himself for God by his love, God, through His love for men, became a man for men; and so far as man, by his virtues, reveals the essentially invisible God, in so far is he spiritually initiated into the knowledge of the invisible.[1] He says further,[2]—Christ is continually, and of His own will, mystically born, for He is made flesh in and through the redeemed; and He constitutes the parturient soul the virgin mother.—The Logos became the Son of man, in order that He might make men gods and sons of God; and His purpose will be actually accomplished there, where Christ now is, as the Head of the whole body, as the "forerunner" to the Father on our behalf, and on behalf of that which is to be realized with us. For, in the assembly of the gods, of the redeemed, God will stand in the very midst.

Such passages show us plainly that Maximus attributed to Christ an universal significance; though, strictly taken, it was the Logos alone to whom this significance pertained. What part the historical Christ takes in such a general process of deification is hard to say, especially when we bear in mind the position Maximus assigns to freedom. He represents the Logos as continually becoming flesh in manifold ways; for he says, everything is a symbol of God, and momentarily, or in one aspect, brings God to view: this is especially the case with

[1] Maximus does not separate volition from knowledge: the extent of our love is the extent of our knowledge. With Clemens Alexandrinus, he terms the will *νοῦν ὀρεκτικόν*. Mansi x. 733.

[2] Expos. in Orat. Domin. i. 354;—*ἀεὶ—θέλων γεννᾶται Χριστὸς μυστικῶς, διὰ τῶν σωζομένων σαρκούμενος, καὶ μητέρα παρθένον ἀπεργαζόμενος τὴν γεννῶσαν ψυχήν*. CC. Capita Theol. et accon. i. 490.

public worship. Not in Christ alone does he consider the Logos to have been made flesh, but in the word of the Holy Scriptures also. The mustard-seed of the Gospel denotes primarily God's word, in which also is divine power; nay more, the mustard-seed is the Lord Himself, spiritually sown in the heart by faith. Whoso carefully tends this mustard-seed by his virtues, on him shall the divine powers descend as on wings (i. 486). The Logos, therefore, continually becomes flesh; and that not merely through being born afresh in us, but also when the inner man expresses and manifests itself in virtues.[1] This continuous descent of the Logos of God into Christians is conditioned by their will. To the work of Christ special attention is not directed; as the God-*man*, he holds Christ to be the precursor in this mystical process (πρόδρομος, i. 490); but as the Logos, or as confounded with the Logos, He is the cause of our deification. He teaches, further, that the human will must ascend by different stages. It must not continue to cling to the outward, which is mere flesh, and useless; nor to the manifold variety of mundane objects, although they do symbolize God; nor to the letter of Scripture; nor to the flesh of Christ. True love and knowledge unite to seek a resting-point beyond all that is created, beyond even the humanity of Christ: their final goal is the pure and naked (γυμνὸς) Logos, as He existed prior to the incarnation and the creation (Note 48). It is clear that, in the last instance, Christ is hereby reduced to the position of a mere theophany, and that the historical significance of His Person is destroyed. The same thing appears also from his application to the professedly highest stage, of the words,—"Even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now know we Him no longer." So far was he from attributing eternal significance to the God-man, that he regarded the humanity of Christ rather in the light of an hindrance to the full knowledge and love of the pure God,—an hindrance which must be surmounted by those who aim to reach the highest stage.

This is the point at which a connection still continued to exist between the system of Maximus and the negative theology of the Areopagite,—to the disadvantage of the former. He departs from the principles of Dionysius, in an anthropo-

[1] See above, i. 354, 493.

logical respect, when giving expression to his moral and religious convictions. By asserting the existence of a freedom which attains to perfection in God, he hoped to be able to posit a real world—a world which, being filled full of God, and thus, in a manner, endowed with independence, must oppose resistance to the reabsorption of the world into God. But, in a theological respect, he was unable to rise above the theoretical principle of the absolute transcendence, infinitude, and incomprehensibleness of God, notwithstanding that the yearnings of his love required him to do so. Ever again does he seem to regard incomprehensible majesty, essential incommunicableness, as the absolutely divine, the absolutely highest good; and the consequence thereof is, that love is congruous rather to man than to God. Man thus falls into the contradiction of being drawn by love towards a God who cannot confirm his love by returning it, but, in strict consequence, can only absorb it. Another no less certain consequence is, that the Most High God cannot become incarnate; for it is only a subordinate element in God that is communicable. He who is truly wise and loving ought, therefore, to know that that which is highest in God is incommunicable. By such a conception of God, Christology was threatened with Docetism, and on grounds similar to those which involved Gnosticism therein. Nor does Maximus make any secret of this fact; for he says, "Even in the incarnation God continued super-essential."[1] And, indeed, in laying down such a principle, he did but put the finishing stroke to the doctrine of the Church, in the form which he himself had helped to fix.

Thus God is also *veiled* by the God-man (not merely by the earthly man); revealed only in part, that is, symbolically. Of that incarnation, which, being essentially a theophany, was not limited to Christ, Christ was merely the starting-point, or the historical centre. God so far revealed Himself in Christ (as, indeed, in general, in the symbols of Himself) as met the wants of beginners. We see thus, that in the domain of theory the negative theology of the Areopagite was allowed finally to dominate, whether it declared its goal to be the incognisable or the super-incognisable. This theology passes away into a holy twilight,—it is borne aloft on sublimer thoughts, as on clouds, into the transparent ether of mystic vision (i. 498, § 59), and

[1] i. 53, 56.

thus lives a life of inner worship and divine service. And as the symbolical cultus of the Church properly moves in an holy, dusky light of this kind, the mystical mind feels itself there truly at home. If there is any difference between the Pseudo-Areopagite and Maximus, it is that the former designates the transcendent divine light also divine darkness (θεῖος γνόφος); whereas Maximus guards against sinking into this abyss of God by the interposition of an ethical barrier. Man participates in the divine to the extent to which his nature lays hold of it: hence the element of Mysticism in Maximus is, without doubt, most accurately described by the expression, holy twilight. According to him, the world in general holds to God the relation of an element, in which He symbolically delineates His ideas or words. He regards God, at the same time, as the primal reality,—as that in which all being subsists, or as the ὑπόστασις and formative principle of all things. The visible transitory world is a mere imperfect symbol of God; more perfectly, but still not perfectly, can God express Himself in man, who is imperishable, and who through his will can become the image of God (Note 49).

Notwithstanding the high esteem in which Maximus was held in the West, its teachers laid bare much more distinctly the real, though hidden, incompatibility both of his views and of those of the Areopagite with the Christology of the Church,—as we shall see in the case of Scotus Erigena. In the West, Mysticism assumed a more rigidly speculative form, and was less qualified and supplemented by a practical religious tendency. The tendency to practical religious Mysticism manifested itself there first at a later period,—specially after the appearance of the two St Victors. In the West, moreover, the cultus of the Church was not its home and vital element, as in the case of Maximus and the Areopagite; but its movements were freer, and it began at once to develop a predominantly subjective and inward character.

In the latest period of the Greek Church, however, that mystical vein of Maximus,—whose characteristic feature was the union of the religious and speculative; and, again, of these two aspects of Mysticism with the faith, and especially with the cultus, of the Church,—was not yet exhausted. Remarkable, and not till recent times duly appreciated, vouchers of this

fact, are the Hesychastic Controversy of the years 1341 to 1350, and the Mysticism of Nicolaus Cabasilas, who flourished subsequently to 1350.[1] It is the more important to dwell on these two phenomena, because they give characteristic expression to the conception formed of God by the ancient Greek Church, and because that conception was at the same time confronted with the one held by the Latin Church.

The importance of the Hesychastic Controversy cannot be justly estimated, unless viewed in connection with the views of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite. As we have seen, he defined God to be both the Many-named and the All-active, and the Nameless. At first, therefore, God appears as the Approachable, the Communicable; but afterwards, no less, or even more truly, as the absolutely Transcendent and Unapproachable One: and the true knowledge of Him is ignorance,—is the suspension of discourse and thought,—is the silence of deep awe in the presence of that transcendent light, which veils itself from us in gloom. This holy awe of the mind which knows God in ignorance, is most appropriately expressed in devotion to the sacred cultus of the Church, whose symbolical usages are characterized by the same amphiboly,—giving, on the one hand, an impression of the Divine presence, and, on the other hand, covering it with a veil.

But the negative (*ἀποφατικὸς*) theology denied what the affirmative (*καταφατικὸς*) theology posited. God cannot, it maintains, be the cause of the world; because that would be contrary to His infinite nature: yet, on the other hand, the empirical, nay more, the religious view of things, requires us to acknowledge God to be actually the first cause; and, consequently, involves the denial of the principles of the negative theology. To continue in a dualistic suspense of this kind, was impossible, save to a mixture of speculative or metaphysical thought, and of religion, which seriously cared neither for the negative nor the affirmative theology. Following the example set them by Maximus, the Hesychasts, instead of applying the opposed principles of these two theologies to one and the same subject, applied them to different subjects. They

[1] Gass, passim: compare Engelhardt's "Die Arsenianer und Hesychiasten," in Illgen's "Zeitschrift für historische Theologie," Th. viii. pp. 48–135.

considered the negative principles to hold perfectly good as applied to the domain of the divine essence; for it is absolutely simple, transcendent, unapproachable. God, however, is not merely essence, but also energy or causality. As to the former aspect, He remains eternally unapproachable, unknown; but the latter is by no means a mere movement or act, still less a mere created world,—it is the periphery around the divine centre; it is a divine world of the second rank; it is a glory around God's essence, charged with real forces of the divine light, which have not been produced, but eternally emanate from God.[1] By means of a mystical calm and silence, we attain to the blessed and transfigurative vision of this unbegotten light. So Palamas, the spokesman of the monks of Mount Athos. This light works as a purifying and perfecting element, communicating itself to pious souls that have attained to *ἀπάθεια*. In this way a compromise is effected between two principles equally certain,—that of the absolute incommunicableness of the divine essence, and that of the communicableness of divine powers. We shall find something similar in Thomas Aquinas. So much, however, is clear, that a Christology developed logically from such premises could scarcely end otherwise than in Subordinatianism, although with an emanatistic colouring. The Logos would have been converted into the centre of unity of that secondary divine world of lucific forces. And, as a matter of fact, the Greek Church, by allowing the conception of God which lay at the basis of this system to pass at several Synods, unintentionally showed (what was clear also from its rejection of the "Filioque") that it had not yet altogether thrown off the yoke of Subordinatianism. Moreover, it can scarcely be denied that the renunciation of all pretence to a knowledge of the most high and true God, on the part of the Hesychasts, and their claim to hold intercourse with the lucific powers, that is, with the divided deities of the second rank, is proof enough in itself of a commencing return to heathenism; not to mention that their view of the process of redemption and of purification was not

[1] They also hypostatize these powers of the light-world, and thus evince an affinity with the Gnostic Pleroma, with the doctrine of the δόξα of God, and with emanistically tinged Angelologies. We may see also therein, the after-influence of the heavenly hierarchy of the Areopagite, and the expression of the ideal world in a more realistic form.

Christian, but partially negative and ascetical, and partially physical in its character (Note 50).

The Hesychasts, with Palamas at their head, set themselves in opposition to Barlaam and Acyndinos, who were called the Latin-minded (λατεινόφρονες); though they were abetted also by Nicephorus Gregoras and others. On the other hand, the Hesychasts, or at all events their main thesis, were defended by Nicolaus Cabasilas, Bishop of Thessalonia, and by Marcus Eugenicus, Archbishop of Ephesus.

The Latinizers controverted the distinction made by the Hesychasts between essence and activity; but discriminated the more carefully between the activity and the result of the activity. To assume the existence of activities side by side with the essence, would be, says Nicephorus, to posit an accident in God Himself. But a true conception of God can never be arrived at, until we have shut out every kind of division from the divine essence. In God there is no being (Sein) which is not also activity, act (actus); and, *vice versâ*, there can be no activity in God in which His essence is not present. If we assumed an operation without an essence, we should have no operative subject: the operation would be a subsequent addition to the essence, and would supplement a previous lack in the essence; which would be incompatible, both with the divine unity and simplicity, and with the conception of God as the Good. For the Good cannot be conceived save as freely expressing itself in action. From this follows the Christological conclusion, that where the divine activity is, there also inseparably, is the divine essence; and as God works also in believers, and even in nature, He must be conceived to be universally present, not merely as to His operations, but also as to His substance. It remained, therefore, for the advocates of this view to discriminate by some means the presence of the divine essence in Christ, from the presence of His activity in other beings.[1] So far as is known, the opponents of the Hesychasts did nothing towards the solution of the problem. The spokesmen of the Hesychasts, on the other hand, drew conclusions such as,—If the divine activity is absolutely inseparable from the divine essence, God's activity is as eternal as His essence;

[1] In an exactly similar position is the orthodox theology of the Lutheran Church; for example, as set forth by Calov.

and then we must either adopt Origen's doctrine of an eternal creation, or teach that the Trinity was the production of the divine activity, instead of that the Son was generated, and that the Spirit proceeded from God. If, further, Having (das Haben) and Being (das Sein) are absolutely one in God, we either know Him solely in His essence, or we cannot know Him at all: whereas, we really know Him in His activity, and not in His essence. As God's essence is absolutely simple, whilst His operations are manifold, it is impossible to cognise His operations relatively to their ground in Himself, if, instead of assuming a plurality of divine activities, we identify them with the one substance of God. Cabasilas, therefore, distinguished between the participable (μεθεκτὸν) and the incommunicable in God: the latter being the inmost part of God, His centre, His proper essence and being; and the former, God's property or possession, which, being a possession, can be communicated.[1] Nicephorus repudiated such a distinction in God, designating it ante-Christian. God's essence, he remarks, is at once incommunicable and communicable. On the one hand, God is and dwells entirely in Himself, is self-contained; and yet, on the other hand, He exists entirely and essentially for that which is other than Himself, and is active, without therefore becoming divisible or sacrificing Himself to individuals. He reproached the Palamites with the double error of representing the activity of God, which they conceived to be the communicable element in God, as losing itself, without self-assertion, in that to which it communicates itself; and of robbing the incommunicable in God of that content which constitutes its fulness and vitality;—the divine essence thus retained, being merely a self-assertant void.

We see that in this interesting controversy efforts were made on both sides to interweave the affirmative and the negative theologies; the Hesychasts dividing, as it were, God's very essence into a Holy and a Holiest of All, and referring the affirmative theology to the former, and the negative to the latter. Such a division of spheres,—introducing, as it does, a subordination of the living Pleroma of God, under the empty (for empty it remains) divine essence,—was justly regarded by

[1] Thomas Aquinas also makes this distinction; and it is the presupposition of the Lutheran Christology, which regards attributes or determinations of God as communicable without the essence,

Nicephorus and the Latins as a remainder of the ante-Christian conception of God, and accordingly rejected; but they themselves did not advance any further than simply to *postulate*, that God must be held to be, as to His entire essence, in Himself, and for Himself, and yet, at the same time, to exist for beings other than Himself. The reconciliation of this apparent contradiction, and the word of the enigma, is Spirit. Spirit, and spirit alone, is actually self-contained; and yet, whilst constantly asserting itself, and returning upon itself, it is at the same time universal, and wills to be for others. Or, more precisely, the ethical, which is the true essence of spirit, is alone capable of rising above that antagonism between an incommunicable self-retentive nature and a communicable nature, between the Jewish and the heathenish conception of God (*a*). The truly ethical unites within itself righteousness and goodness, justice and mercy (self-assertion and self-communication); and there is no love where either the one or the other is absent. A love, which in giving does not assert and maintain itself, is emanation, is a merely physical outflow: and beyond this view of love, the Greek theology does not essentially advance, so far as it deals with the operations of grace. On the other hand, a mere guarding of limits, a mere self-assertion without communication, may be justice; but it lacks the free power, and not only the desire, to dispose of its own fulness without the loss of itself. No true conception of God is arrived at until both moments intimately interpenetrate and combine. The opponents of the Hesychasts did no more than declare them in words to be united; though, as must be acknowledged, they did thus keep the problem in view.

Cabasilas, indeed, put the light-theory of these Mystics in the background, and that, unquestionably, because he felt that it assigned to the Church and to historical Christianity too uncertain a position; but, on the other hand, he clung firmly to the distinction drawn by them between the essence and the energy of God, and made use of it in connection with the system of Church-life, representing the sacred rites of the Church, especially the sacraments, as endowed by that divine element of the second rank, with virtues to renew, to strengthen, and to perfect. All this, however, he tries to connect with the

(*a*) See Note K. App. ii.

Person of Christ. Christ is, in his view, the resting-place (*κατάλυμα*) of those human yearnings which are directed to the future highest good, He is the luxuriant pasture-ground of the thoughts; in Him the eternal good is incorporated with time. He retains and employs the traditional doctrine of the two natures and the double will, with the difference, that, like the Areopagite and Maximus, he conceives the Logos to have been super-essential even in the incarnation, and the humanity of Christ to have been superhuman and deified, notwithstanding its being of like substance with us. But the firm outlines of the humanity of Christ perceptibly fade away into the Logos during the process of deification; and, in the main, the only significance Cabasilas attaches to it, is that of marking the precise point at which the divine principle was actually and historically implanted into humanity. When following his own bent, therefore, he dwells exclusively on the sphere in which Christ manifests Himself as this divine power incorporated with the historical organism of humanity—the sphere, namely, of the Church and its sacraments, which are the instruments and channels of the life which streams forth from Christ to us, and which operate of themselves upon every one, even though he should be but passively open to their influence. Holy *Baptism* is, primarily, the generation of the new life which is in Christ; but it is also enlightenment. The triple invocation typifies the theological aspect; the submersion and re-elevation typify the economical aspect: the latter type being in the language of act, drastic, inasmuch as we are called upon to follow Christ. Strictly speaking, everything was accomplished by the death and resurrection of Christ; and all that is now required, is the transference to us of the virtue of the bath founded by Him and through His merits. Nay more, not merely gifts and light, but also power of vision and power of breath, stream forth to us from the one fount.—The *Anointing* (*μύρον*), which is his second sacrament, denotes symbolically the consecration of human nature, primarily as effected in Christ, by which it was ennobled and rendered capable of receiving the divine nature But, at the same time, the human vessel of Christ, with its contents, is incorporated with humanity as a principle of consecration, and continues to operate in the sacrament of anointing. It is especially the holy *Eucharist*, however, in which, to his mind,

the mystic solemnity reaches its climax. The imprinting of the divine image in baptism, the infusion of spirit by the anointing, are but preparatory steps to the perfection of human nature in its entirety—a perfection wrought by the divine-human nature present in the holy Eucharist. That which was done for human nature in Christ, is constantly done by this sacrament for the individual man. From the description given of that which is experienced by those who partake of the Eucharist, we may judge what sort of an image of the union of God with humanity would have been presented by these Mystics, had they expressed themselves, independently of the traditional Christological formulas. Appropriating Christ in this feast, we enter into a blood-relationship with God and Christ; and Christ celebrates His spiritual marriage (γάμος) with the Church, His bride. Its effects extend to the whole man. Christ's entire being, even His physical organism, was deified and became a higher nature: such, also, is the effect of the holy Eucharist on individual men. This action of its divine physis, which mingles itself with, pours itself into, and so transforms, our organism; that, in comparison with our relationship to Christ, the relationship to our earthly parents vanishes,—nay more, which brings Christ nearer to us than we are to ourselves,—is its first and prime action, overcoming in us the impurity which draws us to sin, and enabling the spirit of man freely to move its pinions in accordance with its own nature.[1] The distinctive feature of Cabasilas, therefore, is a natural Mysticism, sacramentally treated and viewed, by means of which he supposed the human substance to be united, yea, mixed, with the substance of Christ; and, on the basis thereof, he endeavoured to show that the humanity of Christ, as well as the pure divine light, or the naked Logos, stood in an important

[1] Compare Gass l. c. 143 ff. In accordance with the principle, that a cause must be homogeneous with its effect,—a principle which plays a great rôle in the history of the dogma of the holy Eucharist,—we may draw conclusions, as to the Christological image tacitly recognised by these teachers, from the above description of the effects of the Eucharist on its recipients; especially as Cabasilas considered Christ's Person, particularly His body and blood, to constitute the objective element in that sacrament. Gass must be allowed to be right, when he says (p. 145): Eutychian principles, which were disallowed in connection with Christology, were applied without hesitation to the operations of the holy Eucharist.

relation to the accomplishment of redemption. Not the Logos in Himself, but the Logos in union with human nature—His divine-human substance, in which the human is superhuman and commingled with the divine—is the vital essence, which, when received into our organism, ennobles it, and transforms it into its own substance.[1] As regards the spiritual aspect, Cabasilas undoubtedly failed to show that the freedom of the will, on which he lays great stress, was really compatible with the action of grace, as he represented it. This is evident from his physical doctrine of the sacraments. Grace and freedom he represents as alternating; and is not quite free from the notion, that each by itself, apart from the other, is able to conduct man to perfection.[2] Still, his system contains also another idea, by means of which he endeavoured to neutralize the principle of the exclusive antagonism between grace and freedom, elsewhere laid down by him,—and that, both as regards the divine and the human aspect. Through this idea, he anticipated being able to surmount, and reconcile, that antagonism between necessity and freedom which had been implicitly, if not explicitly, introduced into God Himself, by the distinction drawn between the divine essence and the divine operations. It appeared fitted, finally, to clear the way for a spiritual action of the holy Eucharist, and to form the starting-point of a peculiar Christology.

This idea is his doctrine of the φίλτρον, of the magical power of divine love. Self-renunciation is the property of love. By it, he who loves passes out of himself (ἐξιστάναι), and bestows himself on, in order to exist solely for, the object of his love. This spell of love the Bridegroom throws like a dart into the heart, a ray of His beauty.[3] "He wounds souls; and the greatness of the wound, and the longing of the soul, point to Him who wounds, who draws the soul, in a holy ecstasis of love, out of itself and into Himself,—carried away by the might of love, and yet at the same time free. But this love is likewise a power in God Himself, which draws Him forth

[1] Περὶ τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ ζωῆς, lib. iv. § 55. Ὁ γὰρ τῆς ζωῆς ἄρτος αὐτὸς κινεῖ τὸν σιτούμενον, καὶ μεθίστησι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μεταβάλλει, p. 95. Christ is the Head and the Heart of the Church, His body.

[2] Compare lib. vii. §§ 111, 112, p. 196.

[3] Lib. ii. §§ 132, 133, p. 56 f.

from His loftiness, incommunicableness, and impassibility, and compels Him, as even Dionysius hinted,[1] to pass out of Himself, and to empty Himself, as it were, in an ecstasis of love.[2] He does not continue in His own sphere, and call to Himself the servant whom He loves; but He Himself descends in search of the servant, approaches near, lets His loving yearnings be seen, and seeks what is like Himself. From those who despise Him He does not depart: with the defiant He is not angry; but follows them to their very doors, and does and bears everything, and even dies, in order to demonstrate His love.[3] But much as this may be, we have not yet declared the highest: not merely does the Lord enter to such an extent into fellowship with His servants, and extend to them His hand; but He has given Himself entirely to us, so that we are temples of the living God, and these members of ours are the members of Christ. The Head of these members is worshipped by cherubim; and these hands and feet are joined to that heart."

In his view, therefore, Christ is the present God, who, though nothing was left in His possession save love, by its beauty, by its irresistible charms, overcame the world. First of all, however, He overcame, as it were, in Himself His own extra-mundane glory and loftiness, in order that He might be nearer to those whom He wins and blesses than they are even to themselves; nay more, in order that He might become their other self. Now, although it is almost, as it were, by sheer violence that this fervid Christian conception of God is put in the place of the abstract infinite being recognised by ancient speculation, it cannot be denied that he approximates towards the view of this love of God, not as an isolated or momentary movement—not as a causal act put forth once for all, to which, amongst other things, the above-mentioned infinite divine essence had opened itself,—but as the proper being and the true

[1] De divinis nominibus, c. iv. § 13 f.

[2] Lib. vi. § 16: Καθάπερ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἐρῶντας ἐξίστησι τὸ φίλτρον, ὅταν ὑπερβάλλῃ καὶ κρεῖσσον γένηται τῶν δεξαμένων, τὸν ἴσον τρόπον ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔρως τὸν Θεὸν ἐκένωσεν. §§ 18, 19: ἔδει δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν σφόδρα φιλῶν, ἀλλᾷ τῆς μεγίστης ἀγάπης δοῦναι πεῖραν ἡμῖν, καὶ δεῖξαι τὸν ἔσχατον ἐρῶν ἔρωτα. Ταύτην μηχανᾶται τὴν κένωσιν, καὶ πραγματεύεται καὶ ποιεῖ δι' ὧν οἷός τε γένοιτ' ἂν δεινὰ παθεῖν καὶ ὀδυνηθῆναι. Pp. 135, 136.

[3] Cf. vi. 19–24, §§ 99 ff.

life of God. So, at all events, does he represent the life of love led by Christians.[1]

But, even in relation to God Himself, he saw that it is essential to the nature of the good to communicate itself, in order to draw the good in turn to itself. This is clear from the doctrine, advanced by him with equal beauty and confidence,[2] that not only the human race was, from the beginning, created with an eye to the God-man, and destined to be united with Him, but also the God-man for humanity.

"Ye are not your own, for ye are bought with a price," says Paul: for the sake of the new man was the nature of man created from the beginning; intelligence and appetency were prepared and bestowed with a view to him; we received reason that we might know Christ,—desire, that we might hasten towards Him,—memory, that we might carry Him with us; for He was the prototype after which we were created. It is not the old Adam who is the pattern for the new, but the new Adam who was the pattern for the old. If, as is written, the new was made in the likeness of the old, the reason thereof was simply that He might remove the sickness of our nature by His medicine, and that mortality might be swallowed by life. The elder Adam was a copy of the second,—was formed after His idea and image. Human nature strove after immortality, it is true, from the commencement; but attained it first through the body of the Redeemer, which He raised from the dead to immortal life,—thus becoming the Captain of immortality to the race. To sum up all in one word,—the Saviour for the first time exhibited the true and perfect man, both as relates to character, life, and everything else. If, then, this be in truth the idea and destiny of man, beholding which, God created him as the end and crown of all creation,—to wit, a life of purity, free from change and sin; if, further, the one, the first Adam, fell far short of realizing perfection; whereas the

[1] Cf. vii. §§ 164–167.

[2] Lib. vi. §§ 132–139. P. 166, § 132: *Καὶ γὰρ διὰ τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου φύσις συνέστη τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ νοῦς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ἐκεῖνον κατεσκευάσθη.—Οὐ γὰρ ὁ παλαιὸς τοῦ καινοῦ ἀλλ' ὁ νέος Ἀδὰμ τοῦ παλαιοῦ παράδειγμα.* P. 167, § 133: *ὁ πρεσβύτερος τοῦ δευτέρου μίμημα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν ἐκείνου καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα πέπλασται.* § 135: *καὶ ἵνα τὸ πᾶν εἴπω, τὸν ἀληθινὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τέλειον καὶ τρόπων καὶ ζωῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕνεκα πάντων πρῶτος καὶ μόνος ἔδειξεν ὁ σωτήρ.*

other Adam, being Himself perfect in all points, communicated His perfection to men, and harmoniously prepared the whole race for Himself; why should we not say that He who came later was the pattern for the earlier,—that the later was the archetype, the earlier, the antitype? The primal norm (*κανὼν*) of all things is the last man,—not he who proceeded last forth from the earth, but He—namely, Christ—to whom man is drawn by nature, by will, and by thought. And not merely for the sake of the deity, but also for the sake of other nature (der andern Natur), is this Christ the resting-place of all human love, the bliss of thoughts (*κατάλυμα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐρώτων, τρυφὴ λογισμῶν*).[1]

The survey just taken shows that Cabasilas involuntarily became faithless to the doctrine regarding God first laid down by him, and which resembled that of the Hesychasts; for when, in obedience to his mystical tendency, he revels in the thought of the divine life of love, and clearly enough conceives God Himself as love, he entirely quits his hold on the doctrine that the divine essence is not contained in the divine activity, but that the highest in God rather remains eternally incommunicable. That in which the spirit finds its eternal resting-place, and its own perfection, he regards as the highest good; and that, not merely in relation to man, but in itself and in relation to the universe. Of this his Christology furnishes the proof. The sacramental Mysticism of Cabasilas is, though in a form not very scholastic, really an attempt to combine subjective personal with objective Church piety; and so far he bears most resemblance to Thomas Aquinas. First, when the Byzantine Empire approached its downfall, and Greek theology, which was already showing signs of decay, had no longer any firm ecclesiastical support, do we find Greek Mysticism losing the, as it were, liturgical character which it once possessed, and assuming (partly owing to contact with the West), especially in Italy, a form similar to that given to it by men like the Areopagite, and even by Scotus Erigena. In such men as Georgius Gemistius, surnamed Pletho,[2] Bessarion, the author of Hermes

[1] Lib. vi. § 139. He goes on to say: *οὐ γάρ ἐστιν, οὗ μὴ πάρεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν, ὅπως μὴ σύνεστιν ἡμῖν, ἅσσα τοῖς ζητοῦσι καὶ αὐτῆς ἐγγίων ἐστὶ τῆς καρδίας.* Lib. vi. § 140, p. 168.

[2] Compare Gass' "Gennadius und Pletho, Aristotelismus und Platonismus, in der griechischen Kirche," 1844, pp. 24–98.

Trismegistus, who gained many adherents amongst the Italians, Marcilius Ficinus, the elder Count Pico of Mirandola, Greek science passed into a species of Neoplatonic theosophy, destitute, in many respects, not merely of an ecclesiastical, but even of a Christian character. For the Christian cultus, they substituted a cultus of the beautiful and of science; and, intoxicated with delight, found the Gospel in the philosophy of Plato. Then it became evident that the ingenious fabric of theological conceptions reared by the Greek Church had no longer an inner foundation in the intellect of the age. On the contrary, no sooner did tradition lose its authority, and the Church its prestige and position, than the fabric fell to pieces; and out of the ruins arose a spirit, which, as though there had been no intervening history, took its stand in the field of the ancient heathen philosophy, made the attempt to bring back the gods of Greece, and set itself to luxuriate in the brightness of their beauty, in the fulness of their wisdom. It does not lie within our plan to follow this subject further into detail: one observation, however, we may make, namely, that, as the Middle Ages drew to a close, the two streams of Mysticism—the Oriental and the Occidental—manifested a tendency to union (the cultures of the two regions tended, also, towards a union in the persons of other men), and were partially united in the person of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, Bishop of Brixen, one of the most eminent men of the fifteenth century. Led by his Fates to Greece, he there endeavoured to bring about the union of the Greek and Latin Churches,—an object which he regarded as the dearest in his life. Returning from that country by sea, he informs us that his mind was lifted up, as by enlightenment from above, to the intuition of God as the Most High, who unites in Himself and reconciles all antagonisms,—an intuition which forms the central feature of the system whose Christological aspect will subsequently occupy our attention, and which exercised so important an influence on Giordano Bruno.[1]

[1] Compare Scharpff's "Der Kardinal und Bischof Nikolaus von Cusa," I. Theil, Mainz, 1843; F. J. Clemens' "Giordano Bruno und Nikolaus von Cusa," 1847; Moritz Carriere's "Die Philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit in ihren Beziehungen zur Gegenwart," 1847, pp. 16–25, 365 ff.

CHAPTER THIRD.

ADOPTIANISM AND THE COUNCIL OF FRANKFORT, A.D. 794.

FEW phenomena in the history of dogmas have been so variously judged, or present greater difficulties, than Adoptianism. By contemporaries, it was identified with principles commonly *held to be* Nestorian; by those who followed after, and who were capable of discriminating Nestorianism in its actual historical form from the vulgar notions of Nestorianism, it was at all events mixed up therewith. Others, especially Walch,* consider the difference between it and the orthodox doctrine to have consisted more in form than in substance; or regard it as a logical following out of principles sanctioned by the Church, by which the inner inconsistencies of the orthodox system had been irresistibly dragged into the light. Others, again, look on the controversy more in the light of a first exercise of subtlety and ingenuity on the part of the awakening intellect of the barbarian nations.

At the very outset, it must be assumed to be utterly improbable, that so important a contest should have been a mere revival of long-forgotten disputes. The most eminent men in the Church of that period measured weapons with each other in connection with this question. On the one side was ranged by far the larger portion of the Spanish Church, with its head Elipantus, Archbishop of Toledo, who took his stand on old traditions, and with Felix of Urgellis, who was the chief representative of Adoptianism, and exhibited unusual acuteness, culture, and acquaintance with the writings of the Fathers. On the other side we find Alcuin, teacher and friend of Charlemagne; the Asturian Bishops, Beatus and Etherius; Paulinus of Aquileia, Agobard of Lyons; with all the men from the German, Frankish, Italian, and British Churches, who had occupied themselves with this matter at the Councils of Ratisbon (in the year 792), Frankfort, Rome (in 799), and

* Ch. W. F. Walch, author of the "Entwurf einer vollständ. Historie der Ketzereien," and other works on Church History, published during the last century.—TR.

Aix-la-Chapelle (in 800). There is unquestionably a resemblance between Adoptianism and some earlier phenomena,—especially between it and the actual historical form of Nestorianism. Nor, certainly, did the keen attention devoted by the Church, not merely to Nestorius, but also to Theodore of Mopsuestia, in the Three-Chapter Controversy, and especially at the Council held in the year 553, fail to help on the revival of the ideas of the school of Antioch. The spirit of persecution did not shrink from uttering its anathemas even over the ashes and works of men who had died at peace with the Church; and the consequence thereof was, that many of their thoughts were scattered like seed far and wide, and, falling into fit soil, brought forth appropriate fruit. This was especially the case with such districts as North Africa and Spain, which were farther removed from the influence and authority of the Byzantine Court than others. But Adoptianism must not, on this ground, be regarded as a kind of straggler, which had lagged behind in some remote part of the advancing host of the Church. It was neither an unvanquished remainder of the ancient Nestorianism, nor an old heresy revived by those who were ignorant of what had gone before. We know enough of the Spanish Church to be able to affirm that it did not constitute a Western counterpart to the Christians of Chaldæa, but stood in active intercourse with the rest of the West, and with North Africa; and that, notwithstanding all its peculiarities, and the independence of its spirit, it fostered a continuous fellowship with the Romish Church. We know also that, in its numerous Councils, particularly in that of Toledo, it displayed a theological and dogmatical life, which favourably distinguished it during the seventh and eighth centuries; and that, in the course of many external and internal struggles, it succeeded in developing a kind of established national character, principally under the leadership of the Archbishops of Toledo. The main point, however, is, that notwithstanding the similarity between the mental tendencies at work in it and Nestorianism, Adoptianism had a peculiar distinctive character, and that in virtue thereof it brought its influence to bear on the problem in the precise form in which it was presented in the eighth century, but not as it was presented at the time of Nestorius. If we can succeed in showing this to have been the case, no further

proof will be needed that it was not a mere production of ingenious subtlety.

Nor, on the other hand, can Adoptianism be explained merely from the opposition raised to remaining Arian or Sabellian elements; or from the controversy with the Bonosians in one direction, and that with Migetius in another.[1] We cannot, of course, deny that even the school of Antioch endeavoured to forefend Arian explanations of Scripture, by distinguishing more carefully between the divine and human aspects of the Person of Christ, and by referring the lower predicates to the latter, in order to keep them away from the Son of God. Besides this, neither the opposition raised by them to Arianism, nor that to an Ebionitic view like that of Bonosus, furnished a sufficiently urgent reason for applying the predicate *υἱὸς θετὸς* to the humanity of Christ: they must rather have been influenced by a positive interest in the accurate determination of their own view.

The long-continued struggles with the Arianism of the West Goths in Spain, unquestionably prepared the way, to a certain extent, for this new controversy. Still more did the sects of the Priscillians and the Sabellians (to the latter sect Migetius belonged, who appears to have been controverted and refuted by Elipantus about the year 780), as also Monophysitism, which for a long period had been diffusing itself from Africa throughout Spain, loudly call upon the Church to guard against the reduction of the humanity of Christ to the position of the mere organ of a theophany, and against attributing passibility and mutability to the divine nature. In opposition to Monophysitism, the Spaniards avowed themselves at the Eleventh and Fourteenth Councils of Toledo *Triphysites;* they also raised their voice against Monotheletism. During this latter controversy the Spanish Church evidently accustomed itself, in antagonism to every species of commixture, to give prominence to the distinctions in the Person of Christ. Indeed, we find even as early as the end of the sixth century that a doctrine of the Trinity was formed in a similar spirit; and that, even relatively to that point, the Synod of Toledo took the lead

[1] Bonosus of Sardica, about the year 390, regarded Christ as a mere dopted man. Migetius taught that the Logos became a person in Jesus, he Holy Ghost in Paul, and the Father in David.

of the movement in the Church. In addition to these negative occasions of the rise of Adoptianism, some positive causes may also be adduced: for example, the numerous remaining adherents of the school of Antioch, particularly in North Africa, which had probably acquired strength in the course of their conflicts with the Arianism of the barbarian peoples, and from the countenance afforded them by the Dyotheletic North African Synods previously mentioned. We may no less probably assume that the amalgamation which took place between the early Christian population of Spain and the arianizing Germanic tribes, gave rise to a culture which, even theologically, attached great importance both to precision of thought, and to the idea of the free personality of man.

All these are elements which must be taken into consideration in accounting for the rise of Adoptianism. But how these negative and positive factors came to produce the Christological result presented to us in Adoptianism, can only be completely understood, when we call to mind what stage the dogma of the Person of Christ had reached, prior to its appearance. Adoptianism was not one of those phenomena of Church History which might as easily have made its appearance earlier than it actually did; nor was it a mere repristination of Nestorianism; but it presupposed the problem of Christology to be in that precise position which we have found it then occupying in the Greek Church. The negative and positive factors just alluded to fitted into the Christological results previously arrived at, and relatively to which the Spanish Church had by no means remained ignorant or indifferent. Accordingly, when the problem, in the form in which it presented itself to the mind of the Church after the Dyotheletic Synod of the year 680, was brought into contact with the factors embraced by the Spanish Church, the result was Adoptianism.

Adoptianism, we say, is decidedly discriminated from Nestorianism. Adoptianists made no objection, for example, to the term θεοτόκος; but against the doctrine of the duality of the persons they decidedly protested, not merely as an afterthought, but from the very commencement. Again, from the very beginning they taught that the Logos assumed humanity; but not that Christ owed His exaltation to His virtue, as the Nestorians, and especially Theodore of Mopsuestia, had held. On this

latter subject their language more resembled that which the Church itself might have employed, so long as the state of exaltation had not yet been completely imported into that of humiliation, but a progress from the latter to the former continued to be recognised.[1] The υἱὸς θετὸς of the Antiocheians was undoubtedly also an adopted Son, but this idea did not form the central feature of their system; and they regarded, at all events more strongly than the Adoptianists, the attainment of this rank as the reward of moral desert. As far as concerned Christology, the Nestorians occupied themselves with the sphere of the natures, and only secondarily, nay, even unwillingly, with that of the personality; being in so far opposed to the Monophysites. The Adoptianists, on the other hand, who were not under the necessity of fighting the battle of the duality of the wills and natures for themselves, but found them already recognised by the Church, occupied themselves with the sphere of the personality, whose unity had hitherto been rather taken for granted than made the object of a definite conception. It is worthy of note, moreover, that, as might be anticipated from the character of the peoples which took part in the Adoptianistic Controversy, the term "Person" was now, for the first time, understood to denote the "Ego." Previously, as is clear from the view taken of the ὑπόστασις by John of Damascus, "persona" had denoted predominantly the constitutive principle of existence; or even the συμβεβηκὸς, the accident of the genus, of the common substance; or the existence of the substance in particularity, the particular mode of the existence of the substance. Owing to the vacillation between different views, the Greek writers on Christology were brought, as we have seen, into very great confusion.[2] *

Adoptianists took their stand, consequently, on the previous decisions in favour of two natures and two wills. But at the same time they maintained that, logically, this duality

[1] Compare Alcuini opp., ed. Frobenius, 1777, c. Felic. L. iv. 5, p. 823, v. 1, 2, i. 15; compare Paulini Aq. L. iii., c. Felic. Ven. 1734. Agobard. adv. dogma Felic.

[2] Especially as that was obliged to be in great part retracted in connection with the Trinity which had been posited in connection with Christology:—for example, that the hypostasis is merely a συμβεβηκός of the οὐσία.

* See Note L. App. ii.

ought to be recognised in a sphere which the controversy had not yet touched—in the sphere, namely, of the personality. Not that they had any intention of maintaining the existence of two Egos in Christ,—they were farther therefrom than Theodore of Mopsuestia himself,—but they tried to conceive the one and sane Ego, as pertaining in common to both natures, as that which raised both natures to personality, thus perfecting and fulfilling their idea. In this respect, therefore, Adoptianism was unquestionably the genuine continuation of the course entered upon by the Church when it gave its sanction to Dyophysitism and Dyotheletism,—the course, namely, of refusing to allow anything belonging to the general human nature of Christ to be taken away. They aimed, as it were, at gathering in the harvest of the previous development, and applying it for the behoof of the personality. The "unity of the person," nay, even its undiscriminated unity, had hitherto been presupposed: the chief expression for it was, "the Son." The Son denoted the personality; it expressed the unity of the hypostasis; nay more, it was the protection of the unity against the dismemberment threatened by the duality of the natures. For infinitely and essentially different as are the natures, and, therefore, also the wills, they consoled themselves with the thought,—the Son, to whom pertain the two natures, is one,—He is the Son of God and the Son of man. The dream of having thus sheltered and secured the unity was disturbed by Adoptianism in a no very gentle manner; but yet it made so deep an impression, that from this controversy dated a retrogressive movement in Christology, which substantially paralyzed Dyophysitism and Dyotheletism ever more and more. With the re-assertion of the impersonality of the human nature, Cyrill rose again on the horizon of the Church; and the view (which at that earlier period had been with difficulty turned aside) of the incarnation as the miracle by which the divine was substituted for the human *substance*, leaving to the latter merely its accidents, began at this time to show itself, at all events, in connection with the holy Eucharist, instead of in connection with Christology, the free treatment of which was now no longer allowed by the ancient "Canones" relating thereto. Adoptianism thus constitutes a dividing line in the development of Christology. The tendency towards the assertion of the duality, and towards the development

of its logical consequences, which had hitherto manifested itself afresh, after every struggle, however severe, came to a climax in the Adoptianists, but was also brought to a decisive crisis by their victorious opponents. The first act of the German Councils, imperfect and bungling as it may be considered, was to turn Christological inquiry into a course the opposite of that which it had hitherto pursued,—a course which, consistently followed out, would have led back to the position occupied prior to the Council of Chalcedon.

That the true Son of God, who is of the substance of the Father, was born, and assumed humanity in Christ, no one doubted.[1] But Felix starts from the position, that if two natures, with two wills, were really combined in Christ, so that He was a Double Being, "geminæ substantiæ gigas," it is impossible again so to discuss the unity of His person as to overlook the distinction of the natures; that is, in reality, to treat Christ any longer as though He were one nature, and not two. And yet this is done when not merely the divine nature of Christ, but Christ Himself, is designated in the strict sense (proprie) Son of God, or the proper (proprium) and natural (naturalem) Son of God; for that is to allot the Ego to the divine nature alone, and to deny it to be also the actual crown of the human nature. This latter cannot, any more than the divine nature, be a mere thing. The human nature may not be conceived as absorbed by the divine; for it must be a son, that is, the Son of man, even as the divine nature is the Son of God in virtue of its possessing the very same Ego. Against giving the man Jesus the name, Son of God, on account of his union with the Son of God in the Person of Christ, Felix did not make the least objection. Felix treats him as "nuncupative deus;" and, so far from feeling any difficulty regarding the doctrine of the transference of the titles of the one nature to the other, as taught by the Greek Church, he endeavoured by means of his own theory to establish it on a clearer and firmer basis. But he never relaxes his hold on the opinion, that the Son of man was of a different nature from the Son of God,—that he was, namely, a created being of another substance than the

[1] Lib. iv. 5. "Dei Filius ex deo substantialiter natus essentialiter habuit omnem potestatem cum patre et spiritu sancto." Felix adds, "hæc potestas data est filio virginis."

Deity. Hence the Son of David cannot possibly be styled the Son of God by nature; for the only true and proper natural Son of God is the second person of the Trinity. Whoso denies this, says Felix, ought, in consistency, to believe that the Father produced the humanity of Christ from Himself, even as He produced the eternal Son of God.[1] According to the Scriptures, Christ is the Son of God and the Son of David; but inasmuch as one being can only be the son of one father, how can he who is the Son of David be also, and in the proper sense, the natural Son of God?[2] To carry out the idea of the unity of the person so far as to say that Christ was, in the strict sense, Son of God, not merely as to His divine, but also as to His human, nature, would be to confound God and man, and to leave no distinction between Creator and creature, between Word and flesh, between Him who assumes and that which is assumed.[3] By designating Christ, as to His humanity, strictly and truly God, we do away with that resemblance between Him and believers, which is a source of so great comfort. How can we become members of God, or Christ, according to His deity? Men are not the members, but only the temple, of God. Being reconciled, we become children of God, adopted sons; but the adopted sons must also have an adopted Head (L. ii. 4, 14). As to the glory of His deity, in virtue of which He is in all things like the Father, and unlike every creature, Christ cannot have been in all points like us, sin excepted (exceptâ lege peccati). As to His humanity alone, that is, as to His nature, did He in all things resemble us; in respect to His glory, there is none like, none equal to Him. What more excellent, honourable, and holy gift could have been bestowed by God

[1] Lib. iii. cap. 7. "Nullo modo credendum est, ut omnipotens Deus Pater, qui spiritus est, de semet ipso carnem generet."

[2] Lib. iii. cap. 1, and lib. i. 12. "Christum duos habere patres deum omnipotentem et David regem, et non posse proprium filium duos habere patres."

[3] Lib. iii. 17: "Ita in singularitatem personæ confunditis (geminas in Christo naturas) ut inter deum et hominem, inter carnem et verbum, inter creatorem et creaturam, inter suscipientem et susceptum nullam esse differentiam adstruatis." Lib. ii. cap. 12: "Quodsi idem redemptor noster in carne suâ,—adoptivus apud patrem non est, sed verus et proprius filius, quid superest, nisi ut eadem caro ejus non de massa generis humani, neque de carne Matris sit creata et facta, sed de substantia patris, sicut et divinitatis ejus generata?"

on human nature than that by which His creatures, after their fall, were recognised as reconciled by God? Higher, he thinks, human nature cannot rise than to be adopted into the family of God; and whatever goes beyond that, is a conversion of substance, and consequently involves the annulment of the distinction of the natures. And not only does the nature of the case, but the Scripture also, speak in favour of this doctrine: —the Scriptures term God, the Head of Christ (1 Cor. xi. 3); they speak of His anointment; they say that God was *in Christ;* but never that this man was God. They also style Him our advocate,—an office He could not hold if He were not a man. Christ Himself says,—"No one is good, save the one God;" for God alone is essentially and by nature good: He confessed that He knew not the day of judgment. Moreover, the Evangelists speak of His growth in years, wisdom, and favour; and Paul teaches that He took upon Himself the body of sin, and the form of a servant.[1] At the same time, we must not allow these lowly expressions regarding Christ to make us unmindful of the love and compassion which moved Him to assume human nature. He became a servant for our sake.[2] But if Christ was by nature truly man, and in all things subject to God, what authority have we for saying that this man of the Lord (homo dominicus), from His mother's womb, was, both in His conception and birth, the true God? (iv. 12.) If the man assumed by the Son of

[1] Lib. ii. 13, 14; lib. iii. 3; lib. iv. 9 ff.; lib. v. 3, 4, 7; 8–10; lib. vi. 1–3, 7, 9. In John i. 14, he referred χάρις to the humanity, ἀλήθεια to the deity (vii. 6). Singularly enough, in lib. ii. 19 he draws a distinction between the two genealogies in Matthew and Luke, styling the former, in which the names of heathen women occur, Christ's descent according to the flesh, and that of Luke, in which priests are mentioned, His genealogy according to the Spirit. The adoption of the "caro" appears, therefore, to place Him on the same level with holy men and prophets, and to attribute to Him, in relation to adoption, a dignity higher simply in degree, not in kind.

[2] vi. 1–3, iii. 3. He became "servus conditionalis" by His birth from the Virgin. "Quid potuit ex ancilla nasci, nisi servus?" He was "servus Dei," subjected to God's law (vi. 4), because every creature must serve God either willingly or by constraint. This obedience He rendered, it is true, freely; for He was also "filius adoptivus." He was not called servant because He obeyed, but because He was obliged to obey. He was "per naturam servus Patris et filius ancillæ ejus, non solum per obedientiam." This is the sense of the "servitium conditionale."

God was true and begotten God from the moment of his conception and birth, how could the Lord apply to Himself the Old Testament prophecy regarding the Servant of Jehovah, which represents the Servant of God as being formed from the womb of his mother? (Isa. xlix. 5.) Surely, in the servant's form, he cannot be the true Son of God (vii. 2, 14).

But the Son of God, from the moment of conception, united this man most intimately with Himself, in the unity of His person; so that the Son of man became the Son of God, not by the conversion of human nature, but by an act of grace (dignatione); and the Son of God became like the Son of man, not by a transformation of substance, but in that the latter was constituted a true son, in the Son of God. (Note 51.)

The Son of man may therefore now be designated, "nuncupativè," God; for if, according to the word of the Lord (John x. 35), the Scriptures call those gods to whom the word of God came, although they are not by nature God, but are deified by God's grace, through Him who is the true God, and are styled gods under Him; in the same manner, God's Son, our Lord and Redeemer, although He was glorious and distinguished above all others, occupied, as to His humanity (both in its essence and name), precisely the same position as the rest in regard to everything else,—in regard to predestination, election, grace, and adoption, in regard to the assumption of the name of a servant, and so forth. The reason whereof is, that He who was very God, of one substance with the Father and the Holy Spirit, in the unity of the Godhead, desired to be deified, and to be named with the name of God, by the grace of adoption, in the form of humanity, and in company with His chosen ones.[1] Felix represents the entire majesty (that is, glory) of God as passing over to the Son of man, on the ground of his assumption.

The question now is, whether he held adoption to be the same

[1] C. Felic. iv. 2. Compare Epist. Episcoporum Hispaniæ ad Episcopos Galliæ:—"Credimus deum dei filium sine initio ex patre genitum non adoptione sed genere, neque gratia sed natura." On the other hand, we read: "Hominem Christum non genere filium sed adoptione, neque natura sed gratia;—unigenitum ex patre sine adoptione, primogenitum vero verum hominem assumendo in carnis adoptione, etc. Idem qui essentialiter cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto in unitate deitatis verus est deus, ipse in forma humanitatis cum electis suis per adoptionis gratiam deificatus, fiebat et nuncupative deus."

thing as assumption, or whether he considered adoption to follow later than, and not directly upon, assumption? This question is connected with another,—How could this adopted Son form one person with the Son of God, as is repeatedly maintained?

In answer to the first question, many were tempted to reply that the adoption was nothing else than the assumption. The word "adoptio," they affirmed, was so used by the older Fathers, and probably also in the Mozarabic Liturgy. The whole thing would then be reduced to a dispute about words. But, in the first place, the Adoptianists were accustomed to speak, not of an assumed human nature, but of an assumed man; and further, they took adoption in the sense in which it is used regarding Christians who become thereby children of God. Felix, however, further distinguishes between a fleshly and a spiritual birth of Christ, even as respects His humanity. The latter took place when He was adopted; the former, which must pertain both to the second Adam and to us, when He was born of the Virgin Mary. The flesh born of Mary, was assumed from the moment of the conception; and through it Christ took upon Himself the body of sin, which the prophet Zechariah describes as a "filthy garment."[1] It would be going too far, indeed, to assert that he supposed a veritable sinfulness to have been transferred to Christ, in consequence of His natural birth in our flesh: for Felix decidedly reprobates such a notion.[2] He referred rather to external impurity, mortality, and so forth. His opinion, however, undoubtedly was not that Christ assumed the nature which Adam had prior to the fall, but in the state to which the fall had reduced it. Maximus and Anastasius, on the contrary, fearing that otherwise, in that the human nature must necessarily will and act in accordance with its inward essence, conflicts would arise between it and the divine will, deliberately took the course which Felix declined. This nature, consequently, in itself, stood on no higher level than that of the first psychical Adam; nay more, as far as the body was concerned, it was in the state in which Adam was left by the fall, though the soul was created out of nothing, and then appropriated by the Son.[3] By this act of assumption, both

[1] Lib. ii., 13, 16, vii. 8: "Vestimentum ex transgressione de carne peccati sordidum, quam induere dignatus est."

[2] Lib. i. 15; see above.

[3] Lib. v. 1–3.

were most intimately conjoined in the unity of the person (of the Ego—"singularitate personæ"). Nevertheless, it was necessary that He should undergo a second birth, in order that His humanity also might become the Son of God. This second spiritual birth was adoption; which became His from the moment of His resurrection out of the bloody baptism of death.[1] Were we to deny to Him this second spiritual birth, which took place by adoption, there would remain merely the first fleshly birth: nay more, we should be previously compelled to do away with the first fleshly birth, because it was the ground of the necessity of the spiritual one. From this it would appear, that Felix dated, at all events the completion of the adoption from the ascension of Christ to glory; and therefore, referred the words uttered at His baptism and transfiguration, "Thou art My beloved Son," to the divine nature alone.[2] But if Christ were not an adopted Son, endowed with the fulness of divine gifts and of divine majesty, prior to His exaltation, and were merely the Son of man, although conjoined in unity of person with the Son of God; then we should be free to allow that He underwent a human development, and that His knowledge was imperfect, without being therefore justified in teaching, with the school of Antioch, that the Son of man merited His exaltation by His virtue and progress. Felix's view, like that of his opponents, appears to have had more affinity with the teachings of Augustine, on the subject of grace.[3]

[1] Lib. ii. 16. "Qui est secundus Adam, accepit has geminas generationes (like Christians); primam videlicet, quæ secundum carnem est, secundam vero spiritalem, quæ per adoptionem fit, idem redemptor noster secundum hominem complexus in semet ipso continet: primam videlicet, quam suscepit ex virgine nascendo; secundam vero, quam initiavit in lavacro a mortuis resurgendo." The meaning of the last words is probably —"The second birth He had from the time of the resurrection, after it had begun in baptism."

[2] Lib. ii. 15, i. 20. He does not appear to have ascribed to the baptism of Christ any special significance in relation to His adoption. He preferred taking the old doctrine of the resurrection as a new birth, for his point of departure; and, instead of treating it as the third birth of the Son of God, to treat it as the second birth of His human aspect. Paulinus (i. 44) took a different view of it; but he is chargeable with some degree of arbitrariness.

[3] Lib. vii. 9: "Quæ ille de humanitate Filii Dei, in qua natus homo, *per adoptionis gratiam* meruit esse quod est, et accipere quod habet."

If this is the relation between adoption and assumption, Adoptianism must evidently have been chiefly interested in preventing the removal of the humanity of Christ, out of the sphere of created beings, and in showing that it was at first essentially like ours,—having being created of nothing as to the soul, and born of Mary as to the body. After the resurrection, however, when the two natures had one and the same Ego, and therefore approximated more closely to each other, their aim would naturally be to represent Christ's humanity as a new creation, under the new name of Adoption. It is clear that, as far as the two *natures* are concerned, every conception of the incarnation of the Son of God, which should attempt to cross that barrier between God and the creature, is, and remains, excluded. But must not Adoptianism itself deny the assumption of humanity by the Son of God, and emasculate the οἰκείωσις between the two natures? As described by it, the Son of man is a whole, a person by Himself;—so at least it seems. But in that case, what meaning can be attached even to the assumption? And how is the unity of the personality of Christ compatible with such an eternal double Sonship? This is the second main question.

The very opponents of Felix (even Paulinus, i. 48, ii. 8) acknowledged that he had no intention of teaching, that there were two personalities or sons in Christ. Nor, when he designated the Son of man, God, and the adopted Son of God, did he mean that there were two Gods, though each in a different sense, in Jesus (Alc. v. 1). His opponents merely maintained, that, followed out to its logical results, his view would end in a duality of persons. Adoptianists, however, were of the opinion that the same thing might be said, with equal justice or injustice, respecting the orthodox doctrine, if the principle of the duality of natures, of different essence, were consistently carried out: and Felix, they asserted, had rather sought to hold fast the unity of the person in the way prescribed by the previous development of the Church. He represents the principle which constituted and established Christ, as, in such a sense, the Ego of the collective person, that the Son of man had His personal centre (the Ego which was essential to His true idea) in the Son of God (see Note 51).* This bore a certain resemblance

* See Note L, App. II.

to the doctrine of John of Damascus (ἐνυποστασία). His view, however, implied that the human nature was anhypostatical, which the Adoptianists did not hold; and the ἐνυποστασία, in his use of it, denoted rather that the Ego of the Logos was the vehicle and substantive principle of the humanity, than that it actually appertained to the humanity as its own, and gave the humanity completeness, as though it originally belonged to its nature. Hence, both the Damascene and the Church conceived the divine nature to be so united with this divine Ego, that the former alone enjoyed independence and the hegemony, and that the human nature became merely the transition-point for the divine will, or was even reduced to that selfless condition which characterizes the body. The Adoptianists, on the contrary, drew a sharp distinction between the divine nature and the divine Ego, in so far as they allotted the latter alone to the humanity, which in virtue thereof became the Son of man. Clinging to the duality in the one Christ, they conceived Him as a double being, held together solely by the unity of the personal centre, in such a manner that to each of the two aspects of this twofold Christ were secured its reality and independence.[1] One and the same person had a double sonship through its relation to different natures; but Son it was in both,—either first from the time of the resurrection, or from the very commencement,—in so far as the "assumtio" was that act of grace, by which the divine Ego, without the divine nature, was made the Ego of the man. To this point were Adoptianists led by their concern for the personality of the human nature. That it was personal, they were convinced; although they held that it was constituted such by the divine Ego, which really and truly lent itself, as it were, to the Son of man, in the act of assumption; and that this Ego became the veritable property of the humanity. In their view, therefore, the human nature lost nothing at all of its completeness, or of that which belonged to it; for the divine Ego, abstracted from the divine nature, did nothing more than perfectly supply the place of the human Ego. The human nature of Christ

[1] Paul. i. 32: "Mendax spiritus conatur astruere, quia per incarnationis dispensationem et unigeniti proprietas in dualitate hominis sit geminata, in proprii scilicet et adoptivi, et unio individuæ Deitatis in plurali sit numero." Compare i. 55.

was, naturally, not regarded by them as a man prior to the "assumtio," which first gave it its hypostasis. Similarly to Felix, the skilled dialectician who represented the party, taught also the bishops of Spain. In their memorial to Charlemagne (Note 52), they acknowledged the unity of the person in the most decided terms; but at the same time, also, professed that their interest in religion compelled them to hold fast the "adoptio," which they represented as taking place earlier, though they did not give any very distinct opinion regarding its conciliation with, and relation to, the "assumtio." In this respect they resembled Elipantus, so far as can be judged from the fragments which remain of his writings. He expressed himself more obscurely than Felix, but seems to have had a profounder mind. We find in the works of Elipantus two ideas, which might have been made the basis of a higher form of Adoptianism, that is, of a more intimate union between the Son of man and the Son of God. On the one hand, namely, he designates the Trinity "unius glomeratio caritatis, unius ambitus dilectionis, coæterna substantia." God, he considered to be one, notwithstanding the triplicity of the persons, because they are constituted a unity by the embrace of their one substantial love. Love constitutes, as it were, the higher unity or personality, which conjoins again the three distinctions of the persons; this higher unity being conceived to have a substantial existence (Sein), and not to be a mere "actus." On the one hand, this conception of the Trinity might have indicated the direction in which the unity of the Son of man and the Son of God was to be found; and, on the other hand, the doctrine that the Son of man was not merely a single limited individual, but of universal significance, pointed to the same goal. For the resemblance which this character gave him to God, fitted him the more for being united with the Logos, in the identity of one person. With Him who was adopted as to His humanity, we also, says he, are adopted; with Him the anointed One (Christ), we also are anointed. If Christ could be designated, as to His humanity also, the proper and natural Son of God, He would be raised to a dignity which He did not seek, and which would annul the incarnation. He could further, then, be no longer the archetype and principle of our glory, inasmuch as the promise, that we shall be like Him after the resurrection,

referred not to His deity, but to His humanity.[1] The opponents of Elipantus were moved by religious considerations of an opposite kind,—they feared, namely, that the distinctive and unique position occupied by Christ would be endangered if He were not even as to His humanity the proper Son of God; and were also unwilling thus to diminish the distance between Him and redeemed Christians.[2]

The Adoptianists, nevertheless, still clung to the doctrine of the difference of the essence of the two natures, and, so far as we know, did not follow out further the view of love as a substantial bond, conjoining the two natures into one personality. As we have shown above, they did indeed posit one person for the double Sonship, but, at the same time, seriously applied the (according to John of Damascus) still admissible principle,—that the subject of the Son of God (apart from His nature), as it was the subject of the divine nature, became also the proper subject of the human nature; they further, in accordance therewith, assumed two non-coincident life-courses (doppelten incongruenten Lebenslauf),—a Son of man merely running parallel with the Son of God. Their opponents, therefore, objected, that, on such a view, the only function of the personality was to connect the Son of God with the Son of man, and that the proper idea of the incarnation of the Son of God, and of the deification of this man, was really cast aside: The one person, they urged, was still in reality nothing more than the identical empty Ego,—a formal link between two natures which remain essentially separate. We see thus that the ecclesiastical opponents of the Adoptianists were concerned for the preservation of the very foundation of Christology, for the reality of the incarnation of God.[3] It is true, the arguments advanced by Alcuin, the Council of Frank-

[1] Alcuini, Opp. ii. 586 ff.

[2] The Council of Frankfurt represented the cause of the power and glory, the Adoptianists that of the moral deed and condescension, of Christ. The Council regarded the "adoptio" of the Son of man (even though brought about by the Son of God) as an "injuria." To refuse the "persona" to the Son of man, appeared to it no more than an act of justice to the Son of God, and yet to be no injustice to the humanity.

[3] Lib. vi. 10: "Geminæ gigas substantiæ, totus proprius Dei patris Filius et totus proprius Virginis matris filius inseparabilis in personæ unitate, vel Filii proprietate unus." Paulin. i. 12, 14: "Debuit homo in Deum proficere—non decebat Deum in hominem deficere."

furt, Beatus, and Etherius, in support of the φυσικὴ ἕνωσις of Athanasius, or of Cyrill's fundamental idea, without that Antiocheian adjunct to which the Adoptianists clung, were in part but weak, especially when they came to the establishment of their own view. They principally employed the old image of the unity of body and soul, or fell back on the unsearchableness of the mystery, and on the omnipotence of God, which they deemed able to create anything out of nothing, according to its own pleasure; urging, that as no nature can prevent God making of it what He may choose, there was nothing to prevent Him making a natural Son of God out of human nature. But Alcuin, in particular, displayed greater ability in his criticism of Adoptianism. He asks, whether every man is the proper son of his father? If this be affirmed, he reminds us that men are not of their fathers as to the soul, but only as to the flesh; and deduces the conclusion, that if it is not allowable to designate the entire Christ God's own Son, no man can be called the son of his father. He further argues, from the unity of the person, as to whether a son can be both the proper and adopted son of one and the same father. Then from the difference of the natures, he argues as to whether the Son can be the true and proper Son of the Virgin. This is granted, says he; and yet when they come to treat of the divine aspect, they refuse to designate the entire Christ the true and proper Son of God. He further tries to force from them the confession, that the entire Christ ought not to be worshipped, nor miracles to be attributed to the Son of man. He asks, Was God's own Son, or a strange son, adopted? Of course, a strange son. When, then, he asks further, was Christ strange to God, so that God was under the necessity of adopting Him? Rather was the true and own Son of God conceived and born in the conception and birth of Christ. In general, he tries to prove that the Adoptianists ought logically to let go the unity of the Person of Christ, and to agree to the separation maintained by Nestorius.[1] He also endeavours to lay, as he says, the grammatical or dialectical groundwork of his own view.[2] The question is, Whether, notwithstanding the difference of the natures, the Son of man can be "proprius Dei filius?" This depends on the general question, Whether

[1] Epist. ad filiam in Deo carissimam, i. 921 ff.; contra Fel. i. 11 ff.
[2] i. 921.

that which, strictly or properly, pertains to a substance, must always be of the same substance as that to which it thus pertains? His opinion is, that something which *is* of a different substance from another thing, may undeniably *possess* as its property this other thing, in such a manner, that for the sake of this real and substantial relationship between the two, the latter may become a predicate or mark of the former.[1] At this point, also, a revolution is observable. The earlier teachers of the Church had insisted, especially during the Monotheletic Controversy, that what is not of the same nature cannot have the same predicates, and so forth; and on this principle they based the abiding duality of Christ. In this respect, therefore, the ἀντίδοσις and οἰκείωσις continued to be entirely nominal; the utmost that was conceded, was a strengthening of the human powers,—the intellectual powers alone, as the character of the Greek Church would have led us to expect, forming an exception. Now, on the contrary, the doctrine of the duality of substances in Christ began to be modified, and the human nature, accordingly, to be allotted as "proprium" and predicate to the divine. Assurances were, of course, not wanting that this was not intended to affect the duality of substances; but that their difference began thus to be pared down, is equally unmistakeable. As regards this particular matter, the difference between Adoptianism and the doctrine which received the sanction of the Church at Frankfurt, was as follows:—the former maintained that the personality or the Ego of the Son of God pertained to the human nature as its own; the latter maintained that the human nature was made a predicate of the Son of God, which implies that it was essentially deified. Even when the Adoptianists represented the human nature as having become like the divine attributes, they assumed the proper human nature to have been merely elevated, and jea-

[1] i. 921: "Tu vero de grammatica tua profer regulas naturales, ostendens quædam propria non ejusdem substantiæ esse, cujus propria esse dicuntur. Nam propria dicimus nomina, non quæ nostræ sint substantiæ, sed quæ specialem nostræ habeant substantiæ significationem. Terrarum quoque possessiones proprias esse dicere solemus. Israel is said, in John i. 11, to be the proprium of God. Deum in rebus humanis tam multa proprietatis nomine appellantur, cur in solo filio Dei hæc proprietas non potest esse, ut sit proprius filius Dei, qui ex Virgine natus est, qui solus inter omnes filios Dei hoc habuit proprium, ut una sit persona cum eo."

lously guarded against every species of mixture or transubstantiation. Their opponents arrived at the opposite view;—that the one nature became the predicate of the other, they also did not deduce from any special or later act, but from the act of incarnation itself. The Adoptianists, on the other hand, who were guided in the formation of their doctrine of the Son of man, to whom the Ego really belongs quite as truly as to the Son of God, by a desire to assert the truth and completeness of the humanity of Christ, also contributed to the same result, by drawing a marked distinction between "adoptio" and "assumtio."

The correctness of our view of Adoptianism is particularly shown by the further course of history. For whilst, on the one hand, Adoptianism recognised a double personality, and conceived both natures to be personal and independent,—maintaining only that the Ego, which is the constitutive principle of the personality in both cases, is common to both,—the teachers of the Church, on the other hand, said, Even though the human nature be represented as personal, still on this view no real incarnation has taken place. All that we have gained is the simple juxtaposition of two complete personal beings; and the hypostasis of the Son of God is held to have been so alien to the substance of human nature, that the human Ego was excluded by the divine, and the human nature was impersonal, after the Unio. So do they distinctly express themselves. Transubstantiation comprises two *momenta:* firstly, the destruction, annihilation of the one substance, so that, at the utmost, only its accidents remain behind; secondly, the substitution of another substance in the place of the annihilated one, —not, of course, as though the former substance, or its accidents, first realized its own completion by means of the substitutionary substance, but it ceases to have a substantial existence, and is converted into the new. This being the case, the teachers of the Church opposed to the Adoptianists, and in particular the Council of Frankfurt, must be said now to have turned their faces in the direction of a Christological transubstantiation; not, indeed, as regards the nature, but certainly as regards the Ego. For, in the first place, they expressly taught that the human personality was destroyed, consumed (deleri, consumi), by the divine,—regarding the personality, consequently, as a substance; and, in the second place, they represent the divine

person of the Son, as taking the place of the destroyed human personality from the very commencement (Note 53).

If it be decided that the human nature of Christ was not personal, and that it did not become personal through the personality of the Son of God, as abstracted from His nature, then it is clear that the question of a twofold Son could not any more be raised, and we can understand how Alcuin came so zealously to insist that Christ, including also His humanity, ought to be straightway designated the one indivisible Son of God. For he considered that no other than the Son of God should be recognised as the vehicle of the predicates. It is true, he persists in maintaining that, "non deus conversus in hominem;" but yet he says, "sed homo glorificatus in Deum" (iii. 17), which is scarcely compatible with the intention of the Council of Chalcedon. He says further, also, "nec homo a natura humanitatis recessit ut non esset homo, sed natura humanitatis proprietatem naturæ servavit;" but how is this reconcilable with the position, that the "*persona* humana," which he also certainly held to belong to human nature, is annihilated by the divine? If the human personality is destroyed and replaced by the divine, what becomes of Dyotheletism, not to mention the "glorificatio in Deum?" Even the duality of natures must then be taken in a different sense. Previously, so long as little attention was directed to the personality, and almost all to the natures, these latter were conceived as diverse, relatively independent, and even absolutely opposed, magnitudes; each was a complete whole, a substance conjoined with a congeries of qualities or accidents, which inhered in the substance; and to Monophysites (for example, even to Severus) the most vigorous opposition was raised, because they called in question the existence of such a special substantial centre of life in the human nature. Now, however, as a consequence of the reaction against Adoptianism, which wished to follow out the principles involved in the Chalcedonian decisions, the situation of matters was so changed, that, although the name of substance was still given to the human nature, a power was set over it, which not merely (as was decided even in 680) omnipotently determined it, but which, by the destruction of its inmost centre, that is, of its personality, and by the substitution of itself in the place of that centre, essentially degraded human nature to a mere husk or shell.

Thus robbed of its own centre, and transposed into a strange one, human nature was brought down from the position of a distinct substance alongside of the divine, to that of a real predicate, or congeries of predicates, subsistent in a higher centre.

The great importance of the part played by Adoptianism is not attributable to any positive results which it worked out and embodied, but to the circumstance that the opposition raised to it, constituted a great crisis in the history of the dogma. The fundamental ideas of the Council of Chalcedon could not be further carried out than it attempted to carry them out: it formed the close of a long series of efforts for the complete uprooting of every trace of Monophysitism. But its attempts to put the topstone to the labours of the old Synods, from the year 451 onwards, brought to the view of the Church the danger to which Christology itself was exposed, of being set aside, and the idea of the incarnation, of being replaced by a double spiritual life, or even by a double personality. With difficulty it had, at an earlier period, repudiated the doctrine of a transubstantiizing incarnation as applied to the natures; now, it resorted to the very same doctrine in reference to the Ego, which was destroyed and replaced by the Logos.[1] And, in the way of evidence that the Church, subsequently to the end of the eighth century, was greatly under the influence of these Monophysitic, nay, even Apollinaristic elements, which were in reality but a more subtle form of Docetism—not, indeed, directly as respects the sphere of the natures, but certainly as respects the higher and decisive sphere of the personality,—we need only adduce the welcome given to the doctrine of the Eucharist taught by Paschasius Radbertus, at the very commencement of the ninth century. We shall soon enough, also, see the direct Christological results of this Adoptianist Controversy, which occurred at the boundary line, separating the Old from the Middle Period.

[1] Instead of two parts, σῶμα and ψυχή, Apollinaris taught that there were three, and allotted merely the νοῦς to the Logos. Precisely in the same manner, the *persona*—that is, simply the divine hypostasis—was now placed over the body and the rational soul.

SECTION III.

THE MIDDLE AGES.

From the Ninth Century to the Reformation.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE DECAY OF THE DYOPHYSITIC FOUNDATION LAID BY THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON.

INTRODUCTION.

WHILST the Greek Church, after the death of John of Damascus, was hastening with rapid steps towards outward and inward, moral, religious, and scientific decay, the Western Church had prepared for Christianity a new home, amongst nations which it first constituted participators in, and promoters of, the culture of the civilised world. The Western Church was distinguished from the Oriental by characteristics peculiarly its own. It viewed Christianity not mainly as doctrine, but as a matter of the will. In the West, the Church was not the passive servant of the State, to which it had sold its freedom and renounced its moral and religious mission in return for outward pomp and glory, contented to manage the spiritual forms in which the life of the State and of the people was clothed; but felt itself to be a divine and independent institution; manifested a pure zeal in martyrdoms and self-sacrificing missionary work; brought a number of barbarous peoples, in consequence, under the yoke of the cross; and even aided materially in founding new states and constitutions amongst them, by means of its more fully developed system of Ecclesiastical Law. It was not content with being merely recognised and respected by earthly authorities: it set before itself as a goal, to bring the world into subjection to the law of Christ. But as it regarded itself as

the administrator of this law, nay more, as the representative of Christ, it followed, that the more clearly self-conscious it was, the more distinctly would the Western Church aim at the subjugation, not merely of peoples, but also of states. The idea of the Church thus underwent an essential change; and, in connection therewith, the doctrine of the work and the Person of Christ. By the Greek Church, Christ was predominantly regarded as the Revealed Wisdom of God; and His work as a work of enlightenment, through the instrumentality of the πίστις ὀρθόδοξος: chief stress was accordingly laid on His prophetical office. The West, on the contrary, evidently under the after influence of the same spirit which had created the old Roman Empire, was stirred by a desire to replace the old universal monarchy of Rome by an all-embracing, present, not future, kingdom of Christ,—by an universal spiritual empire. This kingdom, of which the hierarchy is the earthly representation and embodiment, is one of spiritual dominion, discipline, and grace; and the phantastic ideal of the Areopagite, which had but hovered over the earth, now descended in the West to the firm ground of actuality, gained extensive power, and assumed a concrete living shape. Efforts were made to bring the entire life of the nations under the law of the Church —a law which embraced, not only the services they were to render to, but also the gifts they were to receive from, the Church. Both grace and works were represented in the light of a law: by participation in both, the individual became a member of the kingdom of Christ. In that the hierarchy now added the kingly, to the prophetical and priestly dignities already claimed by it, and contemplated both the grace it had to confer, and the works it demanded, under this point of view, it supposed, indeed, that the conquest of the world for Christ would not be fully accomplished until Christ should have become King; but, unconsciously, Christianity was converted into a means of securing power—into a something physical, which works according to natural laws—into something put into the hands of the hierarchy, to be disposed of according to its pleasure; for the hierarchy believed itself to have been appointed by Christ to occupy His place, to rule in His stead,—a belief which not only interfered with the personal government of Christ, but robbed Christians of their royal priesthood. It is characteristic, that in the writ-

ings of Augustine, and through the whole of the Middle Ages, Christianity, so far as in it we have to do with a communication from God, was not defined as the religion through which we attain to vital fellowship with the living Christ, who is the true creative ground of salvation; but, for the *personal* expression, "Christ," was substituted, as the predominant technical term, the *impersonal* expression, "grace." This made it possible to regard the highest good as consisting in something else than fellowship with the personal Christ,—in something which, though in thought, at all events, traced back ultimately to the Saviour, was viewed as a relatively independent potence, placed by Him in the power of the Church at the termination of His work on earth. Had Christianity been deemed, as to its every moment, to centre in the living Christ and His work, instead of being conceived as a mere thing, the Church would scarcely have ventured on undertaking to be His representative. The hierarchy did not so much consider itself to possess theurgic power over Christ; but rather, in consonance with its disparagement of the personality, as possessed of power over grace,—that is, over the divine redemptive virtues, over the treasure which is placed to the disposition of the Church, as the spiritual kingdom of Christ. The Church and its ministers were not (as is the case in the Greek Church down to the present day; for example, even in connection with the Holy Eucharist) looked upon as the instruments by which the living and ever-present Christ, discernible as it were by the eye of faith, accomplishes His work in individuals—that work which He has reserved in His own hands; but Christ, when He had founded the institution, which is His kingdom, retired, as it were after a Deistic fashion, into the background, and to the foreground advanced the present authorities, who represent Him in His absence. These representatives were entrusted with such full powers, that there scarcely remained any reason for longing after the second coming of Christ and His personal reassumption of the reins of government.

No wonder, therefore, that during the Middle Ages theology produced nothing new also in reference to the Person of Christ, but merely devoted itself to the study of the works of the past; and that, on the contrary, sole attention was given to those things which had more affinity with the above mentioned

conception of the Church. Proofs of this may be found in more than one direction.

In connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, it is true, the Council of Toledo did, in the year 589, decide that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Son also; and this decision was endorsed by the Western Church. But this more complete equalization of the Son with the Father had no influence on Christology, with the exception, perhaps, of preparing the way for that transition from the Person of the God-man to impersonal "grace," of which we have just spoken;—the Holy Ghost being viewed as the gift of Christ, over which the Church has power, and therefore as having taken Christ's place. The Holy Spirit,—formally, indeed, represented as a person, but practically treated as a thing,—is that with which the Church has been once for all endowed by Christ; and Christ's mission, in relation to earthly Christendom, was fulfilled, when He had once for all bestowed this Holy Spirit on the institution founded by Him. According to this view, Christ gave the Church to have life in itself; and it is by no means the work of the Holy Spirit to lead believers, even on earth, directly to the eternally living Head of the Church, who rules in His own Person. The Holy Spirit, imperdibly bound up with a particular order of men, and through them communicated to the Church, constitutes it participant in, and powerful over, all the divine powers which were concentrated in Christ. The Church itself was thus involuntarily made the incarnation of Christ—the present living incarnation; whereas the real incarnation was reduced to a lifeless thing of the past. Attention could not, of course, fail to be attracted to the contrast between the actual state of the Church and this its claim to divinity; and in consequence, sects began to appear which raised a more vigorous protesting voice. Moreover, the Church, even as respects the clergy, did not attribute to the powers with which it was entrusted, properly sanctifying, but merely sin-forgiving and consecrating virtues; hence was it possible for that need of realizing the holy deity as present in union with humanity, which was met by Christ, to continue to be livingly felt. But the Church having exalted itself, in its own view, to such a divine eminence, this need sought for satisfaction, not so much in Christ, as in the pure examples of human nature,—that is, in

the saints, and particularly in Mary. The following causes also contributed to this result.

Firstly, the position of the Christological question subsequently to the Adoptianist Controversy. As we have seen, from the Council of Chalcedon to that of Frankfurt, the Church steadily resisted the tendencies which aimed, with well-meant zeal, at conceiving the Person of Christ as supernatural and perfectly divine, but which really ended in robbing the humanity of Christ of its truth, either by its conversion or by its deification. With this purpose in view, so far from avoiding, it had perpetuated a dualism of the natures—of volition and knowledge—which, in the exercise of practical piety, was necessarily and of itself ever again overlooked. But when, in opposition to Adoptianism, it had been established that Christ was the Son of God even as to His humanity, the long repressed torrent burst irresistibly forth; then was the humanity of Christ robbed of its proper significance, and the image of His one Person was so sublimated into the pure transcendence of the deity, that to the eye of simple faith He only bore the aspect of "our Lord God." Thus, whilst apparently heightened, Christology was brought to a point, at which the God-man, the sympathizing High Priest, who belongs to our race, practically ceased to exist; and there remained only the unapproachable, holy God, as He was conceived and feared by men previous to the appearance of Christ. All that was now expected with regard to Christ, was that He should come again to judgment. No marvel, then, that an ante-Christian horror of death and Hades fell afresh on Christendom,—that it sought a compensation for the loss of the sympathy of the God-man in human intercessors, whose post it was, forming as they did the ideal Church, to preserve sinful humanity from the devouring fire of the holy Judge, into whom Christ had been transformed. The loss of the historical God-man, of the Son of man full of grace and truth, thus reawakened, in the religious nature of humanity, impulses similar to those out of which had grown, prior to the coming of Christ, the myths and Christological preludes of Heathendom. Undoubtedly, even on this fundamental view of the Person of Christ, as it pervaded the Middle Ages, the necessity of a historical appearance or revelation of God might still be recognised. The Church, the divine, could not have

sprung up spontaneously out of the soil of humanity; it must have been divinely founded, and have received its powers from God. But as the mere communication of divine truth, or the fulfilment of prophetical functions, did not involve the necessity of an incarnation,—for all that was strictly needed thereto, was an inspired man,—so neither did the mere establishment of the kingly office require an incarnation, inasmuch as God is the almighty Lord and King, independently of the incarnation. For the founding of the kingdom, which the Church considered itself to be, there needed only a second Moses, an inspired lawgiver, entrusted with power over the divine treasury of grace.[1] On one point alone had a more correct view kept its ground; although even it was contracted and distorted. It was fitting, they urged, that God should not bestow His grace directly; but that the grace with which men were to be blessed, should be morally earned by Christ. But this grace having been once earned (the Holy Spirit), the continued existence and operation of the God-man was deemed to be, strictly speaking, no longer necessary; and the grace was regarded as a treasure once for all apportioned to humanity. The utmost required by this consideration, therefore, was a momentary union of the deity and humanity in Christ,—a theophany of somewhat longer continuance.

The first result of this loss of the living, divine-human Mediatorship of Christ, was that the piety of the Middle Ages created for itself, in the exercise of a phantastic imagination, by way of compensation, a host of mediators, amongst whom the Queen of Heaven occupied the foremost place. By this procedure, another tendency of the natural heart found a kind of satisfaction,—the tendency, namely, to the deification of nature, that is, to the deification of humanity and its powers, apart even from Christian grace; a tendency in which are combined at once timidity and defiance, indifference and haughtiness. For Mary, the mother of the Lord, was held not to have needed redemption; and was not, therefore, on an equality with the other members

[1] In this connection we must not omit to notice the circumstance, that in the Middle Ages doubts were entertained by teachers held in very high esteem, whether the incarnation was really necessary; and the question was raised, whether God could not have given of His free power, apart from Christ, all that Christ bestowed. See below.

of her race: she was raised above them by her freedom from original and actual sin; she was absolutely pure and holy from her very birth; and on the ground of this her perfection, which she possessed *prior* to the birth of Christ, she was fitted and worthy to be the mother of God. She sets before us, therefore, —she who stood, to the piety of the Middle Ages, in a relation of such prime importance,—what human nature is capable of producing out of itself, even apart from the redemption by the God-man.

Mary, further, stood before God as the ideal of pure humanity, or of the Church; and, bearing humanity on her heart, was looked upon as an intercessor in all the difficulties of the present, whom God and Christ are unable to withstand: she consequently took Christ's place, even as regards the very sufferings by which the graces conferred on the Church are supposed to have been won. Not so much on the passion of Christ, did the gaze of this Middle Age piety rest: it was the anguish endured by Mary, the "mater dolorosa," on account of her suffering Son, that was celebrated in the most beautiful hymns, and contemplated with the greatest fervour. All was thus again reversed. Mary was the embodiment of pure humanity: in her, humanity, even in this very particular, was conceived rather as actively *loving* and *enduring* suffering, on account of the sufferings of Christ, than as loved even unto death. Christ also was looked upon solely as the Beloved of humanity—as the one whom *we* honour with our love, in that we sympathize with the sorrows of the much afflicted mother—as the one to whom we present, through the mother, the sacrifices of our sympathy, of the fulness of our love, and laying it down on the altar of His cross when we celebrate the Passion. Instead of which, we ought to come before Him, on the one hand, repentant and ashamed, broken and condemned; and yet, on the other hand, sensible that we are consoled and embraced by His transcendent and suffering love. That place, therefore, which ought to call to mind human guilt and poverty, and the riches of Divine compassion, is perverted into the scene of the triumph of human nature—of the natural feelings of noble hearts, which offer to the Lord their sympathy, like the weeping daughters of Jerusalem, instead of contemplating, as they should, His sympathy with us, and our guilt in causing His sufferings.

Even what we have last mentioned is proof enough of the want of a deeper understanding of the ethical. Sentimental emotions of the natural heart were ingeniously substituted for death with Christ; and, in fellowship with the anguish felt by the mother for her Son, such emotions were supposed to have the power of making us acceptable in the sight of God. The same fundamental view, which is Pelagian at the roots, made its appearance, with the same result,—the result, namely, of casting the living Christ into the shade,—in connection with that rite of worship which was, more than any other, characteristic of the Middle Ages. The *Holy Sacrifice of the Mass* (before which the holy Eucharist, as an act of communion, was thrown completely into the shade) was a strange embodiment of that dualism which constituted the fundamental feature of the official catholicism of the Middle Ages,—the dualism, namely, of Pelagian and magical elements. Superficially regarded, the stress laid upon the Eucharist, especially since the ninth century, might be taken as an evidence of the awakenment of a lively feeling of need of intercourse and fellowship with Christ. But, in point of fact, the Mass had taken the place of the living Christ, and was a solemn declaration of the fact, that in the view of Roman Catholic piety, Christ was no longer the Lord and King, still ruling and still bestowing grace. For, in the first place, who is this Christ, to whose real presence in the Eucharist so great importance was apparently attached? Is it the exalted Lord and King of spirits, who graciously inclines Himself to a blessed marriage with the soul? By no means. The Christ of the Mass is not turned toward the soul, but toward God: He is the sacrifice which is offered to God by the priest, and which is conferred on man in the "communio;" but the benefit of which may also accrue to us by a private Mass. And of the certainty that it is personally embraced and loved by Him, the soul has no taste whatever. Consequently, Christ is no longer at all in the holy Eucharist the present and active One: it is the Church which is active therein, distributing Him in His name. Even at this point there was no set purpose to further the celebration and intensification of direct, personal, loving fellowship between Christ and the soul.—One hears it often said, that the evangelical view of the holy Eucharist has caused it to lose infinitely in fulness and depth of meaning. We

should rather say, that the Roman Catholic view is poverty itself, in comparison with the Evangelical. According to the former, that which takes place in the holy Eucharist is but the perpetual repetition of the historical fact of the sacrifice of Christ, which, if it were satisfactorily accomplished on Golgotha, holds good once for all, and is preserved, without need of repetition, in eternal activity, and raised to a power capable of eternal individualization, in the Person of the exalted Lord. Christ, however, was not satisfied, as He would appear to be from the Romish Mass, with merely gaining for His people freedom from punishment, or "graces;" His purpose was to bestow Himself, the living personal One, upon them, as the highest good, when they believingly renew the memory of His death. It is therefore only the Christ who lived on earth, who died, who offered Himself a sacrifice to God, and who laid the foundation of the treasury of grace of which the Church holds the keys, that is ever again set before the Church, or rather before God. Christ's significance is thus confined within the limits of His past earthly life. The feelings of the Church are to be just such as it would experience were Christ actually dying over again His sacrificial death, at the moment of the offering of the Mass. That the living Christ was thus thrown into the background, as compared with the past Christ, who is repeatedly made parastatically (παραστατικός) present purely by force of an absolute miracle, is clear enough; but the same thing is still more clearly evident from the fact that, in the Mass, Christ was treated almost solely as a thing or material—as a material, the power to mould which lay in the priest invested with the formula of consecration. The priest constitutes (conficit) the elements, Christ's body and blood, the present Christ; nor is it Christ Himself who presents Himself as a sacrifice to the Father, but He is presented by the priest, that is, by the Church. Christ therefore holds a passive position: the actor is the priest; and the only activity left to Christ Himself is, that He *once* founded the Church, and once for all endowed it with the power, by means of the sacrificial rite of which He forms the material, to gain for itself at every repetition new favours from God. The Church being thus placed in the foreground, as the one that acts, merits and offers its sacrifice, Christ is again so thrown into the shade, that no progress in Christology, depending as it does for living impulses

entirely on piety, could be expected, so far as the magic circle of these representations extended.

In the piety of the masses of the people, the place rightly occupied by Christ, was now taken up by the world of saints on the one hand, and by the holy sacrifice of the Mass, on the other. In Christ's Person, doing and suffering were united; and, in virtue of His divine-human unity, His suffering was a doing, and His doing a suffering: to the popular eye, on the contrary, the doing and the suffering were distributed between the two redemptive surrogates above mentioned,—the nature of both being in consequence changed. In the holy Mass, Christ is purely *passive;* the Church, on the contrary, is active: and it covers the imperfections of its actual condition, not with the perfections of the divine-human Mediator, but with those of the intercessory world of saints, in which it beholds itself in the ideal form in which it stands before God, in which it brought forth Christ, and in which it presents sacrifices of love and virtues to God.

A system was thus formed in the Church, whose effect was to absorb and exhaust Christ's significance in the one fact, that He rendered Himself dispensable for the whole period extending from the ascension to the second coming, by endowing the Church with the authority and power of His mediation.

In the last instance, however, we must go back to the *conception of God* which prevailed in the Middle Ages, and to the relation between it and the prevailing conception of the *world.* In analogy with the peculiar mixture of magical and Pelagian elements which characterized the Middle Ages, they clung, on the one hand, firmly to the conception of God as absolutely transcendent and supernatural; and yet, on the other hand, represented the world, specially the Church, as possessed of a degree of independence in relation to God, which must be considered false, and equivalent to its deification. The point, then, is to solve this apparent contradiction, and to ascertain the reason why the catholicism of the Middle Ages wears at one time the appearance of an acosmistic Pantheism, which aims at transubstantiating the world into God, and at another time, the appearance of Deism. The solution lies, perhaps, in the fact, that an ethical conception of God had not yet penetrated the Christian mind, but that it was still swayed by one of a

predominantly physical character, though differently modified at the different epochs of Scholasticism.

During the first period, God was still placed quite predominantly under the category of the absolute substance or essence. God alone has being in the strict sense: He is being; whereas the world is formed out of nothing, and always bears the signs of nonentity in it. It is evident on the surface that this view, most logically carried out by Scotus Erigena, was connected, on the one hand, with the system of Augustine, and, on the other, with Neo-Platonism and the theories of the much-lauded Areopagite Dionysius. Anselm and Thomas Aquinas occupied the same platform. Such a doctrine leaves the world but a precarious kind of being; and the system would be formally pantheistic, conceding to the world a merely illusory existence, had not faith clung so firmly both to the transcendence of God, and to the independent existence of the world for itself, that threads of another character were interwoven with the original warp. God, indeed, alone is reality, in the absolute sense: everything else, therefore, can have being only so far as it in some way belongs to the essence of God;[1] and the necessary consequence of which would seem to be, that the distinctive character of the world begins where being in general ceases,—that is, with nonentity. That in the world which may be said to have being, appears rather to be simply God. This would be pure acosmistic Pantheism, reminding one of Eleatism. But even the centuries surrounding the birth of Christ had sought to discover a theory which should combine the absolute transcendence of God with the independence of the world, and both with the doctrine, that God is the origin and goal of the world, so far as it possesses reality. Such was the notion of Emanatism,[2] which was a mixture of the ante-Christian and Christian conception of God. Emanatism regarded God as, on the one hand, absolutely exalted above the world, which derived its existence out of His fulness. He is the infinite and originally sole Being; but forth from Him has a world proceeded, which descends by gradations to the lowest and most limited stages of existence, where nihility has the mightiest sway. Nevertheless, so far as

[1] Compare the Ambigua of Maximus Confessor in Scotus Erigena, "de divis. Nat." ed. Ox. Appendix.

[2] Compare Heinrich Ritter, "Die Emanationslehre."

these ranks of being are outside of God, they are independent of, and in their sphere like, God: as God in His sphere, so have they a certain sway in their sphere, especially as they are of divine substance, and possess by nature, so far as being can be attributed to them, powers productive of good, though in a lesser degree than God. They have also freedom,—that is, the classes endowed with reason are also possessed of conscious causality. Having been once brought into existence, God, strictly viewed, does not move them from within; still less does an increasingly intimate marriage of God with their substance take place, but they move themselves in the power of their own (divine) nature. According to this system, God is not overreaching, overarching (übergreifendes) being; but, as the infinite essence, keeps Himself outside of the finite, remaining unchanged even during the emanation of the world. Even Philo compared the divine life to a fountain ever flowing over, and yet never exhausted. A deistic view of the world, such as would be congruous to Pelagianism, might thus be engrafted on Pantheism. But in the determination of the final goal, the pantheistic basis again inevitably bursts into view. For Emanatism, so far as any ethical principle stirs within it, regards the distance from God, which is involved in the very origin of mundane beings, as sin against, or apostasy from, God. Its ideal, therefore, is the total abolition of any existence apart from God, that a being should be carried away out of, and beyond itself, into the divine essence, —a notion which we have frequently found to be a fundamental ethical principle of systems tinged with Neo-Platonism. The legitimate consequence of this merely quantitative difference between God and the world, and even between good and evil, is, of course, that the redemption of the world would be its annihilation, even as separation from God was its beginning. These emanatistic representations, however, underwent the more modifications, both at this and at other points, the more the Christian principle attained to prevalence. These modifications were resorted to, in order to remove the inner contradictions which were felt to exist. But although it was essential to all forms of Emanatism, to treat God's absolute physical being as the inmost and highest element in Him, and, so far as the world exists at all, to consider God's essence alone to be its essence,—thus leaving at the utmost a merely quantitative dis-

tinction between God and the world,—these facts show us that Emanatism was constantly driven out beyond itself. Although Erigena, in his system, treats of divine causality, he does not allow to the world that degree of independence which even Emanatism leaves to it. Substantially, he contents himself with saying that God alone really *is* (Acosmism) and has being; that the world can only be a manifestation or symbol of God. For, in order to His being a free cause, capable of projecting forth from Himself beings actually different from Himself, God must be something more determinate than bare absolute being, and His spirituality ought not to be treated as a secondary, accessory thing. In that case also, for God to communicate Himself is an impossibility,—still less can a proper incarnation be effected. On the one hand, God could not burst through the limits imposed on Him by His own infinitude; and, on the other hand, no world could be brought into existence to which the communication might be made.

The Christian consciousness, however, has its life in the belief, that it may conceive of God as self-communicative. Communication, if it is not a mere appearance and illusion, presupposes the real existence of two different beings—the communicator and the receiver. This belief points back to the procession of the world out of God: redemption and perfection have no meaning apart from a creation. The categories of substance and phænomenon, needed to be developed into those of cause and effect. With this subject, Anselm, the St Victors, Thomas, and Duns Scotus, occupied themselves. The last-mentioned arrived at the *will*. Let us now bring the chiefs of this school under consideration, for a short time.

I. In the footsteps of the last great representative of Platonism, namely, Maximus, followed John Scotus Erigena in the following century.[1] Not only was the mind of Erigena akin to that of Maximus, but very many points of his system also were determined by that of the latter. The extent of the resemblance between the fundamental ideas of the two men, has only recently been duly estimated.[2] In Erigena's system, the Negative and Affirmative Theology also play a great part (compare above, p.

[1] See his work, "De divisione naturæ," L. v. Ox. 1681.

[2] Baur a. a. O. ii. 269 ff.

157, 233 f.), and form the lever to which the system owes its onward movement. This alone brings to view the duality of the point of departure:—on the one hand, there is empirical knowledge, taking its start from a multiplicity of objects, the world; on the other hand, rational knowledge, taking its start from a unity, God. Even the multiplicity, he did not regard as originating in an eternal substance, independent of God: its causes lie solely in God Himself. God alone, therefore, is, in the last instance, unity, and the multiplicity has no principle of being, save God Himself.

All that was required, then, was to show how this multiplicity was produced by, and proceeded out of, the Divine unity. But the Neo-Platonic conception of God, by which Erigena's mind was still swayed, made it impossible that he should render this service. We found that even Maximus, notwithstanding his ethical doctrine of freedom, did not advance essentially beyond the Areopagite, as regards his conception of God: and a similar remark may be made concerning Erigena. With him also, God is, in the last instance, the superessential being, of whom not even being can be predicated, because He would not be the absolute unity of all antagonisms, were He not as truly not-being and self-ignorance, as being and knowledge. Were He anything determinate, He would, from this point of view, be no longer the absolute. He is, consequently, absolutely abstract being; which is, at the same time, nothing. It is evident that the existence of a world could not be deduced from this eleatic conception of God. The Trinity in God is also reduced to a mere name. But, in point of fact, as we know from experience, the world exists; and the question is, even if it cannot be deduced *a priori* from God, how is its existence, at all events, reconcilable with the conception of God formed by speculation? He who has attained the true idea of the world, will be able to demonstrate the compatibility of its existence with the conception of God; and thus also, light may possibly be thrown back on the latter.

This result is the rather to be expected, as the very idea of the world points back to God as its eternal point of departure, and its eternal goal (v. 24). A theology which recognises and affirms the reality of the world, must necessarily go back to God as its cause. What needs to be done, then, is to show that God can be at once superessential and absolutely transcendent, and yet, that

cause, or world of causes, relatively to which the world is an effect. The poverty of the category of being or reality, renders it impossible that a procession should be accomplished, save by a *division of being* (Theilung des Seins, divisio naturæ). The relation between God and the world is defined as follows:—God is, logically, the primitive Whole or All; parts of this All form the world. Or, to employ an image of a kindred character,—the being, which God is (das Sein, das Gott ist), is the universal essence,—He is, as it were, the generic idea, regarded not as a subjective product of reflection, but, platonically, as Reality; nay more, regarded not merely as a type, but as a productive, fruitful cause. This universal essence resolves itself into species and individuals; and this, its self-analysis, is the creation of a real world. But God, again, is the eternal goal of the world; and the self-dissolution, self-resolution of the world, so far as it is a congeries of many dissociated finite elements, is its perfection. The eternal procession (processus) of God from Himself, origi nates the multiplicity; and the goal of the multiplicity is its return into unity. He regards the universe as a genealogical map, which must be read at once upwards and downwards, but whose members are derivable not merely (deistically) from other members, but all at the same time, also, from God. The genealogical (temporal) relation, in itself, however, would be merely a succession; whereas everything, so far as its being is not a mere illusion, should be viewed and grasped as simultaneously present (like the divisions on the map of a country) in the "causæ primordiales," whose centre of unity is the Word of God, with the "mundus intelligibilis" contained in Him (ii. 16, v. 25). Nature, as the unity both of that which is, and that which is not (natura-universitas, embracing God and man), he regards as divided into four fundamental forms. The first creates, and is not created; the second is created, and creates; the third is created, and does not create; the fourth is not created, and does not create.[1] The principle on which the division is made, is, therefore, the idea of creative causality, and of effect, applied positively and negatively. How God can, at one and the same

[1] The fourth denotes God's supramundane being; the first denotes God, so far as there is in Him the potentiality of creation. In the second, this potentiality becomes the ideal world; and causality belongs to the third, the world of effects.

time, be both superessential and causality, and why He determines Himself to causation, Erigena does not show: he regards it, however, as certain, that the motive thereof must lie in God Himself. As superessential being, He cannot come forth, in order to be a causality. To say that God is a cause, is to posit God as determined; which is contradictory of His abstract simplicity and self-identity. How, then, does he reconcile the existence of a world—and, indeed, of a world in which God's being is immanent—with the abstractly simple character of this His being? By regarding the world from the point of view of a manifestation of God, from the point of view of a theophany:[1] thus falling in with related elements in the system of Maximus, and even of Sabellius. For it is in the character of a theophany to symbolize, but not, strictly speaking, to express, the presence of God. The theophany is conceived as a *deed* of God, and not merely as a "modus" of His being; and yet God remains in it, what He is, superessential. He only shines, then, into the world, in order that He may again shine forth out of the world, and be recognised by the spirit of the rational creatures according to the measure of their respective susceptibility.

A theophany, of course, requires a medium, a material, in which it may be realized. On the question, Whence this material? we will not longer dwell; although the categories of cause and effect, in connection with the theophany, are reduced to the categories of substance and appearance, and no longer retain a real position, unless it be in relation to the material, which is the medium of the theophany.[2] Enough, he says; let God find in Himself the matter and occasion of the theophany. He conceives God to be therein actually a cause,—a cause, moreover, under various forms; so that mind in particular, which is

[1] L. v. 25, p. 253; c. 26, p. 256; i. 7, 8. The "apparitiones divinæ" are, "causarum æternarum imagines;" the "causa" is thus the essence manifesting itself.

[2] All things sensuous, all things visible, he regards as a mere semblance of the true world, in which they alone subsist, out of which they arise, and into which they return when they lose their visibility and materiality,—without, however, losing themselves. For the true essence of things is eternally in their "causis primordialibus," into which they return. Sensuousness is a mere accident of the essence; and this essence cannot be sensuously perceived, but must be spiritually cognized. The sensuous is a mere shadow of the body, an echo of the voice. L. v. 25, p. 253; M. i. 3.

created in the image of God, can be and is a theophany.[1] More important than this, however, is his representation of the rational spirit, as the real end and aim of the theophany. Not for His own sake, not for the sake of nature, does God proceed to His "apparitiones;" but man in particular, his blessedness and his knowledge of God, are the aim of God therein.[2] But if man, as the end God had in view, is taken up into God, his existence must have been willed as a real effect; and the divine causality, therefore, reaches its climax at this point. The true man is, on the one hand, the microcosm, the most perfect theophany; on the other hand, he is the end of all theophanies in the macrocosm: he is the middle of the universe, the beginning and the end, combining in himself the most extreme antagonisms, and is thus the image and end of God (ii. 9). In Erigena's case, therefore, the system which represents the world as a mere manifestation of God, as a mere theophany, is already carried out beyond itself. In man, who is an end to himself, the world advances to the point of having an absolute value of its own, side by side with God. But, as this value must nevertheless have its foundation in God and His immanence, Erigena could not refrain from discriminating a double being in God—the undisclosed, absolute being, and another being, which is the vehicle and bearer of the principles of the real world, that is, in the last instance, of the true man, of spirit. At a later period, some endeavoured to arrive at the same result, by distinguishing, after the example of Maximus, between the communicable and incommunicable essence of God.[3] The immanence, in accordance with which God is and remains the true essence of the world, is united with the causality, whose reality must be postulated if a true effect, different from God, is to be produced by God, by

[1] The "divina essentia" is "per se incomprehensibilis," but it appears "per intellectum" (that is, the nature of man) "in intellectibus:" i. 10, 7.

[2] i. 7, 8.

[3] The Simple nature (God), indeed, suffers nothing in itself which is not itself; hence no one may call in question the eternity of all things which are in God, nay, which are God. "Divina natura extra quam nihil est, et intra quam subsistunt omnia, nihil intra se recipit esse, quod sibi coëssentiale non sit." But he also goes on to say, "creatricem quidem naturam nihil extra se sinere—totum vero quod creavit et creat intra semet ipsum continere, ita tamen, ut aliud sit ipsa, quia superessentialis est, et aliud, quod in se creavit, nam se ipsum creare non verisimile videtur."

taking into consideration at the same time the perfection of the creation. Egression from God gives rise to diversity,—yea, to diversity of a constantly widening character, until at last the distinction of the sensuous and spiritual (sin included), and of man and wife, is arrived at: at which last point, the pure idea of man,—that idea which is God's eternal end,—acquires a resemblance to the brutes. It may seem as though the climax of this differentiation set forth most clearly the distinction existing between God and the real effects produced by Him, and, consequently, evinced most distinctly the reality of the world. But Erigena was very far from entertaining such an opinion. God is a perfect cause only in those perfect effects, in connection with which causality has worked in its entirety,—that is, when the effect perfectly corresponds to the cause, and is led back out of its differentiation, which produces merely the semblance of being, into unity with its cause. Regarding the mode in which this return is effected, further remarks will be found below; as also regarding the position which is left for Christology. It only remains here to remark, that this unity of perfection (adunatio) does not, in the view of Erigena, necessitate the suppression of the world, but brings it to its truth. Yet the true man, or, more precisely, the speculative knowledge of God realized by the human spirit, and the blessedness therein involved, is thereby characterized as the true form of the world, and as the end of God in manifesting Himself.* But to carry this fully out was impossible, so long as the idea of God had not undergone a metamorphosis; for that which is represented as the highest in God, to wit, His incommunicable abstract being, which is at the same time nothing, is something very empty and void, and by no means capable of being an object of rich and benedictory knowledge. Here, therefore, we come again upon the same unsatisfactory, nay, even in the theoretical or speculative aspect, contradictory, feature, which we found attaching to the system of Maximus. Neither of them was able to free himself from the Neo-Platonic conception of God which they had inherited, nor escaped being imposed upon by its semblance of sublimity. According to Maximus, love,—according to Erigena, the blessedness of knowledge, pertains entirely and solely to man: both love and knowledge, therefore, lack a worthy object. Nay more,

* See Note M, App. II.

without being aware of it, they reserve the best portion, to wit, love and wisdom, for man; and thus, in effect, set man higher than God. There is, however, a distinction between these two teachers, which must not be overlooked,—a distinction arising out of the difference between the ethical and speculative point of view. Maximus regarded the ethical,—not mere knowledge as such, but loving knowledge,—as the highest: from which we should judge that, on the one hand, he looked upon man surrendering himself to God, as making God his sole end and aim, and, therefore, as seeing in himself but a mere means; without, however, holding, on the other hand, that God, who is abstract being, could respond to man's devotion by a counter love, which makes man its end and aim. According to his view, it is not God, but man, who is Love in and for himself. To man is thus, it is true, assigned the best portion, namely, love: inasmuch, however, as the conception of the object of the love is not in its inmost essence an ethical one, the love itself also is not truly and completely ethical; for it loses itself in the divine being, through its ecstasis. It does not recognise in itself a highest good, whose continued existence should be maintained; and, in consequence, the effort to establish the actual existence of a real world, by laying stress on moral freedom, does not accomplish its purpose. Nor was the accomplishment of this purpose possible, so long as the reality of the world was not seen to be pledged by that love which constitutes the very essence of God, and as the divine nature retains its egoistic appearance, and continues shut up within itself. The system of Erigena has a decidedly less ethical character: to love and freedom he as good as never alludes; and, therefore, his speculations may wear the look of a mere retrogression, as compared with those of Maximus. At the same time, it must be allowed that although he speaks, not of the love of man whose end and aim is God, but rather of speculation, which makes God the object of enjoyment and of blessedness, he brings very definitely to view not only an ethical momentum overlooked by Maximus,—the momentum, namely, that man also is an end in himself,—but also (and this relates to the objective aspect of the matter) the fact, that the true man is God's end and aim: for God *in Himself* is thereby implicitly, though by no means with sufficient consequence and distinctness, defined to be Love. Thus that highest feature, which

Maximus represented as pertaining only to man, is by Erigena implicitly attributed to God. The latter, indeed, can bring forward nothing else as the end and aim of God, save the blessedness to be realized by man in mental contemplation; with regard to love on the part of man, he observes silence. God's purpose, also, is thus left without a worthy object; and the loving deed of God, which, considered in itself, is held to have been performed, not yet represented as truly ethical. For this reason, Erigena also, though he held man to be the object and aim of the self-revelation of God, was unable to show that, on the principles of his system, the perfection of the world would not be its annihilation. Only by attributing to the world an ethical character, that is, by supposing it to participate in freedom, could he have been able to ensure at once its eternal distinction from, and unity with, God; and give truth and reality to the conception of the divine causality.

Erigena's system has unmistakeably an emanatistic foundation. This is evident from the ideas of the "processus" out of God, of the immediate consubstantiality of the world with God, and especially from his idea of the "divisio," which, the further it advances, the greater is its distance from the simple, from the divine.[1] But there are no traces in his system of the other aspect of Emanatism, which (deistically) represents the world, in its departure from the divine perfection, as advancing onwards till it attains a kind of God-deserted independence. Erigena rather clung (platonically) to the notion of the overreaching *(übergreifend)* immanence of God in the world, even in its state of disintegration; and represented it, so far as it has actual being, as having the "primordiales causæ" for its foundation; nay more, as contained in God, and as being God. Rather than receive that doctrine of the independence of the world,—a doctrine absolutely repugnant to his non-ethical Monism,—he allowed himself to be led away into an attempt to show that the disintegration, the sensuality, and the sin of the world are a mere seeming, which disappear before the gaze of Him who can contemplate the whole at once, resolving themselves into the fullest eter-

[1] In the dedicatory epistle to Charles the Bald, prefixed to the translation of the Scholia of Maximus on Gregory Nazianzen, which that monarch had requested him to make, he remarks:—"We learn from Maximus, among other things, qua ratione, quæ sunt maxima multiplicatione, minima sunt virtute."

nal harmony. Considered in their true light, therefore, all elements which would be cast out by this harmony are counted as non-existent; those, on the contrary, which have being must be treated as good, and as subserving the beauty of the universe.[1] Had Erigena consistently kept to this point of view, involving as it did the existence of an ever-present ἀποκατάστασις, he must have denied the possibility of any progress or any history; and thus the ethical, which, at all events in the form of true knowledge, he steadily represented as the universal goal, would have been swallowed up in a natural process revolving eternally in the same circuit. On the whole, however, he refrained from consistently following out his premises, and regarded, not merely knowledge, as needing to be perfected and set free (which might in itself have been compatible with the supposition that the most perfect order reigns in the world, and that it is solely our view of the world which is confused, owing to the faulty habit of insulating what should be conjoined), but also the divisions and sensuality of the world. Although these latter defects can never gain full force and reality, they still indicate a veritable lack of the vital power of the Divine unity in the world, and, in his view, cannot be overcome save by a process. What this process is, let us now inquire.

On the one hand, indeed, this visible world is a mere accident of the true substance, a mere shadow of the true form, a mere echo of the voice. For the true world abides in the "Verbum:" the "primordiales causæ," whose "forma intellectualis, universalis" is the Word, are the true eternal essence of the world, into which the world returns out of the coarse sensuous seeming which it wore. And then the question put by the scholar would readily suggest itself (L. v. 24):—"But tell me, then, whether or not the Word of God, in whom the causes of all things subsist after an eternal manner, Himself entered into the effects of the causes, that is, into this visible world?" Consequently,—whether, if the visible world be treated as a mere seeming, the incarnation was not also a mere seeming? The teacher answers, in the first instance, "Whoso denieth the incarnation hath turned his back on the true religion." What he meant by these words, becomes clearer when we examine his

[1] A certain "divisio" is necessary to cognition (that is, to the highest good): iv. 6, p. 178.

doctrine concerning man. He tries to show that man is more than mere seeming. Man is made in the image of the Trinity (ii. 23). It is distinctive of human nature to unite in itself the substances of all things. In it are bound up together the whole visible and invisible creation, spiritual and corporeal. For this reason, man is termed the workshop and the middle of all; for in him everything is contained that follows after God,—yea, even angels. For a moment it might be supposed that Erigena was now on the point of adopting a line of argument, which would enable him to assert for the material world also, a significance in connection with man, and, apart from this, to point out the seat of a universal susceptibility for the universal principle of the Logos. But he at once resumes his previous train of thought. So high is man's position, considered in his integrity, which is paradise (iv. 15). There, the Word is his tree of life; there he is in his ideal world, in his home. But the Protoplasts did not inhabit this paradise in time. Man had not originally his material body; it first became his through sin (iv. 13). Sin, however, did not first come into existence some time after the commencement of his earthly existence, but arose coincidently, contemporaneously with his entrance into the world of disintegration. His deliverance, consequently, must consist in the negation of this apostasy, in the return of the effects into their primordial causes, in the abolition of the divided (ii. 14, p. 55; iv. 15, p. 197 ff.); that is, it consists in a physical process.

It would appear, therefore, that Erigena held firmly that this material divided being (the world) is not a mere empty seeming, but a seeming to which pertain significance and power, and which, therefore, needs to be really overcome. These premises, however, seem to render an incarnation impossible, inasmuch as a participation in a corporeal nature would involve Christ's undertaking also the maculation of sin. Moreover, such premises make an incarnation unnecessary; for there seems no course open but to regard the reduction of the effects into the "causas primordiales," as an universal cosmical process, to whose furtherance, not the humanity of Christ, but solely the omnipotent divinity of the Word, can at all contribute.

Nevertheless, he represents the teacher as replying further to the above question (v. 24): He took upon Him the form of a servant, and human nature in its entirety; but in this latter

the whole world subsists. Consequently, the Word of God, in whom all things were created and causally subsist, stooped and entered, as touching His deity, into the effects of these causes, into this material world, when He assumed human nature, in which are contained the entire visible and invisible creation. He stooped, in order that, as to His humanity, He might deliver and call back the effects into their causes,—those causes of which, as to His deity, He was the eternal vehicle and bearer; and that thus the latter might be retained in the former by an unutterable union. If the wisdom of God did not stoop down into the effects of the causes, causality itself would perish; the extinction of the effects would involve the extinction of the cause, and *vice versâ;* for it is in the nature of such correlative ideas to stand or fall with each other (p. 252).

Herein lies the idea that, apart from the incarnation, the extinction of the world of effects, and, through that, of the world of causes, was imminent. But how far? He had taught that the "effectus" eternally subsist in the "causæ primordiales," and have in them their true substance and being. And now one might be tempted to understand him to teach, that Christ was nothing more than the expression of that eternal relation between "effectus" and "causæ," in virtue of which the "effectus," notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, repose eternally in their "causæ," and the "causæ" eternally evolve themselves in their "effectus." Christ would then have been the mere symbol of an universal and eternal truth—the truth of the unity of God with the world, especially with man as the centre of the world: with regard to which he simply observed,—So certainly as we believe, as Christians, that the eternal Word descended in Christ into the world of effects, and that humanity, in which the universe is contained, itself reposes in the Word, even so certainly must we hold that the eternal Word is and remains eternally united with the world of effects. But for this (eternal) descent of the "causæ primordiales," whose archetype is the Word, into the effects, the effects themselves would be nothing. In this case, however, Christ would be the mere allegorical representation of a philosopheme, of the universal indestructible relation between cause and effect. Moreover, inasmuch as the world, strictly speaking, continues ever uninterruptedly rooted in its eternal primordial

grounds, Christ could not, on such a view, be deemed to have been entrusted with any real work of deliverance or perfection. But that Erigena had no intention of teaching this, is evident from his describing the divisions and materiality as an evil which called for a redemption. And, though he could not attribute to this evil, with the sin which it involved, that substantial reality which belongs to the ideal world, this (in Erigena's estimation) only proved that it was capable of being overcome,—not, however, that a deliverance from this illusion and seeming was unnecessary.

It is true, indeed, that redemption, according to Erigena, consists chiefly in wisdom—in speculative knowledge. This knowledge, however, he did not represent as a natural, matter-of-course possession, but as needing to be acquired (p. 282 ff.). In the first instance, the opposite of knowledge holds sway.

At this point he endeavoured to show the connection between the Person of Christ and the process of the completion of the world. In the only-begotten Incarnate One, the entire world was at first individually (specialiter) restored: at the end of the world, it will be again restored in Him, universally and generically. What He accomplished in His individual self, He will accomplish in all,—not only in men, but in the whole visible creation. When He became man, the Word of God passed over no created substance,—not a single one did He fail to take upon Himself; for, in assuming human nature, He assumed the whole of creation. Consequently, in renovating the human nature appropriated by Him, He renovated the whole of the visible and invisible creation. And, in point of fact, having assumed human nature in its entirety, He raised it in Himself above all that is visible, and converted (convertit) it into His deity. Consequently, He saved the entire human nature, which He entirely assumed, entirely in itself, and entirely in the entire race* (p. 252). He did not regard Christ's humanity merely as the sum and substance of the "mundus" in the same sense in which every man is so; but in Christ's humanity were the "primitiæ" of the whole of humanity (L. v. 27, p. 257). Entire humanity is exalted in Him, and sits at the right hand of God (ii. 23, p. 72). In Him it has become God. And for

* "Folglich hat er die ganze menschliche Natur, die er ganz annahm, ganz in sich selbst und ganz im ganzen Geschlechte gerettet."

Himself, the Head of the Church reserved this distinctive peculiarity—that His humanity was not merely made partaker of deity, or deified, but was made very deity (verum etiam ipsa Deitas fieret). In Him alone was humanity conjoined with the Godhead in unity of substance (p. 252).

That he intended in this way again to do away with the incarnation, and merely to teach that the Verbum was the universal principle of perfection, cannot be maintained; although, as we have seen, he could not employ the language he does, were not the deity of Christ, strictly speaking, in his view, the principal thing. Quite as little importance must be attached to his confession of belief in the orthodox doctrine of two natures (L. v. 25–27). At the utmost, he could only accept it so far as it related to the earthly life of Christ.

But in what way does Christ bring about our return into the primordial causes? *Primarily*, as has been observed, by accomplishing this return into God, as completely and perfectly as possible, in His own Person. His return was the archetypal, nay more, the principial (prinzipiell), return of the whole of humanity. *Next*, by becoming, in virtue of His own perfect return, the mediatory cause of the *adunatory* process (adunatio), to be accomplished outside of Himself. The Word of God, says he (L. v. 25, p. 252, 253), was unintelligible to visible and invisible creatures ere it became man; but, by stooping down to them, as it were, in the incarnation, it became cognisable. Thus, also, was manifested the archetype of that which we shall be. For if Christ, who knows all things—nay more, who is the understanding of all—has, in truth, arranged everything assumed by Him, who can doubt that what was done in the Head, by way of illustrating what is to be effected for the whole of human nature, will be afterwards accomplished in the whole?

The question still remains unanswered—How could Christ enter into this divided nature and world without sin, and thus fulfil the mission just attributed to Him? He who is himself subjected to the divisions from which deliverance is needed cannot be the redeemer, but only he in whom there is no longer any discerption, who "differentia mystice in spiritum aufert" (ii. 14, p. 55, cll. v. 20, p. 243). Does not this imply that the Exalted One alone is able to deliver? Indeed, Erigena designates Christ the second Adam, because in Him was adunated,

what in the first Adam had been disintegrated,—disintegrated, for example, into the difference of sex (L. iv. 20, p. 211). He does not enter upon a more careful consideration of the question, How could Christ have exhibited that ideal image in a form intelligible and recognisable by us, if He Himself first needed to be delivered from divisions? At this point, however, he might have found a support in his doctrine of the divine Theophanies; especially as to have done so, would have been perfectly consistent with his view of the entire visible world as a mere echo, a mere transitory reflection, of the true world. The divine substance in itself is absolutely unapproachable to contemplation; nor could it become quite intelligible even in the incarnation. So far as God is superessential, it is undoubtedly impossible for Him to become man; especially impossible is it for Him to enter into the division and disintegration, for example, of the sexes. That would be a negation of, an apostasy from, Himself. So far, therefore, as Christ still participated in that dividedness, He was not the perfect God-man (that is, God had not yet in Him become man, nor man God). In the *historical* Christ, consequently, God can only have revealed Himself in a form which was at once a revelation and the negation of the supposition that God had actually revealed Himself, had really come forth: in other words, He could only show Himself in an image,—which image, whilst expressive of a will to be counted as present, contained also a summons to men to allow themselves to be stirred up by the image itself, to the negation of itself, and to soar aloft into the region of archetypal, naked, unimaged being.* In no one individual person and form can God reveal His essence; consequently, not in the earthly manifestation of Christ. The Word did but reveal, as by a reflection of Himself, *that* God is, not *what* He is. This, indeed, is revealed by the visible world also, so far as the eternal is its true substance and reality; and it is accordingly consistent enough in Erigena to put Christ on the same level with a "multiplex theophania," by which the Word became without end a subject of knowledge to angelic and human natures (L. v. 25, 26). He considered the historical life of Christ to have been distinguished by the peculiarity of furthering and facilitating the rise of men above theophanies to the archetypal.

* See Note N, App. II.

For it does not allow of our considering the full and true idea of Him to have been realized in His temporal life, which was marked by transitoriness. His earthly existence was followed by His resurrection and ascension; and these constitute an objective summons, not to confine ourselves to the outward form, but to lay hold on the inner truth and reality of Christ, —to see in Him the One who rose above all that is finite, divided, material, and accomplished the eternal, absolute "adunatio" of God and creation. Though he was unable to attach any true significance to the earthly life of Christ, on the ground of its inner moral content, still, even as a theophany, he held it to be of more importance than other lives, because in it occurred things (for example, the walking on the sea, the transfiguration) which were premonitory of that higher supra-historical existence, into which He was destined to rise, through the various stages of death, resurrection, and ascension. Into the same higher mode of existence He will also gradually exalt humanity and nature; for by His perfection He Himself became deity.

At the commencement of the Middle Ages, the influence of Erigena was by no means small.[1] A large proportion of his pantheistic principles found shelter under the authority of the pseudo-Areopagite and Maximus, who, during the Middle Ages also, were held in the highest esteem. Two other circumstances were also in his favour:—firstly, the close affinity of parts of his system both with the older Romanic Mysticism of the Middle Ages (Sec. 12), and with the Scholasticism on which that Mysticism had exercised a fermenting influence: secondly, that during its first period, Scholasticism was intimately connected with Platonism. Not till the year 1209 was the chief work of Erigena branded with censure by the University of Paris, through the influence of the Amalricians.

II. Anselm did not regard God as the mere infinite, indeterminate ocean of being. According to his system, this ocean of infinitude seeks a centre, through the medium of which God thinks and possesses (denkt und hat) Himself (Note 54). This stands to him for the doctrine of the Trinity, to which he returns; thus decidedly diverging from the Areopagite and

[1] For example, in lib. i. Exceptionum, c. 24,—a work attributed to Richard de St Victor,—he is desigated the Discoverer of "Theologia."

Erigena. As triune, God is an Ipsum; and this Ipsum Anselm considered to be the starting-point for the procession of a Non-ipsum, of the world. But he still maintained, that God alone was the reality of everything; and that the world, so far as it *is*, appertains to God.

III. The St Victors, especially Richard, availed themselves of the doctrine of the Trinity, for the purpose of effecting a more determinate discrimination in God, which should allow of the combination of the ideas of the communicableness and self-assertion of God, in connection even with the act of communication. Richard puts the question,—On the one hand, power and wisdom are to be conceived as communicable. On the other hand, the attributes of God are His substance; power, wisdom, eternity, are He Himself: but God's substance cannot be communicable; for there cannot be anything higher than God, anything equal to God. How, then, are these two things compatible? His reply is,—There is an individual substantiality, and a general substantiality. The former is incommunicable, and can only pertain to one. That which constitutes God God, or, in other words, His unique individual substantiality, is incommunicable: the general, on the contrary, is communicable. The distinctive characteristic of God is, that He not merely *has*, but *is*, wisdom, omnipotence, love, and so forth; whereas we *have* wisdom, but *are* not it. In his view, the Trinity constitutes God, an individual unique substance, an essence sui generis. The universal divine substance constricted itself within God, by the eternal, trinitarian, self-composed, self-satisfied process (selbstberuhigt), so as, at the same time, to have an individual form of existence, decidedly different from the world, which, although representable, is incommunicable.[1] Thus the personality of God has in itself, through the Trinity, a pleroma, of which He disposes in the way of communication, without therefore giving up Himself. God can never communicate Himself, that which constitutes Him the absolutely unique Spirit, sui generis;—so communicate, namely, that the receiver should not only have, but be, that which he had received. Such self-communication takes place in the Trinity alone.

[1] Richard de St Victor, "De Trinitate," lib. i. 15, ii. 11–13. Ritter, a. a. O. 3, 559.

But the mystical yearning after God is not satisfied by merely attaining to participation, as it were, in the impersonal essence of God. It seeks Him Himself; it is not content to abide merely in that sphere of the divine, which, by communicating itself to different beings in different degrees, brings into existence the different grades of beings. The ancient Greek Mystics, absorbed in the mystical vision, were content to keep reverent silence in the presence of the Supra-essential One; to allow thought and discourse to cease, whilst admiring and adoring the mystery. Even the Mysticism of Erigena still retained predominantly the character of knowledge,—it was a theosophy. But from the time of the St Victors, we find the subjective tendency becoming every day mightier, to regard such admiring wonder of God and His transcendent essence as a mere preparatory step to that which is rather its true aim, to wit, the *enjoyment* of God Himself. The holy passion of this form of Mysticism broke through the barriers of the eternal transcendence and incommunicableness of God set up by the Areopagite; and cast aside the doctrine, that the lower grades of beings depend on the higher, and that through the latter alone the divine descends to the former, vouchsafing in a certain sense its presence, in that by which it manifests itself. With youthful vigour it pressed on, and knocked, as it were, even at the door of the divine mystery, at the very sanctuary of His unique and singular being: its goal was not merely the communicable divine powers, but God Himself; its desire was, that He should open Himself, and give Himself to be enjoyed. But how does the individual subject attain hereunto? Such yearnings undoubtedly infolded within themselves a conception of God which rises above His merely physical sublimity: for nothing but actual personal love can be embraced with such fervour. And yet, on the other hand, Richard firmly maintained that the occluded (verschlossen) incommunicable element, is the highest element in God, and constitutes His singularity, and, as it were, His individuality. Nothing, therefore, remained to be said for this love, yearning as it did for the enjoyment of God Himself, than that by its means man can and must be carried out of and beyond Himself, and be ravished into the divine essence; that he attains the perfection of his nature by ecstasis,—to wit, by a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, by a subjective,

mystical transubstantiation. For the fiery love of God is not satisfied until it is swallowed up, God-intoxicated, in the enjoyment of God.[1] Of this, man is capable, not in his own sin-weakened strength, but in the strength of God.[2]

Hugo de St Victor, who wrote before Richard, had been more sober; and in him the subjective characteristic had been still more prominent.[3] To the question regarding God's communicableness and incommunicableness, he had not devoted any special consideration: he conceived God's essence to be communicable. But concerning man he says, not merely that he has an infinite capacity for God, but also, that through merit and development alone can he become actualiter that, the "potentia" and "virtus" of which, were implanted within him by the grace of creation. It is not clear, however, what inner significance he still could, and meant to, attribute to the objective grace and communication of God. Hugo was related to Erigena, much as Maximus was to the Areopagite. The sense of freedom, deeper moral and religious needs, had been awakened in him; and these were the things which rendered it impossible for Hugo to rest satisfied, either with mere sacramental grace, or with mere speculative intuitions: but still he ventured merely to approach, not to meddle with, the hard and rigid traditional conception of God. Richard, on the contrary, stirred by the same deeper anthropological impulses, wrestled with the traditional conception of God, and endeavoured to infuse warmth into it; but the task was too difficult for him, and instead of the sacramental transubstantiation of the Church, he adopted the mystical transubstantiation previously referred to. If anything can, the history of Mysticism in the Middle Ages does show, both that the conception of God stood in need of an actual transmutation and remodelling; and that in order to the success of this reformation, it must go hand in hand with a further intensification of the inward life, and must be the result of more penetrating and conscious vital experiences. The evangelical assurance of redemption, and it alone, could be the starting-point and inauguration of fresh progress in the knowledge of God and

[1] He speaks of a "raptus," "excessus," etc. "De contemplat." iv. 22.

[2] According to Albert the Great, man can come into contact with, but cannot grasp or comprehend, God.

[3] Liebner's "Hugo v. St Victor," 1832; Ritter a. a. O. Bd. 3, p. 507 ff

Christ. The way was prepared for the attainment of this assurance by the growth of the knowledge of the office of Christ.

In one aspect, however, the Mysticism of Richard, whose ecstatic character gained him numerous followers, necessarily stood in a relation to Christology exactly similar to that of Erigena. The ancient Neo-Platonic conception of God, which still retained its hold on the Christian mind through the medium of the Romanic Mysticism on which it had exercised so strong an influence, did not admit of regarding any revelation of God, whether in Christ or the sacraments, as anything more than a mere image. To soar aloft, or to be ravished into the very essence of God—that was the task. This Mysticism sought God, accordingly, behind His revelations in the mystery, in that essence which was notwithstanding represented as, in its very essential idea, unapproachably occluded:—in that, on the contrary, in which He had revealed Himself, they did not believe it possible to find Him. Not unjustly did these Mystics remain unmoved by the pomp of the Church's theurgy, by the transubstantiation of the elements into the present God-man; the converse aspect of which was, that conversion of the divine into a finite thing, subject to physical limits, which they could not but find objectionable. They desired a more intimate union with Christ than the sensuous, tangible one; they desired a spiritual union: and in the domain of the spirit their Mysticism could allow free play to the infinitude of the divine essence, especially as, instead of shrinking back from, they yearned after, submersion in the ocean of this infinitude. Their sacrament was the enjoyment of the overpowering sweetness of God, which might indeed connect itself with the outward sacrament as an image, but could not be bound thereto. We cannot but acknowledge, however, that this Mysticism lacked precisely that element which the Church possessed in even too great plenitude, especially in the sacraments, which had taken Christ's place: though, be it remembered, this element possessed by the Church, could never be combined with the truth in Mysticism, save by means of a higher principle. For it is quite as important to the pious soul, that "grace should be to be found in a place,"—that God should, as it were, deny or constrict His physical infinitude, in order to be personally intelligible and approachable by personal men,—

as that God should be spiritual and free,—the truth represented by Mysticism. The need just referred to, Mysticism was unable to meet: the Church, on the contrary, by its Middle Age doctrine of the sacraments, endeavoured, it is true, to bring God objectively near to every individual man, and, by clothing grace in the form of a continuous miracle, aimed at enabling all subjectively to lay hold upon it. But though it thus sought to help a more needy subjectivity by new means of an objective character, it failed to accomplish its purpose, because, instead of introducing the divine into the inner being of the personal spirit, it merely introduced it into his outward nature: that is, it failed from lack of the very element, onesidedly, and therefore resultlessly, aimed at by Mysticism. The higher principle, which unites infinite spirituality with concreteness, is the true idea of personality; or the divine love, as it was personally revealed in Christ. That love meets alike the need felt by Mysticism, of the presence of God to its inmost spirit, yea, of having God as its own; and the need felt by the piety of the Church, of the constriction of the divine infinitude into an intelligible form.

Though the Mysticism of the twelfth century accomplished little for this subject, because as yet the higher conception of God demanded by Christian piety was but germinantly enveloped within its fervent love and appropriation of God, still we must allow that it prepared the ground. And, however little its idea of God could be expected to aid in the formation of a true Christology, so far as we understand Christology to relate to an actual revelation of the imageless substance, in another aspect (which will present itself before us subsequently), this Mysticism contained elements having a really important bearing on Christology; though involving the renunciation of the earlier conception of God to which it was itself still bound.

The Middle Age theology first succeeded in extricating itself from the influence of Erigena and Neo-Platonism during the thirteenth century. Sabellianism and Subordinatianism were a second time the stages through which the Christian mind passed, from the eleventh century onwards, in its efforts to regenerate and reproduce the conception of God.[1] Abelard had been the chief representative of Sabellianism. Subordinatianism, on

[1] A similar course was taken during the third and fourth centuries.

the contrary, durst no longer openly raise its head in the form of naked Arianism within the bosom of the Church: it was, however, permitted to conceal itself beneath a species of Tritheism, as in the case of Roscellin; or to unite itself with Sabellianism, as in the case of the Abbot Joachim of Floris (about the year 1200), whose view is suggestive of Tertullian's Trinity of the three Ages of the world. But as they touched on Christology merely at a few points, afterwards to be considered, we shall at present only dwell for a moment on Amalrich of Bena and David of Dinanto; and then pass on to the Scholasticism of the thirteenth century.

It is now pretty generally acknowledged that Amalrich and his school drew their ideas from Erigena, whose views, along with the Amalrician, the Sabellian, and the Subordinatian theories of the twelfth century, were condemned by the Church at the beginning of the thirteenth century.[1] Amalrich's mystic Pantheism boldly drew both the theoretical and practical consequences, which must inevitably bring him into collision with the Church. The difference between him and Erigena consisted probably in his more distinctly regarding the world as the actuality of God: he thus broke more completely through that acosmistic bent which was still powerful in Erigena, and, instead of allowing the world to be absorbed in God, represents the world more definitely than Erigena as the self-realization of God. The expression employed by Erigena and many teachers of the Church, "God is all," was converted, now that the principle of subjectivity began to show itself more vigorously (even in the form of opposition to the objectivity of the Church), into that other expression, "All is God;" though *sensu eminenti*, "Man is God." This principle was, indeed, involved in that of Erigena; but it could never have been developed therefrom, had not the intellectual relation to the idea of God and to Christianity become an entirely different one from that of Erigena. In agreement with this latter, Amalrich says, it is true, "God is the essence of all things, the real being of all." He does not, however, rest contented with the contemplation of the eternal ideal being, but goes on to teach, that, though God cannot be seen in Himself, He can be seen in His creatures, as light can be seen in the atmosphere.

[1] Compare specially Concil. Lat. 1215, Mansi xxii. 981.

In his view, the ideas of the divine intelligence are not eternal, but are the subject of a process; they create and are created. He would seem, therefore, to have been disposed to recognise the existence of growth, of finitude in God Himself, as a determination of His spiritual being. On that supposition, the world is no longer a mere theophany of God; the Pantheism of rigid being, towards which Erigena, despite other features of his system, constantly tended, is converted into a Pantheism of process. But Amalrich's mind could not rest content with an empty, endless process; in him stirred a theological factor. Hence he says, further: God is the end of all things, for everything will return into Him, in order to repose unalterably in, and to constitute one being (individual) with Him. That he did not intend herewith to teach a species of annihilation, is evident from other observations of his, which have been preserved. Every man must become a member of Christ; God becomes man in all ages, but (as it appears) progressively,—to wit, as the Father in Abraham, as the Son in Mary, and as the Holy Ghost daily in us. He therefore, of course, held God to be present in the holy Eucharist: not that this presence is the effect of the consecration; for the consecrating formula does but give expression to that which already is, to the actually existent unity of God and nature. But that return into God Amalrich did not regard as first taking place in the future, but as possible even here. When the spirit is exalted by perfect love into God, it returns out of itself into its own proper eternal idea in God; it loses itself (that is, as a sensuous individual), and gains true divine being. It is then no longer a mere creature, nor does it behold and love God merely through the creature; but is itself the visible and beloved God: that is, God has become incarnate in it.[1]

[1] Compare Hahn's "Geschichte der Ketzer im Mittelalter," Bd. 3, 1850, p. 182 ff. Mansi Concil. T. xxii. 1080. Dixit etiam, Deum esse essentiam omnium creaturarum et esse omnium.—Asserebat etiam Deum non videri in se, sed in creaturis sunt lumen in aëre.—Negabat idearum in mente divina eternitatem.—Asseruit ideas quæ sunt in mente divina creare et creari.—Dixit etiam, quod ideo finis omnium rerum dicitur Deus, quia omnia reversura sunt in eum, ut in Deo incommutabiliter quiescant et unum individuum atque incommutabile in eo manebunt.—Amalricus cum suis sociis dicebat, nos esse naturalia membra Christi quia fingebat eandem animam Christi in omnibus bonis hominibus habitare.—Sic Deum locutum

Akin to this is the doctrine of David of Dinanto, that God is both the material (esse materiale) and the formative principle of all things.[1]

The more open appearance of Pantheism, its greater estrangement from Mysticism, and the anti-churchly tone of these men, were undoubtedly one of the chief causes of the disruption with Erigena and Neo-Platonism, which took place from the thirteenth century onwards. Even so early as the first half of the thirteenth century, the Aristotelian philosophy entered on its supremacy.

IV. The Scholasticism of the thirteenth century endeavoured to extricate itself more definitely from pantheistic principles, and to lay hold of the proper Christian conception of God. But, in the case of Thomas Aquinas, it still remained closely connected, both as to form and substance, with the earlier points of view. Anselm had endeavoured to speculate *out of* faith; Abelard had made knowledge and comprehension the foundation and condition of faith; Richard de St Victor had laid down the principle, that the supernatural mystical vision is the true organ of the knowledge of God. But Thomas Aquinas, on the contrary, sought to combine two modes of cognition reciprocally complementary, and correspondent to the two spheres of knowledge. One part of the science of God is dominable by reason, is capable of being rationally cognised: this is the natural science of God, metaphysics. The other, higher portion, essentially transcends the power of reason, is incomprehensible to it, is communicated alone by positive revelation, and can only be attained by the man who is raised

fuisse in Ovidio sicut in Augustino.—Pater in Abraham incarnatus, Filius in Maria, Spiritus Sanctus in nobis quotidie incarnatur. Hanc insaniam nisus fuit ponere Amalricus—spiritum rationalem, dum perfecto amore fertur in Deum, deficere penitus a se ac reverti in ideam propriam, quam habuit immutabiliter—in Deo."

[1] Compare Hahn a. a. O. p. 189. He wrote a book, "De Tomis" or Divisionibus," which reminds one of the work of Erigena. Pantheistic principles were diffused, also, by the works of Arabian natural philosophers, and by commentators on Aristotle, such as Avicebron and Algazel, under shelter of Aristotle's name. For this reason the Council of Paris, in the year 1209, condemned Aristotle; but the prohibition of his works soon became obsolete.

above himself in the enjoyment or vision of God. Thus we see that that mystical supernatural vision of God no longer swallows up or constitutes the whole of the actual attainable knowledge of Him, as the Areopagite had taught; that the world is no longer the mere seeming or theophany which Erigena had held it to be: the spirit of man, in a word, has already gained a more energetical consciousness of being; this furthered the formation of a higher view of the world, and both gave a stimulus to the doctrine of the cognitive faculty of the mind. The Highest and Best, however, is still represented by Thomas as absolutely unapproachable to reason, and as attainable only by a species of intellectual magic. This highest element, transcending all comprehension, is conceived to be the end for which man was created; so that here, also, there remains in the background nothing but a perfection which would be the end of man. The idea of a blending and interweaving of the two modes of cognition, in the mind enlightened by Christianity, lay beyond the horizon even of a Thomas Aquinas: and this alone shows that, in the last instance, he could not avoid regarding the divine and the human as mutually exclusive magnitudes. We cannot now devote further attention to showing how this absolute supernaturalism in the domain of knowledge, was the prototype of the mode in which the subject was alone held capable of becoming a participator in the saving grace of God; and how the doctrines of the magical operation of grace, and of transubstantiation, are necessary to this point of view. What the consequences thereof would have been to Christology, if it had now for the first time been presented as a problem to the scholastic mind, need not to be indicated. It still remains for us, however, to cast a glance at the natural doctrine of God, developed by Thomas with peculiar fondness, in order that we may see the sort of relation to Christology which it also necessarily involved.

Thomas does not, it is true, represent the world as originating in a suffering on the part of God, as did the old Emanatism; nor does he consider its existence to be directly involved in the existence of God. He deems it to have originated in the creative will of God; he even goes so far as to speak of the Divine goodness in connection therewith. But, on a more careful examination, we find that he did not regard this

will as the final cause, but simply as a point of transition for, and an instrument of, a cause lying behind it.[1] This latter and real cause is not the Divine love, but the Divine understanding, which moves the will in the manner of a necessity dominating over it:—relatively to it, therefore, the will is again passive. But the highest end and aim of this Divine understanding,—the end and aim in which lies the unity of its ends and aims,—is not the idea of *an ethical world.* The production of such an idea would have been a moral act, and, as such, not a pure act of the understanding: it would have been rather an act of love; and to love it would have been necessary to go back, in accounting for its origin. Whereas the Divine understanding is nothing more than the living mirror of the fulness and beauty of the Divine being and life. Beyond these physical and æsthetical categories Thomas did not advance. God thinks and cognises the world, says he, when He thinks Himself. In Him, namely, there is an incommunicable and a communicable essence. When God thinks the latter, He necessarily thinks the world; and this cogitation determines His creative will. When He thinks Himself communicable, He thinks another than Himself, to which He communicates Himself, and which thus resembles Himself. Now this cogitation is creative; and as He thinks in His essence all possible forms and degrees of His communicableness, all possible species and classes of beings are posited in His cogitation of Himself. The unity of all these possibilities, which become actualities, is the world; and, in the world, man is the connecting link between mere nature and pure spirit. The differences amongst mundane creatures, arise from the differences in the degree and mode of their participation in that divine reality by which they are constituted. Their difference from God, the sole original communicator, lies not so much in their substantial nature; for they derive it, as it were, from the "divisio" of the Divine nature, by the "intellectus," and in this aspect, therefore, there is merely a quantitative difference between them and God. God is the absolute "quantum" of reality; mundane beings are partial realities, which merely resemble Him. But precisely

[1] Compare H. Ritter a. a. O. Bd. iv. 286 ff. Another view is expounded in Branisz "Geschichte der Philosophie seit Kant," 1st volume, Introduction, p. 444 f.

this quantitative difference of God, not merely from individual beings, but also from the whole world, constitutes again an impassable gulf between God and the world, which owes its independent existence entirely to the imperfection of the communication. From this point of view, if the communication had been perfect, the world would no longer have been the world, but God; and yet the imperfection of the communication is conceived to be the cause of the imperfection of the creatures, which, consequently, if they seek to realize the idea of their perfection, must set, as the goal of their efforts, that complete communication which will terminate their independent existence. So far, however, as the world subsists, God's communication of Himself is necessarily incomplete, and inadequate to His being; and even the idea that the individual is supplemented by the universe, or (to use the language of the Church) by the mystical body of the Church, can, in this case, be no more than a palliative. Still less can there consistently be any word of God's being completely in one, that is, in Christ. Of all this, one thing alone is the cause; to wit, that the physical category of the infinitude of the essence still continued to be applied to the idea of God, and that this quantitative infinitude of being, between which, considered in itself, and finitude there still remains an absolute incommensurability, is represented as constituting God's highest glory and inmost essence. The Christian idea of God as Love, was held, it is true, by faith; but the intellect had as yet been unable to lay hold on it. The idea did, indeed, enter to some extent into the sphere of thought, which was becoming constantly more christianized; for otherwise there would have been no recognition of God's communication, but it had not yet completely mastered the ancient conception of God; hence the hybrid nature of the result,—a character which marked the Romanic Church and its theology.

Last of all, Duns Scotus undoubtedly took an important step in advance, relatively to the conception of God, when he defined the will of God to be not a mere instrument determined by God's thought, but, in relation to the world, the primary and fundamental element in God. He also regards the inner essence of God as absolutely transcendent. According to Scotus, however, God being a Trinity, is so perfectly satisfied in Himself that no necessity, either of thought or being, determines Him to

create; but it is simply and purely His *will* that there should be a world, and that this particular world should exist. This will has no further ground. It was not a thought of wisdom, it was no emotion of love, that impelled Him. All that we can do, is to keep to the positive actual fact, that God willed to create the world, and that He has established the precise moral law, which He gave, and not another. One thing alone is, by logical necessity, involved in this fact—to wit, that having been once created by Him, we are essentially related to, and are under obligation to be like, Him. According to this view of the matter, the relation of God to the world, is, in the last instance, simple arbitrariness. The distinction between Him and us is, that He is absolute arbitrariness, and we are relative arbitrariness, owing allegiance to Him, the Lord. But a further conclusion must also be drawn, namely, that such an inner action of the spirit in us, as involves not the negation, but the realization, of our essential nature, is, according to this system, impossible; and that there remains *no place whatever for an absolute self-communication of God to the world.* And although the ethical was posited, at all events as to its form, when the existence of a will was acknowledged, the ethical itself was not conceived to constitute the necessary content of this will. Indeed, the ethical holds here a more non-essential position than even in the system of Thomas Aquinas. The absolute form of freedom, of which the ethical ought to be the content, the matter, is strained to such a degree of self-contentment, that its relation to the ethical is, as it were, purely one of sport, and it is represented as having its true and proper being, in a supposed loftier, supra-moral, and more majestic sphere. But this professedly supra-moral being, although conceived under the form of a will, is in reality sub-moral. Will, represented as arbitrariness, is in as true a sense merely physical, as a will which is determined by something other than itself (the view of Thomas Aquinas).[1]

[1] The transcendent character of the idea of God, propounded by Scholasticism, set up such a partition-wall between God and Jesus, that the latter was never in a position to admit into Himself the entire Logos. The Logos remained outside of Jesus, especially as, in agreement with the physical nature of the conception of God, chief stress was laid on the Divine illimitedness and infinitude. Duns Scotus and Albert the Great go so far even as to deny all resemblance between the infinite and the finite (compare Ritter's "Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie," Bd. iv. 197, 380 ff.,

It is evident, therefore, beforehand, that the doctrine regarding God, taught by the chief representatives of the Romanic period, could not be very favourable to Christology. No less clear is it that it was, in many respects, fitted to give sanction and occasion to, and be the basis of, false surrogates of a living and efficient consciousness of the significance of the Person of Christ. Finally also, in combination with the prevalent doctrine of grace on the one hand, and the doctrine of the power or divine nature of man on the other hand, it tended to render the incarnation of Christ almost unnecessary, and to lower its real importance, relatively to the life of the individual and the Church.[1]

With these introductory observations, let us now enter upon the History of the Scholastic Christology.

382, 273. According to Thomas, we can consistently attribute to Christ merely the highest degree of participation in the communicable essence of God; strictly speaking, we cannot declare Him to *be God*. Compare also Richard de St Victor, de Trin. i. 15, ii. 11, 12.

[1] It is no accident, therefore, that most of the Scholastics deny the necessity of the incarnation of God, — nay more, that even Thomas Aquinas should do so; for the pantheistic element in his system, on the one hand, anticipates the incarnation, and, on the other hand, renders it dispensable. God's grace, he teaches, might have accomplished the same results without the incarnation, as it has accomplished by it.

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE CONTROVERSY WITH NIHILIANISM.

THE history of our Dogma down to the present time, has shown us that, owing to the predominance given to the divine aspect of the Person of Christ, since the fifth century, the idea of the God-man has been ceaselessly threatened with Docetism, even though in a form which became every day more subtile and refined. This danger was averted solely by the aid of the West, which played the most important part in establishing the duality of the natures, and on the basis thereof, the duality of wills, activities, and modes of operation. Regarded from this point of view, therefore, Adoptianism was merely an exaggeration of Western orthodoxy. But from the ninth century downwards, we find the West yielding to the very same temptation to dissipate the human aspect, with which it had itself always done battle in the East. When Adoptianism endeavoured consistently to follow out the Western tendency to assert the duality of the natures, the Church pronounced its condemnation, and, in the act of doing so, began unconsciously to controvert the premises, along with the consequences drawn from them.

It was not, indeed, the old form of Docetism or Eutychianism, or Monophysitism, that was now revived; for the traditional custom of rejecting the old heresies still continued to prevail. But the true vital interest of piety concentrated itself, as we have shown, on surrogates of Christ, which left Him, in reality, merely the significance of a past incarnation of the Logos.

A general indication of the retrocession of the human aspect of Christ into the background, during the Middle Ages, is the great influence acquired by the Mysticism of the Areopagite in the West subsequently to the time of Erigena, and which it retained, even after that teacher's authority had begun to be regarded with suspicion. Another sign of the same thing we have found in the oldest Mysticism of the Middle Ages,—

that, namely, of the two St Victors. Now, however, it is our task to consider the Scholasticism of the Church, properly so called.

I. PETER THE LOMBARD discussed the subject of Christology in the third book of his Sentences (Distinct. i.–xxiii.); treading pretty closely in the footseps of John of Damascus. The characteristic feature of his inquiry, to which alone we shall devote our attention, will furnish a fair sample of the scholastic art of displaying acuteness and skill, in the putting of new, or the answering of old, questions which only remotely affect religious interests. He is of opinion, that the incarnation might have been accomplished also by the Father or by the Holy Spirit; but it was fitting that He who created the world, should be the one to deliver it;—especially fitting, that He should be sent on the mission who had proceeded from another, rather than He who was self-existent. "The Son is sent by Him, of whom He was born" (in which, unquestionably, an element of Subordinatianism is involved). Other reasons assigned by Peter are purely formal; as, for example,—The Son was chosen for the work, in order that the same who in the Trinity is Father, might not be the Son in the sphere of Revelation, and the two thus cease to be correlatives (Distinct. i.); as would have been the case, had the Father become incarnate. The human nature which the Son assumed, was not a mere attribute, but a nature; comprising body and soul, or the substance of humanity. Body and soul are not, it is true, one substance; but each person has two natures or substances,—the corporeal and the spiritual: and the Son assumed the one essence of humanity, to which both the corporeal and the spiritual pertain. This He assumed in such a manner, that the humanity which He derived from the Virgin, purified by the Holy Spirit, was free from any stain of sin; yet, because He willed it, the punishment which clung to humanity remained. The Virgin, also, was previously entirely purified from sin, nay, even from the charms of sin;—according to some, by their annihilation; according to others, by so abating them, that she never afterwards had the opportunity of sinning. The Holy Ghost also endowed her with the capacity of being fruitful without the co-operation of a man (Dist. iii.). Although as to the flesh He was in the loins of Adam and Abraham, He did

not sin in Adam, as Augustine teaches; for He did not spring from them in consequence of the concupiscence of the flesh: —in this respect, He was not in the loins of the forefathers.

The part taken by the Son in the incarnation was, and continues to be, unquestionably the principal thing; but it excludes neither the action of the Holy Spirit, nor the action of the Father. According to Augustine, the works of the Trinity cannot be divided. But Christ's humanity is not of the substance of the Holy Ghost; nor can He be called the Son of the Holy Ghost, although, in so far as this latter prepared the material in Mary which was to be united with the Word, Christ may be said to have been begotten by Him (Dist. iv.).

He devotes more attention to the question,—Whether the *personality* or the *nature* of the Son assumed humanity,—be it the personality or the nature of the humanity (see above, p. 153). This is easy of answer, in so far as neither the nature nor the personality of the Son assumed a human personality; but rather the personality of the Son appropriated human nature. But the question still remains,—Whether it was the nature of the Son that appropriated human nature?—And this is unanswered. The sixth and eleventh Councils of Toledo (in the years 597 and 653) decided that the Son alone, and not the Trinity, constituted man a part of His own individual person; but did not take him into unity of nature—of that nature which He had in common with the whole Trinity. The divine nature is the element of unity in the Trinity: Mary did not give birth to this element of unity, but merely to the Son, although the whole Trinity co-operated in the formation of the man who was assumed. Augustine, on the contrary, seems to have held that the nature which belongs to the Father as well as to the Son became man. In his work, "de Trinitate" (lib. i. cap. vii. 11), he says,—"When Christ took upon Him the form of a servant, He stooped beneath Himself; for He did not lose in it that divine form which constituted Him the equal of the Father." Now this "divine form" must denote the fulness of the divine nature (Note 55). Similar also are the words of Hilary and Jerome. Peter himself decides,—that the personality of the Son assumed human nature; but he also thinks, that the divine nature too united itself with, and appropriated the human to itself, through and in the Son. It is true, of

course, that the two persons, Father and Holy Ghost, did not assume the form of a servant; but the divine nature was not therefore excluded from the incarnation.[1] When the teachers of the Church say,—That which was peculiar to the Son, and not that which is common to the whole Trinity, assumed a man;—they must be understood to mean, that—Not equally in all the three persons, but, strictly speaking, in that of the Son alone, did the divine nature unite itself with the human. Such also was the opinion of John of Damascus (L. iii. cap. vi.). He intends to say, that the fulness of the divine nature, and not merely a portion thereof, was united with humanity in the Person of the Son. Still he is of opinion, that the expression, "The divine nature became flesh," were better not used. Every individual man has the whole of human nature in himself, and yet something may be predicated of the one which cannot be predicated of others. This is an argument which sounds somewhat tritheistic, so far as it would seem to imply that the only unity in God is a generic unity:—a view which he is otherwise far from adopting. Supposing, however, he here also regarded the divine nature realistically, as the element common to the persons, he would be compelled to limit the incarnation to the Person of the Son (as did Anselm), excluding His nature; unless he were prepared to maintain that the Father and the Spirit also became incarnate, at all events, as to their nature. But if the entire fulness of the divine essence is contained in the nature, and the nature took no part in the incarnation, in what sense can the incarnation have been really of benefit to humanity? A personality without its nature is empty, unsubstantial:—the incarnation of God would then have been a mere illusion. The difficulty is therefore not overcome. Peter adds,—The divine nature did, it is true, assume the human, that is, united the human form with itself; but it did not admit it to full unity with itself, and constitute it a part of its own distinctive individuality. The natures retained their individual characteristics; and therefore we cannot so much say that the divine nature became man, as that the Son of God became man. He did not, however,

[1] The Lateran Council of the year 1215 (Mansi xxii. 981) made use even of the expression, "Unigenitus Dei filius J. Ch. a tota Trinitate communiter incarnatus."

assume a human personality. For that flesh and that soul which He assumed, had not yet been united into a person;—they were first united with each other at the moment when they were united with the Word. Previously there had existed no such person, consisting of body and soul; but a person was constituted by the act of assumption. What the Word assumed was not a person, compounded of soul and body,—the Word did not receive a human person; but, receiving body and soul, it united them with each other and with itself, and in the very act of uniting them, received them. But the main question would then be,—What conception are we to form of this receiving and this uniting?[1] This leads him on to that discussion (Dist. vi.), which drew upon him the charge of Nihilianism (Dist. vi. vii.).

He proceeds to investigate the questions,—What is the significance of the incarnation of the Son of God? and,—What may be said to be its result? In his usual manner, he asks "the wise" of former days and of the present, and classifies their views under three divisions. The *first*, which may be most conveniently described as that of Cyrill of Alexandria, is most adequately expressed when we say, not merely that God became man, but also that man became God,—the latter, indeed, arising out of the former. From this view, it would appear that God then began to be what He had not been before—to wit, a rational being of the human species; and that that rational human being began to be God, not by nature, nor by merit, but by grace;—humanity having been predestinated in Christ to be the Son of God. According to this view, humanity, through Christ, was transfused into, without perishing in, the being of God; and that, because deity appropriated it to itself, and constituted it an integral element of its own being.

The *second* view was substantially the one prevalent in the Church, upheld especially by John of Damascus. According to it, the meaning of the proposition, "God became man," is, that God began to subsist in two natures, or to consist of three substances—body, soul, and deity; but, on the other hand, the meaning of the proposition, "man became God," is, that Jesus Christ is only one person,—prior to the incarnation, *simple;* subsequent to the incarnation, *compounded* of deity and humanity. Now, as the person did not become another than it was before,

[1] See Note O, App. ii.

but the same person which was simple became also the personality of the man, it may be said that the man became God. Not that that person itself then first began to exist, but merely that it then became the personality of the man, or, in other words, composite. This one person, so far as it was distinct from the Father and the Spirit, had constituted the distinctive characteristic of the Divine Sonship of the Word of God: it constituted also that characteristic of the humanity by which it was distinguished from the Virgin Mother, and from the rest of men. Both natures remained entire in Christ: after the union, however, they were no longer as separate and distinct parts, but as parts combined with each other to form one compound hypostasis. This is a substantial, that is, a true union. Not that out of two natures was formed a third, one, compound nature; but they were simply united to form the one compound Person of the Son of God:—that which was created remained a creature, and that which was uncreated remained uncreated; the mortal remained mortal, the immortal immortal; and so also the circumscribed remained circumscribed, and the uncircumscribed remained uncircumscribed.

In the *third* place, he adduces the view which denies not merely that divine being became human, and human divine; but also, that out of the two natures was formed one compound nature;—nay more, which denies that a man at all, or a substance consisting of body and soul, was compounded or brought into being by the incarnation. The union did not have the effect of producing or compounding one nature or person out of two or three (body, soul, and deity); but merely of clothing the Word of God with body and soul as with a garment (indumentum), in order that He might appear in a form accommodated to the eyes of men. Accordingly, Christ did not admit those two into the unity of His person in such a way as that they themselves, or a being compounded out of them, became one person with the Word, much less (as some suppose) were transformed into the Word. They were admitted merely so far as their admission involved no increase in the number of persons; and that because the personality of the Word, which previously had been without garment, was neither divided nor altered by the assumption, but remained unalterably one and the same. On this view, God became man merely in the way of possession,

or as to the appearance which He assumed, that is, "secundum habitum,"—a formula which may, indeed, in itself be variously explained, but which always denotes something that is superadded to another, that pertains to it accidentally, so that that to which it is added might exist without it. Nor does it make any difference whether the addition produce an alteration in either the one or the other, or in both, or no alteration at all. In the present instance, the expression denotes that the nature of the accidental superadded element was not altered, but simply assumed another shape and form, just as a garment laid aside has not the same shape as it had when it was worn. When the Son took upon Himself a true man, that is, a true body and a soul, His form (habitus) was found to be that of a man; in other words, having a man, He was found as a man: not, however, being a man in Himself, but merely in relation to those to whom He appeared in humanity. This, moreover, is the meaning of the words, "God became man;" even as man is said to have become God, on the ground of the assumption of humanity by God. God, therefore, became like men: not that He was transformed into a man, but was clothed with a man, whom, by uniting to some extent with, and making equal to, Himself, He intended to marry with immortality.[1]

The first of these three classes of views,—the one which laid hold on the idea of a real God-manhood with most force and energy,—he despatches pretty summarily with the observation (Dist. vii.), that if that substance had begun to be God, and God, on the other hand, had begun to be it, there would be a substance which was not always God, and a substance which is not divine would be God: consequently, God would have become that which He had not always been; for to become anything, involves the not having been it previously. But against the second view, also, he raises all sorts of objections; above all, the objection, that if the Person of Christ were a composite one, God and man must be designated parts thereof. Now, had the Son of God been merely a part of this person, prior to His assumption of the servant's form, He must have been merely a part, and not a whole; and must, therefore, have undergone an

[1] Dist vi. "Verum hominem suscipiendo habitus (ejus) inventus est ut homo, id est, *habendo hominem inventus est ut homo, non sibi sed cis, quibus in homine appurait.*"

increase, through the accession of the humanity to the deity. But if the Son of God is not a part of the Person of Christ, how can we say that this person consisted, or was compounded, of God and man? This, many concede, he proceeds to urge, and say,—Undoubtedly the parts of a whole do coalesce,—the result being, that something is constituted out of them which previously did not exist; but the principle cannot be applied in the present case; for this Unio is not to be regarded in the light of an union of parts, but is a *mystery*. In the last place (Dist. vi.), favourably to the remaining third view, he adduces the positive consideration, that if God were essentially man, or man God, then, if God had assumed humanity in the female sex (as He might have done), woman would have been essentially God, and God essentially woman. *Against* this third view, which essentially relaxes the bond of the Unio, and attributes to the humanity the mere significance of a permanent theophany,—nay more, which expressly teaches that the Son was not conscious of Himself as a man, but was merely a man in relation to men,—he raises no objections whatever.

Closely connected with this view, is his idea that Christ was a Mediator solely as to His human nature.[1] Now, as the humanity was but a non-essential, accidental feature of the Son of God, and had in no sense become a determination of His person, its only end and aim being the manifestation of Christ to others; nay more, as God could have rendered help, had He so willed, otherwise than by appearing in a man (Dist. xx.),—human nature is thus reduced to the position of an impersonal thing and a non-essential means. But he does not represent the divine nature as so intimately united with the human, its garment, that the mediatorial significance of the latter could also be referred to the former. On the contrary, the divine nature rather remained apart by itself, and we are reconciled *with* the Son of God, even as we are reconciled with the Father and the Holy Spirit: but *by* the Son of God we are reconciled only in the sense in which we are reconciled by the Father and the Spirit. The entire Trinity blots out our sins; and Christ is termed Mediator solely on account of His humanity, not on account of His divinity. By means of the former He mediates between humanity and the triune

[1] For this reason Stankarus appeals to him with peculiar fondness.

God, especially as an example of obedience. We see, at the same time, therefore, that redemptive virtue is attributed to the humanity in itself,—a virtue which might easily be supposed to be transferred to others, especially as it does not, strictly speaking, inhere in the mediatorial beings themselves. God, in His good pleasure, instead of effecting the reconciliation without mediators, as He might do, chooses to treat mediatorial services as though they possessed mediatorial virtue. In reality, however, almost the only part here left for Christ to play, was that of setting forth, by His sufferings, the eternal reconciledness of God, and of thus awakening men to love, and humbly to follow His example.

According to the view which the Lombard seems finally to adopt, God did not become objectively a man in Christ, but the humanity of God had an existence solely in, the representations and notions of the human mind—representations and notions which He intended to take such a form. God clothed Himself objectively with the garment of humanity in order to appear as man. So also the reconciliation was not, strictly speaking, really effected by Christ; but His appearance and sufferings were merely objective occurrences, intended to be regarded by God and man as having brought about the reconciliation.[1] The ancient Christian idea, that in Christ humanity was exalted to the divine throne and to a participation in the divine nature, he totally repudiated; and supposed himself to be justified in so doing by the circumstance, that highly esteemed teachers of the Church had found fault with the expression, "homo dominicus" (κυριακὸς).[2]

It is perfectly clear from this, that the Lombard must necessarily protest most decidedly, not only against Adoptianism, but against every approximation towards conceiving the humanity as personal;[3] naturally, also, he could not but say regarding Christ,

[1] Dist. xix.: "Factus est homo mortalis ut moriendo diabolum vinceret;" in order that the devil might not be conquered "injuste et violenter," the victory must be gained by a man. "Per ipsius pœnam—omnis pœna *relaxatur*.—Secundum humanam naturam mediat Deo Trinitati."

[2] This was, however, not meant to favour Docetism, but to counteract Ebionitism.

[3] "Quod per se sonat," he regards as personal; the human nature, however, was never "per se sonaris," but was united with and subsisted in the Logos.

who merely had humanity, and was its vehicle and bearer, but was not Himself a man, that He is to be worshipped, that He is sinless, omniscient, and so forth. He could not, it is true, entirely evade the question, Does not Luke say that His humanity increased in years, wisdom, and favour with God and man? But, limiting, as he does, the humanity of Christ to impersonality, no other course was open to him than to say, that Jesus was full of grace and wisdom from the very moment of His conception. In Him was the fulness of the Godhead, and not merely particular gifts of the Spirit, as is the case with the saints. These latter are not like the Head, which unites all the senses within itself; but merely like members, which have their share of the senses. Christ did undoubtedly grow in grace and wisdom,—not, however, in Himself, but in those who grew through Him: for, consonantly to the various stages through which humanity passes, He revealed the wisdom and grace that were in Him in ever greater measure, and thus summoned men to praise God. Hence, he says, regarding the soul of Christ, that it knew all that God knows, though everything was not so clear and transparent to it as to the Creator: for it was a creature, and *the creature cannot in any respect be equal to the Creator*. Christ had knowledge without limit; but still the wisdom of God was much higher and more complete;—that is, Christ had wisdom so far as His human nature was capable of having it. But whereas His soul was by nature susceptible of *knowing* all things (naturaliter capax), though not quite clearly, it was not constituted susceptible of the ability to do everything, lest it should be considered almighty, and thus be taken for God (Dist. xiv.). So also Christ was omnipresent, as "totus," —that is, as to His hypostasis; but not "totum,"—that is, according to His whole nature, for He was also a man (Dist. xxii.).

These last features show that the fundamental idea of the Lombard, is substantially that of the school of Antioch,—the idea, namely, that deity and humanity are absolutely incommensurable, and must, consequently, continue separate and distinct. The ancient school of Antioch employed two principal modes of expression, namely: either, Jesus was the υἱὸς Θεοῦ θετὸς, merely adopted into unity with the Son of God; or, He was the temple, the garment of God. The former was

appropriated by Adoptianism, from a more vital interest in asserting the reality of the humanity; the latter, in order to define the precise limits of the union. Nihilianism also appropriated the latter, but not the former. Both expressions degrade the incarnation of the Word to a mere relation to humanity, and, agreeably to the conception of God on which they are based, so relax the tie between the two, that a mere ἕνωσις σχετικὴ remains. In so far, therefore, Nihilianism may be designated the continuation of the school of Antioch. Adoptianism adopted the view of the Unio as a relation, with the ethical intention of asserting the full and real humanity of Christ: of such an intention the Lombard, on the contrary, shows no trace whatever. Strictly speaking, he is concerned not about carrying out the Christological thought,—for he rather allows it to drop out of view,—but about giving the traditional doctrine such a turn as would involve the evasion of the real problem, and would leave the impossibility of a real union of the deity and humanity, which his conception of the Creator led him to maintain, to be acquiesced in, notwithstanding the incarnation. For an incarnation such as that taught by the Lombard is a mere illusion.

II. The proposition of the Lombard, that God did not become anything through the incarnation which He was not before, differs in reality very little from that other: the incarnation effected, posited nothing; that is, it was, strictly speaking, a mere theophany. In a word, Nihilianism does away with the real incarnation, and leaves us, in its place, a simple relation of God to humanity. It gave such scandal, therefore, that the Lateran Council, in the year 1179, under Alexander III., condemned it, and several works were written against it. To this connection especially belongs the work of John of Cornwall.[1] He shows with great prolixity that the Holy Scriptures describe Christ as a man, consequently, as something co-existing with other beings of like nature, which took their rise in time. We must, therefore, allow that God did really become something. The opposite opinion would lead to (Manichæism) Docetism. Nor are we to understand by this humanity which

[1] Joannis Corubiensis Eulogium ad Alex. Pap. III. in Martene Thes. novus anecd. v. 1657. See also Baur a. a. O. ii. 563–569.

God became, mere attributes, but a substantial thing—body and soul. Still, even he is far from deeming the term "homo" to denote anything else than the "natura humana" (body and soul). The formula, "God became man, and man God," he took to mean merely, that "the divine *personality* (without the divine nature) became man, that is, became human *nature;* and human nature became divine personality, not, however, deity or divine nature." But the Lombard was not to be confuted by dogmatical proofs; still less was the Christology of the Church shown to be acting consistently with itself when it repudiated Nihilianism, whilst it had itself, at the same time, reduced the humanity of Christ to an impersonal substance, by the act of rejecting Adoptianism. Nihilianism did but give naïve utterance, as it were, to the secret of that Christology, which, notwithstanding its desire to maintain the incarnation in a sense different from a theophany, either represents the humanity of Christ as impersonal, as a mere garment of God, or allows the abstract Person of the Logos alone, and not the deity, that is, the divine nature, to take part in the incarnation.

By a very similar method, even before the time of the Lombard, Abælard had got rid of the proper idea of the incarnation. As we have already remarked, he started with a more Sabellian conception of God. The Lombard also was charged with the same thing by the Abbot Joachim. God, says he, is absolutely unchangeable:[1] for this reason, it is impossible that He should have become something which He was not eternally; least of all could He become anything created, or a body, which undoubtedly pertains to humanity. He therefore ventured to do what Peter the Lombard durst not venture on doing, namely, to reject the old Church formulas, "God is man," "Man became God," on grounds similar to those which were advanced by the school of Antioch. But whereas the Lombard deduced his conclusion rather from the impersonality of the human nature, and so far, therefore, even in the act of returning to

[1] Introductio ad Thelog. iii. 1126, ed. Paris, 1616. God is everywhere present "secundum substantiam;" but unequally present "secundum operationis efficaciam." He is not present in a particular place, by a "localis adventus." In Christ, the humanity was exalted, the deity tempered: electrum, as a mixture of gold and silver, designates the constitution of Christ (p. 737).

the Antiochean formulas of the "garment," or "temple," adhered more rigidly to the path pursued by the doctrine of the Church, which gave to the divine nature of the Person of Christ the decided predominance;—Abælard, on the contrary, laid more stress on the subjective human aspect. The affirmation, "God did not become anything in and through the incarnation," denoted, therefore, as used by him, "in the *man* Jesus, God *worked:*" that the Son became incarnate, and not the Father, taught him that "in Jesus the wisdom of God revealed itself, in order to lead men to salvation by doctrine and example."[1] God and man are so absolutely separated by their very idea (according to Abælard), that an incarnation is an impossibility. And inasmuch as he further considered the omnipresence of God to involve His being veritably and necessarily everywhere, God cannot move to a place, as to His essence. Being everywhere equally present, then, as to His essence, if He be present differently in different creatures, it can only relate to the action of His will and intelligence. But as the will and intelligence of God, ought to have been conceived by Abælard, to be quite as omnipresent as His essence, it would be consistent to say, that the differences in the divine indwelling arose from the different degrees of susceptibility in the creatures, as did the school of Antioch.

III. Even as early as the thirteenth century, Scholasticism ceased to take the same interest in the task devolved upon it, of further developing Christology. This is evident enough from the poorly concealed repugnance which it betrayed to the idea of an incarnation; but it is as strikingly as possible shown by the fact, that it did not at all distinctly refer the work of redemption to the incarnation. Anselm was almost the only one who regarded the God-manhood as necessary to redemption.

[1] Abæl. Theol. Christ. iv. c. 13, in Martene Thes. v. 1307 f. "Sapientiam Dei in carne esse, tale est, carnales id est homines hac incarnatione veræ sapientiæ lumen suscepisse et eum nostræ mortalitatis testam luce sua accendisse." By His walk, death, and resurrection "nos instruxit et docuit."—"Cum itaque in omnibus quæ in carne gesserit dominus, nostræ sit eruditionis intentio, recte sola incarnari Sapientia dicitur, et in carne quam accepit ista nobis exhibuisse, quia ad hoc omnia gessit in carne, ut nos vera erudiret sapientia, quæ ad salutem sufficerent.—Quæ in carne gessit dominus, ad doctrinam pertinent."

Even so far as it is acknowledged at all, this unity of God and man ought, according to the Lombard, to be left out of consideration: to the humanity alone should a mediatorial significance be attached. In consequence of the misgivings which now showed themselves afresh, and which were not at all satisfactorily laid, a schism was produced in the camp. Fissures also began to be visible in the Christological edifice, which were rather concealed than repaired. This was the effect, for example, of the question,—Does not the doctrine of the compound Person of the God-man imply that the Son of God was but a part of a whole? or of the question,—Is not an incarnation of the entire Trinity a consequence of supposing that the Son of God became man, not merely as to His Person, but also as to His nature? When so many decided that the *person* alone became man, and not the nature of the Son, that is, the deity; and when, further, this decision was given forth without being visited with ecclesiastical censure, does it not prove that the significance of the incarnation had been reduced to the smallest possible measure, notwithstanding that the word itself was retained? We see that the edifice of Christology built on the old foundations already shows signs of decay; that it was impotent to exert a fructifying and regulative influence on the new questions and tasks, which daily presented themselves. The position now taken up towards the inherited doctrine of the Person of Christ, becomes similar to that which the Antiocheians, Pelagians, and, at a later period, the Areopagite, took up to the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity. Still there remained one green branch; it showed itself, as it were, from between the fissures in the walls of the ancient edifice. This is the path into which Ruprecht v. Deutz and the school of the St Victors, especially of Richard de St Victor, struck. In them we can discern the first faint dawn of a solution of the two questions above mentioned, on new and higher principles;—we see the beginnings of a Christology characterized by life and unity, instead of the artificial composite thing which had previously prevailed. This new tendency demands our attention at this point, because of the perceptible influence it had on the Christology of the thirteenth century.

Ruprecht of Deutz (he died about the year 1135) touches, in his writings, very frequently on the question as to the re-

lation of Christ to humanity, and to the creation in general.[1] Of this he takes a much deeper and more inward view than usual. A thought constantly recurring in his works is this,—Men were not created on account of the angels, to make up the full number of the chosen, after the fall of a part of the heavenly spirits: on the contrary, it is, he maintains, childish to suppose that, prior to the fall, God had no plan for the creation of humanity. It would be much more correct to say, that the angels themselves, as well as all other things, were created for the sake of *a certain man;* for the Scriptures teach, that not only by Him, but for Him, all things were made that are made; and designate Him the life of the world. Wisdom, which played in the presence of God prior to the creation, said, "My delight is fellowship with the children of men." Now what does this signify, but that,—Ere God created anything, the decree was that I, the Word of God, should become flesh, and should dwell in men in great love, and in the deepest humiliation, wherein consists true delight?—that, even as the woman was created for the man, so also humanity was created for Christ, and that out of it His Church should be constituted? What stronger contrariety can be conceived than that between this view, which represents incarnation and union with God as belonging to the eternal Divine idea of humanity, and the usual one, which represents God and man as by their very idea eternally and mutually exclusive magnitudes?

Ruprecht, it is true, appears at another time to speak differently. For example, he says elsewhere, that if men had not sinned, there would have been no reason why the man Christ should be taken up out of his low and humble state into God. Still it was not his intention to teach that sin was the sole and entire ground of the incarnation; but merely, probably, that

[1] Opp. T. ii. ed. Mogunt. 1631. For example, De glorif. trin. et process. spir. sanct. L. i. c. 5, 6, p. 141, c. 8, 142; L. iii. c. 7, p. 158, c. 20, 21, pp. 163, 164; L. iv. c. 2, p. 165, c. 6, p. 166. De Gloria et honore filii Dei sec. Ev. Matth. L. iii. 26; De Gloria Trinit. L. xiii. c. 19–21, in Joann. c. viii. The independent and original mind of this man has not hitherto been estimated according to its merits. It is well known, that he did not accept the doctrine of the annihilation and transformation of the substance in the Eucharist; but represented it rather as assumed by Christ, in a manner similar to that in which the Logos assumed humanity;—an idea which was rejected by the Lateran Council under Innocent IV.

sin, and our very deep humiliation, were the means in the hands of the love of God, whereby He did that which He regarded as true pleasure, namely, condescended most profoundly, in His unutterable love, to our low estate. He uses, therefore, the bold language of love when he says, transporting himself as it were into the love of Christ,—Sin has the merit of having enabled Christ practically to carry out His delight in condescension to the furthest conceivable point. Moreover, when he speaks of the being raised up out of a state of humiliation, he refers particularly to the servant's form, the necessity for which he deemed to be attributable to sin. In general, however, he bases his reasonings on the idea of an eternal divine δεῖ, that to the Son of God should be given the fullest opportunity of revealing the love, which is His delight; and he carries out in all directions the idea, that the final purpose and goal of men and their history is Christ. This he presupposes relatively to sin; so also relatively to death. Men must needs die, and were not allowed to eat of the tree of life, because only on the condition of our being subject to death was it possible for Christ also to taste death, which formed part both of His infinite humiliation, of the revelation of the highest good, His love, and of our redemption.[1] Indeed Ruprecht's entire doctrine of evil is not without its peculiarities. His attention was greatly taken up by the question,—Can God be said to have continued almighty, when evil came into existence, although He had not willed it? or should we not say that God willed the evil, inasmuch as He foreknew that it would arise? To this one may reply,—We read in Mark, that the Lord, although almighty, was unable to do miracles in a certain place; how much less could God display any sort of (miraculous) power in the evil spirits! Angels and men fell, not from power into defectiveness, but from defectiveness into defectiveness. Not as saints, as those who were placed in a strong tower of holiness, did they fall into that which is opposed to holiness; but they fell, to the end that they might become holy, and might gradually advance

[1] Ruprecht therefore is not inconsequent, as Julius Müller maintains. He says, rather, in his "De Glor. et hon. filii hominis," L. xiv.:—"Some Church teachers have supposed that evil was included in the will of God, because on its account the Son of God was compelled to become man, and to die."

thereto. The angel who through the fall became the devil, did not fall from holiness (for to holiness he had not yet attained), but sought his own pleasure, as though he were sufficient for himself; and this was not a falling out of virtue into sin, but a remaining in the Inanity in which he was created; which Inanity is a middle thing, between the true and holy essence of God, and that Nothing out of which God created all things. Other creatures return back into that out of which they were made—to wit, into Nothing: angels and men did not return into Nothing, so as to cease altogether to be; but, abiding in themselves, and despising the enjoyment of God, who alone is true Being, they are vain, yea, vanity itself; and the devil is not merely vain (vanus), but the Prince of all vanity. Besides, did not the Son Himself say that He could do nothing of Himself? Consequently, both the omnipotence and the goodness of God are preserved. Ruprecht supposes that everything that has an actual existence is the work of God;—that evil is not the work of God, inasmuch as it is simple Inanity, moral Nonentity, which seeks to assert for itself an existence independent of God, and to be sufficient to itself. Now, according to His righteous judgment, God cannot communicate Himself to such self-sufficiency. Evil entered without prejudice to the Divine power and goodness; and for this reason the wise God was compelled to become man, and to die for all;—otherwise, man could never have been saved. Immediately on these observations there follows a detailed discussion of the theme first mentioned.[1] Every believer takes for granted, that the Son of God would not have become a mortal man, had not we men become mortal through sin. But a prior question still remains to be answered, namely,—Was it not somehow necessary for the human race, that the God-man should, in any case, become the Head and King of all? Concerning all the saints and chosen, it is certain that, independently of sin, each and all would have been born in their full number, according to the purpose of God, which He declared before the fall, when He blessed man, saying, "Be fruitful and multiply." Now, great as would be the absurdity of supposing that the first men would not have generated others without sin, or that sin was necessary in order that the many righteous men might be brought

[1] Tom. ii. p. 135, in Matt. xxvi., "De gloria et honore filii hominis."

into existence, it would be equally absurd to suppose that, without sin, Christ would not have come into being at all; or, in other words, that sin was the principal cause of the incarnation of Him who is the Head and King of all chosen angels and men, and not the delight which His love takes in the children of men. This His counsel was not rendered futile by the entrance of sin, but those words were fulfilled, "Where sin prevailed, there did grace much more prevail." It became Him, by whom are all things, and for whom are all things, that, as the Captain of our salvation, He should be made perfect through suffering. Therein lies the weight of the paternal command, therein consists the beauty of the obedience of the Son of His love, that He humbled Himself, and that we through Him can approach the throne of grace with confidence. It is true, when we contemplate in spirit the heights of heaven, and behold there the highly exalted Son of God, sitting at the right hand of the Majesty, we may well tremblingly exclaim, What will become of us useless servants and sinners, for whose sins He endured such sufferings? But listen also, as to words spoken by Him who is meek and lowly of heart, to the words, "I also should not have been now so great, but for thee, and the sin of thy race." The ungodly became the cause of His being crowned; and therefore they may approach Him with hopefulness, if they believe.[1] Because of the pleasure He took in the children of men, the name by which Christ most delighted to call Himself was, "Son of Man;" concealing His glory, displaying His humility. He designated Himself Son of man, specially, in order that we might feel ourselves to be very near to Him, and might regard Him as our brother. For, why did He not, as He might have done, form a man out of the earth and take him upon Himself, instead of assuming our corrupt flesh? Because, in that case, the same flesh which committed the sin would not have atoned for it, and He would have been a stranger to us. Again,—Not an angel, but the Son of God, became man,[2] because the strongest creature would have been unable to free us from the devil. Besides, it lay not in the power of an angel to become man and to clothe himself with a human soul. But His is the human soul no less than the spirit

[1] Compare Commentatio in Joannem, cap. iii. L. iii. p. 263.

[2] A. a. O. 267

of the angels. For this reason are the spirits of angels and of men neither intelligible nor susceptible to one another: God alone, the uncreated Spirit, is intelligible to every rational creature.[1] Not a messenger did He need, but a son, who should penetrate the human soul by the tender essence of His deity, and unite it entirely into one person with Himself, as a worthy price for the guilt of Adam, incomparably more costly than any angel. Thus it became Him; and the work accomplished by Him is the brightest ornament of His crown, the token no less of His grace than of His power; for by the weight of His cross He resolved, and He alone was able, far, very far, to outweigh our entire race.

Richard de St Victor occupied himself, in like manner, particularly with the question of the necessity of the incarnation of God, specially of the Son of God. He considered the ground of that necessity to be, that the deliverance needed to be in harmony with justice, and should, consequently, be combined with a satisfaction. Had man been redeemed by simple and pure compassion, without the co-operation of justice, there would have remained on him the eternal disgrace of his fall; and even if the devil had not constantly reproached him with the possession of that to which he had no right, man's own conscience, independently of any external accusers, would have reminded him of his unpaid debt; nor could he otherwise have ever entirely escaped from this claim and this disgrace. Now, however, pious believers may boast more of the satisfaction offered for their deliverance, than they previously experienced shame on account of their great fall; so much so, that, throughout the whole world, the Church can sing with all confidence, Verily, necessary was Adam's sin and ours, which is blotted out by the death of Christ! O fortunate crime, which was counted worthy of such and so great a Redeemer![2] But the satisfaction

[1] From this we see, that he does not merely contrast the finite nature of man with the infinite nature of God; but, on Christ's account, takes such a view of the former, as involved its association with, rather than its exclusion by, the latter. The reason thereof, on the part of the divine, is the greatness of the love of God; on the part of the human, the depth of its lowness and need; which was in one aspect an attraction to the divine love, and in another aspect implied unbounded susceptibility.

[2] Liber de Incarn. ad Bernh. Clarevall. editio Col. 1621, cap. viii. p. 429: "Nunc fidelium devotio magis gloriatur de redemptionis suæ satis-

offered must needs be proportionate to the presumption of man in falling. Adam's sin consisted in his exalting himself from the lowest to the highest. The satisfaction must, therefore, consist in a stooping from the highest to the lowest. For this reason alone, no man could redeem, but solely a Person of the Most High Trinity. Moreover, inasmuch as to be justified and made blessed is more than to be created; were a man the redeemer, a greater debt would be due to a creature than to the Creator, and we should, therefore, be under stronger obligation to serve the former than the latter. On the other hand, according to the standard of justice, men would be unaffected by anything which was not wrought by a human person; whereas it is reasonable that a brother should make satisfaction for a brother, and a son for his father. Accordingly, it was necessary that God, who stooped from the highest to the lowest, should become man (Note 56). He followed us into exile (de Immanuele i. x.); in Him God is with us, not merely in name, but substantially (c. xii.). Is He with us, then, merely in virtue of the presence of His majesty? But what would there be peculiarly great in God's being with men as He is with the devils? Substantially, He is everywhere. No; His personality is present, has its being, in our nature; and, in consequence thereof, He partakes of human nature, and we partake of His divine nature. He is God with us—the personal token of the restoration of our rights as citizens (signum repatriandi nos), the pledge of our future glory (c. xiv.);—through the incarnation, God became, as it were, one of ourselves. If, after the fall, it was only ironically, that one of the Trinity could say, "Behold, Adam is become as one of Us," now, on the contrary, we can exclaim with confidence, "Behold, God is become as one of us" (c. xix.). God, however, became man that man might become as God; so that the words, which, as spoken by the Father and the Spirit of Adam, could only have an ironical meaning, have become an actual reality in Christ—to wit, "Adam is become as one of us." In the Person of Christ, "man is become one of Us," because of His deity; God is

factione, quam prius confusa sit de tantæ dejectionis opprobrio; in tantum ut ubique terrarum Ecclesia fidelium cum omni fiducia canat: O certe necessarium Adæ peccatum et nostrum, quod Christi morte deletum est! O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem!"

become one of us, because of His humanity (c. xx.). But even more,—that which holds good of Christ, holds good also of us, who are the first Adam. For, inasmuch as Christ is one of the Three Persons of the Trinity, does not Adam, being configured with the glory of Christ, become, as it were, one of them? The irony and reproach have been converted by Christ into seriousness and congratulation; the lie of the seducer, which promised man that he should be like God, has become truth;—behold, man is become as God, knowing good and evil,—nay, he has become very God—a thing of which the seducer could not have had even the conception (c. xxi.). (Note 57.)

CHAPTER SECOND.

THOMAS AQUINAS AND JOHN DUNS SCOTUS.

I. THOMAS AQUINAS took a step in advance, in so far as he endeavoured to combine the scholastic, the ecclesiastical, and the mystical view, with the double design of giving life to the former, and greater distinctness to the latter. His chief Christological authorities, therefore, are John of Damascus and the Pseudo-Areopagite.

In his "Summa Theologiæ," the first question he discusses, is that as to the necessity of the incarnation.[1] He denies its indispensability, especially apart from the existence of sin. To suppose that it would have taken place independently of sin, would be, he thinks, to represent it, not as something veritably supernatural,—that is, relatively to human nature, as something, strictly speaking, accidental,—but as something which pertains to the full conception of human nature.[2] But still he had no intention of representing humanity as a mere accidens of the Deity, assumed as we assume a garment: it is, on the contrary, in "Unio personalis" with the Logos; so that the one Person of

[1] Summa Theologiæ (Antv. 1612, Opp. T. xii.), P. iii. Q. 1.

[2] He is also of opinion (Q. vi. Art. 12), that, if God-manhood belonged to the perfection of human nature, all would have to become God-men in order to be properly men. For further details, see below.

the Logos, although it continued simple in itself, yet, since the incarnation, exists in two "suppositis," and is accordingly compound. How far he was, notwithstanding, from conceiving the relation between the Logos and humanity to be a substantial, an essential one, is clear from his opinion, that the Logos might have entered into this relation of "Unio" with more than one man.[1]

The pre-eminence of the God-man, therefore, lies not in His inner, essential nature, in the impossibility of His being ever repeated; but simply in the empirical fact, that a second God-man has not actually appeared: and as there was no necessity whatever in God of His becoming man, but merely a "convenientia," so also was there no necessity in the idea of man. Aquinas opposes Nihilianism; but in such a way as to reduce to the smallest possible measure, the part taken by the divine *essence* in the incarnation. The "Unio" he regards as something *created;* that is, it falls under the category of manifestations of grace to created beings, and does not denote a peculiar mode of the being of God (Q. ii. Art. 7). The human nature was, in his view, impersonal (non per se subsistens): it was personal, not in itself, but in the Logos,—which was a distinction conferred on it. Herein is involved the recognition of the truth, that without personality, human nature would not be complete. Its tendency to personality, however, found satisfaction in Christ, in another higher than itself, in one who, relatively to it, is absolutely supernatural,—a view which is certainly not consistent with the notion that a distinction was thus conferred on *human nature itself;* for, if it were distinguished thereby, it must have been capable of appropriating and receiving that which is elsewhere represented as absolutely above and beyond it. The deeper roots of this contradiction lie in the magical conception of grace already referred to; which took pleasure in representing the redemption of human nature as consisting in its being transported out of its own, into an absolutely different, essence. Considered in

[1] Q. i. Art. 7, p. 24. Q. ii. Art. 7: "Persona divina non ita assumsit unam naturam humanam, quod non potuerit assumere aliam;" for otherwise, "personalitas divinæ naturæ esset ita comprehensa per unam naturam humanam, quod (ut) ad ejus personalitatem alia assumi non posset, quod est impossibile. *Non enim increatum a creato comprehendi potest.*" Q. x. 1, ix. 4; P. i. Q. xii. 7.

relation to God, it would follow, then, that the act of incarnation met and satisfied the *natural* tendency of human nature towards personality, and both stayed and replaced it by the divine personality;—a view which reminds us of Cerinthus (Note 58).

The *caro* of Christ, therefore, appeared to him to be simply "nature," without a trace of personality; and yet, on the other hand, he regards matter as the "principium individuationis;"[1] —which would seem to imply, that Christ must necessarily become an individual man, on the ground of the matter of which He was the vehicle. It is true, he considers the Logos to have been the exclusively personal principle, and the humanity therefore to have been merely the material and nature employed by Him: but still the Logos was the principle constitutive of the personality in the sense, that that which is, in other cases, the work of the matter and of its tendency to take a limited individual form, was, in the present case, brought about by the power of the Logos, forming, separating, and consolidating an individual out of the human material. On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas also, considered that the divine *nature* did not become man; for the reason, that such a supposition would necessarily imply that Father and Spirit also became man, as touching their nature; though the Word alone became man as touching the *personality*. "Naturæ divinæ convenit assumere ratione *personæ*" (Summa P. iii. Q. iii. Art. i.-iii.). The divine nature can be termed the "principium incarnationis" only in so far as it is the vehicle and bearer of the "persona filii." This latter, however, is "primo et propriissime" assumptive; and yet personality is also the *terminus* of the process. Consequently, the divine essence itself, or the divine nature, remained unconnected with the incarnation. This was the direct contrary of some more recent and quite as one-sided theories, which represent the Son as under the necessity of stooping and becoming merely divine nature (ceasing, that is, to be a divine person), ere He could accomplish the incarnation. The significance of the incarnation is, in his view, therefore, limited to the fact, that the divine Person of the Son—not, however, His divine nature—was inserted in the human nature. The divine personality stood, of course, in intimate connection with its own

[1] P. 34ª, Q. vi. 1.

divine nature; but still did not allow any portion thereof to pass over into the human nature. It merely bestowed graces, so far as the human nature was able to grasp and contain them. A grace, however, is something created.[1] The humanity of Christ participated in creaturely grace,—the very idea of which, involves its being finite, and finite alone: but the divine nature kept itself back, and did not communicate itself to the humanity. So far from viewing the "Unio" as a mode of the existence of God, he held it to be a mere relation between God and humanity,[2]—a mere form under which the divine grace was displayed towards a man distinguished by it, predestinated for it, but also, without doubt, owing his existence to it. In thought, of course, that which is assumed, must be posited as existent, prior to the act of assumption:—in the case of Christ, however, the personality is not conceived as existing prior to the act of assumption, because, in fact, it resulted from the assumption.[3] And notwithstanding, he remarks that it is impossible to imagine a greater grace than that which was in Christ, although even in Him it was merely something finite, created, infused. Of that genus of beings which participates in grace, Christ is the universal principle, and therefore the Head of the Church.[4] Additional remarks on this subject will be found further on.

This remarkable limitation of the incarnation to the personality of the Son without His nature, of which we have found traces even at an earlier period, had unquestionably another ground besides the trinitarian one just mentioned,—to wit, the desire by such means to render the problem of the incarnation an easier one; though also, it is true, to evade it in one essential particular, or even to let it entirely fall. Thomas Aquinas, and his numerous followers, masked this their retreat, by representing the personality of the Son as a mediatorial tie between the human and the divine natures, and by professing that a relation was thus established, on the ground of which grace is imported into the human nature from the divine.

[1] P. 42. Anima Christi creatura est, habens capacitatem finitam. Compare Q. vi. 12.

[2] Q. xvi. 6, "relatio quædam." Q. xxv. 5. Not every relation expressed by God from the point of view of time presupposes something real in God (aliquid secundum rem), but solely secundum rationem.

[3] Q. iv. 2. [4] Q. vi. 9; Q. viii.

Touching the effects of the incarnation on the humanity of Christ, Thomas Aquinas rests satisfied substantially with the doctrine of Peter Lombard,—merely carrying it out into further detail, and modifying it in a few particulars. In general, he regards the grace which was in Christ, not as gradually increasing, but as communicated in such perfection at the very moment of incarnation, that, viewed from within, an increase of its vigour was inconceivable. From the very commencement He was not merely "viator," but also "comprehensor,"[1]—and that, both in reference to His *knowledge*, and in reference to His *will*. He possessed, however, a double knowledge, a double wisdom (Q. ix. 1): As the Son, He naturally had the absolute divine wisdom; as a man, He had the knowledge of the blessed, that is, a knowledge of all things *in the Word*. But His human knowledge was again twofold;—*firstly*, an infused knowledge; and in this aspect, there was no knowledge in Him potentially, which was not also actual: *secondly*, He possessed an experimental or acquired knowledge (scientia experimentalis, or acquisita).[2] More important is it to observe, that, in his view, Christ's knowledge did not embrace the divine knowledge; for His humanity continued to be creatural, and was confined within the limits of the creature;—but it is impossible for a creature to embrace the divine essence.[3] Everything, indeed, which actually is, has been, and will be, in the world, was an object of the knowledge of Christ's soul in the Word (Q. x. 2); but not the possible: for, to know the infinite possibilities in God, would be to know His infinite essence (Art. 2). Christ's soul, accordingly, knows everything in the shape of

[1] Q. xi. 2; Q. xxxiv.; Q. ix. 4; Q. xv. 10.

[2] Such a knowledge he had previously called in question; see Sentent. lib. iii. dist. xiv. In the Summa he says,—there would have been a something superfluous in Christ, to wit, the potentiality of experimental knowledge, if He had possessed merely infused knowledge; and yet (p. 52[b]) he describes the experimental knowledge, as one gained rather by "inventio," than by "disciplina."

[3] Q. x. 1. "Sic facta est unio,—quod increatum manserit increatum, et creatum manserit intra limites creaturæ. Est autem impossibile quod aliqua creatura comprehendat divinam essentiam (P. i. Q. xii. 7), eo quod infinitum non comprehenditur a finito. Et ideo dicendum, quod anima Christi nullo modo comprehendit divinam essentiam." Here we have the direct antithesis to the Lutheran doctrine.

an *effect*, even the day of judgment; and His ignorance of this last, was merely an ignorance relatively to others (non facit scire). Christ's soul knew the infinite God, but did not fully grasp His essence, the prime first cause of all effects: consequently, the knowledge possessed by God comprises more than Christ's soul; for God grasps and embraces Himself. In capacity of knowledge, it is true, the humanity of Christ did not grow; but yet, through His "scientia infusa," He increased the stock of experimental knowledge which He possessed side by side with the "scientia beatorum," which was complete from the very beginning. In virtue of the latter, He saw God, and in God everything; He knew everything also (Q. ix. coll. xii. 1) by and out of Himself, in that His soul, through the "gratia iufusa," was the expression of the archetype of the Logos, so far as the human nature could grasp Him.

In like manner also he denies to the soul of Christ *omnipotence*,—urging, that such an attribute can belong alone to the uncircumscribed being of God.[1] The soul of Christ was unable, by itself, to sway omnipotently even its own body; it was able to do so merely as the instrument of the Deity. Not by its own power did it raise the body from the dead; but alone by the power of the Deity, of which the soul was the instrument.

Relatively to the *will*, more particularly, he taught, that there was a divine will in Christ, which was the active cause of everything He did (principium primum movens).[2] Yet there was also in Him a human will, which was not a mere dead instrument. The human nature, in serving as the instrument of the Deity, was moved, not by a constraining necessity, but by its own will. It is not repugnant to the human will to be inwardly moved by God; and, notwithstanding divine impulses, it still continues to be a human will, for God's will works volition. Examining more closely, however, we find in Christ a *twofold human will*,—the sensuous will, and the rational will. According to the former (voluntas sensitiva), He willed things other than those which God willed; for in Himself God does not will the things of the sensuous will, which the Son of God allowed freely to work prior to His Passion. And yet nothing contrary (contrarietas) to, but merely something different from,

[1] Q. xiii. 1. [2] Q. xviii. 1, xliii. 2.

the rational will, was the effect of the sensuous will. The will of the Word and the human rational will, remained immoveably and unweariedly on the side of the sensuous will;—nay more, it was their will, that the sensuous will should work: hence the unity of the Person of Christ continued untroubled. The will of redemption was, and remained, absolute. When treating of the relation of the rational will to the divine, he followed in the footsteps of John of Damascus, teaching that Christ had a free will (liberum arbitrium) and a faculty of choice (Q. xviii. 4); and that He took counsel with Himself, and thought discursively (Q. xi. 3). He denied Him, on the other hand, the power, strictly speaking, to decide for and of Himself; and maintained, that He was determined by God, who moved the will as a kind of secondary causality, and really, in the last instance, worked everything Himself.[1] Nevertheless, inasmuch as this one supreme cause worked in two forms, and, moreover, so worked, that the human form was in some respect different from, although it was the instrument of, the divine, and had not only a certain independence of being, but also an individual mode of action, peculiar to itself, Christ was able to earn His glory, although it already belonged to Him by nature.[2] And it is nobler to possess something through one's own efforts, than to receive it entirely from another. How Christ could acquire that which He already possessed, Thomas Aquinas does not explain; unless we are to find an explanation in the nature and constitution of His body, which, without being opposed to His will, and naturally too without sin, was under the necessity of being defective, not merely for the sake of the redemptive work, but also for the sake of the human nature.[3]

He also adopts the principle laid down by the Lombard, that Christ, as Mediator, not as God, but as man. As the Mediator, it was His mission to unite the extremes. Simply as God, He could not do this; for, as God, there was no difference between Him and the Father and the Spirit; but as a man,

[1] Q. xix. 1, 2. In Christ there was one "vis operatrix;" but this one had "duo operata," or "operamenta," corresponding to the two natures. This view is, therefore, substantially Monotheletism.

[2] Q. xix. 3.

[3] Q. xiii.; Q. xxxi.: "He took upon Himself the impure flesh of Adam, in order to purify it by the "assumtio"

He occupied a middle position, being different from God as touching His nature, and different from men in worth, grace, and glory.[1] In this case again, therefore, the humanity, as endowed with the grace of God, is the Mediator, and not the God-manhood. No marvel, then, that Thomas Aquinas should pass at once on to Mary, whose natural birth is put on the same footing with the second birth, nay more, even with sanctification.[2] In consequence of such sanctification, her soul was filled with the fulness of grace, and immediately after her birth, if even not after her very conception, shone with a purity, than which none can be conceived greater, save that of God.[3] But even the services rendered by the mediatorial *human* nature of Christ, were not regarded by him as the final and sufficient cause of our salvation.[4] It is true, His sufferings, in particular, were necessary; that is, it was appointed that He should undergo them, for the benefit of the world. But this same object might have been realized by other means; for to God all things are possible. Without infringing on justice, God might have pardoned guilt without punishment; but no other way was more fitting than that actually adopted. Even the very least degree of suffering would have sufficed to deliver the human race from all sin; but in order to meet the claims of propriety, of fitness, it behoved Christ to undergo, at all events, every *species* of suffering.[5] He asks,—If Christ endured pains which were intenser than those of all others; especially, if His whole soul suffered, how can He be said to have enjoyed, at the same moment, the blessed fruition (fruitio beata)? His answer is,—In its essence, if not in all its powers, the soul remained blessed. Elsewhere he had described Christ as at once the "viator" and "comprehensor;" here, on the contrary, out of regard for His sufferings, he endeavours to show that the bond of union between the different aspects of Christ's nature was at first still a loose one, or even quite dissoluble, and that consequently the incarnation of God was not completely accom-

[1] Q. xxvi. 2. [2] Q. xxvii.

[3] Q. xxvii. 2, p. 102ᵃ. The Feast of the Conception of the Virgin Mary is not kept by the Romish Church. In some Churches, however, it is tolerated; and is not totally objectionable, if not meant to teach that she was holy even at the very moment of her conception.

[4] Q. xlvi. [5] Q. xlvi. 5 ff.

plished from the commencement,—nay more, that it was not realized to the extent to which the idea of human nature admitted of it. He says,—"So long as He was a sojourner, His glory did not stream forth from the higher regions of His essence into the lower, from His soul into His body: on the other hand, the higher aspect of His soul suffered no hindrance from the lower, in that which belonged to its essential nature. Hence the higher part of the soul continued in perfect fruition, whilst Christ underwent sufferings."

That Thomas not only did not arrive at the true idea of the incarnation, but even endeavoured to evade it, is plain from what has been advanced; but especially clear from the mode in which he discusses the formulas, "God is Man," "Man is God."[1] 'All the divine attributes may be attributed to the man Christ, and all the human to the Son of God;—not, however, as though, strictly speaking, they pertained to the respective natures; for, strictly viewed, they pertained to the personality alone. The human and the divine, he regards as opposed, not as belonging to, compatible with, each other. Opposites, however, cannot be predicated of one and the same thing, in one and the same relation; but only in a different relation. So in the present case, opposites cannot be predicated of the person, in its totality, but merely, either in its divine aspect, or in its human aspect.' But how readily does the reverse question then suggest itself,—Is it possible for one personality to be the personality of natures so absolutely opposed to each other? To this question, however, Thomas devotes no attention; and merely lays down the canon,—That what pertains to the one nature, cannot be predicated of the other, considered in itself (in abstracto), but solely so far as it is in the person (in concreto). Like the Lombard, he takes especial pains to limit the proposition,—That in Christ, man is God. The only validity he allows it, is as declaring that God is that element which took the place of the human hypostasis. It is true, this person, to wit, the Logos, is eternally God; but of what advantage is that to the man? The human nature became the nature of the Son of God:—truly; but how? In his view, it was simply a predicate of the Logos, as is evident from the comparison he employs:—One may truly say that a man has become white; but

[1] Q. xvi.

we cannot say that this same white has become man. One might have supposed that he would at all events represent this predicate, humanity, as having become God's own; or that he would have, at the very least, treated it as henceforth appertaining to the being of the Son:—on the contrary, he rather says (xvi. 6),—the incarnation was not a new mode of being or "habitus" of God Himself, but simply a new thing relatively to men, or a new operation of God. A man who stands on the right side, may come to be on the left side, without moving himself, provided the other at whose side he stands moves: so in this case, humanity is changed, not God; and the Unio is a mere relation, a something created. Although he speaks of the predestination of Christ, he did not turn his attention to the question, whether the unchangeableness of God is not ensured by the fact of the incarnation having been the object of His eternal counsel, even though it be conceded that God was actually one with humanity in Christ.

On the other hand, when Thomas Aquinas allowed his Mysticism to speak, his contributions to Christology were of greater importance.

So far as Thomas conceded any independent significance to human nature, he approximated to Adoptianism; for, in his view, the humanity of Christ participated in grace, which is merely something created. As to his fundamental tendency, however, he is opposed to Adoptianism. This is most clearly evident from his doctrine regarding the free will of Christ. The divine Ego is represented as the sole actor. Vacillating in this manner, it was impossible that he should arrive at a divine-human unity. Notwithstanding the premises with which he starts, he still asserts that the humanity could participate in the hypostasis of the Son, the created in the supra-created. But even this cannot help the matter. The Ego, in itself, has no attributes; for the divine nature is not supposed to have become man. Consequently the Ego is again reduced to a merely formal unity;—it is, as it were, the empty space or circle, which is able to embrace within itself indifferently, elements essentially antagonistic, divine and human. It is self-evident, that by means of such a formal unity, no conciliation of the divine and human natures is effected. Such a conciliation was, indeed, rendered beforehand impossible, by the influence which emanatistic

views of the relation between God and the creature continued to exercise. For, so long as full justice was not done to the distinction between the natures, a true unity could never be attained. The activity of Christ, however, he held to have distributed itself through a twofold system of knowledge and volition, to wit, a divine system and a human. The latter system branched out again into two,—the knowledge and volition which originated in the infused grace; and the knowledge gained by experience and the volition of the sensuous will. All this is analyzed and distinguished, but in such a manner, that the unity of the Christological image is effectually disintegrated and destroyed. Nor is this the effect of the scholastic method in itself; but his premises were such as to render it impossible scientifically to realize such an image. Even the communication of the attributes, of which he speaks so much, is in his view a purely nominal one,—it did not rest on a communication of the natures to each other.

II. Duns Scotus[1] appears, at first sight, to have held essentially the same Christological views as Thomas Aquinas and Peter Lombard; for he also limits the incarnation to a relation between God and man: and he did not conceive the nature assuming to have held or acquired, in itself, a real relation to the nature assumed, but only the nature assumed to the nature assuming. The motion is entirely on the side of the humanity: it is that which is worked upon, dependent: the effect neither reacts on the cause, nor is eternally rooted in its essence (L. iii. Dist. 1, Q. 1). He also, like Thomas Aquinas, pronounces judgment against both Nihilianism and Adoptianism (Dist. vi. 1, 2, vii. x.). Lastly, he remains true to the point of view taken by the afore-mentioned,—nay more, exaggerates it, by questioning whether, in the last instance, the incarnation and redemption through Christ were really necessary. His doubts on this subject arose from his conceiving the unconditioned free will of God to be raised above every kind of necessity, whether that necessity were rooted in the divine wisdom or in the divine essence (Dist. xix. xx.).

[1] Compare the "Commentary on the Sentences" by John Duns Scotus, ed. Hugo Cavellus, Antw. 1620, T. ii. L. iii. iv.; H. Ritter a. a. O. iv. 370 ff.

But in another respect Scotus was a remarkable phenomenon, even relatively to Christology. We may remark, in general, in the first place, that his tendency was decidedly ethical. His main interest was concentrated on the world of the will, not on theories (L. iv. Dist. xlix. Q. 4, p. 515 ff.). Hence, also, subjectivity, in the form of a free Ego, assumed a more distinct and determinate shape in his system than in the system of any preceding teacher. This, of course, implies that it could not be so easy a thing for him to sacrifice the human personality of Christ. The mode in which he endeavours to arrive at the personality of Christ is the following:—A distinction must be made between the process by which an individual is constituted and that by which a person is constituted (Individuation, Personirung); the former is not identical with the latter, though it is its condition. Now, that which constitutes personality may be regarded, either, 1. as a *positive* entity (entitas positiva), which is superadded to the individuality of human nature, or, 2. as a *negation*. 1. Regarded as a positive entity, it admits of no incarnation. For, had the human nature of Christ had this further positive element, an Unio would have been impossible, inasmuch as "persona est incommunicabilis existentia;"—there would, consequently, then have been an element which was "inassumptibile;" whereas all created things must be assumptible. But, did Christ's humanity *not* possess that positive entity at first, or did it possess it no longer after the "assumtio," we should have to apply the canon,—That which is not assumed is not healed;* the human nature of Christ lacked, accordingly, full equality with ours, inasmuch as it lacked that in which its actual consummation consists; on this supposition, moreover, a spiritual nature without personality were a conceivable thing.—2. But neither can the personality be brought to pass by mere *negation*. The negation by which a personality is posited, must be the negation of dependence on any external personality, and every individual soul would be a personality. Further, every personality, according to its idea, is incommunicable: but every negation is communicable; consequently, that which constitutes the personality must be something positive. Every negation, more-

* The German is "geheilt:" perhaps it should be "getheilt," divided, shared.—Trs.

over, is based upon and presupposes an affirmation; consequently, the personality exists by affirmation prior to existing by negation. To be divided, is an imperfection; that through which anything resists division (ἄτομον) must, therefore, be a positive entity or a superiority. So also, if dependence on an external personality be an imperfection, as it is, that contrariety to such dependence, which is an integrant element of the idea of a personality, must necessarily be grounded in an "entitas positiva."—3. He himself now discriminates between "dependentia actualis, potentialis et aptitudinalis." In order to understand him fully, it is necessary to bear in mind that he considers the essential characteristic of personality to consist, not in self-consciousness, but in independence—independence especially relatively to others. As has been just shown, the negation of actual dependence does not yet constitute personality; nor does even potential independence: for such an independence is not possessed by the creature relatively to the Word. But the "dependentia aptitudinalis,"—by which he understands that dependence which, as far as in it lies, is always in actus (for example, ponderables in seeking their centre, so far as nothing prevents them),—seems to him to be that, the negation of which, connected with the negation of actual dependence, constitutes a personality. Aptitudinal independence, in his view, constitutes an intellectual nature a personality, and can be at the same time combined with an incarnation. This aptitudinal independence is inherent in every nature which is capable of becoming a personality (naturæ personabili), even when it does not possess actual independence. All created things are of necessity actually dependent on the Word, but aptitudinal independence is quite compatible with this actual dependence. For such a nature, like everything created, stands at the same time in a relation of compliancy (has an aptitudo obedientiæ) to the Word; and may, therefore, very easily enter into such a state of actual dependence on the Word, that it shall become personal through the personality on which it is dependent. And yet, even if it had not acquired its independence through the person of the Word, it would have become personal in itself, through the mere negation of its dependence, and not, for the first time, through a positive addition to that which constituted it the nature which it was.

Scotus consequently conceives the human nature of Christ to have been so constituted, that it would have attained to personality even apart from the Word, and would of itself have negatived dependence on any other than God, without needing, for this purpose, any further positive adjunct;—such also, at the same time, that it did not the less stand in the obediential relation to God which befits the creature, and was thus capable, through actual dependence on, and union with, the Word, of realizing that negation of dependence, or that independence of personalities external to itself, which belongs to the idea of personality. His real intention, however, becomes plainer when we take into view another point. He adds, that, more closely examined, the divine is unquestionably personal in a different sense from the human; for incommunicableness pertains to the essence of the divine person alone, not to that of the human —at all events, not relatively to the Word of God (Dist. i. Q. 1, pp. 4–6). With the nature of the creature it is not incompatible that personality should be communicated to it, because it contains essentially within itself the "potentia obedientialis" also; whereas the divine personality possesses, in place thereof, a further "positiva entitas," which offers resistance to communication (compare L. i. Dist. ii. Q. vii. 38, T. i. 58), to wit, absolute independence. But the fact of his asserting for the humanity of Christ such a latent or possible personality, shows that he attributed to it real significance, in a fuller sense than Thomas Aquinas; and that he did not regard it as a mere selfless husk. For this reason also, he did not, like Thomas, merely categorically repudiate Adoptianism: but, in place of the idea of adoption, he advances that of the predestination of Christ to a dignity which He did not possess by nature,—to an inheritance which had always indeed pertained to Him, yet was His solely by grace; —and this is really nothing but Adoption. The Church, however, had already pronounced judgment against Adoptianism, and therefore he leaves the problem unsolved. Nay more, he further objects to Adoptianism, that, as an "opus Dei ad extra," it ought to be attributed to the entire Trinity; therefore also to the Son: which would imply that the Son of God, in so far as He constituted the actual personality in Christ, adopted Himself, or was His own Son (Dist. x.). Scotus ought consistently to have limited the predestination and adoption to that latent or

possible personality: but in that case the adoption would have continued to be a mere possibility, and could not have been referred to the humanity of Christ, in its actuality. We see, however, on the whole, that Scotus strove to vindicate to the humanity more than a mere selfless being; but the principles on which he took his stand mocked all the acuteness with which he endeavoured to escape from the consequences they involved. In the last instance, therefore, all that he did was to direct attention to a gap which needed to be filled up, but which could not be filled up independently of further and more thorough reforms.

What Scotus did towards showing that an union between the divine and human natures and personalities was possible, is by no means to be lightly estimated. In estimating his services, we must take into consideration his view of the supernatural and natural, which was very different from any that had preceded. To the idea of an exaltation of human nature by grace above itself, he objects: he also objects to the idea that ecstasis is the perfection of man, and to that supra-human virtue, of which others had approved.[1] The supernatural, on the contrary, he regards as the complement of human nature itself; and whereas Thomas thought to do honour to grace by putting in the place of the old, something absolutely new, which altogether transcends the limits of human nature; and whereas, further, he was unable to conceive of man's capability of receiving as other than limited, although he at the same time supposed himself able to acknowledge an incarnation; Duns Scotus, on the contrary, lays down the principle, that God can only enter into the higher beings (illabi), in virtue of a susceptibility (capacitas) or capacity in them of possessing the divine. Nay more, the reception of grace, is, in his view, at the same time a development of human capacities: the nature of man being, in its final roots, supernatural, and his destination, God. He further teaches, that the vitality or activity of this susceptibility must bear proportion to the grace which is to be received.[2] In short, inasmuch as we are intended to receive God the Infinite One, the soul must possess, not a merely finite, but an infinite

[1] L. iii. Dist. xxxiv. 3:—"Omnis actus hominis proprie loquendo est humanus; actus convenire debet operanti," p. 288. Dist. xiv. Q. 2, 3, pp. 94–102.

[2] L. c. L. iv. Dist. xlix. 11, p. 535 f.

capacity;[1] although this infinite capacity can only by degrees be developed and co-operate towards the impletion of itself with God. Accordingly, he maintained with regard to the humanity of Christ, that it might have through the Word the most complete possible intuitive view of creation, which cannot but be an infinite one.[2] The objection, that this would lead to the assumption of two such infinite intuitive views,—a created and an uncreated one,—did not occasion him difficulty. For, is it not acknowledged that Intellectus in general never arrives at rest and satisfaction, save in the infinite; and yet, relatively to the cognitive act, it is not coincident with the infinite. Merely in relation to concrete, intuitive knowledge, does he also allow that the soul of Christ was limited, on the ground that the knowledge of the concrete was not included in that knowledge of the general, which it possessed. This also was the opinion of Thomas Aquinas, when he spoke of Christ's *habitual* (habitus) knowledge. The soul of Christ has the habitual capacity of knowing everything concrete, but it gains this knowledge by degrees.

Having laid down these principles, the incarnation of God became for him a much more approachable idea. The problem now presented to him, was not a demand that the whole should be represented as existing or comprised in the part, the infinite in the finite; but he was required to conceive the infinite ethical susceptibility of man as filled by the infinite God. This infinite God is discriminated from man, not by the infinitude of His being,—for the being of both is infinite, though each in a different way;—but whereas God is the Unconditioned, Necessary, and Necessarily Free, relatively to Him, man is the Necessarily Conditioned. He does not regard susceptible humanity, it is true, as merely passive; but in general as personal, and as destined to develop ever increasing vitality and activity. Far greater difficulties, therefore, lay in his way, than in the

[1] In Sententias lib. i. Dist. ii. Q. vii. 40. He carries out this capacity for the infinite, both as respects knowledge and as respects volition. L. iii. Dist. xiv. Q. ii. 6, 16, pp. 95, 98. But still he had no intention of putting God's knowledge of Himself, and the knowledge possessed by the creature of God, on the same footing: ib. p. 96, L. iv. Dist. xlix. Q. 2. He frequently makes the observation, that the human soul "satiatur, quietatur" by the "infinitum."

[2] Compare Baur l. c. ii. 842 ff.

way of those older writers (for example, Theodore of Pharan), who formed a Christology out of the conjunction of the active divine element, with a passive instrumental humanity. For this very reason, therefore, he taught that the humanity of Christ, like everything created, had a "potentia obedientialis" relatively to God, and that, consequently, it was not "inassumptibilis" for the Word. Whence he judged, that the human nature of Christ, although endowed with an immanent tendency to seek a consummation in personality, might determine or be determined, to put itself, into a relation of obedience towards God, and thus to make itself vitally susceptible to, and capable of receiving, God. The consequence thereof being, that the two wills,—on the one hand, that of the Son which proposed to become man; on the other hand, that of the compliant humanity,—conjoined to form one personality, in which the divine is the non-determined determining constituent, and the human aspect is determined by the divine:—the human, however, being determined by God in such a manner, that it also determines itself to increasing susceptibility to God. It is self-evident, that it was not only possible, but, strictly speaking, even necessary, for Duns Scotus to assume that Christ had a true humanity, and that it underwent a gradual process of growth, as touching both knowledge and volition (Dist. xviii. 5).[1] He also attributes actual natural suffering to the soul and body of Christ. His idea was not, that the will of Christ had constituted His body, which participated (perhaps in consequence of the Unio) in the glory of the Son of God, capable of suffering, by a miracle; but, that the glory of the higher portion of His soul did not stream down into the lower powers. This abstinence practised by the divine nature, in

[1] He pays in this case also, it is true, his portion of tribute to the period at which he lived, in that he represents Christ as possessing both perfect grace and perfect merit from the very beginning. He does not trace this grace to the Unio, not even the sinlessness of Christ: but derives both from the Holy Spirit, who made the soul of Christ blessed, and thus sinless, apart altogether from merit of its own (L. iii. Dist. xii. xviii.). It frequently seems as though the Unio were for Scotus a mere dead treasure; and that the principal thing in his eyes were the supernatural gifts of the humanity of Christ, with which Mary also was endowed, and of which the principles hold good—"omnis actus hominis humanus," and, the "superhumanum" is a metaphor. (L. iii. Dist. xiii. Q. 4.)

order that the human might be really human, he describes also as a miracle,—the miracle by which the natural attained to actual existence (suffering, "Leiden").

If it be true and plain, then, that the idea of Scotus was to constitute Adoptianism a constituent element of Christology, the only question to be asked is,—Must he not of necessity have assumed (Cerinthically), that the human personality existed, and determined itself to dependence on the Son of God, prior to the act of incarnation? He did, perhaps, recognise as deducible from his idea, the conclusion, that the human nature of Christ determined itself to obedience prior to the incarnation, in so far as it had its existence primarily in Mary. Through her obedience, the human nature of Christ, which was primarily in her, received a self-determination to obedience, and thus became capable of receiving the Son of God. Perhaps, therefore, he found in the mother of the Lord that pre-existence of the humanity of Christ, prior to the God-manhood, which his system required; and we thus see that it was no accident, but a logical and consequent procedure on the part of the adherents of Scotism, to run wild in their Cultus of Mary, to deny that she shared original sin, and to maintain her "immaculata conceptio" (Note 59). But Duns Scotus thus struck on another rock of danger. Such a transference of the obedience of Mary to Christ is incompatible with the significance which he otherwise attaches to personality. For in Mary there could only have been some elements of the human nature of Christ—not His soul, nor His personality.

Of these defects of his Christology, he himself was in great part conscious; and, therefore, sometimes refused to give a final decision. In addition may be mentioned other shortcomings. Between his Scholasticism and the Romanic Scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas, there is, indeed, this distinction: that in the former, clearer traces are discernible of the ethical tendency which characterizes the Germanic mind. Scotus presents to us the picture of a vigorous wrestling mind, in which a new principle travails unto birth, still struggling with the chains imposed upon it by the antagonistic principle which had held sway. Whereas, previously, the theoretical and physical, necessity and nature (essence), had held almost undisputed sway, he now puts forth the claims of free will (L. iv. Dist.

xliii. Q. iv):—though his mode of doing so is marked by abruptness and exclusiveness. The consequence thereof is, that perfection, as represented by him, consists in empty, formal freedom[1]—that the divine will stands in an accidental, fortuitous relation to human nature—and that the highest good receives an eudæmonistic colouring. Our will seeks its blessedness as a free will, and alone as such can find it. But the divine law, which is the object of the free will, although formally involved in, and posited by, the creatural relationship, is (as set forth by Scotus) fortuitous in content, and foreign to the nature of man. The spiritually universal (das geistig Allgemeine), notwithstanding that, apart from it, personality cannot realize its own idea, presents accordingly the appearance of a power alien from, or even minatory to, freedom; and Scotus therefore deemed it necessary (Pelagianistically) to impose limitations on it. With this is connected the circumstance, that in his system the mystical element is thrown completely into the background, and that, consequently, its ethical features lack living roots.

Duns Scotus, it must be allowed, decidedly broke through that magic circle of ideas drawn by the Areopagite, that Emanatism which, by prematurely equalizing the divine and human, in regard to physical substance, rendered a true union of the two no less impossible than when they were abstractly separated. He posits a deeper distinction than that between infinite and finite, or whole and part: in his view, God is necessary, unconditioned, free being; man is conditioned and necessarily contingent being. Both are not merely equally being, but also infinite being, though different species of infinite being; the connection between which, he tries to point out. His idea of God, as the unconditionally free being, involves, indeed, that there was no necessity whatever, either for the creation of a world, or for its being such as it actually is: we know not whether God in Himself loves that good which He wills to be regarded as such in the world; and the giving of the law of God reveals to us nothing more than His will, that we should regard it as authoritative. Nevertheless, supposing God actually to will the existence of a world, it was necessary that it should be conditioned by His will; nay more, that God Him-

[1] L. iv. Dist. xliv. 2: "Libertas in Deo est perfectio simpliciter." L. ii. Dist. xxxvii. Q. ii. 9.

self, or, more precisely expressed, the Divine will, should be the goal of creation. On this account, it was also necessary, if man were created at all, that his will should be, not indeed equal to God, but still connected with, or, as Scotus was accustomed to say, proportionate to, the will of God, of infinite susceptibility, and destined for the infinite. He acknowledged, however, that the very idea of conditioned existence implied that this divine will could only be appropriated by degrees, and in an ethical manner, and that, consequently, the "viator" could not be at once also the "comprehensor." On the path to the goal lie freedom and merit; but that impletion with good, which is the foundation of the security and blessedness of the will, and which renders apostasy for ever impossible, cannot be the work of man, but must be the work of God.

Considered by itself, this view leads to the alternative, that either all are destined to God-manhood, or none. All are destined thereto, in so far as all must be proportionate to God or His will; and by using their freedom aright, would become God-men, unless God should withdraw Himself, and cease to be their end and aim; whilst the world, if it exist at all, must needs have God as its goal. Scotus lays down the principle, that all the acts of man are human,—even those which are performed subsequent to, and in consequence of, the impletion of human susceptibility with God. The position would thus seem to be gained, that the truly human and the divine are but different aspects of the same thing, or the same thing regarded from different points of view.. But, as though he feared that this would leave him merely a perfect man, he turns round again, and represents the incarnation in Christ (to which he was unable logically to assign the unique and pre-eminent position claimed for it by the Church) as an absolutely transcendent, isolated work of the Divine omnipotence or arbitrariness; and, overawed by the Divine omnipotence, so far forgets the ethical spirit of his system, as again to say,—God might have assumed any creature whatever; God might have assumed even a stone, without undergoing any change. This, however, leads us to the other aspect of the matter.

On a closer examination, we are compelled to confess that the system of Scotus does not admit of the accomplishment of a true and proper incarnation, even in Christ; for, according to

it, the world does not stand in any relation to the inmost being and essence of God, but merely to His absolute, indeterminate will—to His power, the will of which, by itself, is empty and without heart.

Or, did he advance beyond this point of view, when he taught his well-known doctrine, that Christ would have come even had Adam not sinned? His course of reasoning is the following: To the opposed authorities it must be conceded, that without Adam's sin Christ would not have come as a Redeemer. But the incarnation was not resolved on, merely casually, at the instance of another, but from the very beginning. It was not willed merely as a means to the redemption of man, but immediately as a divine end and aim. More precisely, he sets forth his views as follows (Dist. 7, 10, 19): Among the things which God willed external to Himself, the incarnation of Christ was the first:—not because Christ had been from eternity conceived as the Head of humanity, but purely for Christ's own sake,—Christ was an end in Himself. The predestination of every soul, even to glory, necessarily precedes the foreknowledge of sin. Still more must this hold good with regard to the predestination of the soul of Christ, which infolds within itself the highest glory. Humanity as it is in Christ, was a final aim of God, prior to the glory of all other souls. Now, God invariably wills the end ere He wills the means; still more did He will this end, previously to His foreknowledge of sin. We see, accordingly, that the afore-mentioned principle laid down by Scotus, was by no means meant to establish an essential connection between God and humanity, or between humanity and the Person of Christ. It rather serves to break the connection between Christ and humanity, and to represent His mission as an event grounded solely in the free pleasure of God—that is, "liberum arbitrium." We cannot even say, that Scotus believed God to have beheld and willed His own glorification in the humanity of Christ, as in a good possessed of absolute inherent worth. In the last instance, in fact, he held both the existence of the world and the existence of Christ to be fortuitous.* Supposing, however, that God, in His free

* "Fortuitous"—"Zufällig:" that is, God was not moved by an internal necessity of His being to create a world: He merely willed to create, and might as easily not have willed.—Tr.

arbitrary will, should bring such a humanity into actual existence, it could not be conceived as a mere means, but only precedently to everything else (" vor allem Andern"). Strictly viewed also, it is not so much the incarnation of God, as this highly favoured humanity of Christ, that was the object of predestination :—and that the Unio, in his view of it, stands in no inner relation to the favour thus conferred, we have already shown. He does, indeed, allow that the incarnation was a fact; but his Christology is marked by an Ebionitic feature, which makes Christ dependent on the free pleasure of God; and it could have occasioned him but little difficulty to discover, as did Raymond Lullus at a subsequent time, a predestination for the holy Virgin, similar to that which he taught with regard to the humanity of Christ.

The unconditioned freedom of God taught by Scotus, is, in the last instance, absolute arbitrariness, which must, strictly speaking, be able at any moment to take back the world and the God-man. What this freedom is, and what it wills, *in itself*, remains a mystery; and consequently we must conclude, that the inmost essence of God was not brought to light by the incarnation, did not become man. God's command may become incarnate, but not the freedom in which the command originated. And even supposing we say, that, in the view of Scotus, the will, considered as power, is the inmost essence of God, and that it reveals itself both in the creation and incarnation; still the very idea of such an absolute indeterminate freedom and power, implies that everything done by it is good, indeed, but good solely because it does it; and not also something willed by it, because it was good in itself. In itself, therefore, the resumption of the purpose of creation and incarnation would have been as good as its realization, if God had not, as it were fortuitously, already become incarnate, and an alteration thus been rendered impossible; in other words, if God's absolute indeterminateness had not subjected itself to that fatalism of facts, according to which " factum infectum fieri nequit," and been consequently transformed into its direct contrary, necessitation.

However closely, then, he conjoins the divine and human, and whatever efforts he makes to strip them of their mutual exclusiveness, Scotus still remains involved in contradictions. The determinations given of the " Unio personalis" by the doctrine

of the Church, still drag on an existence in the system of Scotus; but the divine-human personality, in the sense in which it was held by the Church, was to him but as a dead fact. The Unio of the Word with the man assumed by Him, is allowed to have taken place: he does not expressly assail the doctrine of the Church. But he leaves this act of the Son of God almost entirely unnoticed, when he treats of Christology. Instead of removing the rubbish of the old edifice, he takes it for the foundation of his new edifice. The new idea by which he was led in his work, and which discriminated him from the school of Antioch, was a higher view of human nature. In setting forth that new thought, however, he not only approximates to Adoptianism, or even to a species of Cerinthianism; but his doctrine regarding God is so strongly marked by predestinarian features, as scarcely to allow of the existence of real human freedom. The most important point to be remarked, however, is, that his conception of God is such as not to admit of an incarnation of God. According to it, human nature can, strictly speaking, come into relation with the will of God alone, with that which God has appointed to be good for the world. From that good, however, the essential nature of God eternally withdraws itself, and, instead of expressing itself in it, soars freely above it as "liberum arbitrium." He is discriminated from his predecessors, it is true, by the firmness of his grasp on the *form* of the ethical (forma), the will; failing, however, to conceive of the ethical ontologically, and representing the will merely as an indeterminate form, and as free arbitrariness, the will, considered in itself, becomes again mere blind force, and falls back into the physical:—even as Thomas Aquinas and the older teachers were unable to work their way out of the domain of the physical, because they directed their attention solely to the good content of freedom (good volitions), and paid no regard to its form (the will). This is, further, very clear from the observations he makes regarding the necessity of the work of Christ. The merits of Christ, he says, have their basis in His human nature, and are therefore not (as Thomas Aquinas asserted them to be) infinite; for otherwise, the created will of Christ would have been as well-pleasing to God as the uncreated will, and the Trinity would have loved both with equal love. Those merits are infinite only in so far as they are suffi-

cient for an infinite multitude of men; but they are not infinite in themselves, and intrinsically.[1] There was, moreover, no necessity, he urges, that Christ should have suffered in order to restore the human race;[2] and he undertakes a detailed refutation of the views of Anselm on this point. The death of Christ was necessary, simply because God willed it; and He willed it freely and fortuitously. God's foreknowledge that Christ would suffer was a fortuitous thing; but, without doubt, if it was foreknown, He did actually suffer.* Nor, again, was there any necessity that our race should be restored; for the only reason why men should be restored, was the fact of their having been predestined to glory, to which it was impossible for fallen creatures to attain, save on the basis of a satisfaction; and the predestination of man was fortuitous, not necessary. The assertion may also be questioned, that man could not be reconciled without a satisfaction.[3] Supposing, however, a satisfaction were necessary, it was not absolutely necessary that God Himself should make satisfaction. Anselm is further in error when he maintains, that, in the way of satisfaction, something greater than all creatures must be required; for we ought rather to say, that man, who had sinned by loving an infinitely worse object, ought himself to have made satisfaction by loving an infinitely nobler object. He entirely objected to any other infinitude of guilt than that which is so designated from the infinitude of its object, God. He considered Anselm to be further in error, when he argued that none but a man could make satisfaction; for he also who is not a debtor is able to make satisfaction for another, even as he is able to pray for him. If it had pleased God, an angel might have offered satisfaction. For a created offering possesses just as much value as God chooses shall attach to it, and no more. Even a mere man, born without original sin from a mother like Mary, and endowed with graces such as those which were possessed by the humanity of Christ, apart from any antecedent merit, might have earned the blotting out of sin; and yet, even had this been actually the case, we should not have been (as Richard de St Victor supposed) under the same obligation to

[1] L. c. Dist. xix. p. 138 ff.
[2] Dist. xx. pp. 143–146.
* "Wenn es vorher gewusst war, so litt er."
[3] Lib. iv. Dist. xv. Q. i. p. 255 ff.

such an one as we are under to God, because he would have owed all his good to God;—we should have been indebted to him merely as we are *indebted to the Virgin and the saints.* Finally, he maintains that every individual might offer satisfaction for himself, provided only there were bestowed on him the first grace (baptism) without merit:—and this, in fact, occurs. How was it possible more plainly to characterize the incarnation as a thing almost unnecessary to the redemption of man? What better method could have been adopted of equalizing the deserts of Christ, relatively to us, with the deserts of Mary, and of leaving to Christ merely the distinction of having founded sacramental grace?—which grace, again, was not deemed to have been necessarily, but merely as a matter of fact, dependent on the incarnation; inasmuch as God might, in the exercise of His freedom, have chosen other means of establishing the Church. These principles bear evident traces also of a pelagianizing tendency, which makes light both of sin and of the divine righteousness: and the explanation of their presence in the system of Scotus, is his reducing all things back to the divine freedom or arbitrariness, as their final ground.

Thomas Aquinas considered the incarnation to be something new merely in relation to man, not for God Himself. Even so, did Duns Scotus consider it rather in the light of a work (factio) undertaken by God for the sake of producing a "gratia creata" in a man, than as a mode of the divine being itself. This grace might have been produced without an "Unio;" and God's presence in Christ denotes an "habitus" merely in man, not in God.[1] We see, accordingly, that the two greatest Scholastics, strictly speaking, let fall the very idea of an incarnation of God:—the one, in that he does not admit that God became man, but sees in Christ merely an impersonal manifestation of

[1] Appositely does Baur remark (vol. ii. 832): "When God is said, by Duns Scotus, to have become man, the real meaning of the words is rather —God became nothing; consequently, He did not become man: everything of the nature of growth, whether completed or in process, is predicable solely of the human nature of Christ. This being the case, it needs no further argument to show, that, if God did not become man, man cannot have become God; and when one of the two essential aspects of the 'Unio' has been separated from the other, its very idea is destroyed, or is reduced to a purely nominal thing."

God under the form of a man; the other, in that, although far from intending to represent the humanity as selfless, he did not really advance beyond that position, except perhaps negatively, that is, by representing God as present in this man merely to a limited extent: and of such a limitation, the necessary consequence was, the reintroduction of the Nestorian doctrine of a double personality.

III. THE MYSTICAL ELEMENT IN SCHOLASTICISM.—As we have seen, the scholastic Christology is, in general, very defective: its scientific formulas show no traces of progress; on the contrary, they indicate, in many ways, that the mind was already beginning to regard the scaffolding with less interest, and was disposed to evade the proper problem of Christology on the one hand, and an open confession of adherence to Nihilianism on the other. Still, side by side with the formulas of Scholasticism, we discover the signs of warmer life and higher contemplations; we find an image of the Person of Christ cherished, which, though but imperfectly expressed in the formulas of the Church, served the purpose of nourishing and fecundating the piety of private individuals, and, in part also, the public Cultus. Without the consideration of this aspect of the matter, an important factor in the work of preparation for the Germanic Mysticism, which we shall have subsequently to examine, would be wanting; and that being wanting, we should be less satisfactorily able to account for the rise and character of the Reformation.

It was the doctrine of the atonement, that, having been made the subject of more careful reflection, exerted a specially fecundatory influence on that form of Christology which made it its aim to steer clear both of Docetism and Nihilianism. But, as this Christology fixed its attention principally on the divine-human Person of Christ in its totality, it stood in no inner relation to the old doctrine of the duality of the natures, but had more affinity with the views of the first period;—with those views which were the fruit, not of the duality just referred to, nor of the unity which grew out of that duality, but of living Christianity itself, and of the impression which the picture of the life of Christ, contained in the Gospels, continuously made on pious hearts. Many teachers of the Middle Ages based the possibility of Christ's making satisfaction

for us, amongst other things, on the fact that He is the Head of the mystical body of the Church. The head is able to offer satisfaction on behalf of its members. Following the example of Peter Lombard, the Scholastics were accustomed to devote a chapter of their Christology, specially to the subject of the peculiar "gratia" which was conferred on this person. Christ, they held, possesses in Himself the "plenitudo gratiæ et divinitatis," because He is the Head.[1] But the successors of the Lombard carried this further out in different directions. According to Albertus Magnus,[2] there was in Christ an "increata gratia" side by side with the "creata," by which He is distinguished from all others. In his detailed description of this "gratia," the feature to which he gives most prominence, and apparently attaches chief importance, is,—Christ is the Head of the Church. He would appear, it is true, to be Head solely as to His divine nature, consequently, not as God-man; in that the motion and feeling produced by Christ in the Church, are traced to His divine nature. But he answers,—Relatively to its body, the head has three characteristics,—*firstly*, it is the principle which works actively on the powers, on the feeling, and on the motions; *secondly*, it streams forth into the members as a formative vital principle; *thirdly*, there is a conformity between the nature of the head and that of the members. Now, it is solely as God that Christ is a principle exercising an active influence; though this does not necessarily exclude His humanity from being the channel through which His divine power flows. As an assimilative principle, which flows over, as it were, like a formative form, Christ is the Head of the blessed, and of those who have received grace, and impresses upon them the likeness of His life, of His "sensus" and of His "motus." In the third sense, He is the Head of men alone;

[1] Petr. Lomb. Sent. Lib. iii. Dist. xiii. "Ut in corpore nostro inest sensus singularis membris, sed non quantum in capite,—ibi enim et visus est, et auditus, et olfactus, et gustus, et tactus, in ceteris vero solus est tactus,—ita et in Christo habitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis, quia ille est caput, in quo est omnis sensus; in sanctis vero quasi solus tactus est, quibus spiritus datus est ad mensuram, cum de illius plenitudine acceperunt. Acceperunt autem de illius plenitudine non secundum essentiam, sed secundum similitudinem."

[2] Compend. theol. L. iv. de Incarn. Christi, c. 14, and L. iii. on the Sentences, Dist. xiii.

—as Head, namely, of members consubstantial with Himself, He is able to communicate to them His merits.

The "gratia" of this Head, consists, accordingly, in the "virtus influendi." Even as an individual man, He possessed a grace so rich and full, that it overflowed in Him (exuberat). Therefore does He pour forth spiritual feelings and motions into the members of His mystical body, out of the abundance of the graces of which He is the well-spring.[1] Not merely as God, but also as man, does He inspire all those who cling to Him with "sensus et motus spiritus et gratiæ." But, as man, He exercises active influence not immediately, but "meritorie:" He earns for us the inflowing of grace, and delivers us, in that He removes the obstacle to influx out of the way (obstaculum influxus in nos),—to wit, by paying our debt of guilt.

Thomas Aquinas discusses the same question at length.[2] In his "Summa," he advances in support of the opinion, that Christ, as a man, cannot be the Head of the Church, the further consideration,—that God is designated the Head of Christ; that, moreover, the head is a single member, itself dependent in turn on the heart; whereas Christ is the universal principle of the entire Church. From this it, accordingly, might apparently be concluded, that He is not the Head of the Church, but merely governs it in His divine nature. He replies,—As the whole Church is designated a mystical body, after the similitude of the natural body, so Christ is designated the Head of the Church, after the similitude of the human head. Now, this latter is head in three respects:—*Firstly*, it is the first in point of rank; *secondly*, it is the first in point of perfection, for all the senses are concentrated in it; *thirdly*, it is the first in point of power, for, the human head being the throne of the "vis sensitiva et motiva," the other members derive their strength and motion, and their government, from it. All this may be applied to Christ in a more perfect, even in a spiritual sense. He is nearer to God,—this gives Him His rank; He possesses the fulness of grace,—therein consists His perfection;

[1] Comp. theol. iv. 14: "Influit in membra corporis sui mystici sensum et modum spiritualem secundum *fontalem plenitudinem* omnis gratiæ in ipso habitantis."

[2] P. iii. quæst. 8, 1. Quæst. 3, 4, 7, 19, 23. Super Sentent. Lib. iii. Dist. xiii.; Quæst. 1, 2.

He has the power of pouring forth grace into all His members,—and that constitutes His "virtus." To the deity of Christ it belongs originatively (auctoritative), to His humanity instrumentally (instrumentaliter), to communicate the Holy Spirit; and although God is the Head of Christ, Christ is notwithstanding the Head of the Church. But the heart of His body, the Church, is the Holy Spirit. To be the Head of the Church, is the distinctive function of Christ. There is undoubtedly an influence on the members of the Church,—for example, by means of government,—which others besides He are capable of exercising, locally and temporarily, with His authority; but that inner influx (influxus interior), by which "virtus motiva et sensitiva a capite derivatur ad cetera membra," pertains alone to Him, because He possesses the "plenitudo gratiæ" in a thoroughly unique sense. On the soul of Christ was conferred grace, as on a universal principle in the genus of those who participate in grace. But the power of the first principle of a genus is universally diffused through all the operations of the same genus; consequently, as the universal principle, an universal significance attaches to Him in relation to the operations. On account of His mediatorial connection with the human race, He must needs have been in possession of a grace which streamed forth also upon others. This is the "fontalis gratia" of Albertus Magnus.[1] Specially clear, however, is the following passage,[2] in which Thomas Aquinas makes use of the idea of the head, in order to show how the merit of Christ can be transferred to us:—"In Christo non solum fuit gratia, *sicut in quodam homine singulari*, sed sicut in *capite totius Ecclesiæ*, cui omnes uniuntur, sicut capiti membra, *ex quibus constituitur mystice una persona*. Et *exinde* est, quod meritum Christi se extendit ad alios, in quantum sunt membra ejus; *quia non solum sibi sentit, sed omnibus membris*." As Adam, in a natural respect, was the principle of the entire human nature, so is Christ appointed by God to be the Head of all men; and, therefore, in the kingdom of grace, His merit extends itself to all His children.

He occupies himself also with the question,[3]—In what sense did Christ assume humanity and the universal human nature?

[1] Compare Summa l. c. Qu. vii. 1, 9, viii. 1, 6, ix.; Qu. xix. 4, ad secundam.

[2] Qu. xix. 4, Resp.

[3] Qu. iv. Art. 4.

Not in the sense, in which it may be conceived, apart even from its earthly realization, as a notion of the human mind; or (Platonically), as the general idea, preceding the concrete realization of, humanity (εἶδος, forma communis). The former would be a mere fiction, originating in the subjective representations of the human mind: and the "forma communis" is not at the same time individual; whereas the end of the incarnation was the realization of that personality, in which the "forma communis" should individualize itself. Indeed, man, according to his very idea, forms part of the sensuous world; for this reason, the humanity of Christ was under the necessity of participating in sensuous material, and cannot be represented as a Platonic εἶδος, whose existence preceded that of the concrete. But, if human nature subsisted neither in the divine intelligence by itself, nor indeed, at all, except in an actual sensible form, in the concrete individuals of the human race, the question at once arises, —Whether Christ appropriated the general human nature, in the sense that He became man in every individual man? This might appear a fitting course, says he; for a wise master-builder completes his work by the shortest possible method. But, to constitute men universally and naturally sons of God, would be a shorter path, than to bring the many to sonship by means of one natural Son. Now, as this is agreeable to the divine wisdom, so also would it seem to be consonant to love: and, inasmuch as that which belongs to a particular genus of beings per se, belongs to all the individuals of the genus, it would appear congruous that human nature should be assumed in all its subjects.

To these reasonings, he replies,—The *wisdom* of a master-workman is rather shown in his not attaining a result by means of many things, which could be satisfactorily attained by means of one. Moreover, to be assumed by God, does not belong to human nature in itself, in the sense that such an assumption pertained to its natural individuality, or its "principia essentialia:" were such the case, all the subjects sharing this nature must undoubtedly be assumed. The love of God was further manifested, not merely in His "assumtio," but also in His "passio" for others.—It was, further, impossible that all should be assumed; for it would have involved the abolition of the plurality of the subjects which share human nature. As the assumed nature could have no other personal centre than the

person by which it was assumed, it follows, that, after the assumption, there would have been but one single subject in human nature, to wit, the assumptive person[1] (Note 60). At such points, the essence of God and the essence of man did not seem to Thomas to be so opposed to each other as they were represented by the Church, and even by himself in other connections.[2] We may here adduce the doctrine laid down by him,—To God's perfect and necessary knowledge of Himself, belongs also the knowledge of His communicableness to the creatures, in different kinds of resemblance: in thus knowing Himself, God knows also the creatures, after their different kinds, in different ideas; so, however, that, like an artist, He comprehends His entire work in one thought.[3] The differences between the creatures are accordingly, in his view, based solely on the differences of their resemblance to God; and the different measures of their resemblance to God, are grounded again in the different degrees of the communication of the divine substance. Such a view is unquestionably emanatistic; and the consequence thereof would be, that Christ, in order to be perfect, must cease to be man: we see again, therefore, that the dualistic background previously referred to,[4] still continued to give a tone to the reasoning of Aquinas. It will repay us, however, to consider other efforts which he put forth, and which almost ended in his establishing an inner and more essential connection between the divine and human natures. Human nature, says he, was more capable of being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature, in consonance with its dignity. All creatures, it is true, bear some traces of resemblance to the Word, but man resembles the Word as His image and likeness. By knowledge and love, human nature is able, in some measure, to attain even to the Word Himself (contingere). It was fitting, moreover, that God should deny to no creature that which it is capable of receiving (capax).[5] Now, a thing may be made to resemble the Word in three ways: *Firstly*, in reference to *form*;—for, as a building resembles the preconceived idea (verbo mentali) of the architect, so every

[1] Summa iii. Q. iv. 3.
[2] See above, p. 304.
[3] Ritter, "Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie," B. iv. 286.
[4] See above, p. 304.
[5] Summ. P. iii. Q. iv. Art. i.; Sent. lib. iii. Dist. i. Q. i. Art. 2.

creature is like the Word, because it is embraced by His artistic idea. *Secondly*, in reference to *cognition* also (intellectualitas, Erkemituiss), a resemblance to the Word is possible; even as the knowledge which exists in the mind of a scholar bears a resemblance to the word which lives in the mind of the teacher. In this sense the rational creation resembles the Word of God, as to its very nature. *Thirdly*, the creature may attain to a resemblance to the Word of God, as regards His unity with the Father, by means of grace and love; and hereby does its adoption to the position of a child become complete.[1]

To this connection belongs his clear and ingenious answer to the question, so commonly raised by the Scholastics,—Why the Son, and not the Father nor the Holy Spirit, became man? His reply is,—Because the Son is the archetype, according to the pattern of which man was created at the beginning, and according to which, therefore, he must needs be restored.[2] The Word of God is the eternal idea of God, the archetype of all creation: and as the several ranks of creatures owe their existence and constitution to participation in this primal type, though after a mutable manner; so was it fitting, that by the personal, and not merely partial or participative, union of the Word with creation, it should be restored in a manner consonant to its original order, to an eternal and unchangeable perfection. For even so, an artist, when his work has been spoiled, restores it by means of the idea which ruled him in its first production.

[1] Summ. P. iii. Q. xxiii. 3, "Filiatio adoptionis est quædam similitudo filiationis naturalis."

[2] Summa, P. iii. Q. iii. Art. 8, coll. sup. Sent. iii. Dist. i. Q. ii. Art. 2: "imago convenientiam habet cum eo, qui reparandus erat, scilicet cum homine; unde decuit, ut imago imaginem assumeret." (Similarly also Albertus Magnus, l. c. Comp. theol, cap. vi.; "imago debuit per imaginem reparari.") Summa l. c. he says,—"Convenienter enim ea, quæ sunt similia, uniuntur, ipsius autem personæ filii, qui est Verbum Dei, attenditur convenientia ad totam creaturam, quia verbum artificis, *i.e.*, conceptus ejus, est similitudo exemplaris eorum, quæ ab artifice fiunt. Unde Verbum Dei, quod est æternus conceptus ejus, est similitudo exemplaris totius creaturæ: et ideo, sicut per participationem hujus similitudinis creaturæ sunt in propriis speciebus institutæ sed mobiliter, ita per unionem Verbi ad creaturam non participatam sed personalem, conveniens fuit reparari creaturam in ordine ad æternam et immobilem perfectionem. Nam et artifex per formam artis conceptam, qua artificiatum condidit, ipsum, si collapsum fuerit, restaurat."

How nearly did Thomas here approach to the doctrine of Irenæus, that the first creation was still incomplete; that there was a necessity for the "immobile exemplar," instead of the "mobilis imago," being manifested through the personal, and not merely through the partial or participative "Unio" of the Word with humanity; and that, therefore, the incarnation of God was not entirely and solely occasioned by sin, but was essential to the realization of the eternal type of humanity![1]

This will be, perhaps, the most fitting place to take a more careful and connected review of the history of the question,—Whether the incarnation of God formed part of the original idea of the world and of humanity, and was consequently a constituent and essential element of the highest mundane good; or, whether its ground is to be supposed to have been the contingent one, of sin—the question,—"Utrum Christus venisset, si Adam non peccasset?"

During the earlier period of its existence, the Church paid but little attention to this question. It was, for the most part, satisfied with basing the necessity of the incarnation of Christ on the actual and evident need of a work of redemption. The ground thus assigned, however, was inadequate, in so far as Christ, the highest of all rational beings, in and by whom humanity is exalted to the throne of God, is represented as a mere means for others; whereas all other beings have the dignity of being ends to themselves, and ends for Him. To the Person of Christ, in and by itself, therefore, no importance could be attached: His work, His merit, alone—that impersonal neutral thing—was of consequence. This view, logically carried out, reduces Christ to the position of a mere act of revelation on the part of God—of a mere theophany, the ground for the continuance of which necessarily ceased with the vanquishment of sin; and this drives us irresistibly on to Nihilianism. It is true, that even on this supposition God and His glorification may continue to be an end to themselves; and that God is also in Christ. But it is God in Christ, and God alone, that is this self-end: for the Logos ἄσαρκος, the humanity of Christ is a mere means, as

[1] To this connection belongs also Sent. L. iii. Dist. i. Q. i. Art. 3, where he remarks,—"The incarnation effected not merely the deliverance from sin, but also "humanæ naturæ exaltatio et totius universi consummatio." Compare the beautiful passage in the Prologue to Sent. L. iii. init.

also for us; the humanity itself did not share with the Logos the privilege of being an end, nay more, of being an end to itself, and a good possessed of an absolute intrinsic value. Yet this was but another mode of giving expression to the prevalent opinion, that the humanity of Christ was impersonal, a mere thing;—with which opinion contrasted remarkably the equally prevalent custom of worshipping the entire Christ,—a custom which proved a corrective as regards piety, but not as regards theory. Such Docetism as this, kept its hold the more firmly in the Church, in proportion as the work of redemption, the necessity for which was supposed to have been the ground of the appearance of the Mediator, was conceived to consist merely in the communication of divine doctrine or in the exhibition of divine power,—that is, merely as the work of a Prophet or of a King. The organ employed to communicate true doctrine is an unimportant and fortuitous thing; the particular personality of the organ is scarcely brought into consideration in connection therewith; nor was a human personality at all more necessary to the exhibition of the redemptive power of God (in conflict with the devil or death). For such a purpose, indeed, it was scarcely requisite that the organ should bear the likeness of man. Not until the process of deliverance is conceived as a moral one, can significance be attached to the human personality as such,—even though it should be, in the first instance, merely the significance of a means. But in the moral sphere, a personality which lovingly constitutes itself a means, asserts or maintains for itself, by that very act, the dignity of an end;—means and end are then no longer divided. Towards the attainment of this position a great step was taken by Anselm's "Cur Deus Homo?" That treatise represents, not indeed the doing of Christ, but yet His suffering, as a valuable moral possession and property of humanity, and as endued with atoning virtue. But, however readily the subsequent Scholastics recognised the necessity of the work of redemption, they advanced with equal decision in the direction of maintaining, that there was no necessity for Christ being the Saviour. God might have forgiven sin independently of Christ: in the freedom of God, was eternally involved the possibility of His forgiving sin independently of a Mediator! The appearance of Christ, therefore, must have been, in the last instance, contingent and almost unnecessary; although it was congruous

(congrua) that man should thus be redeemed;—an opinion glaringly in opposition to the views and feelings of the Christian Church.

Beyond this tendency to Nihilianism those had, it is true, advanced, who regarded Christ merely as the absolutely moral personality, and almost exclusively as an end to Himself:—Such were all the Ebionite parties; such also were, especially, Pelagius, and in more recent times, the Socinians. The example of Christ, to which they attached chief importance, presupposes the existence of a true human personality, which as such is also an end to itself. Those who took this turn, could not therefore grant that Christ appeared solely on account of sin, and that He was not of significance in Himself, independently of sin. On the contrary, with their Deism, they were inclined to teach that Christ is the man, who by his own virtue gained for himself the highly important position which he occupied, and showed what a man can do. Lactantius, however, connected the religious with the moral view of Christ, and represented Him as the ethical revelation of God, as the *lex viva*. But the personality thus presented to us is exclusively an end, and not also means: the importance of the *work*, therefore, is reduced to a minimum, and, relatively to the person, becomes almost as fortuitous, as, according to the prevalent doctrine, the divine-human person was, relatively to the work. By the Church, the human aspect was curtailed; by the parties just referred to, the divine aspect was curtailed, and an unsatisfactory estimate, at the same time, formed even of the moral element. At an early period, however, the deeper-thinking Fathers of the Church were stirred by a disposition to regard Christ, not merely as a means, but as also an end to Himself; and especially to acknowledge in the exalted Lord, the highest good of humanity, the centre of mundane good. Irenæus, above all, was inclined to take this view of Christ.[1]

[1] iii. 18, 7, v. 16, 2. The passage (cap. xiv. 1),—"Si non haberet caro salvari, nequaquam verbum Dei caro factum esset," is only apparently inconsistent therewith; for the first words may signify, "If it had not been possible to restore humanity to its archetypal form, it would have lacked the capability of being assumed by the Logos." But even supposing we must take them to refer to the necessity of the "salvatio," and not to its possibility, Irenæus may have understood the word σώζειν, which he probably employed, also of the preservation and completion of human nature, which in Adam was still in an unsettled condition.

Those who held the incarnation to be at the same time the consummation of humanity, and not merely the consummation of revelation,—who further considered that in Christ more was gained for humanity than was lost in Adam,—had already, in effect, allowed the validity of the premises, from which may be deduced the necessity of the incarnation of God, as involved in the eternal idea of the world. So taught, not only Irenæus, but also Tertullian and Athanasius.[1] Even Theodore of Mopsuestia, also, although his doctrine of the office and work of Christ bore a resemblance to that of Pelagius (in so far as both represent Him as an example, as the bringer of immortality, and as the deliverer from death, although not from sin), advances onward to the speculative principle, that to the perfection of the world, He was indispensable, who, being the cosmical image of God and the archetype, combines and reconciles all antagonisms in Himself. When Pelagius maintained that the Person of Christ was without sin, the result was substantially to lower the dignity of Christ, and to loosen the connection between Him and the idea of humanity, his conception of which was an atomistic one. Theodore, on the contrary, starting from a similar point of view, goes on to represent the Person of Christ as the ornament and crown of the world, as the consummatory realization of its idea; and in order to establish the distinctive eminence of the Person of Christ, he makes reference, although in an unsatisfactory manner, to the deed wrought by God. In exactly the same manner, starting from the opposite point,—to wit, from the idea of the consummation of the divine acts of revelation,—the afore-mentioned Fathers had arrived at the conclusion, that this act of revelation involved, at the same time, the positing of the perfect man, of the true primal man, whom God had in view even when He created Adam.

But when Pelagius and Theodore represented Christ as a good in Himself, and as an end to Himself, it was at the cost of His Mediatorship; even as the Neo-Platonists taught a doctrine of the Trinity which was disconnected from the work of redemption. Those two teachers went even so far as to convert their Christology into a buttress of theories of the self-deliverance of man. That similar views should make their appearance in the Scotist school, was the more to be expected, as Scholas-

[1] See above, Part I. pp. 579, 834 ff. of this work.

ticism, for the most part, denied that the appearance of Christ was rendered necessary by sin; maintaining that God could have forgiven sin apart from the mediation of Christ. So long as God was held to be eternally reconciled with sin, or so long as man was considered capable of saving himself, it was of course impossible to deny to Christ alone the dignity of being an end to Himself; His appearance, on the contrary, must necessarily be attributed to some other cause than the existence of sin. For this reason, the Scotists were able to teach, that Christ was not a mere "bonum occasionatum," existing for the sake of others, but lovely in Himself.

The older Fathers whom we have mentioned, were influenced by quite different considerations. They tried to combine the necessity for the appearance of Christ arising from sin, with that necessity which related to the perfection of the world. Such was specially the effort of Gregory the Great, with whom the passage quoted above (p. 395), in connection with Richard de St Victor, is said to have originated. Augustine, indeed, says also,—"Si homo non peccasset, filius Dei non esset incarnatus". (de Trin. xiii. 10): he taught, too, that the necessity for the appearance of Christ on account of sin, consisted in its appropriateness and fitness to the end in view. But though he did not conceive Christ to be absolutely necessary as a means of redemption, he held Him to be necessary as a means of perfection; and represents Him as essentially allied with humanity.[1]

During the Middle Ages, Peter Abelard, Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Great,[2] left it uncertain whether sin

[1] August. de peccato mortali, c. 26, 27. Though even in his system, humanity occupies but a precarious accidental position, inasmuch as the sole reason urged for the creation of men, is that they might fill up the gap caused in the heavenly world by the fall of some of the angels. Compare Ambrosius, de Incarn. Domini iv. 6; Gregorii M. Moralia, iii. 11; John Damasc. de fide orth. iii. 18.

[2] Compare Quenstedt's System. Theol. P. iii. p. 110. Albert the Great says, in his Sentent. T. iii. Dist. 20, Art. 4, after having adduced in detail the arguments pro and contra, that it is more probable that Christ would have come, even independently of sin. Didacus Stella, in his Enarrat. in Luc. T. ii. 1593, remarks on Luke xv. (p. 131), that redemption was the principal motive of the incarnation. "Nisi Adam peccasset, quanquam Christus ad extollendam humanitatem illamque præmio prædestinationis æternæ beandam nihilominus erat venturus, et ut operibus nostris vigorem daret, tamen in carne passibili non descenderet, etc."

rendered the appearance of Christ necessary, and were satisfied when they had shown His coming to be appropriate in relation to sin; but they, at the same time, asserted the more distinctly, that His appearance was necessary apart from sin. On the other hand, Ruprecht of Deutz connected both reasons, by teaching, that when God predestined the manifestation of Christ, sin also was included in His eternal counsel, in so far as it was fitted to become an instrument for the revelation of the Divine love. At all events, he considers it to have been fitting that the first Adam should not possess sufficient power in himself, in order that opportunity might be afforded for the most complete revelation of the love of God,—which was only possible in conflict with sin. He regards the Person of Christ as the absolute goal of the world, to which everything else, even sin itself, was made subservient. There is a certain resemblance between this view and the doctrine of the later Calvinists, who, although their system of thought had a supra-lapsarian character, did not therefore regard sin as the sole ground of the necessity of a God-man (herein differing from most Calvinists); but, on the contrary, held sin also to have been, for the sake of Christ, included in the Divine counsel;—or rather, to put the case more exactly, they conceived both the appearance of Christ and the existence of sin to have been willed simultaneously, as mutually conditioning each other—neither without the other, and each for the sake of the other. They did not consider the full significance of Christ to have been expressed, when we designate Him "Redeemer," although to redeem was the primary purpose of His coming; but even after the accomplishment of the work of redemption, Christ continues to be essential and necessary to the world of the chosen, who are His body.[1]

Richard de St Victor, on the contrary, held that the exist-

[1] Compare Quenstedt's "Systema Theol." Pars. iii. cap. iii. Membr. i. Q. 1, p. 108. So says Bucanus in his "Instit. Theol." Art. x. Q. 3,—Even supposing man had continued in his original righteousness, he would still have needed this Mediator, "non ut reconciliaretur Deo et sanaretur a peccato—sed per quem retineretur in gratia Dei et præservaretur a peccato." Similar also, according to Quenstedt, was the opinion of Zanchius, in his Hexaëmer. Pars iii. L. 3, c. 2. Polanus' "Syntagma," L. vi. cap. 27. Even Calvin himself (see his "Instit." L. ii. xii. 4) adopts the usual view, only so far as supra-lapsarian principles make clearer the necessity which existed for a God-man, that is, because of sin.

ence of sin was not a necessity, but a contingency; and that the appearance of Christ was necessary on account of sin, which was contingent. At the same time, however, he believed that Christ would have come independently of sin, because Christ appeared to him to realize the absolute harmony of the world,—the perfect, eternal idea of the world,—in such a manner that we need no longer regret the introduction of sin, seeing that sin rather served to bring Christ into a more inward and blessed connection with us. Christ is the Head of humanity; and (Ruprecht, in particular, subjoins), so far from sin being the sole condition of the possibility, or the sole reason of the necessity, thereof,—a reconciliation of man would have been impossible, had not the human nature which He assumed, been from the beginning created with a view to Him. This idea was especially advocated by Johann Wessel (sec. 15).[1] Even if Adam had not sinned, the Son of God, he thinks, would have appeared (Note 61). God must needs become man, in order that the holy and honourable body, to wit, the entire community of the triumphant blessed, might not be mutilated, but might rejoice in the possession of its proper and lawful Head: in other words, that it might become the temple of the corner-stone, on which the two walls—angels and men—should unitedly and securely rest. About the same time, the arguments in favour of the view, that God would have become man quite independently of sin, were collected in the work entitled, "Roberti Caracoli de Licio de laudibus Sanctorum (Sermo iii.)," published at Venice, A.D. 1489:—the author was a Franciscan monk. These arguments are drawn from the idea of the universe; from the dignity and blessedness of man, and his destination for God; from the idea of God, specially of His might, wisdom, and love; and, finally, from the dignity and inner excellence of the Person of Christ. The incarnation of God, namely, served primarily to perfect man, and mediately to perfect the universe, because through it the human race attained "Completio," both as touching its nature, and as touching grace and glory:—the *former*, because the completeness of the world required that man should take his rise in the way in

1 "De causis incarnationis," L. ii.; compare Ullmann's "Johann Wessel," 1834, p. 254. Appeal was particularly made to Col. i. 18; Rom. viii. 29; Heb. ii. 10; Gen. i. 26; Prov. viii. 22.

which Christ took His rise; everything actually possible must attain an actual existence: the *latter*, because the state of grace requires that the Church have its Head, whether sin exist or not; and because the full realization of blessedness depended in any case on the incarnation, apart altogether from the existence of sin. In no other way was it possible for man to find true inward and outward joy. The incipient fitness, the "capacitas," of human nature—a "capacitas" by which it is distinguished from angelic natures—for personal union with God, would have remained useless, but for the incarnation. But no gift could have been conferred on human nature without some purpose.—Then, *further*, as regards God,—By the act of incarnation He manifested His power, wisdom, and goodness. Such a manifestation pertained to the very idea of God, and had nothing to do with the falling or standing of man. The incarnation exalts human nature (above the Adamitic nature); now, if this exaltation had not already been predetermined, it would appear as though man had derived a blessing from His sin,—which, considered in relation to God, would be unrighteous. —*Thirdly*, as regards the Person of Christ,—It is as difficult to merit and earn the infinite good for ourselves, as it is to offer satisfaction for an insult of Him who is the infinite good. If man was incapable of doing the latter, he was also incapable of doing the former. It was, therefore, quite as fitting, even on the supposition that man had remained good, that Christ should appear, in order that through Him the infinite good might be earned; as it was fitting that He should come to make atonement, when man had sinned. As a last reason, mention is made of the dignity of the human soul of Christ. If the incarnation occurred "principaliter," for the sake of the atonement, the soul of Christ was not willed as an end in itself, but merely, as it were, incidentally (that is, the last of all, as a means for the deliverance of the rest):—but it is plainly inappropriate that the noblest of all creatures should have come into existence merely "occasionaliter."[1]

[1] The author himself does not pronounce judgment, because nothing is revealed concerning the matter. Similarly also, at a later period, Bellarmine ("De Christo," L. v. c. 10) remarks,—"If Adam had not fallen, Christ would probably not have appeared in the flesh." So also Gregor. de Valentia. Petavius, on the contrary, translated the "probably not"

Most of the disciples of Thomas Aquinas opposed this view, as even Bonaventura had already done.[1] Thomas himself, however (as we have previously shown), approximated somewhat to the idea of the incarnation of God, as essentially necessary to the realization of the eternal archetype of humanity. It pertains to the omnipotence of the divine nature, says he, that it should perfect its works, and reveal itself in an infinite effect; but a mere creature cannot be termed an infinite effect, inasmuch as it is essentially finite. Now, this demand for an infinite operation or effect, seems to be met by the incarnation; for it united things which were separated from each other by an infinite distance. The universe also appears to attain completion by this work, in that the last creature, man, is thus united with God, the Beginning of all things. This idea would seem to imply that the incarnation of God would have taken place even if there had been no sin.[2] But although he felt somewhat inclined to affirm this conclusion,[3] he was prevented, partly by the absence of scriptural proofs in its favour, and partly by passages of an opposite tendency in some of the Fathers, as, for example, in Augustine. Finally, therefore, he contents himself with saying, that it is more probable that Christ would not have become man if there had been no sin. His followers, with few exceptions, turned his probability into a direct negation.

of Bellarmine, into a "certainly not:" and his example was followed by most of our old Church writers on Dogmatics, as, for example, Wigand, Calov, Gerhard, Dorscheus, Scherzer, Quenstedt; compare the latter l. c. p. 110 ff. 116.

[1] In the main, Suarez alone (T. i. in tert. Part. Thomæ, disp. 5, sec. 2) inclined towards Duns Scotus, and endeavours at the same time to remain true to Thomas. Bonaventura and others also took the part of the opponents of this view.

[2] Summa, Pars iii. Q. i. Art. iii.: "Ad omnipotentiam divinæ naturæ pertinet, ut opera sua perficiat, et se manifestet per aliquem infinitum effectum: sed nulla pura creatura potest dici infinitus effectus, cum sit finita per suam essentiam."

[3] He evinces this inclination more strongly in his commentary on Sent. iii. Dist. i. Q. i. Art. iii. than in the passage just quoted from the Summa. In the latter he says,—alii contrarium asserunt quorum assertioni magis assentiendum videtur, though it is certain that God alone can decide it.

CHAPTER THIRD.

SCHOLASTICISM having attained its maturity in Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, we find it exhibiting many and various signs of decay, from the very commencement of the fourteenth century onwards. These signs of decay occur especially in connection with Christology,—a subject on which Scholasticism, strictly so termed, put forth very little creative power, during its entire existence.

The feeling, that the formal mode of discussion hitherto pursued in connection with Christology must now be dropt, and new ground be broken, stirred most vigorously, and with the greatest result, in the German mystical thinkers. German Mysticism put forth its greatest strength during the fourteenth and part of the fifteenth centuries; but, as it was internally connected rather with the epoch of the Reformation than with that which has just passed under review, its history in relation to Christology must form an introduction to the next part of this work. Let us now, however, dwell a moment longer on the further course of Scholasticism itself.[1]

The philosophy of the Church, which, until the fourteenth century, was under the dominance of realistic principles, served the purpose of giving form and fixity to its dogmas. No one, indeed, supposed that the natural reason could furnish the proper justification of these dogmas;—theology alone, that is, the divine authority of the Church, was their true foundation: but still, the natural knowledge of God and the world was regarded as a kind of school for the domain of faith and theology. Nor, in the view of the Church, could any real contradiction exist between natural knowledge and faith, inasmuch as both lead us back to one and the same God. We have previously shown (p. 278 ff.) what an important part the idea of God, formed by the human mind in the light of nature, played in the scholastic treatment of dogmas.

[1] Compare Baumgarten-Crusius' "Compend. der Dogmengeschichte," 1840, p. 269 ff.; Baur l. c. Bd. 2866 ff.; H. Ritter's "Geschichte der christl. Philosophie," Bd. 4, Buch xiii.; Rettberg's Essay, "Occam und Luther, u. s. W.," in the "Theol. Studien und Kritiken," 1839.

From the fourteenth century onwards, however, the league between natural and theological knowledge was dissolved.[1] This was an inevitable result of the representation given by the Thomists and Scotists of the relation between nature and grace: —each, namely, was supposed to exclude the other. In taking this view of nature and grace, the Thomists were influenced rather by religious considerations, evincing an inclination to Pantheism in conjunction with their Predestinatianism; the Scotists followed a moral tendency. Logically carried out, the principles of the former admitted merely the semblance of a world, side by side with God: the latter asserted for the individual or subject, a separate, independent existence. A consequence of the dissolution of the alliance just referred to, was the revival of Nominalism, which, like the process of dissolution itself, was capable of assuming two different forms—one more Thomistic, the other more Scotistic, in character.

The *Thomistic Nominalism* owed its rise to the conviction, that if objective validity and truth—validity and truth, therefore, as applied to theology—were conceded to the results arrived at by the natural reason, in reference to the general ideas and laws of nature, the dignity of the articles of faith, which lie out beyond nature, would be lowered. Its adherents deemed it necessary, for the honour of theology and faith, to throw doubt on the utility of ideas originating with the natural intellectual faculties of man, to deny to them objective reality, and to concede to them merely subjective importance.[2] But the very ground on which theological knowledge rested, was thus taken away; and as a consequence, the only relation in which it was possible for the spirit now to stand to dogmas, was one of volition. Faith, which cannot be produced by cogency of reasoning, is, say they, the highest virtue—the more meritorious, the greater the difficulties which it has to overcome: nor is it right that the truth of the faith should be confirmed by any supernatural light; for then, to believe, would be no merit. On the contrary, we should therefore deem it by no means impossible for faith to contradict reason; and precisely because faith thus

[1] Ritter a. a. O. p. 547 ff.

[2] So by Durandus de S. Portiano (he died in 1330), in his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Compare Ritter a. a. O. pp. 550-534.

becomes more difficult and more meritorious. The divine has its own peculiar, incomparable laws. The divine world was conceived to be a sphere so completely different, as to stand in no connection whatever with the knowledge acquired in the present sphere. And as no sort of reality belongs to generic ideas, the only knowledge possible to man here, is that which is based on the perceptions of the senses. Now, as there exists no such intuitional sensational perception of divine things as there exists of outward things, no knowledge of divine things can consequently be attained in the present world.

Of God's inner essence, man possesses no knowledge at all, not even through faith: for creation, being diverse in kind from God, does not reveal the Divine essence. The only thing revealed to faith, is relations of God to us: and these relations are grounded entirely in His will, for which no other reason can be assigned, save that such is the Divine will. This scepticism with regard to the sphere of knowledge, and this disparagement of philosophy, were intended to further the adoption of a purely practical relation to matters of faith: the aim was to represent everything lying outside of the domain of faith as worthless, and the powers of thought were exercised for the sole purpose of demonstrating their own incapacity to deal with higher things. At an earlier period, the cataphatic or affirmative theology had been combined with the apophatic or negative theology; but the latter now again gains the upper hand. Truth is held to lie alone in the absolutely supernatural kingdom of grace, with which man can only have a connection of obedience. That kingdom is approachable solely by a faith without knowledge, that is, by a blind faith, such as is objectively attested by the Holy Scriptures and the Church. Thus, this form of Nominalism ended in questioning the possibility of any science at all, even of a theological science. Intending to exalt Christian grace, Nominalists removed it out of the reach of the human spirit; the light which they aimed to diffuse was extinguished; and there remained behind merely the twilight of the authority of the Church, in which it was impossible to attain a clear knowledge of the real nature of that which faith was bidden to grasp. Theology had apparently gained the victory over philosophy, and asserted for itself the absolute and sole possession of spiritual truth. But by this means, not merely was the

entire world alienated from God, and reduced to a mere shadow,[1] but theology also, so far as it claims to be a science, had dug its own grave. Positive phenomena and facts alone are recognised: there exists no active faculty of knowledge, but merely a passive one: and the sole duty of faith is to ask *what* the Divine omnipotence has done,—it can neither demonstrate the necessity of that which God does, nor show that it was fitting that He should act as He did, and not otherwise.[2]

Somewhat later, but on that account the more vigorous, was the development of *Sceptical Nominalism* in the school of the *Scotists*. The system of Duns Scotus himself plainly enough contained the seeds of this after-growth; for, if the "absolutum liberum arbitrium" is the highest in God, it must be impossible strictly to know anything as necessary, unless it be the sovereign arbitrariness of God. To know that, is to know that nothing has truth and reality, except so far as God, or the "liberum arbitrium" of God, has willed it to possess truth and reality: all knowledge, therefore, is, in one aspect, purely hypothetical; in another aspect, essentially empirical. Duns Scotus himself, however, endeavoured to escape from these consequences, and to preserve for man, even for man's knowledge, a real and true relation to the infinite:—an endeavour which was quite in agreement with the importance attached by him to subjectivity and freedom. His disciple Occam (who died A.D. 1347) taught a form of Nominalism which took, and proceeded to apply, in all seriousness, the entire separation drawn, theoretically, between philosophy and theology, and practically, between the worldly and the spiritual. One principle possessed and

[1] The same conclusion was arrived at by the strict Thomistic Predestinarians: see Thomas de Bradwardine's (he died A.D. 1349) "De causa Dei et veritate causarum." Further, Joh. de Mercuria and others. Compare Baumgarten-Crusius, "Comp. der Dogmengeschichte," l. c. p. 267.

[2] Out of special deference to the incarnation, however, Durand distinguishes between the absolute and the ordinated (ordinata) will of God. As touching His absolute power, He might have assumed even an irrational nature; as touching His ordinated power, it would have been unfitting to assume an irrational nature: for in this connection the main point for consideration, is the purpose of the incarnation. That purpose was the healing of the creature: and human nature alone needed and was capable thereof. In Sent. iii. Dist. ii. Q. i. In this case, consequently, he turned his back on his Nominalism, for the sake of Christology. Compare Ritter l. c. p. 573.

animated this powerful thinker in his efforts to defend the rights of the State against the hierarchy, and strictly to exclude all knowledge, pretending to the character of demonstration, from the sphere of faith:—he desired to establish peace between the two powers of philosophy and theology, of the State and the Church, by clearly discriminating and defining their respective domains. To the Church and its theology pertains entirely the spiritual; reason has no warrant for occupying itself with matters of faith, or, indeed, with divine things at all. Let it affirm what it will, the opposite thereof may be, in reality, equally true. (Note 62.) Such is the case with proofs of the existence, of the unity and of the attributes, of God:—much more is it the case with the mysterious doctrines of revelation. In relation to these things, all we can do is to believe,—that is, to bow to the authority of the Church, whose articles may be logically developed, but cannot be rationally demonstrated. On the other hand, the Church also must, to be consistent, evince its contempt for worldly powers, possessions, sciences, in comparison with its own spiritual riches, by not meddling at all with temporal things, especially with the State. He, further (and, as it seems, not without a certain degree of roguery), designedly draws logical conclusions from the dogmas of the Church, which run out into absurdities, and end in bare contradictions;—he accordingly pronounces theology and the Church to have no connection whatever with science, and represents their domain as one in which nothing is of importance but faith, in which contradictions, so far from awakening scruples and doubts, should only awaken a feeling of exultation that it is exalted above all human and rational thought. His scepticism with regard to the possibility of scientific knowledge, extended not merely to divine things, but quite as much to philosophy itself, so far as it aimed at being anything more than logic. Not only does he deny, with Durando, the law of causality, and the possibility of knowing the essence of the cause from the effect, but, carrying Durand's principles much further, affirms that there is a complete contrariety between our conception of being (conceptus) and being itself. Being can be attributed alone to particular individual things, outside of the soul,—they alone are substances: with them "scientia realis" has to occupy itself; for "Universalia" have no existence, but

merely individual things. But, whereas single, individual things are substances, conceptions or thoughts are merely accidents of the substance of the soul; and the accidents are under no necessity of resembling the substance of the soul, still less of resembling the substances outside of the soul. At the very utmost, thoughts are signs or tokens of external things, that is, for the soul itself; and words, as the signs of thoughts, are in reality mere signs of signs. Our general conceptions are simply and solely abstractions from those thoughts, which are the signs of particular things,—that is, they are abstracted from single representations. These abstractions, however, are "fictiones,"—thoughts without reality, if not mere indeterminate chaotic representations of separate individual things. The positive science, which he postulates, is consequently not a knowledge of things in themselves: the only knowledge he retains, is a kind of calculation carried on with the general ideas which form themselves naturally and passively, though not arbitrarily, in the soul; and all he professes to do, is to bring these general notions into unison, and connect them with each other, as constituting a distinct world of their own. In his view, therefore, science is nothing more than the perception and combination, or discrimination, of inner processes; and the judgments arrived at, are at all events subjectively accurate, and valid for the sphere of the subjective. The same principles are applied also to the domain of the supersensual. Our knowledge of the 'supersensual,' is simply a knowledge of our own inner states and experiences. This knowledge is its own evidence, and does not presuppose the existence of something else to which it owes its character of knowledge; for, on the contrary, in order to the certain knowledge of all other things, we need to have such a self-evidencing, or (as he also says) intuitive knowledge of the intelligible. This knowledge of our inner experience (or of our inner intuitions), is consequently a match for all the doubts of the Academicians, and constitutes the most trustworthy knowledge possible to man; as even Augustine hinted (de Trin. xv. 1).[1]

These latter traits set before us the distinguishing characteristic of the Scotistic Nominalism. Returning to the nega-

[1] Compare on this entire subject, H. Ritter l. c. pp. 574–604. Occam in Sentent. Prol. Q. i. KK.

tive theology of the Pseudo-Areopagite, the Thomistic Nominalists arrived at the conclusion, that the human mind must submit itself absolutely to the faith of the Church: the Scotistic Nominalists, on the contrary, were powerfully stirred by the conviction, that the world possessed a reality and weight of its own, independent of the spiritual kingdom;[1] nay more, the principles last brought under notice, evince the presence of an energetic subjectivity, struggling to build for itself an intellectual world out of its own inner, sensuous, and intelligible experiences (conceived to be passively acquired),—a world in which the spirit could feel itself at home, as in that which is in the highest degree worthy of confidence. We should not omit to remark, that Occam thus opened the door for the Mysticism which flourished during this century, and which was the fruit of the inner development of Scholasticism itself. He did not himself pursue the path which he prepared for others: nay more, he was probably not aware of having furnished, from the scholastic point of view, the full authorization to a mystical Nominalism, like that taught by Gerson.[2] Occam himself was far too much a man of the world to be able to realize such collectedness and calmness of mind, as would have admitted of his developing that inner world even philosophically, much less religiously. But when he says, that such propositions as,—I cognise; I know that I live; I know that it is my purpose to be blessed and not to err,—cannot be called in question, and must be regarded as more certain than the truths which are attested by the external senses, he in effect lays down the principle which was further developed in the next century by Nicholas de Cusa, and in the seventeenth century by Des Cartes. The same tendency is also traceable in the fundamental principle of the system of the Realist, Raymond de Sabonde,—that self-knowledge is the basis of all knowledge.

The account just given, attests clearly enough the decay of Scholasticism subsequently to the fourteenth century, and shows that it had grown weary of the struggle after systematic science, especially of the struggle to present a connected view of the

[1] The natural sciences also, which now began to bud into existence, and the awakening feeling of independence in states and nations, contributed their part to giving matters this turn.

[2] Gerson died A.D. 1429.

doctrine of the Person of Christ. Instead of inquiring into Christology, they wasted their energies on the discussion of isolated questions, arbitrarily suggested, which they designated by the very characteristic name of "Quotlibeta." Other signs of this decay are discernible in connection with the eclecticism of realistic, nominalistic, and mystical principles, which attained to ever greater prevalence, subsequently to the fifteenth century; and which was shortly after associated with that enthusiasm for Plato, Aristotle (see above, p 304), Pythagoras, and even for the Cabbala, which had just been newly enkindled amongst the Italians and Greeks. The mind of the Western nations, dissatisfied with what it possessed, turned its eyes in all directions, inquiring whence it could again draw the spiritual certainty and joy which it had now lost. The German mind, in particular, became the theatre on which the entire past intellectual history of man was reproduced, with the design of preparing the way for the great work, destined soon to be accomplished.* The Reformation, however, owed its rise, not to this eclecticism, not to the forces now in process of decomposition; but to a new outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Its way was immediately and positively prepared in history by men who called the mind away from Scholasticism and the doctrines of the Church, to the word of God, to earnest practical piety, and to a holy conversation;[1] and who further, by means of their knowledge of sin, learnt to appreciate the high destiny of humanity. They also unconsciously furthered the same end, who, quietly retiring into themselves, made it their sole endeavour to attain to a life which, being full of God, should be true blessedness, true sanctity, and true wisdom. The conjunction of that biblical, practical, with this mystical, tendency, was the living seed, whose ripened fruit was the Reformation.

* See Note P, App. II.

[1] Amongst these may be mentioned such men as Gerson; Peter d'Ailly; Nicol de Clemenges, who died in 1440; Johann Wessel, who died in 1488; Jerome Savonarola, who died in 1498.

APPENDIX I.

NOTES.

Note 1, page 26.

We need only mention the investigations recently instituted into the Ignatian Epistles, to which occasion was given by Cureton's discovery of the Syriac Recension, which is the shortest that has hitherto come to light:—specially the labours of Bunsen, Ritschl, and Weiss, on the one hand, and of Baur and Uhlhorn on the other. Much new light is also thrown on the intellectual movements in the Syrian Church during the first centuries, by the recently discovered work, edited by Miller of Oxford under the false title of *Ὠριγένους φιλοσοφούμενα*. To this treasure, which dates from the commencement of the third century, Bunsen directs attention in his "Hippolytus und seine Zeit" (see vol. i. of German edition), and justly praises it as of great importance, relatively to both criticism and history.—The correctness of the historical and critical point of view from which the subject of Christology was considered in the first volume of this work, has received ample confirmation from this unexpected discovery. Specially, confirmation has been brought of the important thesis, that, in the ancient Christian Church, an Ebionitic Christology was never dominant; although it is undeniable that a doctrine of the deity of Christ, unconnected with the doctrine of the Trinity, existed for a long time, and was widely diffused;—that is, there existed a species of Monarchianism, which at first bore a resemblance to Patripassianism, and then gradually inclined to Sabellianism (Sec. 3), after it had become plain, in the second century, that the Logos-doctrine, in its de-

velopment, was unable to offer any lasting resistance thereto.—We may still expect further disclosures in respect to the Syrian Church, if success do but attend the efforts which are being made to reconstruct the history of the ecclesiastical constitution of Syria; materials for which are afforded partly by the Antiocheian text of the "Apostolic Constitutions," and partly by the treasures of ancient Syriac literature contained in the British Museum. New light may be expected to be thus thrown also on the Pseudo-Clementines. Compare Bunsen's Hippolytus, vol. i. 418 ff. (German edition); Bickell's "Geschichte des Kirchenrechts," 1843, pp. 63, 185 f., 215 ff.

NOTE 2, page 29.

As might be expected from this its tendency, which was stimulated to activity and set into ferment, in innumerable ways, by the religious doctrines and the spirit of the neighbouring peoples, the Church of Eastern Syria manifested a special productivity in connection with hymnology, liturgies, and the construction of ritûs and constitutions, for the Church. No wonder, therefore, that the Ignatian Epistles, with whose spirit Ephraem, in particular, was as it were baptized, should have taken specially strong hold on these districts, and, through the medium of an early translation, have there found a second home. The intercourse between the two parts of Syria (as also between the whole of Syria and Egypt) was in other respects also, lively. In both divisions of Syria, the Greek language and literature were current.

NOTE 3, page 30.

It is deserving of notice, that the anthropology of Apollinaris, which formed also the basis of his Christology, is substantially identical with that of James of Nisibis (compare Jacobi Nisib. vi., Sermo de Devotis, § xiii.; Galland. Bibl., T. v. pp. xlix. l.). The first generation confers merely the "spiritus animalis, qui confirmatur in ventre,"—hence the mortality of man: holy baptism bestows the spirit, which is from the Deity Himself,—that spirit which constitutes the true personality of man, and which, at the proper time, will aid in the resurrection of the body. (See above, i. pp. 992 ff.) The trichotomy of Apollinaris cannot be satisfactorily referred back to

Plato. In the Platonic trichotomy Apollinaris could not have found πνεῦμα or νοῦς in the Christian sense, that is, in the sense in which those terms are applied, not merely to Christ, but also to Christians, in whom is realized the true idea of the divine image and likeness. It would appear, however, that James of Nisibis did not advance to the point of giving his doctrine a Christological application; otherwise he would have proceeded to a more distinct denial of the existence of a human soul in Christ, as we have found to be the case with Patripassianism and Sabellianism.

NOTE 4, page 30.

It is still more interesting to look back from the Audianites to earlier parties. From of old, patripassian representations had found a home in Mesopotamia: the Minæans had directed their steps especially thither. (Vol. i. 305.) Even Manichæism, which was diffused from the neighbouring country, Persia, designated the good principle "patibile." The Audianites are often represented as occupying the same platform with the Manichæans. Theodoret informs us that they did not consider fire, water, and darkness to have been included in the divine work of creation; but this in itself is not enough to show that they held an absolute dualism. Baumgarten-Crusius, in his "Compendium der Dogmengeschichte" (1840, p. 117), maintains that the sect bears the stamp of a Judaizing theosophy, with which dualistic elements are frequently found connected. Their asceticism and their usages also have a Judaistic character:—for example, they clung firmly to the Jewish festival of Passover. Neander (see his "Church History"), who also regards them as Judaistic in tone, reminds us that fire is similarly spoken of in the Pseudo-Clementines: it is described, namely, as the element of evil. That there was a very strong Judaizing tendency in Eastern Syria, is further clear from the character of the sects which, in all probability, took their rise in those districts:—for example, the Hypsistarians (whose system Ullmann considers to have been a mixture of Judaism and Parsism); the Abelonii (from Eljon) and the Cœlicolæ, mentioned by Augustine; the Euphemitæ and Θεοσεβεῖς, mentioned by Epiphanius and Cyrill of Alexandria. On the basis of these data, the following may be taken as the probable internal and

external connections of the matter. Even as early as the time of Christ, Judaism was very powerful in Adiabene, and indeed in Mesopotamia generally, and must have extraordinarily facilitated the speedy spread of Christianity in those parts (compare 1 Pet. v. 13). At the same time, however, owing to this circumstance, the Christianity of Eastern Syria must have had a Judaistic colouring for a considerable period; and that, although the Gospel was probably first proclaimed by preachers from Antioch. This must have been still more the case after intercourse had been broken off with Antioch, or after the clergy had begun to resort to Jerusalem for ordination. Further, what can be more likely, than that after the destruction of Jerusalem, under Hadrian, many Jewish Christians from Palestine would settle down in these same districts, and bring with them the ideas and pretensions they had previously cherished? More at home they could scarcely feel themselves anywhere, than in the land whose inhabitants (according to the traditions of the North) consisted for the most part of Jews of the kingdom of the Ten Tribes. Add to this, that, in the south of Mesopotamia, there were flourishing Jewish colonies, and that the feeling for a hierarchical constitution, and for the elaboration of the cultus, had early worked. It is possible that the Christians of East Syria were acting under the influence of the Pseudo-Clementine literature or thoughts, when, about the middle of the second century, they constituted themselves into an independent National Church (Assem. iii. 2, 612), with an archbishop at its head, the seat of whose see was Seleucia.—But both the Judaism and the Christianity of Eastern Syria were particularly in danger of undergoing disintegration, partly from their action upon each other, and partly from the action upon them of the religious systems prevailing in those districts, which were for the most part somewhat characterized by dualistic and emanatistic elements. Whilst these circumstances rendered an hierarchy the more necessary, they also put it out of the power of any hierarchy to prevent a multitude of sects breaking loose from its authority. All the above-mentioned sects bear a certain family likeness to each other. The older ones—as, for example, the Melchisedekians, the Audianites, and the Messalians—combined Judaistical elements, both of a doctrinal and practical nature, with dualistic, after the manner of the Clementines. The remaining sects went back to

a primal revelation; designated Adam, Melchisedek, Moses, Christ, and others, prophets of the Most High God (having in this respect some affinity with the Clementines and the Melchisedekians); and thus developed a kind of religious syncretism, on a groundwork which was gradually more and more purged of dualistic elements. So the Hypsistarians (a name derived from Θεὸς ὕψιστος, אֵל עֶלְיוֹן, Gen. xiv. 18), who regarded fire and light as an emanation of the good principle, and kept the Sabbath (Jewish); and the Cœlicolæ and Θεοσεβεῖς of the fourth and the fifth centuries. That such sects, existing near the confines of Arabia in the fifth century, must have prepared the way for Muhammedanism, with its syncretistic doctrine of a primal revelation, and its acknowledgment of a diversity of prophets, needs no more detailed elucidation. Side by side with these sects, however, there existed in East Syria a powerful and flourishing Church, especially in the fourth century. Although the above-mentioned parties did not fail to act upon this Church, it developed a very distinct character of its own, and through its peculiar character, subsequently to the second half of the fourth century, exercised considerable influence, first over the West Syrian, and afterwards over other portions of the Christian Church. The vehicle of this influence was, in particular, the monastic system and mode of life, which had struck firm roots in Eastern Syria, and diffused itself from thence ever more widely through Western Syria; and the adherents of which devoted their attention very largely to scientific questions. It would probably repay the labour, to renew the inquiry into the origin of the Pseudo-Clementines, on the basis of the data just furnished.

Note 5, page 32.

How far does Theodore advance in this respect beyond Origen, with whom (as with the anthropological views of the Clementines) he has, in other matters, as much affinity! For if man is higher than pure spirits, the supposition is inevitable, that matter confers upon spirit a further advantage, of which it would be otherwise destitute. The controversy with Dualism and Manichæism, carried on with such zeal by the school of Antioch, must unquestionably have contributed materially to this result. Diodorus (see Phot. Cod. 83) had written twenty-

five books against the Manichæans; so also against the εἱμαρμένη; in which connection he discussed both the Dualists and Bardesanes (Cod. 223). Theodore wrote against the Magism of Persia (Cod. 81); and, at the same time, gave an exposition of the doctrine of Zoroaster, opposing to it the cosmogony of Moses. It was in the course of this struggle that the Antiocheian teachers were driven to emphasize so strongly the unity of the world, and to the rejection of the Origenistic doctrine of matter. This point also determined Theodore's relation to Augustinianism, with which he was acquainted solely through Hieronymus Aram (Phot. Cod. 177).

NOTE 6, page 34.

The descendants of Adam sin, not φύσει but γνώμῃ (see Phot. Cod. 177, p 121, and my Dissertation, pp. 19 ff.). They still possess freedom, and the knowledge of good and evil (p. 14, Note 17). But the tie between body and soul, which in Adam, though dissoluble, did still really exist, was loosened, and almost completely broken, when they entered on their possession. And the result of this independence of the mortal body, with its desires and its mutability, has been, that the freedom of all alike is exposed to assaults and temptations. Even at this point, Theodore diverges from Pelagius, and allows the existence of an inherited defect in the descendants of Adam, although he acknowledges no sin, save where a free act has really been performed. He further appears to resemble Pelagius in teaching, that Adam was subjected to the necessity of dying; though here again there is the difference, that he traces the necessity of death, to which Adam was subjected from the moment of creation, to the Divine foreknowledge of the fall. Because God foreknew man's career, He did what He otherwise would not have done, to wit, He created man necessarily mortal. Death would in any case, he thinks, have been introduced by sin. Adam is, it is true, thus put on an equality with us; and that not merely in reference to death, but strictly also in reference to sin. If Adam were created with the link connecting body and soul already broken, then that antagonism and indestructible enmity between body and soul, on which he in other respects lays such great stress, must have clung to Adam from the very commencement, and creation itself must have,

empirically, necessarily co-operated in the origination of sin:—a view which would smack of supralapsarianism. This, however, he did not intend to teach; but he knew no other way of avoiding the conclusion, than by denying that the historical causalities took a natural and normal course, and by treating them docetically: he says, therefore,—It was not the innate actual mortality of Adam that produced his fall, but the freedom with which he was endowed. In like manner, on the other hand, he represents God and His creative act as the real cause of death, and consequently denies actual sin to be the veritable cause of death. That such a view reduces guilt and the real causality of sin to a mere seeming, is evident. On this point, Theodore approximated to the doctrine of an *intelligible* freedom, which pursues its own course, whilst the real corporeal world is, from the very commencement, bound as by an iron necessity, by the firm chain of cause and effect. (The Præexistentianism of Origen is not to be found in his system.) We shall find that this played also an important part in connection with his Christology. God gave the visible world such a constitution as seemed to Him fit and just, in accordance with His foreknowledge of the use which Adam and his descendants would make of freedom. Theodore thus left the world in partial possession of unity (the mortality of the body befalls the spirit as a punishment); but if he had advanced no further than this scanty commencement, the eternization of sin and unblessedness would have been inevitable.

Note 7, page 35.

In the view of Theodore, salvation consists mainly in the fact of resurrection, and in the gift of eternal life, that is, in the overcoming of death, which is the *punishment* of sin;—it is not in the victory over guilt, or over sin itself, that consists salvation. Similarly, also, though not with so conscious an exclusiveness relatively to other aspects, teachers like Athanasius had laid chief stress on the immortality gained for men by the work of Christ. From the victory over mortality, Theodore then proceeds to derive the eradication of the earthly tendency of our nature, of its disorderly and evil desires. Now that humanity has been restored by the Prince of life to a unity like the unity of God, it is possible for the Holy Spirit so to pervade men, that they

can no more apostatize and sin, but possess true freedom—the freedom of irrestrainable love. It would seem, therefore, that during their earthly life, the only part of redemption which Christians, strictly speaking, experience, is the knowledge of a salvation to come: they do not realize a present salvation, but merely receive the promise of a future salvation,—a view of the matter essentially Old Testament. This account of the office of Christ is the proper counterpart to the Ebionitic eschatological view of the Person of Christ, referred to above (see vol. i. 230 ff.). Holy baptism he regarded as containing the promise of this body of resurrection and of eternal life—hope through the Holy Spirit. For this reason, infant baptism occasioned him no embarrassment: even without recognising original sin, he found a significance in the rite—a significance, indeed, very similar to that attached to it by the disciples of John, when they baptized for a kingdom that was to come. Notwithstanding this, he held that baptism strengthens us in our earthly struggle, as a pledge of the fulfilment of the promise. He who rose again, gives us in baptism a pledge that we also shall rise again, and that we shall be sinless, without the law, through the Holy Spirit: it is both symbol and pledge of the future regeneration,—a thing of which those who occupied a purely legal, Judaistic point of view, had not even an idea. Although he further denies the inherence of sin in children, and traces no connection between their baptism and the forgiveness of sins, he still assumes the existence of a bias (*ῥοπὴ*) to evil in our nature, which is not fully eradicated till the resurrection (compare Phot. Cod. 177; Spicileg. Rom. ed. A. Mai, T. iv. Comment. Ep. ad Rom. p. 502 ff., 510). All that he postulates for the present world, is an imitation (*μίμησις*) of the future life *κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν*, the *will* to be pure (Comm. ad Rom. 7, 4; 6, 12; cf. Catena in Epp. ad Corinth. ed. Cramer, Ox. 1841; the note on 1 Cor. vi. 15). That a new birth takes place in the present world, he does not hold; but merely that past sins are forgiven, especially through the medium of the holy Eucharist (l. c. in connection with 1 Cor. xi. 34). The promise, however, acquires a fuller significance, because there is so sincere an intention that it shall attain realization in all. Like Origen, he taught that there would be an *ἀποκατάστασις*; but differed from Origen, in believing that it would be a per-

manent one (Comm. ad Rom. v. 20, πολλοὶ is synonymous with πάντες; compare Phot. Cod. 177), not without the just punishment of the wicked (see his remark on 1 Cor. x. 15), who will be saved merely as a brand from the fire. Freedom he treats as, in all cases, mediatively necessary to salvation: grace is imparted to those alone, concerning whom God knows that they will use their freedom well. Even after the bestowal of that pledge of hope, all depends on its being freely and faithfully guarded.

NOTE 8, page 39.

By Eustathius, for example (see above, vol. i. 965 ff.). The τρεπτὸν attributed to the middle being of Arianism, may perhaps have been the expression, under an abnormal and mythological form, of the ethical tendency to assert for Christ a certain independence,—an independence, it is true, such as might pertain to a mere creature. Eustathius and others relieve the confusion by which Arian representations were characterized, in so far as, by asserting for Christ a true human soul, a fitting place was secured for the τρεπτὸν, whilst the Logos at the same time continued ἄτρεπτος. Theodore, however, first traced this τρεπτὸν of the humanity of Christ to its ethical roots, and limited it by his own profounder doctrine of freedom. Diodorus' work against the εἱμαρμένη, and Theodore's against the Magusæans, formed the points of transition thereto. We may therefore be allowed to say, that an element of Arianism, not previously properly appreciated by the teachers of the Church, and badly expounded even by Arians, endeavoured to secure for itself the recognition it deserved, by means of the school of Antioch. With regard to Paul of Samosata, compare i. 510–516.

NOTE 9, page 40.

In the passage cited from pp. 300 ff., after saying that the ἐνοίκησις must be something distinctive, he proceeds to say,—οὐσίᾳ μὲν οὖν λέγειν ἐνοικεῖν τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ἀπρεπεστάτων ἐστὶν, for then He would be present merely as to His essence in those in whom He dwells, καὶ ἔσται τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἐκτὸς ὅπερ ἄτοπον εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀπείρου φύσεως, or we must attribute His ἐνοίκησις to all beings, even τοῖς ἀλόγοις καὶ ἀψύχοις, inasmuch as it would be based on His φύσις, which is omnipresent

and cannot be restricted. *Οὐκοῦν οὐσίᾳ τὴν ἐνοίκησιν λέγειν γίνεσθαι τῶν εὐηθεστάτων ἂν εἴη. Τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας*, and on the same ground: *Τί οὖν ἄρα ὑπολείπεται; τίνι χρησόμεθα λόγῳ ὃς ἐπὶ τούτων ἰδιάζον φανεῖται φυλασσόμενος; δῆλον οὖν ὡς εὐδοκίᾳ λέγειν γίνεσθαι τὴν ἐνοίκησιν προσήκει. Εὐδοκία δὲ λέγεται ἡ ἀρίστη καὶ καλλίστη θέλησις τοῦ Θεοῦ ἣν ἂν ποιήσεται ἀρεσθεὶς τοῖς ἀνακεῖσθαι αὐτῷ ἐσπουδακόσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτῶν.* Wherefore, *ἄπειρος μὲν γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀπερίγραφος τὴν φύσιν παρεστι τοῖς πᾶσι, τῇ δὲ εὐδοκίᾳ τῶν μὲν ἐστὶ μακρὰν, τῶν δὲ ἐγγύς.* Compare Col. i. 19.

NOTE 10, page 44.

A. Mai Coll. N. vi. 304,—*ἥνωτο μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῷ Θεῷ ὁ ληφθεὶς κατὰ πρόγνωσιν ἐκ αὐτῆ τῇ διαπλάσει τῆς μήτρας τὴν καταρχὴν τῆς ἑνώσεως δεξάμενος.* This reference back to the Divine *πρόγνωσις* is a remnant of the Christology of Origen. But that there ever was a real moment in which Christ had made Himself worthy of union with the Logos by His own virtue, is no longer assumed:—such a purely human life, is merely held to have existed as a thought of the Divine mind. At the same time, the knowledge that Christ, even independently of an original union with the Logos, would have made Himself worthy of the distinction, was the ground of the distinction actually conferred on Him by God, from the very beginning. But the passage cited, xxvi., should also be compared: according to it, *πρόγνωσις* is not so much "præscientia" as predestination. God would not, says he, merely out of regard for utility (*χρήσιμος λόγος*) have assumed a man, and so united him with Himself as that he should become an object of adoration to the whole of creation, had not the work to be accomplished through him been a common benefit to the universe.

NOTE 11, page 51.

It is not without interest to compare the work erroneously attributed to Justin Martyr, *Ἔκθεσις τῆς ὀρθῆς πίστεως* (compare Pseudo-Justini Opp. ed. Otto, T. i. 1-57; and Gass in Illgen's "Hist. theol. Zeitschrift" xii. 4, p. 130 ff.), with the doctrine either of Theodore or of his school. In the matter of the Trinity, the *Ἔκθεσις*, like Theodore, kept to the doctrine of

the Church. In the matter of Christology, there are no traces whatever of that speculative element which laid hold of the idea of the divine image; on the contrary, the incomprehensibility of the How? of the union of the two natures, is emphatically asserted (c. 14). And yet the path into which the writer strikes, despite all his caution, is substantially the same as that pursued by Theodore. Significant especially are such expressions as the following: *ναὸς* (c. 13), *εὐδοκία* (c. 15), etc. (C. 10),—*ὁ Λόγος—τὴν (τῆς παρθένου) νηδὺν εἰσδὺς οἱονεί τις θεῖος σπόρος πλάττει ναὸν ἑαυτῷ τὸν τέλειον ἄνθρωπον, μέρος τι λαβὼν τῆς ἐκείνης φύσεως, καὶ εἰς τὴν τοῦ ναοῦ διάπλασιν οὐσιώσας. Ἐνδὺς δὲ αὐτὸν κατ' ἄκραν ἕνωσιν, Θεὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ ἄνθρωπος προελθὼν οὕτω τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς οἰκονομίαν ἐπλήρωσεν.* That the *ἄνθρωπος*, the *τέλειος ἄνθρωπος*, is not here mentioned by mistake instead of the *ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις*, is evident from the circumstance, that he only partially approved of the comparison drawn from the relation of the body to the soul, as applied to Christology, although it was so much in vogue. It is appropriate, he remarks, in so far as man is one, and yet consists of two natures, with one of which he thinks, with the other executes: for Christ also is one; and with one of his natures He performed miracles, in the other He abased Himself;—both which parts of His life are to be carefully discriminated and strictly distributed between the two natures. This principle in itself puts a decided limit on the *κοινωνία* of the two natures. But then he goes on to say,—In another respect, the comparison halts; for, concerning man, although he has a double nature, we cannot say—he *is* the two natures; but merely, he *has* them, he consists of them. Furthermore, man is a third something in addition to the two natures of which he consists, to wit, the real unity which combines them together; even as a house is not the building material, nor the plan, but is the union of the two. Christ, on the contrary, does not consist of deity and humanity, in the sense of His being a new third something in addition to the two aspects, but He is simply the two, both God and man; that is, He is just their arithmetical sum. Further, the soul is able to suffer along with the body; but it is absurd to affirm such a thing of the deity in Christ. But still the author puts the question exactly as it presented itself to Theodore, namely,—If the entire Logos were in Christ, how

could He at the same time be in the world as to His essence? And if the Logos was omnipresent, in agreement with the nature of God, what remained for the temple of the Logos? He gives the following answer:—As the universal light, which was everywhere diffused, was created in the beginning; and as then the solar body was created, in order that the general light might be concentrated in it without thereby undergoing any change of substance, though destined to be indissolubly united with, and to shine by, it: so likewise the connection between the Logos and human nature was indissoluble after the Unio; the one Son can now no more be separately termed Divine Logos, and the other Son, Man, but there is one Sonship; even as light and its vehicle constitute one Sun (c. 12). But the question returns again,—How came the temple (Christ's humanity) to such a distinguished, yea, of its kind, unique, participation in the Logos, if the Logos dwell indeed in all things as to His essence? (c. 15 ff.). At this point he argues zealously against those who, *ἐπ' ἀναιρέσει τῶν δύο φύσεων*, wish to bring about a *κρᾶσις, σύγχυσις*, a *μεταβολὴ ἀπὸ σώματος εἰς θεότητα*, an *οὐσιωθῆναι* of the *σὰρξ* in the *λόγος*: in the same connection also, he rejects the formula, *σάρκα τὸν λόγον γεγενῆσθαι* (compare Theodore in A. Mai Coll. Nov. vi. 1. c. Nro. viii.). In fact, the relative independence of the humanity of Christ is given as the reason why the Logos, who, in respect of His essence, is omnipresent, could dwell in Christ in a peculiar and unique way. In this case, the law holds good, that although the sun shines everywhere, and everywhere alike, an impure body cannot receive its rays. Of the rays which this sun sends forth for all alike, he who has strong eyes receives the larger number; not as though the sun diffused its rays more over him than over others, but because of the strength of his own eyes, and because he whose eyes are weak cannot bear the brightness of the light. So also the Sun of Righteousness, in that it is God, is present with all in like measure as to its essence; but we all, through our weakness and impurity, are unable to bear the entrance of the Logos. On the contrary, the temple which the Logos inhabits as His own, is, as it were, the purest possible eye, and can take in the full brightness of His light;—for His temple was formed of the Holy Ghost without sin (c. 17).

That concentrated revelation or appearance of the Logos,

whose end was the salvation and the organic articulation of humanity, did not demand for its accomplishment, therefore, that He should Himself cease to be essentially present in the All;—the Logos remained as He was, both in Himself and in His activity, but had a different existence in Jesus from His existence in the universe, in so far as His light found in Jesus an eye of the purest and most susceptible kind, an eye prepared by the Holy Spirit. This humanity abides; it participates in the divine dignity (*ἀξία*), though not in the divine nature, according to the good pleasure of the Logos (*εὐδοκία*: c. 15). A comparison somewhat suggestive of the one just adduced, may be found employed by Gregory of Nyssa (Or. Cat. M. c. 10):—The infinite Logos is not imprisoned within Christ's soul and body, any more than light is confined to a torch. The flame, indeed, is indissolubly joined to the *ὑποκείμενον*, to the substratum of the torch, but the light is not therefore imprisoned.—The difference between this Christology and Theodore's may, on the whole, be said to consist in its laying greater stress on the divine *εὐδοκία*, regarded in the light of a decree, than upon the freedom of Christ. Produced within the limits of the Church, this work shows how near theologians who took their stand on the principles of the Council of Chalcedon, might approximate to the school of Antioch, through the very earnestness of their antagonism to Monophysitism.

NOTE 12, page 66.

T. v. 2, p. 705,—*ὁ λόγος ἐνεπλάκη σαρκί*: p. 708,—*εἰς ἓν ἄμφω συλλέγων καὶ ὥσπερ ἀλλήλοις ἀνακιρνὰς τὰ τῶν φύσεων ἰδιώματα.* 711,—The Logos remained what He was, both in time and in the flesh; as *Θεὸς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνωθεὶς σαρκὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως ἀγαθὰ κοινοποιεῖν εἴωθε τῷ ἰδίῳ σώματι.* 712,—*μονονουχὶ συναγείρει τὰς φύσεις καὶ εἰς μισγάγκειαν ἄγει τῶν ἑκατέρᾳ πρεπόντων ἰδιωμάτων τὴν δύναμιν.* Homil. xvii. pp. 226, 228. Ep. ad Monach. p. 9; *συνδεδραμηκότα εἰς ἑνότητα φυσικήν.* Ep. ad Acac. p. 115,—Prior to the *ἕνωσις* there were two natures; *μετὰ δέ γε τὴν ἕνωσιν ὡς ἀνῃρημένης ἤδη τῆς εἰς δύο διατομῆς μίαν εἶναι πιστεύομεν τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ φύσιν ὡς ἑνὸς πλὴν ἐνανθρωπήσαντος.* He is not content merely with the recognition of *φύσεων τὸ διάφορον*, even after the incarnation: he is willing, indeed, still to allow that there are diverse utter-

ances (φωνὰς), divine and human predicates, but demands for both classes of predicates one common centre of unity (φύσις), p. 119. Κρᾶσις, τροπὴ, φυρμὸς he repudiates (p. 718); and yet he frequently employs the simile of wine mixed with water. Homil. xvii. p. 228; Dial. 9, p. 776.

NOTE 13, page 75.

For details, see Neander's "Church History," vol. 4, 913 ff. 921 (German edition). A common Confession of Faith the Egyptians at Ephesus refused to agree to, on account of the Orientals who were present at the Synod. And yet Cyrill afterwards entered into negotiations regarding the Confession of Faith of the very same men. The "Confession of Faith of the Orientals," which Cyrill subscribed in the year 432, draws a sharp distinction between the two natures, teaches no ἕνωσις φυσικὴ, no μία φύσις after the incarnation, no natural Son of God according to the human aspect; but one Son of God, one Lord and Christ, in agreement with the union of the natures without mixture; and it allows to Mary the title θεοτόκος. On the other hand, however, in the later negotiations, Cyrill was not compelled to recall his anathemas: the judgment of deposition pronounced at Ephesus against Nestorius was also, at a subsequent period, accepted by the Orientals, with few exceptions. That judgment, it is true, as we learn from Ep. Cyr. 34 ad Acac., charged Nestorius with teaching that there were two Christs;—a doctrine which might, indeed, be deducible from, but was not explicitly set forth in, his writings, as is allowed even by learned Roman Catholics; for example, by Enhüber, in his Dissertation appended to Alcuin's Opp. T. i., Regensb. 1777. This unhistorical representation of Nestorius' teachings was then handed down from century to century through a long period.—From what has been advanced, it is also clear, that the obligation to accept the decrees of the Council of Ephesus, still occasionally enforced by law, related to an object of an extremely uncertain and indefinite character. One thing alone may be confidently affirmed, that the party which conquered at Ephesus in the year 431, stood much nearer to Cyrill, and consequently to the doctrine of μία φύσις, than to the Antiocheians and to the Chalcedonian Dyophysitism, with which even a Theodoret might have been content.

NOTE 14, page 77.

The Nestorians took firmest root in Assyria and Chaldæa; hence also they have been termed Chaldæan, Assyrian, or Oriental Christians. The usages of the Chaldæan Christians contain many ancient elements, which remind us of Jewish Christianity. Their liturgy was celebrated in the evening,—a circumstance which seems to point to the old division of the day; and they reject celibacy. In Chaldæa they still offer sacrifices of thanksgiving or in the fulfilment of vows, offerings of the first fruits; they observe the laws of the Old Testament relating to food and purification; and in their sanctuaries is a recess entitled the Holy of Holies, which is not entered. (Compare Grant's "Nestorians, or the Ten Tribes;" Lechler's "Das apostolische und nachapostolische Zeitalter," 1851, p. 302.) They themselves, and the Jews also, consider themselves to be of Jewish extraction, and style themselves Nazarenes. Nestorianism would thus seem to have been ingrafted, as an homogeneous branch, on an old Judaizing stem with remarkable results. About the end of the eighth century, according to some, Babæus (Assem. iii. 429), according to others (Assem. ii. 406), Acacius, as Patriarch of Seleucia, passed over to the Nestorians, and brought their ecclesiastical arrangements into order, by means of a Synod in the year 499. From that time onwards Nestorianism attained to supremacy in the interior of Asia, especially under the rule of the Persians. For a long period, however, the Chaldæan Christians declined to acknowledge the name Nestorians,—Acacius, even in his day, objected thereto (see Assem. ii. 407); the Monophysite Xenajas, say they, first gave them the name. They traced their rise to the Apostle Thomas (ib. 388 ff.), and considered themselves (no less the Monophysites of that district) to be the genuine inheritors of the old patriarchate of Seleucia, which was subordinate to Antioch (compare iii. 299, 587). The Chaldæan Christians maintain that no heresy has found its way into their midst, but that they have preserved the apostolic faith in its purity (iii. 298–302): they also complain that the name Nestorians was given them at a later period, and unjustly (iii. 69, 299, 355, 383, 587). It appears probable, also, that the name was first introduced into Chaldæa, Persia, and Assyria, at the time

of the expulsion of the Nestorians from the school at Edessa by Rabulas and Cyrus: Maanes, Narses, and Barsumas were especially instrumental in its introduction (iii. 303, 381). Justinian endeavoured (see Assem. iii. 632), but in vain, to lead them back into the Church. For the first time, in the seventeenth century a part of the Chaldæan Nestorians passed over to the Romish Church (Ass. iii. 621 ff.). At a later period, the fixed doctrine of the Nestorians regarding the Person of Christ became the following,—that two natures and two "Knumas," or hypostases, were conjoined into one person, "parsupa," *πρόσωπον* (for example, Ass. iii. 108, 280, ii. 292, i. 550). Over the two hypostases, therefore, they set the one "parsupa," within which they, as well as the natures, are comprised as *momenta*. On this ground they believed themselves able, in part, to join the Monophysites in confessing one will of the one "parsupa;" and deemed it as justifiable as to maintain that the three Persons of the Trinity have but one will (Ass. ii. 292, iii. 547). At the same time, they expressly deny any intention of substituting a quaternity for the Trinity. The human hypostasis they assert to be of quite a different kind from the divine hypostases, and therefore not to be reckoned along with them. Similarly, a controversy arose under the Nestorian Catholicos Timotheus, about the year 760, regarding the *knowledge* of Christ. One party maintained that Christ's humanity had the vision of His deity; consequently, that He had an adequate knowledge of God. Inasmuch as this implied, that the knowledge regarding the Son of God possessed by the Son of man was equal to the Son's own knowledge regarding Himself; it followed that the knowledge of the deity and that of the humanity had been equalized, and that therefore, in this respect, the Unio had been absolutely accomplished (Ass. ii. 287). Another party, on the contrary, maintained that Christ's human knowledge was not adequate to that of the divine nature; and so far coincided with the monophysitic Agnoetes (Ass. l. c.). Ebed Jesus, about 1280, not only assumed, like the rest, that the Unio was indissoluble, but also that it was operative. In consequence of the *συνάφεια* (adhesio), the divine nature illuminated the human, and made it like itself: the human itself, therefore, now shone with a divine brightness, like the most beautiful diamond, and bore the likeness of the nature of the Creator, without having undergone

any conversion (iii. 354). Babæus (Ass. iii. 95) held, that the soul of Christ, whilst separated from the body, ceased to think and act, even as ours ceases to think and act after death.—With the Muhammedans they were able to keep on pretty good terms (Ass. iii. 585), but with the Monophysites they were constantly quarrelling, even in a scientific respect (ii. 543); and the church-fellowship which Barhebræus asserts (ii. 291) to have been mutually cherished, can only have been a transient and local thing, although it must be allowed that the Nestorians appear to have been more inclined to concord than the Monophysites (iii. 514). In accordance with the law, that extremes meet, we find Nestorians frequently becoming Monophysites, and Monophysites Nestorians. Worthy of remark is, further, the Nestorian doctrine of the Eucharist. They celebrated the "Communio" in both kinds, and for the most part confessed that the Eucharist is Christ's body and blood (Ass. iii. 514). But the reproaches brought against the Nestorians by Xenajas (ii. 39), and the express teachings of Babæus, and George, Metropolitan of Arbela (iii. 95, 534), who rejected the doctrine of transubstantiation, and insisted on distinguishing accurately between sign and substance, would seem to imply that they meant by transubstantiation that, in one respect, to wit, as symbols, the elements are the body and blood of Christ; that through the medium of the act of consecration, a connection is established between the elements and Christ, either subjectively, by each individual mind, or objectively, in agreement with the will and in virtue of the action of God. Ebed Jesus of Soba (Nisibis), who died in 1318, first taught, exactly after the manner of the Romish Church, that the elements are converted into the body and blood of Christ, by the living word of Christ (the words used at the institution), and by the Holy Ghost (Assem. iii. 358). This latter is the doctrine frequently held in the East, even by Monophysites (Assem. ii. 200).

NOTE 15, page 77.

Leporius attributed to Christ, labour, piety, faith, and merit (Leporii presbyteri libellus emendationis, cap. viii.; bibl. patrum Gallandii, Tom. ix.). To this assumption he adds the further one, that Christ, the perfect man, successfully underwent His sufferings without receiving any kind of help from His deity

(cap. ix.). His notion was, that the perfection of the man in Christ consisted, firstly, in His having undergone all His sufferings without any participation whatever on the part of the Word of the Father; and secondly, in the human nature of Christ possessing the power to accomplish everything by itself. In this connection, he appealed especially to the words of Christ on the cross,—"My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" These words indicate, says he, that the sufferings of Christ were completely and exclusively human. Pelagian principles evidently here lay in the background. Augustine was successful in his discussions with him. The chief argument with which Augustine met him was, that such an idea would lead to the assumption of a human personality alongside of the divine; consequently, of two Christs: and as the humanity remains eternally united with the Logos, a fourth person would thus be introduced into the Deity. It is, therefore, not allowable to teach, that the man was born with God in such a sense, that what belongs to God must be attributed to Him alone, and what belongs to the man must be attributed to him alone. The argument thus drawn from the danger of introducing a quaternity of persons, evidently implied that in idea the Persons of the Trinity were put on the same level as the human personality Leporius, however, yielded; and taught (c. 3), that the Word of God, having taken upon Himself all that pertained to man, was man, and that the man assumed by Him, in that he participated in all that belongs to God, was nothing else than God: out of compassion, God commingled Himself with human nature, but human nature was never commingled with the divine nature (c. 4). The relation between them was not that of two visible created things or substances which permeate each other, so that the two natures were, as it were, chemically converted into one substance (conflatili quodam genere). "Caro proficit in Verbum, non Verbum proficit in carnem," and yet the Word really became flesh, but "*proprie solum personaliter, non naturaliter*," because otherwise the "Pater cum Spiritu Sancto" would have become His flesh. "*Verbum caro factum evacuat in persona quod possidet in natura*," so that the "persona" alone, without the "natura," became man.

Augustine did not always express himself in the same terms regarding the human nature of Christ. In some instances he designated Christ "homo dominicus:" a designation which, at

a later period, he repudiated. As Ambrose, in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, remarks on the words, "Servus Jesu Christi" (cap. i. 1),—"Utrumque posuit, ut dei et hominis personam significaret, quia in utroque et dominus (est)—Quoties scriptura aut Jesum dicit, aut Christum, aliquando personam dei, aliquando *personam hominis* indicat;" so also says Augustine,—"Christ was an object of predestination as to His humanity." In Joh. xvii. Tract. 105. Contra Manichæos, lib. ii. 24,—"Reliquit patrem, cum dixit, 'ego a patre exivi,' etc., apparendo hominibus *in homine*, cùm Verbum caro factum est, —quod non commutationem naturæ dei significat, sed susceptionem *inferioris personæ, i.e.* humanæ. (The reading "naturæ" is spurious.) Similarly in his de Trinit. lib. i. 7, § 15. But Augustine's standing doctrine was,—"Two natures, one person." He allowed that the Logos assumed a "perfectum plenum hominem," but held that the existence of this humanity commenced with the act of assumption, creando, and that it belonged to the person of the Only-begotten One, not by nature, nor by merit, but by grace. Similar also is the view expressed by Fulgentius of Ruspe, in his "de Fide ad Petr." c. 17,—"Verbum personam non accepit hominis, sed naturam, duarum naturarum veritas manet in Christo secundum unam tamen personam." Compare, in libro sententiarum Prosperi,—"persona Christi constat et conficitur deo et homine." August. Epist. 3 ad Volusian. ed. Venet. 1756, T. 2, Ep. 137, p. 529,—"Ita mediator—apparuit, ut in unitate personæ copulans utramque naturam et solita sublimaret insolitis et insolita solitis temperaret.—Persona Christi mixtura est Dei et hominis." The nature of the Verbum est sine mole ubique tota (for not mole sed virtute magnus est Deus); but "longe alio modo quodam quam eo quo ceteris creaturis adest, suscepit hominem, seque et illo (—um) fecit unum Jesum Christum."

Along with the expressions just quoted, which appear to teach the personality of the humanity of Christ, he employs also the old images of "vestis, templum, vehiculum, instrumentum." Sympathizing with the opposition raised against Apollinarism, he strongly objected to every species of transubstantiation or commixture, and gives careful prominence to the "gemina substantia." The only way in which it seemed to him possible (de Trin. i.) really to meet Arianism, was by referring the "inferiora" ex-

clusively to the humanity, and not directly to the one person in its totality. Not even in the state of exaltation does he allow that the humanity is converted into deity. On the other hand, he attributes to the Soul of Christ perfect knowledge from the very beginning. It was merely for His disciples, that He did not know this and that (for example, de Trin. i. 23). As far as the individual elements of His humanity were concerned, Augustine attributes to it soul and body, but no freedom of choice. The body was a part of the Adamitic mass, which was constituted a body by the act of assumption; Mary conceived Him, "non carnaliter concupiscendo, sed spiritaliter credendo;" she gave birth to Him also in unviolated virginity. It was necessary that He should take upon Him flesh, in order that our souls might become His members, and that the devil might be vanquished by the same nature which he had seduced. Hence also Christ must needs purchase us by His own death. Along with the body, He took upon Himself all human "affectus et infirmitates, non conditionis necessitate, sed miserationis voluntate et potentia." He appears, however, to conceive of the purpose of incarnation as involving the subjection of His nature to the law of mortality, to the necessity of death: consequently, the body He assumed was not like that of Adam prior to the fall, but one bound by the necessity of death. In his "De peccati meritis et remissione," L. ii. c. 29, he says, "Quia in eo erat similitudo carnis peccati, mutationes ætatum perpeti voluit—ut ad mortem videatur etiam senescendo illa caro pervenire potuisse, nisi juvenis fuisset occisus." Wherefore also he remarks, that Christ assumed, with the "caro," the "pœna (mortem)," even if not the "culpa," of sin. At the same time, he naturally does not agree with the Pelagians, in their opinion, that other men are by nature "æquali puritate" with Christ (c. Julian. v. 15). Other men, born of "concupiscentia," inherit "concupiscentia." Hence also the Pelagian objection has no force, that, if "peccatum" is "naturale," as the Traducians believe, it is "irrefutabiliter necesse, dici etiam Christum reatum de Mariæ carne traxisse." Whether the inherited "tabes" is propagated through the body and the soul, or through the body which affects the soul—that, indeed, he does not undertake to decide (c. Julian. v. c. 4, § 17); but he maintains, that a body not formed in "concupiscentia" cannot have attracted to itself this "tabes" (c. 15, § 54). The

soul of Christ, however, he thinks, is not in any case "ex *traduce* animæ illius primæ prævaricatricis (de Genesi ad Literam, L. x. 22 f., about 393). On the other hand, in the letter to Euodius, written about the year 415 (ep. 164, ed. Venet. T. ii. 754), he lays it down as possible, that if *all* souls are derived from the fallen soul of Adam, He "eam suscipiendo mundavit." But when this humanity was assumed by the Son of God, it became, at the same time, God—"homo deus. Sic homo susceptus est a Verbo ut simul cum eo Deus fieret." Vice versâ, also, he says in Serm. 187, in nat. Dom. 3, c. 3,—through the assumption, not merely did the Son of man become the Son of God, but the Son of God also the Son of man. "Homo factus est, ut nos Deus faceret." He is the Head of the Church, and we are His members: see, for example, his Enarr. 2, in Ps. 29; De Trinitate iv. 2–7; "De Agone Christiano," c. 20. Yet the Son of God remained what He was, and did not renounce the "forma dei," as Hilary supposed: He continued with the Father in heaven, at the very time when Jesus was sojourning on earth; but still He was in Jesus. "Forma servi accessit, non forma Dei discessit." Sermo 183, de 1 Joh. iv., Tract. 28 in Evang. Joh. De Verbis Evang. Joh. i. Sermo 122,—"Accessit ad nos, sed a se non multum recessit, immo a se quod Deus est, nunquam recessit, sed addidit quod erat, naturæ nostræ. Accessit enim ad id quod non erat, non amisit quod erat." Sermo 123, He is "Deus manendo et hominis carnem assumendo, addendo quod non erat, non perdendo quod erat." But if the Word, as "Deus, ubique totum est" (see above), in Christ it would appear to have no distinctive mode of existence: the only difference between Christ and others would then apparently be, that He possessed a degree of susceptibility to God which no one else possessed;—an idea which might lead to a Nestorian view, especially as he says,—His "exinanitio" was merely an "occultatio" of that which He was, and a "demonstratio" of that which He had become. It would then be a mere abuse of language to apply to Him the words, "He became flesh;" and, in fact, he says, that because of the union of the Word with humanity, their respective predicates are spoken of as interchanged. But he again eases his mind with the affirmation,—the human nature is to be distinguished, indeed, but not to be separated, from the personality of the Word, nor to be placed in

a distinct and separate person. Sermo 47, de ovibus in Ez. 34, —"Distinguenda erat forma servi (Joh. xiv. 9, 10) non separanda et alienanda et in aliam personam constituenda." But although Christ consists of the two natures, or is a "totum" made up of Word, soul and body, God did not therefore become a mere part in Christ (c. Maximin. Arian. L. ii. 10). The three Persons of the Trinity are not each a "pars dei." And quite as inadmissible is it to call Christ "una persona geminæ substantiæ, *pars* hujus personæ." For, before the assumption of the form of a servant, the Son of God was "totus," and underwent no increase when the humanity was superadded. This wholeness, this totality of the person, evidently relates in the first instance to the Ego, to the constitutive principle of personality, and not to the result, the collective person. And yet he also makes the general observation,—"Pars rei ullius esse non potest Deus." Even so, God does not increase through those who, by cleaving to Him, become one spirit with Him. The category of Part and Whole are, he thinks, inapplicable to God. Now, if we pass by the circumstance that he elsewhere, notwithstanding, designates Christ a composite person (see Abælard's detailed discussion in his "Sic et Non"); if, further, we allow that, considering the matter from the lower side, from the side of the man Jesus, he says,—This is not a mere man, but a person compounded of body, soul, and divine nature; and that, considering the matter from the higher side, from the side of the Logos, he denies that the Son of God became a part of the Person of Christ; still we are forced to confess that Augustine did scarcely anything in the way of showing that the incarnation was more than a closer relation, "relatio," σχέσις, of the "Verbum quod ubique totum est," to that particular point of humanity, which became Jesus in consequence of its special and unquestionably God-created susceptibility to God. In that case the difference between Christ and others is merely a quantitative one, especially as they also, like His humanity, become sons of God by grace, though they are not such from the very beginning. And Augustine's view contains traces not only of Ebionitical, but also of Docetical elements. For, not to mention other matters, what reality can be attached to the expression, "factus est, quod non erat," or even to that other expression, "accessit, quod non erat," if attention be directed merely to the

unchangeableness and omnipresence of the "Verbum," who notwithstanding His union with Christ, was "ubique totum?" How can Christ be seriously regarded as an incarnation of the Son, if He did not actually come into the possession, not even by love, of something which He had not possessed before? According to Augustine, the world of revelation, that is, the Church, presents to view, in general, nothing more than the hinder part of God (de Trin. ii. 30); God can reveal Himself solely through the creature. Even the Son is essentially invisible in the revelation; and therefore, the inmost essence of God does not become manifest (iii. 7, 21). On the other hand, however, the warmth of his Christian feelings drove him out beyond a position like this, and prevented him being satisfied with the idea that the eternal Son of God existed merely theophanically or symbolically in Jesus, or stood merely in an external relation to Him: he pressed directly on towards the position, that we have in Christ, Him who "personam Sapientiæ Dei sustinuit," with whom God was personally united, so as in no other theophany. His best utterances on the subject of Christology lie in the sphere of the mystical, especially in his Tractat. on the Gospel of John; for example, Tract. 21, 28, 52, 61, 67, 80, 81; in Ep. Joh. c. i. Tract. 1, 3, 9; in Joh. Tract. 28,—"Non enim Christus in capite et non in corpore, sed Christus totus in capite et in corpore. Quod ergo membra ejus, Ipse; quod autem Ipse, non continuo membra ejus, nam si non Ipse essent membra ejus, non diceret, Saule, quid me persequeris? Non enim Saulus Ipsum, sed membra ejus persequebatur. Noluit tamen dicere, sanctos meos, servos meos, postremo honorabilius fratres meos, sed, Me, h. e. membra mea, quibus ego sum caput." In 1 Joh. v. Tract. 10,—"Extende caritatem per totum orbem si vis Christum amare, quia membra Christi per orbem jacent. Si amas patrem, divisus es; si divisus es, in corpore non es; si in corpore non es, sub capite non es." Compare Chrysostom, ed. Montfaucon, T. iv. 678, Homil. in Genes. 7, where he carries out the idea, that Christ has won more treasure than Adam ever lost. In Theodoret's writings, also, there are many passages which point to a mystical Christology, as the background and basis of his system of ideas, although the system itself is otherwise fabricated of very different material. Theodor. Opp. ed. Schulz, T. iv. pp. 275, 278 ff.,

" de hæret. fab." L. iv. 13, pp. 373 f.; Ep. viii. ad Eugraphiam, p. 1066; Ep. cli. p. 1291.

NOTE 16, page 78.

Opus imperfectum iv. § 92 f.,—"Quidquid naturale est, voluntarium esse non potest. Si ergo est naturale peccatum, non est voluntarium; si est voluntarium, non est ingenitum." § 47,—"Hic ut adsit toto animo lector, admoneo; videbit enim Apollinaristarum hæresim, sed cum Manichæi per te adjectione reparari." Apollinaris denied Christ's having a human soul; Augustine now teaches that He had a soul, but denies the existence of "sensus corporis" in Christ, and affirms Him to have been incapable of sinning, as though He "non virtute judicii delicta vitasset, sed—felicitate carnis a nostris sensibus sequestratæ cupiditatem vitiorum sentire nequivisset." Such a Christological adulation (adulatio) is in reality a profanity: § 49,—"Si vel carnem sine anima, vel hominem sine sensibus quibus nos imbuit natura gestavit, exempli formam et legis non docetur implesse. Quid enim fuit laude dignum, contemnere illecebras sensuum, quarum incapax erat beneficio naturæ?" § 50,—"Quæ postremo palma tolerantiæ, si dolor vulnerum et verberum, intercepto itinere sensuum, pertingere ad animum non valebat? Quo ergo profecit Apollinaris adulatio? Videlicet ut omnis virtutum pulchritudo, quam in se Christum expresserat, indebitis naturæ ejus laudibus vacuata flaccesceret, cunctoque veritatis suæ splendore nudata sacrum magisterium mediatoris offerret irrisui?" § 53,—He was rich in all virtues, non carnis infirmitate (incapability of sinning), sed virtute mentis; and not even the supernatural character of His birth might at all alter the state of the case. § 54,—"Prædico omnem in eo sanctitatem beneficio animi, non carnis stetitisse præjudicio. Sic enim et natura tam conditione ejus quam susceptione defenditur et vita hominum virtutis illius imitatione dirigitur." He then further proceeds to say (§ 56 ff.),—Augustine does not agree with the Manichæans in teaching that there is a natural evil in natural beings; what right has he then to designate the same natural element, evil in man, if the will of man has no share in it? If Christ did not assume those "sensus" which pertain to our nature, and the "possibilitas," He did not really take upon Himself our nature.

§ 84,—"Proinde incarnatio Christi opus suæ divinitatis tuetur, qui afferens ad me naturam meam et voluntatem suam, cujus mihi speculum afferebat et regulam—ostendit, culpam non de carnis conditu, sed de sola suscipi voluntate;—etiam illud claro testimonio perdocetur, quod suscepti *hominis justitia non de naturæ diversitate sed de voluntaria actione substiterit.*"

NOTE 17, page 78.

Opus imperfectum l. c. § 84. "Itane vero ne hoc quidem Christus diversum habuit in natura, quod ita ex virgine natus est, ut jam esset non solum hominis, sed et Dei filius? Ergone ista susceptio—nihil illi homini valuit ad excellentiam justitiæ?—Siccine vos contra Dei gratiam defensio liberi arbitrii præcipites agit, ut etiam ipsum Mediatorem, ut esset Dei filius unicus, voluntate sua meruisse dicatis—? Secundum vos—non a Verbo Dei homo susceptus est ut ex virgine nasceretur; sed natus ex virgine suæ postea voluntatis virtute profecit, et fecit ut a Verbo Dei susciperetur; non talem ac tantam voluntatem illa susceptione habens, sed ad illam susceptionem tali et tanta voluntate perveniens; nec Verbum caro factum est,—sed postea, merito ipsius hominis et ejus humanæ voluntariæque virtutis." From which it follows, that it is possible for others to be like Christ.

NOTE 18, page 79.

Even as early as the year 435 he began to utter threats against the Antiocheians, who accepted the θεοτόκος, saying,—"For the destruction of the virus of Nestorianism, that is not enough; whoso appeals to Diodorus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, still cherishes the error of Nestorius." And, accordingly, even at that time he aimed at compassing the condemnation of these teachers, notwithstanding the reverence with which they were regarded in the East, and that they were dead. (Ep. 179 to Aristolaus, and Ep. 167 to Johannes.) "Theodore," says he, "taught the same, yea, even a stronger, degree of Godlessness; under his name, the Nestorian heresy is being revived." But it was in vain that he applied to the Emperor and to the successor of Nestorius, the Patriarch Proclus. This latter, indeed, his opinion having been asked by the Armenian Church, in the course of his discussion of the point in dispute

with Nestorius, in his "Tomus ad Armenos," adduces, with expressions of disapprobation, statements from the works of Theodore, without mentioning his name; but entirely disavowed any intention of thus condemning a teacher who had died at peace with the Church. The Emperor further commanded peace to be kept. Consequently Cyrill complied, but wrote a work against Theodore—the work already mentioned, "That there is but one Christ." Theodoret felt himself, therefore, called upon to write a defence of his teacher.

NOTE 19, page 84.

This would be equivalent to the "conflatile genus" of Leporius, and the συνουσίωσις of Theodoret. The union of the divine and the human issues in a new third product; but in the new product, the divine is not merely one of the factors, but also the conjunctive, and therefore the completely predominant, constituent. Whether the conversion, in consequence of which the human element derived from Mary ceased to be of the same substance with us, related to the human form or the human essence, he does not state;—probably, to the latter, on account of the term οὐσία. To such an humanity, which would be neither like us nor merely divine, but through the divine would have become a new third something, the simile of ἤλεκτρον might be applied. Electron, a chemical mixture of gold and silver, was a substance of the highest value; and the image drawn from it was not seldom, without any particular name, attributed by the Fathers to a monophysitic heresy. Eutyches regarded Christ as τέλειος ἄνθρωπος,—the holy Virgin as of like nature with us,—and acknowledged that ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐσαρκώθη ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν (Mansi vi. 700, 741). But the body of our Lord and God was not ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν. Further, says Flavian (see Mansi v. pp. 1328 ff., Ep. ad Leon. i.),—Eutyches rejects the Council of Nicæa, Cyrill's letter to Nestorius, and (which was probably the main thing in Flavian's eyes) his letter to the Orientals, and renews the errors of Valentin and Apollinaris. The following are said to have been the words spoken by him before the Synod,—τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν μὴ δεῖν (ὁμολογεῖν) ἐκ δύο φύσεων μετὰ τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν, ἐν μιᾷ ὑποστάσει, καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ προσώπῳ παρ' ἡμῶν γνωριζόμενον, μήτε μὴν τὴν σάρκα τ. Κ. ὁμοούσιον ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν, οἷα δὴ ἐξ ἡμῶν προσ-

ληφθεῖσαν, καὶ ἐνωθεῖσαν τῷ Θεῷ λόγῳ κἀθ' ὑπόστασιν· ἀλλ' ἔφασκε, τὴν μὲν τεκοῦσαν αὐτὸν παρθένον, κατὰ σάρκα ὁμοούσιον ἡμῖν εἶναι, αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν κύριον μὴ εἰληφέναι ἐξ αὐτῆς σάρκα ἡμῖν ὁμοούσιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ κυρίου σῶμα μὴ εἶναι μὲν σῶμα ἀνθρώπου, ἀνθρώπινον δὲ σῶμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς παρθένου.

NOTE 20, page 84.

The appeal of Eutyches to Leo, gave promise at first of the most favourable results. Leo expressed himself to Flavian as hurt at not having been at once put into possession of the facts of the controversy. He remarks, that he had been first informed of the matter by the Emperor (who was favourable to Eutyches), and by a memorial addressed to himself by Eutyches; that he did not know what just ground there was for excommunicating Eutyches, but that he will postpone his decision until he had received more accurate information. He expresses his wish to know what new dogma, contrary to the old faith, has been taught by Eutyches, and recommends moderation, as Eutyches declares himself ready to give way if he be proved to have acted wrongly. In conclusion, he repeats that it is his intention to abide immoveably by the divine tenets of the Fathers (among whom, however, Cœlestin also must be included). Besides this, Leo wrote to the Emperor to the following effect,—"The memorial of Eusebius, which has come to me through Eutyches, does not clearly state what is the ground of the complaint of heresy raised against him: Flavian's silence is blameworthy; but I trust he will speak out, so that I may be able to pronounce a judgment." Probably not entirely without Leo's connivance and approval, Petrus Chrysologus, Bishop of Ravenna, wrote to Eutyches, who had been excommunicated in Constantinople, addressing him as "his brother." In this letter, as it were with the design of inspiring him with confidence, he gives prominence to the divine majesty of Jesus, saying, "Even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now know we Him no longer." In conclusion, he admonishes him to submit himself to the Romish See and its decisions; for the same Peter, who still lives and presides on his own throne, gives the true faith to all those who yearn for it.

NOTE 21, page 85.

Dioscurus had not suffered Leo's circular letter of June 449, addressed to the Synod of Ephesus, to be read at all (Mansi v. 1409); nay more, Leo's legate had been compelled to take to flight. This was a treatment, indeed, which little accorded with the expectations expressed by Leo (Ep. ad Dioscurum, in the year 445, Mansi v. 1239), and which were intended to point out his proper position to him, the successor of an Athanasius and a Cyrill, and the inheritor of a see which had gained so perceptible a predominance in the Church. Leo's first greeting to the new bishop, Dioscurus, had been, namely, an admonition to the effect, that an Alexandrine bishop is as inferior to the Romish, as the founder of the Alexandrian Church was inferior to Peter;—a clear evidence of the importance attached by Leo to the humiliation of the Alexandrian Patriarchate, and of his opinion that, to be well timed, the step must be taken prior to the Council of Ephesus. Between that see and Leo's predecessors, in the time of Cyrill, there had been no dissension on the doctrine of the one nature of Christ.

NOTE 22, page 86.

Even in his second letter to Leo, written in March 449, Flavian adopted more the tone of willingness to be accountable to Leo, to whom he forwarded the entire Acts of the Council of Constantinople. He there (p. 1352) reproached Eutyches with commingling (*συγχέει*) the attributes of the natures united in Christ, and the natures themselves, after the Unio; and with thus contradicting the letter addressed to Nestorius by the Synod of Ephesus, in which it was taught,—*διάφοροι μὲν αἱ πρὸς ἑνότητα τὴν ἀληθινὴν συνενεχθεῖσαι φύσεις· εἷς δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν χριστὸς καὶ υἱὸς, οὐχ ὡς τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνῃρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, ἀποτελεσασῶν δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν τὸν ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν θεότητός τε καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος, διὰ τῆς ἀφράστου καὶ ἀπερινοήτου πρὸς ἑνότητα συνδρομῆς.* Relatively to Eutyches, therefore, he takes up the position of a defender of the first Council of Ephesus. He further gives Leo to understand that the Emperor ranges himself on the side of Eutyches; denies that Eutyches at the Synod appealed to Leo; and begs him to make common cause with the rest, to agree to his depo-

sition, and to establish the faith of the Emperor: for, he urges, it is in Leo's power to turn the scale (ῥοπὴ); and if he give his help, peace will return, and the Synod, of which much is spoken, and which threatens to throw all the churches into confusion, will be able to be avoided, and will be dispensable. Such was Flavian's language to Leo, even prior to the Synod of Ephesus held in the year 449. That Flavian had made important concessions to Leo, in regard to the precedence of the latter, ere Leo decidedly took his part, is evident from Leo's letter to the Emperor and to the Synod of Ephesus (Tom. v. 1411, 1359). But towards the end of the year 449 (Mansi vi. 36 ff.), Theodoret said to Leo, after the second Council of Ephesus had terminated, and he himself had been deposed, that as Paul, on the occasion of the dispute concerning circumcision at Antioch, hastened to the great Peter, in order to beg him to solve his doubts, even so he hastens with his difficulties—in fact, with even more justice, considering his own insignificance—to the apostolic throne, διὰ πάντα γὰρ ὑμῶν τὸ πρωτεύειν ἁρμοττει. Especially, he adds, is Leo clothed with an apostolic character; as is evident from other things, but particularly from his work on "The Incarnation of God," and from the admirable acuteness and spiritual wisdom it evinces. He refers to the letter addressed by Leo to Flavian in June 449, which had attained great note (Mansi v. 1365–1389). After reading it, he had praised the grace of the Holy Spirit, which had spoken through Leo, and now entreats him to deliver the Church of God from the storms which are raging around it.

Note 23, page 93.

Ib. ep. ad Anatolium 91, p. 129,—"Mirati sumus congregandi synodo tam augustum tempus adpositum; cum, etsi nulla necessitas hostilitatis existeret, ipsa interjectorum dierum paucitas *necessarios* sacerdotes nos evocare non sineret. Quando enim per diversas longinquasque provincias mitteremus, ut *fere possit fieri universale concilium.*" There were therefore many absent, whose presence was required to constitute an Œcumenical Council. But, on the other hand, that the participation of so many bishops in the so-called Fourth Œcumenical Council, who at Ephesus had subscribed, under constraint, a different creed from that of Chalcedon, as did the Orientals; and of

those who at Chalcedon, after the deposition of Dioscurus, had ranged themselves under a confession of faith other than that which they really acknowledged, as did the Egyptian and Palestinian bishops and others, must detract from the authority of the Council of Chalcedon, no unprejudiced historian can well doubt; especially as the passage above quoted makes it very questionable whether it was truly *œcumenical*. This is true, apart from the fact of its not having been recognised as authoritative by great churches. Some Romish theologians also are of the same opinion (compare Baller. not. iii. on the above Ep. 91, p. 129). Indeed, to Romish theologians this defect is rather welcome than otherwise; for they resort at once to the expedient of saying, that it first acquired œcumenical character through the approbation bestowed on it by the Romish See.

NOTE 24, page 99.

Anatolius asked the Synod, whether the formula met with their approbation; whereupon all the bishops, with the exception of the Roman and some Orientals, answered in the affirmative,—"That is the faith of the Fathers; whoso thinketh otherwise is an heretic, and let him be cursed; out with the Nestorians. The whole world holds the true faith; yesterday, the formula pleased all, and one can scarcely discover who they are (that do not consent)." Others, however, exclaimed,—"The faith should not be handled deceitfully (ἡ πίστις δόλῳ μὴ παθῇ)." The former then cried out again,—"The formula has pleased God; yesterday, it pleased all; the Emperor is orthodox, the Empress also; Nestorius is deposed. The State authorities are orthodox; we beg that the formula may be subscribed on the Holy Gospels; it has pleased all; command its subscription. Whoso subscribeth it not, is a heretic; the Holy Ghost has inspired it; cast out the heretics. Out with the Nestorians." The State authorities said,—"Dioscurus deposed Flavian because he taught the two natures; but the formula contains the words, ἐκ δυῶν φύσεων" (that is, the doctrine of Dioscurus is not favoured; the party of Flavian ought to be content; Dioscurus is and will remain deposed). Anatolius, in order to prevent it being thought that the Synod, in confirming the deposition of Dioscurus, had also condemned his doctrine,

reminded the assembly, that Dioscurus had not been deposed on account of his faith, and that, consequently, the point of faith is still a "res integra:" by way of conciliating the Romans, he added,—"He is deposed because he excommunicated Leo, and, although three times summoned, refused to appear." The imperial authorities endeavoured to put an end to the disputes, by proposing that from Leo's letter such things as affected the point in question should be added to the formula. But the bishops, and, among them, now also Eusebius of Dorylæum, exclaimed,—"We will construct no other formula; nothing fails the formula; the formula recognises Leo's letter; let it be subscribed; it contains everything! Leo has said that which Cyrill said; Cœlestin has confirmed it, Sixtus has confirmed it!" But the cry was again raised,—"Put away the deceit of the formula!" Then the authorities declared, that these cries should be brought to the notice of the Emperor.

NOTE 25, page 100

After the proceedings described in Note 24, the authorities appeared again, with the command from the Emperor, either, as had been already previously proposed to them, to form a Commission, consisting of six Oriental, three Pontic, three Thracian, three Illyrian bishops, and three from Asia Minor, under the presidency of Anatolius, whose business shall be to frame another formula, with which no fault can be found, in order that nothing amphibolical may remain: or, if that course did not please them, that each member of the Synod should declare his faith through the medium of his Metropolitan, in such a manner, however, that there shall remain no ambiguity or discordancy. But if they refuse to adopt either the one or the other course, they are informed, that the Synod will be convened in the West. One party now again called out,—"The formula must continue, or we will depart." Cecropius of Sebastopolis demanded that the formula should be read aloud to the Synod, and that those who neither accept, nor subscribe it, shall quit the assembly: The formula is good, and he and his party accepted it. The Illyrian bishops cried out,—"Let the opponents of the formula show themselves; they are Nestorians; its opponents may go to Rome." The opponents appear, at this point, to have maintained silence. From all this we may see

how great must have been the number of those who, at the outset, expressed their approval of the first formula, which was favourable to Dioscurus, and the renunciation of which can scarcely have been due solely to accident. We see, also, what opinion is to be formed of the majority of the Synod, who afterwards again took an opposite course, and only consented to allow the first formula to be dropped after they had heard the Emperor's threat, which indicated in a sufficiently clear manner the dogmatic conclusions he expected to be arrived at. The threat to bring the matter to a decision in the West took the greater effect, as there were probably few in the Greek Church who would not have esteemed the transference of the Council to the West a great disgrace and danger to the East. The State authorities, on their side, now that they had learnt from the declaration of Leo's legates that a formula of the first kind would in no case meet the approbation of Rome, but would merely lead to a schism between the East and the West, no longer glossed over the "status controversiæ," but, decidedly taking Leo's part, set it forth exactly as it was. Previously they had said,—Dioscurus rejects the doctrine of the two natures; but the formula teaches it, namely, τὸ ἐκ τῶν δυοῖν φύσεων. Now, however, they said,—Dioscurus also expresses his readiness to accept the ἐκ δυῶν φύσεων, but not the δύο φύσεις *in* Christ: Leo, on the contrary, teaches the latter. Whom, then, are they disposed to follow, Leo or Dioscurus? And when the cry resounded,—We believe as Leo believes (whose letter, in fact, had been already subscribed); they reiterated their demand, that an addition should be made to the formula from Leo's letter,—that they, for example, should add, —In Christ are two natures, unchangeably, undividedly, and without mixture, united. The matter was thus again led into a path, in the pursuance of which alone an union of all was attainable,—into the path of a formula which should include the most important propositions of Leo's letter, and to which, therefore, no one could object who had subscribed the letter itself. For the reasons just given, the Commission now chosen must necessarily start with the best possible prospect of arriving at a conclusion which should meet with the approbation of all.

NOTE 26, page 101.

Ὁμολογεῖν ἐκδιδάσκομεν ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν τὸν K. ἡμῶν I. X. τέλειον, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι, καὶ τέλειον, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι—ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιον τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας—ἐκ Μαρ. τῆς παρθένου, τῆς θεοτόκου—ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χριστὸν—ἐκ δυῶν φύσεων (al. *ἐν δύο φύσεσιν*) *ἀσυγχύτως ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον· οὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνῃρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ἰδιότητος ἑκατέρας φύσεως, καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης, οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον, ἀλλ' ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν*, etc. That the Greek version of the formula should have *ἐκ δυῶν φύσεων* (to which Dioscurus also agreed), and the Roman version, on the contrary, "in duabus naturis," can, of course, scarcely be regarded as an accident, when considered in connection with the history of the Council. For, in the case of the first formula, which was rejected, the entire dispute concentrated itself on the particles *ἐκ* and *ἐν*—which should be adopted. The Romans, in particular, rejected *ἐκ*. It is also true, that *ἐκ δυῶν φύσεων* suits the verb *γνωριζόμενον* better than *ἐν δύο φύσεσιν*,—which is so far, therefore, an argument for the genuineness of the former. Perhaps, also, the choice of *ἐκ* was partially dictated by a wish to humour the ear of the Monophysites. But as far as the actual thought is concerned, Monophysitism is excluded not merely by the verb *γνωριζόμενον* (*ἐκ δυῶν φύσεων*), but also by a number of other determinations contained in the symbol. If Christ is cognised, or becomes cognisable, from or out of the two natures, the said natures must surely exist together in Him. For there is certainly, in this case, no reference to the natures "in abstracto." But with respect to the Latin formula, we must also allow, that it is as little open to the charge of falsification, on the ground of its "in," as the Chalcedonian, on the ground of its *ἐκ*. For, as *ἐκ* was necessary on account of the verb *γνωριζόμενον*, so was "in" necessary on account of the verb "agnoscendum," which is not identical with *γνωριζόμενον*. The Latin formula has,—"Christ is to be recognised as the Son in two natures;" the Greek has,—"Christ is to be cognised as Son out of or from two

natures:" both evidently contain substantially the same thought. The Latin formula is merely a free, but substantially faithful translation; the tone of which, perhaps, hints more distinctly at the subsistence of Christ in two natures:—on which account it was undoubtedly more agreeable to the Roman type of doctrine.

NOTE 27, page 104.

A third form of the Unio is further excluded by the term ἀσυγχύτως,—the form, namely, which treats the two natures, as it were, as the constituent elements of a chemical process, in the result of which both continue to have a certain kind of existence (and the pure doctrine of conversion leaves neither the one nor the other an existence). This result, however, in which the two natures continue to exist, is not conceived as a new, third substance; for even the doctrine of the Church speaks of the Person of Christ as compounded of the two natures (σύνθετος); but as of such a character, that the one nature is affected, tempered, as it were chemically bound and saturated, by the other,—the two forming thus one new third substance (compare above, pp. 77 ff., Leporius). To the same point might the monophysitic (Severian) view arrive,—the view, namely, that Christ had a nature compounded of the divine and the human, φύσις σύνθετος, which, at a later period, was frequently controverted,—for example, by S. Maximus, John of Damascus, and the Scholastics. The Church, on the contrary, used this expression regarding the personality alone.

NOTE 28, page 112.

The Logos-doctrine, in its day, rendered the Church the important service of describing the relation of the divine principle in Christ both to the Father and to the humanity of Jesus. On the one hand, the idea of the Logos as the principle of revelation, which is itself God, rendered it easier to say that there was a divine principle in Christ; and, on the other hand, it offered a welcome link of connection for the doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos, in so far as, according to it, the Logos found in the rational nature, with which every man is endowed, an element related to, or even derived from, Himself. At the same time, in another respect, the doctrine of the Logos brought with it its own peculiar difficulties and dangers; and was there-

fore more and more completely driven into the background, the greater definiteness was given to the doctrine of the Church. For example, as respects the doctrine of an immanent Trinity,—so long as the Logos was regarded simply as the Principle of Revelation, or the Word, or Reason, the possibility of vacillation between Sabellianism and Subordinatianism was not quite set aside. Furthermore, in consequence of the universality attributed to the Logos as the Principle of Revelation,* the boundary line between His ante-Christian and Christian kingdoms, instead of being clearly defined, was hazy and blurred;—especially was this the case, when no reason could be assigned why the incarnation and work of Christ were necessary, and why the proper and true reign of the Logos began with, instead of anterior to, the coming of Christ. Those vague theories of the λόγος σπερματικός, which obliterated the features of historical Christianity, needed to be limited, and the degree of the participation of humanity prior to the time of Christ, in the Logos, to be carefully defined, in order that nature might not be made to anticipate grace. We have seen, that from the third century onwards, the Church warded off the danger with which that Logos-doctrine threatened the Trinity, partly by the substitution, and partly by the explanation, of the word "Son," in the sense of a true divine hypostasis, for the expression "Logos," in the usage and symbola of the Church. As to the other matter, it was indispensably necessary that a much more precise distinction should be drawn between the divine and the human, between nature and grace, than the Logos-doctrine of the second century had really accomplished.

NOTE 29, page 125.

With Nestorianism, on the contrary, the case was a different one. Having fled out of the way of the persecutions of the Court of Byzantium into the interior of Asia, and thus come under the rule of heathen monarchs, the Nestorians and their system passed more and more beyond the horizon of the Church. Polemical works, it is true, still continued to be written against Nestorianism;—for example, besides Cassian, by Vigilius of Tapsus, Boëthius, the Constantinopolitan monk Leontius, the presbyter Anastasius, and others. But there were no continuous

* "Durch das Offenbarungsprinzip des Logos in seiner Allgemeinheit."

colloquies, enlivened by the starting of new points, and furthering the development of the question in both its aspects: the Church remained, on the whole, ignorant of the course taken by the doctrine amongst the Nestorians. Its polemic, therefore, was almost solely with the old form of Nestorianism, which, in consequence, constantly acquired features of a more mythical character. It had in itself, however, enough dualistic elements.

NOTE 30, page 127.

A different opinion was expressed, for example, by Amphilochius of Iconium (A. Mai, Toin. vii. p. 15, *a*), who not merely denied that the deity suffered in its own essence, but also rejects the statement, that the deity suffered in the flesh, or through the flesh. We can only say that Christ suffered. The Logos did indeed appropriate to Himself that which affected His temple, but He did not Himself suffer thereby. For further information, see Baumgarten-Crusius's "Compendium der Dogmengeschichte," pp. 203, 204; Baur's "Trinitätslehre" ii. pp. 61–68. The necessary consequence of the ecclesiastical recognition of this proposition was, that the idea of personality, even as applied to the Father and the Spirit, was formed in analogy with that of the personality of the God-man, and that the distinctions in the Trinity, therefore, approached nearer to Tritheism. It was, consequently, neither an accident, nor solely the effect of the Aristotelic philosophy, that during the sixth century important Monophysites, such as Johannes Askusnages and Johannes Philoponus, turned to Tritheism, in opposition to which the Monophysite Damian then set Tetradism. That the conception of person, in the Trinity, was otherwise viewed in the Church at an earlier period, we have shown in vol. i., pp. 904–938. Opposition was also raised to it by teachers of the Church; for example, by Eulogius of Alexandria (A. Mai vii. 18), and Anastasius Sinaita (Galland. xii. 240; "De Trinitate"), who tried to bring back the Christian mind to the point of view which obtained in the fourth century.

NOTE 31, page 143.

In illustration of this statement, it may perhaps also be appropriate to mention here, that a number of Monophysites, subsequently to the ninth century, taught that He who was born of

Mary was perfect God, perfect, complete man, and had one personality formed out of two personalities, and one nature out of two natures (Assem. l. c. ii. 125). So the Patriarchs Theodosius, Johannes (about the year 969), Athanasius, and Dionysius V. (similarly the Nestorians; see above, pp. 77, 78). It is scarcely correct simply to say, with Assem. and others, that they interchanged the terms, nature and personality, in Christology, and did not do so in the Trinity. They rather taught, on the principle of Aristotle, that a nature (the κοινὸν, "universale") cannot be conceived without a personality, without an individual being, in which it subsists; and that, consequently, the adherents of the Council of Chalcedon, when they teach two natures, ought also to teach that there were two persons. They, the Monophysites, on the contrary, are consistent, in that, whilst allowing that one nature may appear in several persons (as in the Trinity), they maintain that a nature must necessarily subsist, at the very least, in one person: on the other hand, it is not enough to hold that in Christ there were two natures, for two natures would necessarily imply two persons; but the distinctive essence of the incarnation is, that two natures and two persons through it became one. Christ's one nature and person, therefore, after the incarnation, in that it was composite or a synthesis, comprised both natures and persons in itself as in the whole (compare Assem. ii. 137, 152). "Fieri nequit, ut natura sit nisi in persona." For there is nowhere to be found a "natura absque persona" (except in an individual being, ἰδικόν). Similar was the view taken by the Nestorians (see above, pp. 76 ff.), who, even earlier than the Monophysites, directed their attention to Aristotle, and occupied themselves with the problem —How one person could be formed out of two hypostases or ὑποκείμενα, out of two distinct and independent existences?

NOTE 32, page 145.

Compare Galland. Biblioth. T. xii.; Rustici diaconi disputatio contra Acephalos, pp. 39–76 (about the year 550); Anastasii Sinaitæ, Patriarchæ Antiocheni, oratio iii. de divina œconomia, *i.e.*, incarnatione (about the year 570), pp. 246–251; Eulogii Alexandrini (about the year 580), capita vii. de duabus naturis, etc., p. 310; Leontii Byzant. scholia de sectis, pp. 625 ff. 644 ff. (about 610); Ejusdem Libri tres contra Eutychianos

et Nestorianos, pp. 660 ff.; Ejusdem solutiones argumentationum Severi, 708–715; Ejusdem dubitationes hypotheticæ, 715–718; Leontii Monachi Hierosolymitani (about 610), apologia concilii Chalcedon. 719–737. See further, A. Mai, Tom. vii. pp. 10 ff.; cap. vi. p. 18; cap. xi. pp. 40 ff. 46, 52 ff.; Leontii quæstiones adv. eos, qui unam dicunt naturam compositam J. Christi, pp. 110–155; Anastasius presbyter contra Monophys. 192 ff.; Eustathii monachi ep. ad Timoth. Schol. de duabus naturis contra Severum, pp. 277–291; Boëthius de duabus naturis, etc. (see below; about the year 510); Justinianus imperator contra Monophysitas, 292–313; Joannes Damascenus, de natura composita, adv. Acephalos. Nicephorus and Gelasius have been mentioned above. Amongst the acutest polemics against the Monophysites, may be mentioned several writings of S. Maximus, Opp. T. i. ii. ed. Combefis.

NOTE 33, page 148.

Compare Niceph. Eccl. Hist. L. xviii. c. 47, 49. Well acquainted with the philosophy of Plato, and especially of Aristotle, he endeavoured, in his Διαιτητὴς (Arbitrator, Schiedsrichter), to show that the view he entertained was dialectically necessary. One may speak of essence or nature in a double sense,—firstly, as a common idea, or common image, without reference to any concrete existence; or secondly, it may be conceived as the generic nature or substance, which exists in individuals, which acquires an independent existence in each individual, but which has no existence save in such separate individuals: and what each of these individuals has, it alone has; for by that which it thus has, it is distinguished from others. Such also is the teaching of the Church on the subject of the Trinity. The three subsistences, or persons, are realiter distinguished by their individual peculiarities. What else, then, can the one divine nature be, but the common or generic idea, which has no real existence, and is distinguished from each of the persons solely in thought. This usage of the word "Nature," according to which it denotes the general nature which has assumed an individual form, or the nature in the form, in which it pertains to no other individual, is followed also in the doctrine of the unity of the deity and humanity in Christ. For, not the common deity or divine nature, the idea of which we

think in the Trinity, became incarnate;—otherwise, the Father and the Spirit must also be held to have become incarnate: nor, again, was the common generic humanity assumed by the Logos;—otherwise, we should have to conceive Him united with all men, even with those who are yet to come. Indeed, this general nature exists solely in the form of a conception; there is no real divine nature, save as it is found in the Father, or in the Son, or in the Spirit. Now, that divine nature which subsisted in the person of the Son, we say, became incarnate, and assumed, not the generic or general human nature, but alone humanity as contained in a particular individual.—According to this position, the universal general nature individualizes itself eternally in itself; nay, more, exists solely in the form of individuals.

NOTE 34, page 150.

Anastasius Sinaita l. c. c. 10-12:—Substance is not a particular nature, but the universal nature. Christ took upon Himself our whole substance (totam massam nostram), and became the firstling of our nature. For, because it was His will to deliver the whole of that which had fallen, and the entire race had fallen, He submerged Himself entirely into the entire Adam; He, the Life, penetrated into that which was dead—He penetrated the entirety of that with which He was united, animating the whole, as it were, like the soul of a great body. Hence the human race is termed the body of Christ: Christ is conceived to permeate the whole equally, and yet He dwells peculiarly in each particular member, according to the measure of its faith; for each member is a separate individual; and what holds good of it, does not hold good of the corporate body. When the Apostle speaks of the body and its members, he describes, indeed, the distinction between the genus and the individual; but in that he designates us the body of Christ, and not His "genus," he meant to teach, that Christ was united with the universal generic substance of humanity, not with a particular individual; for otherwise we should not be called His body and His members. He desired to constitute us all and entirely His garment or body. He was both God and man, but neither a God nor a man: as God and man He is characterized by more general names; for He consisted not of particular hypostases, but of general substances. (We

see here clearly, that Anastasius, as little as the Monophysites, draws a distinction between individuality and hypostasis; he therefore feared, that to concede the individuality of the human nature, would lead to a double personality.) Nor can we say that He was a part of the substance; for the parts of substances are themselves substances, and that which we call a part has in all respects the character of the whole: consequently, He must be styled the Whole (dynamically?), and not a part; for we cannot speak of dividing a substance, as we speak of dividing a ball. Christ became man; therefore, not by assuming a part of human nature, but the whole.—So also, it is not allowable to say, that He assumed merely a part of the Divine substance, to wit, the Son. For the distinction of part and whole cannot be applied to God. As Son also, God is not a "natura particularis specialis" or "singularis" (Orat. i. de S. Trinit. c. 18, p. 240). And Rusticus says (ibid. p. 40),—The divine nature of Christ included also the Father and the Holy Spirit; and His human substance included the remaining men. This is connected with the older doctrine, that Christ ἀπαρχὴν ἀνέλαβε τοῦ ἡμετέρου φυράματος: this ἀπαρχὴ, however, is through Him also an ἀρχὴ,—a beginning and principle of an universal kind, an universal power of rebegetting all, through His new humanity. John of Damascus gave this idea the following turn,—All *persons*, indeed, did not die and rise again in Christ, but still our entire *nature* died and rose again in Him (L. iii. c. 6, p. 213, ed. Lequien). Consequently, not merely a man, nor the nature of a single man, nor, again, we ourselves as to our personality, but *we*, as to our nature, were assumed by the Logos. *We*, as to our nature, rose again in Him, ascended up to heaven, and so forth. Theodore Abukara, who belonged to his school (Opuscula ii. pp. 386 ff.), sought to connect the universal significance of the humanity of Christ with the fact of His being a single, individual human existence. We cannot say that the humanity of Christ, and the body of Christ animated and endowed with intelligence, were the same thing. When we say, —He took upon Himself humanity, we mean, the humanity of us all, who are men; whereas His body and His soul were specially His: otherwise, He would not have been of the like substance with us, or the body of the eternal Son must have been the body of us all, who are men. He does not, in this connec-

tion, regard the general as a nonentity, as a mere thing of thought; but it is incorporeal, it does not belong to the world of the senses, it is universal; and this incorporeal existence first becomes visible by means of the *ἰδιότητες ὁριστικαὶ*, the individualizing predicates. These ideas show us, further, how physical was the conception of redemption which prevailed at this period. Theodore Abukara says (vi. 452),—A lemon seed dipped in honey is said, when planted, to communicate its sweetness to the fruit; even so Christ, when He assumed humanity in the state in which it was prior to sin, and dipped it in the honey of His deity, gave us also to share in its sweetness, *ὡς οἱ κόκκοι τοῦ πέπονος τῷ ἀπ' αὐτῶν καρπῷ καὶ κατὰ διαδοχήν* (per traducem).

Note 35, page 150.

Compare Theodore Abukara l. c. ii. 398 ff., and the passage quoted in Euthym. Panopl. P. i. Tit. vii. Their opponents endeavoured to drive the adherents of the Council of Chalcedon into a corner by asking,—Did the eternal Son assume a general essence or thing (*κοινόν τι πρᾶγμα, τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον*), or a *μερικόν τι*, a something individual? If they answered,—The universal man, or the generic substance: then they were met by the objection,—But that does not fall within the range of the senses; how can an incorporeal thing unite itself with a corporeal? Christ would then remain invisible, even as the general nature remains invisible? And inasmuch as the general appertains to several subjects, Christ would have had many hypostases: indeed, Christ would then have been of an altogether different nature from us, for we are *ἄτομα*. If, however, they answered,—The Son assumed a *μερικὸν ἄνθρωπον*: the objection was raised,—That leads to two hypostases, after the manner of Nestorius. The teachers of the Church replied,—It is neither of the two; on the contrary, we must rather say,—He assumed *φύσιν μερικοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, that is, *ἀτόμου*, in that He became the hypostasis thereof. The nature of this individual man was, it is true, *κοινὴ, ἐν ἀτόμῳ δέ*.

Note 36, page 155.

Monophysite National Churches still exist even at the present day, as well as scattered congregations. The latter are found chiefly in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia, and are still

designated Jacobites; the former, in Armenia, Egypt, and Abyssinia. The Abyssinians continue to the present day, as it were, fascinated by the precise question which occupied the attention of the old Monophysites. Their Metropolitan (Abuna) is still subordinate to the Alexandrian (the Coptic) Patriarch. That one nature was constituted out of two, is their universal doctrine: the mode of this constitution is still a subject of reflection and controversy. As the Jacobites, consciously treading in the footsteps of Ephrem, assigned to the Holy Spirit a great rôle, in connection both with the Holy Eucharist and with the Incarnation—the rôle, namely, of the connective principle of the Logos and the humanity, or of the elements, in the Eucharist; so were the three Christological theories prevailing in Abyssinia connected with the doctrine of the Holy Ghost (i. 286). The *first* view, which is diffused in Tigre, and which originated with one of the last Abunas from Egypt, is the following,—By the Holy Ghost, with which Christ was anointed, we are to understand His deity, which did not need the help of the Holy Ghost, in that it was in eternal possession of it. The deity of Christ itself, therefore, was the bond between the human and the divine natures, and constituted the two one nature. Jesus anointed Himself, and not another (compare p. 141). The *second* view, which prevails in the provinces of Godsham and Lasta, represents the union of the divine with the human nature as having been effected by the Holy Spirit. The *third* view, which prevails in the remaining provinces and in Shoa, maintains, that the man Jesus, from the moment of His conception, was united, indeed, with the deity, but received the Holy Ghost as a gift of the Father, precisely in the same manner as we receive Him, in order that He might be able as a man to accomplish the work of redemption. The anointing with the Holy Ghost, they term the third birth of the Son. This third view, which reminds one of Adoptianism, and manifestly lays greater stress on the true humanity of Christ than do the other two, is not able to allow to the God-manhood, in the first instance, more than a potential existence, and employs the phrase, "Third Birth," to express the idea, that the advancing realization of the divine-human life brought with it a something actually new. But by appealing to John iii., where the birth from the Holy Spirit is designated a new birth, the adherents of this view approximate to

those who attribute to Christ also a participation in human impurity, derived from Mary. They do not appear, however, to have followed out this course to its results: indeed, the prevailing cultus of Mary would hinder them from doing so.—Some appear to hold, that the union of the two natures into one substance was first accomplished subsequently to the ascension, or that it awaits the close of the day of judgment (p. 110). Here, therefore, we have an attempt, on a monophysitic basis, not merely to establish a distinction between the two aspects, but even to construct a continuous, advancing process of actual humanification, and thus, by the adhibition of the doctrine of the anointing with the Holy Ghost, to do justice to the demand for a veritable human development. The act of incarnation posited, at first, merely the divine-human potence: ere the God-manhood could become an actuality, the anointing must take place, that is, the humanity must undergo development and progress. The relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit is not, it is true, further explained: the Monophysites do not teach, with the Greeks, that the Holy Spirit proceeded also from the Son. At the same time, it would appear that some (p. 105) regard this anointing, which affected the humanity of Christ, merely as a consecration to, or equipment for office, and attribute to it, therefore, no constitutive significance for the Person of Christ: others, on the contrary, represent Christ's participation in the Holy Ghost as rather analogous to our own.

The Armenian Monophysites principally adhered to Julian of Halicarnassus, perhaps even from the time of Barsumas (Assem. ii. 292, 296). Such also are their Christological views even at the present day (compare Ass. Diss. de Monophys. ii.). According to Barhebræus, they maintain that, coincidently with the union, the body of Christ became perfect; that it did not gradually grow; that it was neither capable of experiencing suffering nor harm, neither mortal nor created, nor of a circumscribed form. Circumcision He underwent merely in appearance; He merely appeared to take food, and in reality never ate at all, save in the sense in which He ate in the presence of Abraham. (Under Athanasius, in the year 726, the Armenian Catholicos Johannes united himself, for the time, with the former, but they very soon went back to the doctrine of Julian. On the contrary, the Syrian Jacobites and the Egyptian continue in church-

fellowship with each other. The old sects have almost entirely disappeared from among the Monophysites of the present day.) They styled themselves Diakrinomenoi (διακρινόμενοι), that is, Protestants against the Chalcedonian Symbol. In analogy with that Armenian tendency, is the doctrine held by some Abyssinians, that human souls in general are not developed along with the body, but enter the body, complete and perfect, from the fortieth day. Even Xenaias had assumed this to be the case, as in all men, so also in Christ. Other Monophysites, however,—as, for example, Dionysius, Bar Salibi, Johannes of Dara, James of Sarug, James of Edessa, etc.,—differed from Xenaias on this point, and taught that the Word united Himself with the body and soul at the same moment (Assem. ii. 158, 159).

Many Monophysites—as, for example, Bar Salibi and Barhebræus—assumed, indeed, the real presence of Christ in the Holy Eucharist, but denied the conversion of the elements. Their view seems rather to have been that of Ephrem and the mystical school of Syria. The prototype of the Unio of Christ with the elements, is the Unio of the Word with the flesh. Through the Holy Ghost, bread and wine are appropriated by the body and blood of Christ. The Holy Spirit descending on the altar (as in the incarnation in the Virgin), constitutes the elements the body and blood of the Word of God (Assem. ii. 190), and gives them quickening, enlightening, fermenting virtue. Not, however, through their own nature are bread and wine, body and blood, but through the descending grace of the Holy Ghost (p. 293 ff.). Anastasius Sinaita and the Abbot Ruprecht of Deutz also took this view. James of Sarug, on the contrary, as it would seem, adopted the doctrine of transubstantiation (ii. 194).

Note 37, page 157.

Opp. Dionysii Areop. cum scholiis S. Maximi, etc., edidit Balth. Corderius, Antw. 1634, pp. 500 ff. De div. nom. c. 2. Engelhardt's "Die angeblichen Schriften des Areop. Dionysius, übersetzt, und mit Anmerkungen begleitet," Sulzbach 1823, 2 Thle. Engelhardt supposes these writings to have originated in the fifth century, and that their Christian author must have been closely connected with the school of the Platonist Proclus. What we observed above in connection with Barsudaili, and the esteem in which the Areopagite was held amongst

the Monophysites, speak for the connection of the author with these latter. Hierotheus was professedly the teacher of Dionysius (de div. nom. c. 3); and under the name of Hierotheus, Barsudaili wrote the work in which he taught the transition of all things into the divine nature. Such is the account given by Barhebræus (Assem. ii. 293, 30 ff.). Among the Monophysites, the writings of the Areopagite were much used (Assem. ii. 295, 207, 302, 307, and especially pp. 120, 121), translated and commentated. It is possible that Barsudaili's fiction,—a fiction to which he may have been led by the Origenism which prevailed in many of the monasteries, and which formed a bridge to Neo-Platonism,—may have given rise to the spread of Neo-Platonism in a Church form, under the name of the holy disciple of Hierotheus.

NOTE 38, page 177.

The affair of Honorius belongs, as is well known, to the causes celèbres. Those who believe in an infallibility of the Pope, independently of a Council, appear here to be in greater perplexity than those who attribute infallibility to a Pope in conjunction with an Œcumenical Synod. The former endeavoured to escape from the difficulty in two ways, both of which, however, may be now said to have been abandoned. Some—as, for example, Onuphrius, Bellarmine and Gretser, Baronius, Binius, and Schott—make a desperate attempt to deny the fact of the condemnation of Honorius as an heretic, by tracing it to a falsification of the Acta of the Sixth Council: they also treat the letters of Honorius contained in those Acta as spurious. The most, however, regard this expedient with no confidence. A whole series of later Synods, both œcumenical and recognised by the Romish Church, repeated the condemnation; and several Popes, particularly Leo II., expressly approved of the condemnation. It is a fact, historically so well established in all directions, that it can only be called in question at the dangerous price of an universal undermining of the credibility of Church traditions. It is also clear from the Disputation of Maximus, which followed a few years later, that Honorius wrote a letter, in which he declared himself opposed to the duality of wills.—Others say, that Honorius was indeed condemned, but *unjustly*; and therefore, in point of fact, call in question the infallibility of Œcumenical Councils which agreed

with Popes, for the sake of asserting the infallibility of the Papacy. They say,—That Honorius was orthodox, is evident from the testimony of his secretary, given by Maximus at the close of his disputation. He did, indeed, teach one will, and reject the duality of wills; but his opinion really was,—that it is not right to teach the existence of two *human*, self-contradictory wills:—an almost ludicrous vindication of his honour. Of two human wills, no one had ever spoken; it is out of place, therefore, to mention it here. Honorius, moreover, did not merely assert that there could not be two contradictory wills in Christ, a divine and an evil human will; but generally, that there could not be two wills of any kind in Christ, because there could only be one who willed. What weight can be attached to the testimony of a secretary,—a testimony probably dictated by interest,—in face of the original documents which have been preserved, and of all the Œcumenical Synods which have regarded the view of Honorius as an heresy? He differed from Sergius, it is true, in so far as he did not teach the unity of the ἐνέργεια: nor did he teach that there were two ἐνέργειαι; but rather asserted the doctrine of two natures, especially in his second letter. He never, however, gave up the unity of the will, nor conceded that the will is a matter of the natures, and follows them: he attributed the one will to the one volitional agent, namely, to the person; though he, at the same time, supposed that this one volitional agent which had taken up human nature into Himself, employed it as His organ, and may thus be said to have worked theandrically. From this point of view, it is of course, as Honorius pleaded, foolish to speak of one activity or of two. For, if it be established that the will, as theandric, is one, it must, agreeably to its nature, develop very many modes of activity, and not merely one or two. We see, therefore, that to evade the question of the unity or the duality of the ἐνέργεια, as irrelevant, was very plainly in accordance with his monotheletic point of view. But, indeed, these letters contradict the orthodoxy of a later period, in many respects. Like Theodore of Pharan, Honorius, along with Sergius, concluded, that if there were two wills, there must be two volitional agents: he, however, confessed but one will, because the nature, and not the will (Schuld, guilt(?), in the German), was assumed by the deity. Two wills in the same subject, he urges,

must needs come into conflict: if they did not come into conflict, they would converge into one will, if the person were one. The will, he esteems a matter of the personality, not of the nature: for him, therefore, to have granted two wills, would have been to grant two personalities. Hence he does not refer the words, "Father, let this cup pass from Me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt," to a human will, which required to be subjected to the Father; but says,—Christ gave utterance to these words in the name of us sinners, not in His own name: we must not, therefore, deduce therefrom the continuous existence of a proper human will in Christ. By the act of incarnation, the human will was made completely one will with, or a determination of, that of the Logos. Finally, he agrees with Sergius in saying, that the human nature of Christ stood in the relation to the divine of a purely passive organ; that it did not separately, or of its own impulse, will any motion, contrary to the hint of the Logos hypostatically united with it, but was in all cases, both as to occasion and manner, determined by the Logos. Against this position, Maximus had decidedly protested. Now, as there is no historical notice whatever of a retractation on the part of Honorius (and if he had retracted, the memory thereof would have been imperishable), no course is open, but to say,—Honorius erred, and gave currency to a heresy, merely as a private individual; not, however, publicly or as a Pope:—an expedient which does not further concern us in the present connection, but which has been thoroughly, and in detail, discussed in the learned treatise on the Monotheletes, in the Instructiones historico-theologicæ Jo. Forbesii a Corse (see pp. 222–291, especially pp. 288 ff.). He shows that the letters of Honorius bear the character of an "Epistola Decretalis." But the difference between the Synod, when it taught that the will of the Logos, who constituted the personality, had both the power of initiative and decision; and Honorius, when he asserted, "One will of the person," was less than it appeared: Maximus, on the contrary, differed more widely from both.

Note 39, page 182.

This is also the point in the Symbol of Chalcedon on which Maximus of Aquileia leaned for support at the Lateran Synod.

(Mansi x. 1060, 1061.) That the Synod of Chalcedon meant to teach the existence of a special human will, although it did not expressly say so, was taken for granted by him; and yet that was just the subject of controversy. The old symbols do not say, "One will;" nor do they deny that there were two wills; therefore (such is the conclusion drawn), they are favourable to two wills (p. 1057). That even Nestorius professed to maintain one will alone—this was no warning against Dyotheletism, that was of no advantage to the Monotheletes. Now, they said,—Nestorius, who taught one will, has been condemned; therefore, Monotheletism also is condemned. In strict justice, all that could be said was,—the old Synods did not express any judgment on the matter of the unity or duality of the will; and therefore, neither of the parties can be regarded as condemned by them. Although the Lateran Synod appealed to the twelve anathemas of Cyrill, as sanctioned by the Synod of Ephesus (Tom. x. 1040, 1041), thus recognising them as of authority, still, after what has previously been advanced, there can scarcely be a doubt, that Cyrill was far nearer sharing the fundamental intuition of Monotheletism:—indeed, his fourth anathema forbids that which the Dyotheletes did; namely, referring one set of the words of Christ to Him as a man, considered by Himself, apart from the Logos; and other words, as befitting God, to the Logos alone. Furthermore, the Synod of the year 553, fourteen determinations of which (Mansi x. 1045) were also publicly read at the Lateran Council, anathematized, in its seventh canon, the use of the number two, so far as those who spoke of a duality meant two φύσεις ἰδιουπόστατοι: the formula, "one incarnate nature of the Logos," it did not condemn in itself, but merely when it denoted the extinction either of the divine or of the human nature, or their commixture; it commanded also that their worship should be but one. Theodoret's writings, however,—not merely his Twelve Chapters, but all that he had directed against Cyrill and the Synod of Ephesus,—were condemned; and a man was thus condemned who unquestionably shared the fundamental intuition of Dyotheletism.

NOTE 40, page 191.

Mansi x. 745 f. It is not clear whether he referred that exchange (ἀντίδοσις) merely to the object, the content of the

will, or also, for example, to divine attributes. If we bear in mind the distinction drawn between the communicable and the incommunicable in God (in which, probably, we may trace the influence of the cataphatic and apophatic theology), we shall see that the exchange in question cannot have referred to the latter also, in Christ. Indeed, the communicable element already dwells in the humanity of Christ, in the form of the created, divine element; and therefore our safest course is to refer the exchange to a community in the object of volition. Compare above, the disputation with Pyrrhus. At the very utmost, all that he can further have connected herewith, was a nominal "Communicatio Idiomatum," that is, a transference of names.

NOTE 41, page 191.

Ibid. *Ὁ ἀπόῤῥητος τρόπος τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλας τῶν Χριστοῦ φύσεων περιχωρήσεως* (p. 753). In this way, as indeed in general, by the force of his dialectics, Maximus contributed largely to the fixing of the doctrine of the Church. He may be regarded as the originator of the doctrine of the *περιχωρήσις*, in part also of that of the *ἀντίδοσις*; and he endeavoured also, to draw a clearer distinction between the ideas of person and nature. The natures (even the divine) are not hypostases in themselves. Neither of them, indeed, is without an hypostasis (*ἀνυπόστατοι*), but in an hypostasis (*ἐνυπόστατοι, ἐνύπαρκτοι*); and the hypostasis, although not itself a nature, is yet not without, but in, a nature (*ἐνούσιος*). Compare S. Maximi Confess. Opp. T. ii. ed. Combefis. Par. 1675. *Περὶ θελημάτων δύο τοῦ ἑνὸς Χριστοῦ* (p. 98 ff.). Full light is first thrown on these principles, in their bearing on his mode of thought, by the further proposition laid down in his Scholia to Gregory,—That God is the *ὑπόστασις* of all believers (compare Append. to Jo. Scotus Erigen. ed. Gale). But on this point we shall make additional remarks subsequently. He employs the expression,—The Son is the hypostasis of the two natures; that is, probably, the real or substantial principle of their particular or individual subsistence.—He devoted, altogether, much attention to the subject of the possible forms of Unio. There is unity of essence between persons, individuals (for example, of the same genus); there is hypostatic unity between different substances,

as body and soul. There is an union of relation (*κατὰ σχέσιν*), where different *γνῶμαι* combine to form one will (or one object of will?). Juxtaposition takes place in the case of boards; mortising, in the case of stones; intermixture, in the case of different fluids; kneading together, in the case of fluids and solids, as flour and water; a mixture, in the case of diverse substances, which are melted; acervation, in the case of solids, and so forth. An union of essence has place between beings which remain different as to their hypostases (the Trinity); the hypostatic union, on the contrary, has place between beings which continue different in essence. The distinction between the human and divine substances he aims, it is true, at preserving; as also that between their partially opposed attributes; but, like Anastasius, he differs from the adherents of the Council of Chalcedon, in that he considers human nature to have some relationship to the divine. In God there is a *μεθεκτὸν*, a something in which the creature can participate: there is also an aspect of man's being in which he can participate in the divine (a *μετέχον*). His view of this, however, was not that of the Monotheletes, neither as respects the perfected Christ, nor as respects the beginning of His humanity;—the Monotheletes, namely, conceived the human to be merely passively susceptible of receiving the divine fulness or communications: Maximus, on the contrary, conceived the human to be essentially free and active; indeed, his view leads rather to a duplication or multiplication of divine being, than to an action of God by means of human organs. He maintains creatianistically that there are independent existences besides God, and thus is opposed to the divine immanence; though he conceives created beings to derive their true essence from God. Such a duplication of the divine was effected in Christ, in that a pure Adamitic humanity existed in Him, alongside of the Logos. Little was thus done, however, for the assertion of the unity; as is most strikingly evident from the formula employed by him,—"Christ is the two natures." The real issue of his deification of the true human, is rather to strengthen the duality than the unity. If we further take into consideration, that the Logos is present with believers also, as to His omnipresence, and that the pure humanity of these latter likewise sets forth a cosmical divine element, we shall be unable to see what specific significance can be

attributed to Christ, or, what is the peculiar force of the union between the Logos and the humanity of Jesus. It is true, Maximus designates it hypostatical; but he holds God to be the hypostasis of all believers, their higher, true personality. According to him, therefore, the volitions and sway of the Logos continue supramundane; whereas the human will is finite. Dualism, consequently, keeps its ground, and it is a mere assertion, when he supposes that, on his theory, Christ is *ὑπόστασις σύνθετος τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν ἄκρων διαίρεσιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατ' ἄκραν καταυτίζουσα καὶ εἰς ἓν ἄγουσα τῇ τῶν οἰκείων ἑνώσει μερῶν.*

NOTE 42, page 193.

Mention deserves to be made, in this connection, of a fragment (Mansi xi. 597 ff.), professedly from a very old Codex of Homilies by Athanasius, on the passage, "Now is My soul troubled" (John xii. 27), which was laid before the Sixth Council by Cyprian bishops, and was recognised by the Synod, though with doubtful right (see vol. i. 1072, 972 of this work), as Athanasian. In a spirit thoroughly other than dyotheletic, and with the intent of asserting for Christ a true human development, this fragment teaches the existence of a duality in Christ, during His earthly life, such as is certainly to be substantially allowed. Whereas Dyotheletism eternized the duality, representing it as an abiding duality of the divine and human will, here, a merely temporary duality is taught—a duality, namely, between the will of the Logos to become incarnate and to redeem, which was constantly, and on principle, the will of His life; and the will of the flesh, which, although blameless in itself, was yet destined to be sacrificed. The author starts with the position, that it was necessary for Christ to resemble us, in order that we might become like God. Wherefore, condescending to take our likeness, it behoved Him to become like to us chiefly in that in which we needed transformation, to wit, in the passible, in order that He might raise us above passibility. Not, indeed, as though the deity had undergone a transmutation, but the passivity, which arose from the corporeal and psychical motions, was vanquished, and was participated in by Christ in order that it might be vanquished: it was vanquished, moreover, in order that the entire substance of the human race, in agreement with its relationship, might receive the blessing. For, beginning with

Him, we all are transformed from being merely passive, are exalted above suffering and passion, and are set forth as those who are alive from the dead. Therefore let no man fall into error when the Lord, who is at once God and man, says, "Now is My soul troubled." For this happened because the deity permitted it (εἰκούσης); the flesh, however, being stirred up, resisted (ἐγειρομένης). It was possible, indeed, for the deity to have prevented that agitation; but it was the divine will to permit it, in order that the resemblance to us might not be destroyed. As a simile, the relation between water and the honey mixed therewith, may be employed. When the flesh of the Lord was excited, there was, as it were, a predominance of the water, which is mixed with the honey; on the other hand, when the deity came into view, and manifested its power in miracles, it was as though the sweetness of the honey had overpowered the water. For it was in the power of the deity, at one time, to allow the flesh to have the upper hand (τὸ πλεονάσαι), at another time to rule it, and to do away with its passivity and weakness. Of the latter exercise of power, we have an illustration in the fasting in the wilderness; of the former, in the hunger felt by Jesus after the forty days were passed. The flesh predominated, in order, both that there might be opportunity for temptation, and that the tempter might be put to shame. Therefore did He bear the agitation felt by the flesh at the approach of death; for how could He have been obedient, instead of our obedience, had He not carried a contradiction within Himself (ἐναντίωμα) and overcome it? When a contradiction of the flesh arises in us, and we, overcome by the flesh, transgress the command, sin overtakes us. In the Lord also, a contradiction must needs arise from the flesh; but it was equally necessary that, by His obedience, He should overcome the contradiction. For, although He was God, He was in the flesh, and accomplished His obedience in the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα), and overcame the will of the flesh by the will of the deity, as He said,—"I came down from heaven, not to do Mine own will, but the will of My Father." He also terms the will of the flesh His own will; for the flesh was His own: for the divine will of the Son was not separated from that of God. But the will of the flesh must needs move, in order that it might be subjected to the divine; and thus, through this marvellous

obedience of Christ for us, the collective disobedience of men was done away with. In like manner, he adduces the words,—"And what shall I say? Father, save Me from this hour,"—as words which Christ spake agreeably to the motion of His flesh. But the next following ones,—"Yet for this cause have I come to this hour,"—reveal to us again the conquering deity, so that the divine will scarcely permitted the fleshly will to appear. He thus manifested, on the one hand, the reality of His flesh, and on the other, its subjection. Further, how did He esteem sufferings? Not as a dishonour and disgrace, but as an honour to Himself and the Father; and He rather sought than avoided suffering: "Father, glorify Thy name!" For my part, says He, I will decline no suffering; opposition shall yield, and that shall conquer which cannot be opposed. For the fleshly nature resisted death; and, indeed, so it needed to do, for the sake of the truth and reality of the incarnation. But the divine will chose the salvation of the world, which was effected by death: He thus showed that He had fulfilled the words, "To do the will of Him that sent Me." There is no man who has not in some point, or for some length of time, broken away from the divine will: in Christ alone, did the divine and human wills continue inseparable; and if we follow Him, we shall secure in His likeness, a saving union with God. Thoughts similar to these we shall find occurring in the writings of the Monotheletes.

NOTE 43, page 194.

This, I believe, is the true significance of the monotheletic doctrine of the *gnomic* will of Christ, against which Photius wrote in the ninth century. Thus understood, it is a remarkable attempt, in an unexpected quarter, to assert for the humanity of Christ more complete truth than had hitherto been conceded it, and to leave room for a real human development. They spoke of the γνώμη of Christ as βουλευτική, deliberative, as one that discerned opposites (τῶν ἀντικειμένων κριτική), as one that inquired into the things of which it was ignorant (ἀγνοουμένων ζητητική, Mansi x. 741), as one that chose and formed purposes. This reminds one of the doctrine of the Agnoetes; as also, to a certain extent, of Nestorianism. For, so long as each volitional process lasted, they supposed the humanity to act for itself, after its own manner; and although they considered the

process to issue in a divine-human unity, yet, during the continuance thereof, the bond between the human and divine natures was merely a relative one—merely a relatedness to each other of two relatively independent natures. At this point, we see again that Monophysites defined the two natures in such a manner as to constitute them two persons, so far as they cannot yet be said to have been united. They regarded the problem also as one of the union of two persons; because, in their view, natures exist solely as personal (in their sense of the term). This their position was concealed, indeed, so long as the humanity was conceived to have originated with the incarnation, and the idea of a pre-existent humanity, with which Eutyches was frequently reproached, denied—denied, moreover, in such a tone, as to imply that the very commencement of the incarnation brought with it an absolute personal union. But it came to light, when efforts were made to represent the union of the two personal natures, or of the two persons, as the result of the historical process of the life of Christ. The doctrine of the gnomic will is, consequently, not a thing of trifling significance. Monophysites, in it, attempted the solution of the same problem that was presented to, but not solved by, the Nestorians—the problem, namely, how to constitute one person out of two. It is, therefore, both natural and remarkable, that they also speak of a σχετικὴ ἕνωσις, besides employing other Nestorian formulæ; though they naturally applied such terms merely to the time during which the process lasted. The older Nestorianism, however, did not conduct the process so surely to its goal. Other Monotheletes appear to have striven to secure the unity of the will by denying to the divine *nature*, apart from the incarnation, any will at all (that is, probably, any single concrete act of will), by representing it as itself without will, and as attaining actualiter to will in the humanity of Christ (l. c. 741). We should then have the formula,—The divine is to be conceived as the essence, the humanity as the actuality of this essence, as its form or ἐνέργεια.

Note 44, page 206.

Monotheletism, proscribed in the Empire, maintained its existence in the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon among the Maronites ("Two natures, one will, and one activity"). The

Maronites are said to have derived their name from a saintly Abbot Marun. Even Theodoret was acquainted with such a name long prior to the Monotheletic Controversy;—a circumstance which later Maronites, in turning to the Latin Church, allege as a proof of the continuous orthodoxy of their nation. According to others, they were formerly designated Mardaites (compare Richard Simon's "Histoire critique des dogmes, etc.," 1711, pp. 147–164; Neander's Kirchengeschichte, vol. iii. p. 276; Joh. Damasc. i. p. 528; Philipp Wolff's "Die Drusen und ihre Vorläufer," pp. 234 ff.; Klose, Zeitschrift für historische Theologie, 1850, pp. 334 ff.). Mention still remains to be made of some hybrid forms which existed in the same district, and which cannot strictly be termed Christian heresies:* they were rather modifications of extra-Christian religions by Christian influences; as, for example, Manichæism in the third century. The Druses give their Muhammedanism a garnish of Christian ideas. The Egyptian Khalif Hakem is revered by them as an incarnation of God. The author of the system, and the proper head of the sect, was Danasi (Wolff, pp. 263 ff.). When Muhammedanism and Christianity came into contact with each other, the result was, that adherents of the former began to teach incarnations of various kinds, and the adherents of the latter struck into an Unitarian tendency. An illustration of the former result is furnished by the Nossairites, who believe that God appeared in the form of Ali, to whom they attribute even an existence before the creation of the heavens and the earth, and, indeed, in general transfer the predicates of Christ.—The Romish Church has made repeated, and not quite unsuccessful attempts, to win over the Maronites;—for which reason older Roman Catholic writers are used to be very mild in their judgments regarding them. Great concessions were made to them; for example, independent right of ordination, their own liturgy, the marriage of the priests, communion in both kinds, and a constitution incompatible with the Curial System.—Traces of Monotheletism may be found elsewhere also, subsequently to the seventh century; amongst those who show such traces, may be particularly mentioned the Armasites, from Harmasius in Egypt (cf. Joannis Damasceni Opp. i. 528).

* See a note on the idea of Heresy in the first volume of the First Division of this work.—Tr.

NOTE 45, page 221.

When opposing the Monophysites, he frequently draws the conclusion, that they cannot maintain the unity of the will, unless they also concede the unity of the essence or nature. For that which is different in point of will, is different also in point of essence; and that which is not the same in essence, cannot be the same in will. But the same line of argument must lead to the conclusion, either that Christ, if He consisted of two opposed substances and wills, could not have been constituted one person by one and the same hypostasis of the Logos; or that, if the two natures could have, and really had, one and the same hypostasis, they could not have been different in essence and will.—Indeed, at a subsequent opportunity, he actually, though unconsciously, assigns to the humanity its own hypostasis. Not merely (see above) in that he recognises the existence in Christ of the general human nature, along with the accidents which constituted Him the particular man He was; —in other words, he did not merely attribute to it that which, in his view, made up the general idea of hypostasis. What he would thus have attributed, was but very inadequate, and scarcely sufficient to constitute an individual, much less a personality. He says, however (L. iii. 19; iv. 1, 2),—"The human soul of Christ accompanied the world-ruling Logos, not merely with its thought and knowledge, and was not a mere indigent human soul; but it knew also, that it was *Θεοῦ νοῦς*. In heaven, it keeps up a remembrance of its earthly course: it knows and sees that it is, and deserves to be, worshipped; for it knows itself to be the humanity of God; it knows that it is hypostatically united with the Logos." To the humanity, by itself, is thus attributed a certain independent self-knowledge; and not merely, as it were, a self-knowledge through the medium of a substitute, of the Logos as its hypostasis. The hypostasis of the Logos, therefore, on this view, is not the personal centre, but merely the vehicular principle.

NOTE 46, page 223.

Lib. iii. cap. 16. The Monophysites ask,—"Is the human substance one?" Inasmuch as this question is to be answered affirmatively, they draw the conclusion,—Therefore, two natures

can become one nature, or one substance, in Christ also. But, if there continued to be two natures in Christ, and if Christ is to be called a double nature because He was constituted of opposites, then is man also a double nature, and not one substance, because he is constituted of body and soul. In that case, however, Christ ought to be termed a triple nature, because He was compounded of body, soul, and Logos. To this he replies, besides what we have given in the text,—That in answering the question, Of what substances was Christ compounded? we must look, not to the more remote stamina or elements, but to the next unities or syntheses,—for example, to the unity or synthesis, humanity.—That in Spain, at a Synod of Toledo held about this time, the existence of three natures in Christ should have been affirmed (though the Romish Church objected thereto), we may suppose to have resulted from the very strong spirit of opposition to Monophysitism. This circumstance was probably, also, a prognostic of the Adoptianist movement.

NOTE 47, page 227.

It deserves to be noticed, how very far this form of Christology was from having been interwoven and thoroughly blended with the doctrine of the Trinity. When their eye rests on the latter, they speak as though the Logos had not merely remained what He was, but had also not even become something which He was not prior to the incarnation. If the Logos, not merely prior, but even subsequently, to the incarnation, had, both formally and materially, one will with the Father and the Spirit; and if, on that account, His will could not become a divine-human will, because, otherwise, the Father and the Spirit must also have had a divine-human will,—plainly, the tie which connected the Logos and His will with the humanity, regarded in the light of the Trinity, was a very loose one; and one can scarcely see that it is right to speak of the Logos having constituted the humanity His own, of the *νοῦς* and will of Jesus having become the *νοῦς* of God; or, indeed, in any other than a figurative sense, of man having become God, and not merely of God having become man. It is true, the tie, whose looseness in the system of the Damascene is betrayed by the frequent use of the expression *συνάφεια* (for example, in lib. iii. 15, p. 235), was endeavoured to be drawn closer, by re-

presenting the hypostasis of the Son, as the bond of union between the two natures. But if this idea had been followed out, it would have been found, that it was not so much the divine nature of the Son, as His hypostasis, and His hypostasis alone, that had assumed humanity:—the consequences of which representation we shall see at a later period. How far this idea was approveable, relatively to the Trinity (namely, as forefending the conclusion, that the Father and the Spirit also assumed humanity, because their nature was the nature of the Son), we have shown above. In another aspect, however, it gave rise to new difficulties. For, inasmuch as the will was supposed to appertain to the common divine nature, in absolute identity, the act of incarnation must either have been an act of will,—in which case it must be described as the act of the common nature; or it must have pertained to the hypostasis of the Son alone, and not to the common nature,—in which case it was not an act of will. But if it were not an act of will, it was a physical act;—and such a conclusion would be more dangerous to the creatural element in the Person of Christ, than Monophysitism itself.

NOTE 48, page 233.

i. 486:—*τελευταῖον—διαδρὰς τὸ ποικίλον εἰς αὐτὸν ἀγνώστως καταντᾷ τὸν περὶ Μονάδος λόγον.—Τὸ τῆς ἀγάπης μυστήριον πάντων ὑπεραίρει τῶν γεγονότων τὸν νοῦν, πρὸς πάντα τὰ μετὰ Θεὸν τυφλὸν ἀπεργαζόμενον.* This divine blindness of the soul, to all that is not God the Monas, is also designated, the "Monachy of the soul." To beginners, Christ appears in the form of a servant; but to those who follow Him to the Mount of Transfiguration, He appears in that form of God which He had before the world was. In their knowledge, and in their virtues, His second coming takes place; and the Holy Gospels, His garments, appear to them white and shining (i. 418, 450–487).—The Logos, who as God, in the beginning with God, carried within Himself *σαφεῖς καὶ γυμνοὺς τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας περὶ τῶν ὅλων τύπους*, without *αἴνιγμα* and *παραβολὴ*, becomes flesh in manifold forms for the good of men, who cannot lay hold on the naked ideal world in pure spirit. *Κατὰ γὰρ τὴν πρώτην προσβολὴν οὐ γυμνῷ προσβάλλει Λόγῳ ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς ἀλλὰ Λόγῳ σεσαρκωμένῳ.* The beginning of the *μαθητεία* is necessarily *πρὸς σάρκα.* But gradually *προσβαίνοντες τῷ*

πνεύματι, καὶ τὸ παχὺ τῶν ῥημάτων (the Holy Scriptures) τοῖς λεπτοτέροις θεωρήμασιν ἀποξέοντες ἐν καθαρῷ καθαρῶς Χριστῷ γινόμεθα· κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώποις, εἰς τὸ δύνασθαι λέγειν "ῥυκέτι κατὰ σάρκα" (2 Cor. v. 16),—διὰ τὴν ἁπλῆν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον χωρὶς τῶν ἐπ' αὐτῷ καλυμμάτων τοῦ νοὸς προσβολήν. Compare futher especially i. 502, § 73.

NOTE 49, page 235.

The Mysticism of Maximus was preceded, not merely by the hierarchic-ecclesiastical Mysticism of the Areopagite, but also by the subjective, ascetical piety of the nobler and older forms of Monachism, the representatives of which were men like Macarius the Elder, Marcus Eremita, Johannes Climacus (sec. 5 and 6; compare Gass l.c. pp. 53 ff.). They also strove after an immediate union with God (γάμος, σύγκρασις with the Holy Spirit, γεῦσις ἀπὸ Θεοῦ, after divine μέθη, after the irradiation of the hypostatic light, after commixture with the substance of God—συμφύρεσθαι Θεῷ—). The stages of cleansing, purification, and elevation are regarded by them solely as subjective states of mind, and are not connected with objective Church rites: the objective sacraments they treated as mere symbols of subjective states, as subjective sacraments. (So fasts and tears, so mystical joy, which correspond to Holy Baptism and the Holy Eucharist.) Nor was any essential position assigned to Christ; He is merely an example. Maximus, on the contrary, endeavoured to combine this subjective Mysticism with that of the Areopagite, as a comparison of his Mystagogy (ii. 489–529) with the "Capita de charitate," and the "Capita theolog. et œconom." i. 394–634, clearly proves.

NOTE 50, page 238.

The lucific material glorifies man. This physical feature of the Greek doctrine of grace, manifested itself quite at an early period, in the description given of the influence exerted by Christ on our race, even through His very birth, and so forth (see above; compare especially, Theodore Abukara Op. ed. Gretser, c. vi. p. 452). It is said, that if the seed of a melon be dipped in honey, the sweetness thus given to the seed, will be communicated to the fruit. Οὕτω καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐκ τῆς ἐλαιώδους ποιότητος, ἤγουν ἐκ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἀποκαθάρας διὰ τοῦ ἁγίου

βαπτίσματος, ἀνέλαβεν αὐτὴν—ἄχραντον οἵα καὶ ἦν καὶ ἐκτίσθη τὸ πρότερον. Καὶ ἐμβάψας αὐτὴν τῷ μέλιτι τῆς θεότητος—ἤτοι μετέδωκεν ἡμῖν τῆς γλυκύτητος, ὡς οἱ κόκκοι τοῦ πέπονος τῷ ἀπ' αὐτῶν καρπῷ, καὶ κατὰ διαδοχὴν (per traducem). There is an exact correspondence between this physical mode of thought, which through so long a period determined the character of the conception of sin and grace, and the Christological predominance given to the nature compared with the personality.

NOTE 51, page 257.

L. v. 1:—"Qui illum sibi ex utero matris scilicet ab ipso conceptu *in singularitate suæ personæ* ita univit atque conseruit, ut Dei filius esset hominis filius, non mutabilitate naturæ, sed *dignatione*, similiter et hominis filius esset Dei filius, non versibilitate substantiæ sed *in Dei filio esset verus filius*.—2: credimus verum et proprium Dei filium, ac verum Deum, qui secundum formam Dei bis genitus est; primo, videlicet et Patre sine carne absque matre; secundo vero ex matre cum carne sine patre. Illum verum Deum ex utroque parente ineffabiliter genitum credimus, cui Pater per David loquitur; ex utero ante Luciferum genui te.—3: et ex Deo Deus et homo ex homine *in singularitate personæ* unus atque idem sit Christus Dei, sicut quicumque homo ex anima de nihilo creata et carne, ex utroque parente formata unus est utrisque parentibus, patris sui videlicet et matris filius." In the Son of God, therefore, the Son of man was an actual Son; more precisely, in the "singularitas" of the "*persona*," but not in the "natura filii Dei;" and yet there was but one Christ, because the "singularitas personæ filii Dei"—His Ego without the nature—was also the Ego of the Son of man ("dei filius—hominis filius esset"): hence, too, the Son of man became "in Dei filio *verus filius*," and did not continue a mere assumed nature. (Compare above, Note 15.) Adoptianism was by no means interested in merely keeping God and man apart. Such an interest operated merely to the extent of keeping the natures apart: which same anxiety seemed to possess the teachers of the Church also; for they did not allow that an union of the natures, and of that which pertains to them, had taken place, but solely an union in the sphere of the *ὑπόστασεις*. Adoptianism, it is true, denied that either the *nature* of the Son of God assumed humanity, or that any part

of the divine nature was really bestowed on the human nature, to be its own—to be, as it were, a natural possession. Looked at from another point of view, however, the reason why Adoptianists thus kept the natures apart, was the desire to assert the completeness of the humanity of Christ, without which, indeed, the incarnation itself could not be said to be complete. But they furnished a counterpoise to the segregation of the natures, by teaching that the Ego of the Son of God was also the proper Ego of the Son of man. In this way, they deemed themselves, by one and the same principle, to have established both the completeness of the humanity of Christ, and its unity with the Son of God at the inmost centre of its being; and yet, at the same time, a place remained for that process of adoption, by which the human nature became assimilated to the divine nature. Their opponents failed to perceive that, relatively to the personality, their own doctrine of the union fell short of that embodied in Adoptianism. They sought merely to connect the Son of God with the human *nature*, and substantially returned to Cyrill's view of the matter, as Nedner has correctly perceived (p. 426). Compare Paulin. l. c. i. 12; iii. 25; ii. 4.

NOTE 52, page 262.

Alcuin. opp. ii. 567 ff. cap. x.:—In uno eodemque Dei et hominis filio in una persona duabus quoque naturis esse plenis et perfectis (the Ablatives instead of the Accusatives are Spanish Latin) dei et hominis domini et servi visibilis atque invisibilis, tribus quoque substantiis, verbi scilicet animæ et carnis, ut credatur in una eademque dei et hominis persona et homo deificus (—ficatus) et humanatus deus.—Talis enim erat illa susceptio, quæ et deum hominem faceret et hominem deum (cap. xi.). He was, as a man, "servus," but as the "filius dei" He was "dominus servi," that is, Lord of Himself, which is not self-contradictory; for "adoptivus" is in reality "adfiliatus" (cap. xii.). This did not imply an abasement, but merely a condescension, because it was fitting and needful that the deliverance "de dominatu antiqui hostis" should be effected "justitia potius, quam potestate." This ethical method of atonement is done away with, if, with Beatus and Etherius, we deny to Him a humanity like our own (p. 568). Servitude, they urged, must not, as their opponents supposed, be attributed to Christ, in the sense that

He was disloyal to the law, and regarded it as constraint from without. On the contrary, they deemed the predicates, "servus" and "adoptivus," perfectly compatible with each other; and "adoptio" was held to involve delight and freedom in obedience, in opposition to the servile spirit of the law. The spirit of adoption gives the "forma bene agendi, ut possit agi, quod docuit" (cap. xiv.). From this it is clear, that, unlike Felix, they could not have dated the "adoptio" first from the resurrection.—In the writings of Elipantus, there is not yet a trace of the formula, "nuncupativus deus;" it first occurs in those of Felix.

NOTE 53, page 267.

Even the Diaconus Paschasius (he died in the year 512), in his time, had said, in his "Libri ii. de Spiritu Sancto contra Macedonium" (compare Cave hist. liter. p. 318),—"In Christo gemina substantia sed non gemina persona est, quia *persona personam consumere potest*, substantia vero substantiam non potest, *siquidem persona res juris est, substantia res naturæ*" (ii. 4). To this passage the Council of Frankfurt expressly appealed. This remarkable passage takes apparently for granted, that the only personality attributable to the man is a "persona juris,"—not, however, a physical personality; and that this "persona juris" might lose its existence in a higher personality. Alcuin (c. Felic. ii. 12) says,—"In adsumptione carnis a Deo *persona perit hominis*, non natura:" comp. Paulin. i. 12, ii. 4; whose words remind us thoroughly of Peter the Lombard.—Such an extinction implies, indeed, that a personal human nature existed, at all events, a moment prior to the actual Unio and its results, that is, prior to the incarnation:—which is a remainder of Cerinthianism. But, supposing personality to be necessary to the completeness of the human nature to be assumed, there seemed to be no other course open than to posit its existence for a moment, and then to allow it to be extinguished. To the same purport, Innocent III. remarked in a Decretal,—"quod persona Dei consumpsit personam hominis" (compare Thom. Aq. Opp. xii. ed. Antwerp, p. 27. Not till a later period was the doctrine taught, "persona non præintelligitur assumtioni, sed est terminus assumtionis"). Thomas endeavoured to give these words the following meaning,—"persona divina unione impedivit, ne humana natura propriam personalitatem haberet, which it would have had apart from the Unio."

NOTE 54, page 295.

In Anselm's view also, the universal is, it is true, in general an actuality, and the individual, though its form of manifestation, is not its reality (see Hasse's Anselm v. Canterbury, 1852, ii. 98). Anselm's division of truth (the true) reminds us also of Erigena's Divisio (l. c. p. 112). Anselm too says,—"It is one word by which God gives expression to Himself and to the creature" (p. 151). In its cause, the effect is still one with the cause. In the absolute Spirit, things are not what they are in themselves, but what He Himself is. Their egress out of their eternal ground first gives them a kind of independence over against absolute Being; though it also involves them in the alternations of a process, of which nonentity as well as entity is ever predicable, and which really *is*, only in so far as it follows and approaches near to, its true being (p. 152). With the same thought with which God thinks Himself (se ipsum), He thinks also the creature; for He cannot think Himself, without thinking Himself as that which He is, to wit, as the ground of other beings, of beings which are grounded and rooted in Him. For the Non-Ipsum, the thought of the creature, appertains to the Ipsum itself, so far as, whilst lying in its cause, the effect is not yet an effect, but itself also the cause. In God, things are not yet things, but a determination of the (creative) thought of the Creator. Anselm, however, tries to distinguish between this thought or conception of the world, and the creative act by which the world was realized, in order to be able to posit an existence veritably other than God. But his efforts are in vain; for God must necessarily think the world as that which it actually becomes (l. c. pp. 217, 218). Nor does Hasse's suggestion clear up the difficulty, namely, that as Spirit, God was, in Anselm's view, the most concrete existence—being, life, thought, and so forth; for which reason God comprises the totality of all being, and at the same time embraces this totality of being in the unity of His own Self. For, if the totality of those momenta, in their infinite fulness, be the world, and if God constitute the unity of the world, no real duplication of being has been effected; but God is simply the unity of the world, and the world is the pleroma of God. By the aid of the categories of being, life

and thought, we shall never arrive at anything more than a play of distinction between God and the world. If the divine thought finds the world already existent in the divine being (the Ideal World of Erigena), then the idea of creation must necessarily be resolved into that of the self-cogitation of God. An ethical conception of God alone, can prevent our regarding the totality of the momenta which form the world as infolded immediately in the being of God, and viewing the self-cogitation of God both as His self-actualization, and as the realization of the above-mentioned momenta of His being, that is, of the world: through such an ethical conception alone, can the distinction and the unity of God and the world be secured.—Further, the theology of the Middle Ages long bore the traces of the (Erigenistic) predominance of knowledge over the will (see below, p. 305 f.). In consequence of the cognitive faculties being directed to the being of God, not to the will of God, which determines also His being, everything, not even excluding the work of creation, was considered onesidedly from the point of view of necessity. By the necessity of His physical being, God is, according to this principle, the primal ground of a world; and it is quite impossible to think God without thinking the world as posited *in* and with His being, instead of, as posited by His will. Anselm, who considered the most general purpose of God in creation to be the manifestation of His thoughts, might readily have gone on to demand also the manifestation of that thought whose content and substance is God Himself (l. c. p. 224). But such a demand would not have been so favourable to Christology as it might at first seem. On this view, all mundane beings are essentially mere momenta of the totality; but the unity cannot coincide with a momentum of the totality. It would be another matter if Christ were not an individual mundane being, but merely the true universal humanity itself; and if the individuality of Christ, that which distinguished Him from all others, consisted solely in His unique connection with the Verbum. He came not far from taking up this position in his "de Fide Trin." c. 2, l. c. p. 105.

Note 55, page 311.

This question was made the subject of detailed discussions between Roscellin and Anselm, about the year 1092. Ros-

cellin's Nominalism led to Tritheism; and he tried to justify this Tritheism theologically, by maintaining,—that if we regard the persons in the Trinity, not as "tres res per se (separatim)," or as three individuals, but conceive them in conjunction with a common nature, we must allow that Father and Spirit also became man. All that we can say, therefore, regarding the three persons is, that they are one in power, and in will (aims); for otherwise, it is impossible that the Son alone should have become man. Similarly also Gilbert de la Porret. Anselm now rejects Tritheism: the three persons are merely three relations in God (even as, at a later period, Innocent III. Epistol. T. i. Paris 1682, p. 544, doubted whether it were right to apply "nomina propria" to the three persons. The Church teaches numerically one God: the unity of the persons consists not alone in their belonging to one genus (it is not a merely generic unity); but it aims at a perfect unity—an unity, namely, realized by means of the three persons, which are related, and belong, to each other). To that objection of Roscellin, Anselm, however, replied,—For Roscellin, who divides the entire God into three individuals, it would be necessary that all the three persons should become man in order that there might be any true incarnation at all: but not for the Church; for the Church believes that the very same God was in the Son that is in the Father, though in a different relation; and it further recognises distinctions in the one God, so that there is no necessity for all that is attributable to the entire God in the Son, being also attributed to the Father. Anselm, however, goes still further. He says that it was impossible for the Father and the Spirit to have become man, at the same time with the Son. They could only have done so for the sake of their common nature. But the Church teaches that the incarnation merely accomplished the union of the divine and human *personalities;* that, therefore, it did not affect the divine and human natures. The divine *person became* man, and formed one person with the humanity assumed; but not the nature. Otherwise, the deity must be held to have been transformed into humanity, and humanity into deity. Anselm, therefore, decides that, not the divine nature, but the person, of the Son became man;—a decision, the consequences of which were not as yet clearly seen by himself. He concludes with saying,—But if the divine

person alone, and not the divine nature, took part in the incarnation, it is plain that we cannot speak of the three persons having become man in Christ, unless we hold that several persons could become one person (compare Hasse's "Anselm v. Canterbury," ii. 291–305). In the following century also, Abælard designated this a disputed point; and in his "Sic et Non" adduced the authorities for and against. Gilbert de la Porret, whom we mentioned above, wished to distinguish between deity (the essence, the nature of God) and God: not the former, but God alone, that is, the person, and indeed the person of the Son, did he consider to have become man (compare Baur's "Trinitätslehre," ii. 516, 517).

As at this point, so also at another (as Anselm himself saw), Christology was affected by the controversy between Realism and Nominalism, even at its very commencement (see Hasse's Anselm, p. 105; Anselm, "de Fide Trin." c. 2). Anselm remarks,—Whoso knoweth not that man is something, even apart from single individuals, will, of course, represent to himself merely a single person, when he hears speak of man; and how will he understand the declaration,—the Logos took upon Himself man, that is, another nature, not another person? Nominalism was necessitated to insist on the personality of the human nature, because it regarded the common human, the generical human, not as real, but as a mere subjective product of the mind, and considered the reality of the humanity of Christ to consist solely in its individuality. This was the case, however, merely in the rough beginnings of Nominalism, when the Platonic "Universalia ante Rem" were put in strong contrast to the nominalistic "Universalia post Rem." At a subsequent period, Nominalists themselves conceded "Universalia in Re," and justly regarded this concession as involving a heightening instead of a lowering of the significance of individuality.—From what has been advanced, we see how it was possible for Realism to arrive at the view just mentioned, that the humanity of Christ was merely the general human nature, without any individual specialty whatever:—a view which might be employed in the construction of a mystical Christology, so long, namely, as, a distinction not being drawn between personality and individuality, it was deemed necessary, in denying the former, to deny also the latter to the humanity of Christ.

The question might then readily arise, which was put by Innocent III. (p. 545),—*Whether a proper name should be given to the humanity of Christ?* Realists could never advance beyond this question until they acknowledged the humanity of Christ to be, not merely the universally human, that which remains after abstracting what is peculiar to individuals, but the realization of the true idea of humanity,—which idea came far more clearly to light in Him than in the Adamitic humanity;—but that once acknowledged, the humanity of Christ would have been seen to be possessed of a distinctive, and therefore of an individual character. It would then, it is true, be an appearance towards which the idea of humanity, as it existed in the Divine mind, eternally tended. The manifestation of that idea in an actual person, must accordingly be held to have formed part of the original idea of the world. Inasmuch, however, as at this point an historical personality was deemed to have been founded in the divine ideal world itself, and to have formed a constitutive momentum thereof, Plato's system of the ideal world, treating, as it did, persons as accidents, was broken through in one important respect: the ideal world must now therefore be converted into a divine counsel, the objects of which are persons, history, and an ethical organism of persons, instead of the immoveable, abstract ideas of Plato. We shall soon see, that even as early as the twelfth century, one party struck into this path (see below, pp. 322 ff.).

Note 56, page 328

Of Christ, as not merely a brother, but "quasi alter Adam, caput et principium omnium in ipso resurgentium," he speaks in his work entitled, "de Immanuele" (l. i. cap. x.). In the "de Incarnatione," he carries the idea out further,—It was necessary for the Son to become man; not to the entire Trinity did the satisfaction need to be offered, especially not to the Son, but to the Father. The Father it was who demanded punishment: He therefore could not at the same time become man and pay the penalty (cap. ix.). Further (cap. x.),—Ratio exigebat, ut ruinæ nostræ reparator per exinanitionem descenderet de similitudine Dei ad similitudinem lapsi: Filius autem est imago et figura patris; which the Holy Ghost is not. Adam, indeed, by his attempt to purloin Wisdom, sinned specially against the

Son, who is the Wisdom of God; but how beautiful was the relation, that the Father should have willed to avenge the "injuria Filii," and the Son to forgive it, nay more, to effect its pardon with the Father! "Divisit itaque inter se summa illa personarum trinitas, unus Deus, negotium salutis humanæ, ut unam eandemque hominis culpam Pater puniret Filius expiaret, Spiritus Sanctus ignosceret." Both Richard de St Victor and Ruprecht of Deutz, therefore, keep to Anselm's theory of the atonement; the Lombard, on the contrary, gave it up, because he considered the human nature of Christ alone to have acted a mediatorial part. Richard apparently had in view the objection, that if the Son of God also, in Christ, offered satisfaction, the Son would have been paying Himself; or, in other words, that the satisfaction was offered merely in appearance, that the whole matter was purely epideictic. But instead of passing on to the answer given by the Lombard, which emasculated the significance of the work of Christ, and suspended the incarnation itself,—the answer, namely, the man Jesus alone redeemed us,—Richard endeavoured to overcome the difficulty by distributing the different momenta between the three persons of the Trinity —a course which pretty plainly leads to Tritheism. He then proceeds to say,—That our only help lay in an incarnation of God, was seen by the ancients, both under Judaism and Heathenism. Saint Dionysius, when asked by Paul in Athens, whether the altar was meant for a spirit of the gods, or for a man? answered,—The Unknown One must be true God and true man. But who ever ventured to supplicate such an act of condescension? (cap. xiii.).

NOTE 57, page 329.

"Cesset jam ironia, dicatur jam de sententia! dictum est hoc exprobrando: dicamus modo hoc gloriando, et glorificando et Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, ex quo factum est, per quem factum est, in quo factum est totum, quod propter nos factum est. Dic, impie Zabulon, qui valet nunc fraus tua? Plus est, quod contulit nobis Christi misericordia, quam nobis abstulit illa tua fraudulenta malitia. Ecce homo factus est, quasi Deus, sciens bonum et malum, quod tu fraudulenter promisisti. Ecce homo factus est verus Deus, quod tu quidem nec cogitare potuisti." It deserves mention further, that Richard rightly saw that the birth from a virgin was not necessary in

order to secure the purity of Christ (de Imman. i. 11). "Si Immanuel noster de utroque sexu nasci voluisset et hoc ratio exigeret, utrumque ad mundam prolem seminandam purgare potuisset" (as must, at all events, have happened in the case of Mary). But, "si de utroque (sexu) carnem assumeret, utique et a proprietatis suæ similitudine longius recederet, et ad nostram minus appropinquaret;" it was part of His distinctive character to have God alone for His Father.—On the other hand, Richard's teaching regarding the knowledge of Christ in His childhood, is less satisfactory: he attributes to Him perfect knowledge (de Immanuele ii. 18 ff., i. 15); though he wished to combine therewith the fact of growth. Nor did he, like the Greek theologians, refer the growth merely to the display of the knowledge, but held that the Son of God tasted human life by degrees, and by gradual *experience* became acquainted with that which appertains thereto. To this question, Hugo de St Victor also devoted an entire treatise, entitled, "De anima Christi." He puts the question in a more general form:—If we assume the wisdom of Christ to have equalled the divine, do we not lessen the distinction between the Infinite Creator and the creature? His answer is as follows:—The soul of Christ is not equal to God, for it neither is, nor becomes, the Wisdom of God; but this Wisdom, in which all participate who are wise, according to the different degrees of their susceptibility, dwelt entirely and bodily in the soul of Christ;—not, therefore, in such a manner that the half was in it, and the half outside of it. And thus it *possessed* the entire Wisdom of God, but *was* it not. But in this way the problem of Christology was scarcely touched, for the question still remains,—Wherein consisted the communion and unity of the soul of Christ with Wisdom? He also himself felt this at the close, but merely adds—Christ's soul was completely wise; it did not merely receive of, but embraced the fulness of wisdom (comprehendit). How that was possible, he does not show.

NOTE 58, page 331.

Q. iv. 2. Innocent III. said in one of his Decretals, "Quod persona Dei consumpsit personam hominis." The human nature would of course have had a personality of its own, independently of the incarnation; yet, strictly speaking, that which did

not yet exist could not be consumed. What Innocent says, therefore, could merely mean,—"persona divina sua unione *impedivit*, ne humana natura propriam personalitatem haberet" (p. 29[a]). Cajetan, in his Commentary, reminds his readers, in connection with this matter, that, according to Thomas, a "natura singularis" is incomplete without personality, and seeks and finds its goal or consummation in "personalitas;" whether the "personalitas" be its own or a strange one, lent to it. Now the human nature in Christ, Cajetan goes on to say, "assumta ad personalitatem divinam totum appetitum personalitatis plus quam satiatum ac consummatum habet et consequenter quiescit absque appetitu quocunque alteriùs personalitatis." Hence, strictly speaking, the human nature *had already been*, and not *was*, hindered in the production of a personality of its own (p. 29[a]).

NOTE 59, page 346.

In connection with this dogma, Duns Scotus rendered special service in Paris and Cologne, as an antagonist of the school of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great (compare "Rosarium St. Mariä," in the Appendix to Liber iii.). It is worthy of note, that the main reason for the birth of Christ from a virgin, recognised in the ancient Church, was thus given up. For Mary is represented as having been the fruit of a marriage, and yet, at the same time, sinless (compare L. iii. Dist. iv., and L. iv. Dist. ii., Q. 2, 11). In the proportion in which the later Roman Catholic dogmaticians were unproductive relatively to Christology, especially after the Reformation, in that proportion did the doctrine of Mary grow rankly and apace. It assumed more and more distinctly the character of a dogma, and absorbed the energies that should have been devoted to Christology. Raymund Lullus, in particular, distinguished himself in this respect: compare Libro de la Conçepçion Virginal, compuesto por el iluminado Maestro Raymundo Lullio, traduzido por Don Alonzo de Zepeda en Brusselas 1664. In this work, he shows that Christ was the final cause of Mary; but it was necessary for the final cause, in order to arrive at actuality, to infuse itself into Mary at the very commencement of her existence, and by this infusion of His goodness, greatness, virtue, wisdom, and so forth, to make the human nature of Mary holy, the new creation (recreatio) required to begin with the rise of

Mary, not of Christ. And, indeed, even apart from sin, this would have taken place in Mary, and Christ would have been born of her. To suppose that Mary was not free from sin, not even from original sin, is to put her on a lower stage than Adam prior to the Fall. But, inasmuch as the "causa finalis," Christ, operated at her origin in the manner described, Lullius deems her to have constituted an integral element of His historical actuality. The most famous Mariologian of recent times is Perron.

NOTE 60, page 359.

Whereas the Lombard devoted much attention to the question,—Whether the divine nature or the divine hypostasis assumed human nature (Q. iii. 1, 2); Thomas arrived at the conclusion,—Not the divine person, but the divine nature, assumed human nature; though the personality was the real goal of the assumption (terminus assumtionis). He deems the personal union of the Word of God with a man to be the highest of all possible forms of union for both, and herein lies Christ's specific dignity. At the same time, in the view of Thomas, there was also a certain union of the divine *nature* with the human, so far as the latter was susceptible thereof; and in this aspect, Christ is related to all those who are, at all events to some extent, partakers of the divine nature. Thomas, therefore, cannot be classed among those who, with the notion of making the problem of Christology easier, say,—The divine nature did not assume the human nature, but merely the divine person, without the divine nature (see above; compare Abraham Calov. Systema loc. Theol. Tom. vii., Vit. 1677, p. 148).

NOTE 61, page 367.

Concerning the German Reformers, we shall have to speak at a later period. Suffice it to adduce, in this connection, of Melanchthon, Opp. T. iv. 1564, ed. Wittenb. pp. 338 ff., ii. 318, 319, 232, 242; i. 149, 160. He requires that we consider the work of creation also in the light of that highest revelation, the incarnation. For it was God's purpose to be known and loved by the world; and the incarnation of God first brought this knowledge in perfection. God was moved by love to create, in order that He might communicate Himself to the world: this self-communication attained completeness in the incarnation. The final

cause of creation (causa finalis creationis) was (so he remarks on Colossians i. 16 ff.), *not the Son of God, but the God-man*, "quia hæc copulatio divinæ et humanæ naturæ est summum opus Dei et in hac copulatione conspicitur multiplex sapientia Dei et immensus amor erga genus humanum." He takes particular pleasure in urging, that the purpose of His mission was the union of spirits to the Church, of which He is the Head "efficaciâ, perfectione, ordine et merito." Such passages in the works of the Reformers are the more worthy of remark, as, their attention having been predominantly concentrated on the doctrines of sin and of redemption, no evidence against the principle in question can be drawn from their silence. Those who attach importance to the absence of any such laying of stress on this point in the works of the Reformers, as we find in the works of men like Andr. Osiander (who was thoroughly baptized into the spirit of Luther) and Schwenkfeld, should take into consideration, partly, the doctrine of predestination, which, at first, was common to all; and partly, the doctrine of the Reformers, regarding the unconditioned necessity of Christ and His work to the redemption of men. On the ground of both these doctrines, they could not but regard the coming of Christ as eternally predestined, and not merely contingent on an event like sin. Moreover, they had no doubt that Christ, as the Head of His body, continued, even after He had overcome sin, to stand in an essential relation to humanity; and that is the real kernel of the present question.

NOTE 62, page 374.

His scepticism did not even halt at the moral law. If God should actually command him to hate Him, or to steal, that which we now consider sin would then be meritorious. In his Sent. L. ii. 19, ad dubium 3, 4, ed. Lugd. 1495. Similarly also in his Centilogium, Concl. 5. Instead of conceding the possibility of a knowledge of the necessity or fitness of the incarnation, he maintains, in his Centilogium theologicum, Conclusio 6, 7,—"Deus potest assumere omnem creaturam sive omne aliud a Deo in unitate suppositi." Faith, it is true, teaches that He assumed one nature alone, namely, the human; but "non includit contradictionem, Deum assumere naturam asininam—et pari ratione potest assumere lapidem et lignum,

etc." With the utmost frivolity and indifference to all religious interests, he then investigates, what significance the doctrine of the "Communicatio Idiomatum" would retain, and what results would follow, if God had assumed such another natura. He adduces the arguments pro and contra; and at last ends with saying, that in view of the "potentia absoluta" of God, the most absurd statements have a certain truth; though the "potentia ordinata," as it is taught by the Church, sets a limit to such absurdities. As the "Communicatio Idiomatum" may be hypothetically extended to irrational inanimate beings, so, he goes on to say (Centil. Concl. 13), may it be extended to the individual parts of Christ, with quite as much truth and right as to the human nature in general:—one might, therefore, say, —Christ's head is Christ's foot; Christ's eye is Christ's hand. "Sicut est hæc (propositio) vera: Deus est homo ratione assumtionis naturæ, sic hæc est vera: Deus est caput ratione consimilis assumtionis. Et consimiliter potest probari, quod— Deus est pes. Tunc sic: iste Deus est pes Christi, iste Deus est caput Christi, ergo caput Christi est pes Christi." After having discussed the reasons for and against in detail, and decided that such propositions are true, he says,—Some, indeed, maintain that the "Communicatio Idiomatum" did not take place relatively to the "assumtio" of such individual parts: but still it is probably to be conceded. Let each choose what pleases him best. Other propositions which he proves are the following:— Concl. 19: Natura humana assumta est rationale animal, non homo; ex aggregatione s. assumtione humanæ naturæ in unitate suppositi divini animalia tria resultant.—20: Unum et idem corpus numero est in uno loco (*i.e.*, cœlo) extensive et in alio loco (*i.e.*, in sacramento) non extensive.—22: Non est dare maximum locum, quem corpus Christi non posset implere.—25: Corpus Christi potest esse ubique sicut Deus est ubique; for coëxistit totum corpus Christi cuilibet parti hostiæ parvæ consecratæ.— Unde si esset aliqua magna hostia replens totum mundum, æque faciliter posset totum corpus Christi coëxistere cuilibet parti hostiæ consecratæ (cf. Quotlib. IV. xx.–xxxix.).—35: Aliquis homo fuit ab æterno cujus humanitas incepit esse.—36: Aliquid totum fuit ab æterno, cujus quælibet pars incepit esse.—37: Aliquid totum in aliquo instanti fuit, in quo nulla ejus pars fuit.—38: Homo Christus fuit aliquid quando nihil fuit homo Christus.

Further, with reference to Dyophysitism and its consequences, he says in Concl. 40: "Deus habet duas voluntates et duos intellectus et duas scientias.—41: Deus vult aliquid quod Deus non vult. Deus intelligit aliquid quod Deus non intelligit; Deus scit aliquid quod Deus non scit." The proofs advanced by him for the truth of these propositions, he does not regard as scientific: his intention was merely to show, that they necessarily follow from the doctrine of the Church, and must, therefore, be valid. His procedure is purely one of formal logic. But as he manifests no interest whatever in the religious bearings of the matter, and gives the reins to his logic, it is doubtful whether he were merely desirous of exhibiting his logical skill in a piquant manner, or whether he wished to lay bare the contradictions in the doctrine of the Church. At all events, he was bent on overthrowing every imagination of being able to know anything in the sphere of faith. In Sent. Lr iii: Q. 1, it is true, he defends some of the determinations arrived at by the Church, on the subject of Christology, against certain attacks; but he disclaims at the outset, any intention of proving their truth. He there employs, for the "Unio," the image of "forma" and "materia," which may be united with each other without ceasing to be what they are: not, however, as though the human and divine natures became "per se unum," as do "forma" and "materia;" we must further employ the image of substance and accident, which are merely "unum per accidens." The human nature remained impersonal, even in the "Unio" (ad 18um dubium). Most of the traditional questions he leaves uninvestigated, but occupies half of his brief treatise on Christology with proving, —that to one of the three Divine Persons, indeed, something may appertain, which does not appertain to another; that, in particular, the element which constituted the person of the Son might be the vehicular principle of Christ, that which consummated His personality,—because it was the personality, and not the nature (essentia et proprietates), of the Son, that united itself with the human nature and made it personal. Nevertheless, it was possible for the three Divine Persons to assume this human nature, because it did not receive the divine personality as its own, but was merely sustained by it.

APPENDIX II.

NOTE A, page 19.

"WIRD nun aber näher darauf geachtet dass das Ausgezeichnete in Christi menschlicher Natur, dem sich die besondere Sympathie der allgegenwärtigen göttlichen zugewendet hat, auf Erden nicht sowohl in physischen Vorzügen bestehen kann, als in *moralischen*, namentlich darin, dass auch dieser Mensch eine Sympathie für das Göttliche hat, jedoch auf dem Grunde zweier entgegengesetzter Substanzen, mithin so; dass nicht die Substanzen einander zugewendet Einigung unter sich suchen könnten, sondern nur so, dass jede von beiden innerlich für sich bleibend doch namentlich Dasselbe will wie die Andere."

NOTE B, page 68.

"Dieser Wille ist zwar mehr nur als der Machtwille gedacht, weniger als allmachtiger Liebeswille, aber doch liegt darin schon der Gedanke an eine Macht des Logos über seine eigene Natur eingehüllt."

NOTE C, page 72.

"Fand er in der antiochenischen Formel———, die Löslichkeit des Logos von der Menschkeit noch nicht ausgeschlossen, zu sehr alles auf den Willen, nicht auf ein beharrliches festes Sein gestellt, so lag ihm ja die Möglichkeit offen, das Ethische substantiell als die innerste wahre Natur in Gott zu denken."

NOTE D, page 129.

"———Bringt die göttliche Mittheilung nur die Vollendung der Natur selbst, so ist das Mitgetheilte zu dieser vollen Natur zu rechnen, und gehört es nicht zu dieser Natur selbst,

so bringt es, gleichwohl ihr mitgetheilt, die Natur aus ihrem eignen Wesen heraus, und selbst die Aufhebung der menschlichen Unvollkommenheiten ist dann gleichsam eine bleibende Ekstase oder Entrückung der Menschheit aus ihrem eigentlichen Wesen und nicht ihre eigene Vollendung."

NOTE E, page 148.

"Alles actu existirende muss nach ihnen als Besonderes existiren; das Allgemeine existirt nicht etwa blos auch in Besonderem, sondern nur als sich Besonderndes."

NOTE F, page 158.

"In den Dingen, die der Gestalt nach mangelhaft sind, ist sie die gestaltende Gestalt und Princip der Gestalt; aber nicht minder in den Gestalten auch der Gestalt ermangelnd, weil über alle Gestalt. Sie ist das Wesen, das allen Wesen ganz und gar innewohnt ohne Befleckung, und zugleich über alles Wesen ganz und gar erhaben."

NOTE G, page 159.

Er will das Eine in der Bewegung, im Processe schauen. Allein dieses ist nur möglich bei realem Unterschiede der Momente, während hier die Unterschiede nicht durch die Einheit gesetzt, sondern empirisch oder traditionell aufgenommen, und in die unterschiedslose Einheit wieder versenkt werden. So behalten sie nur die niedentung, eine niedrigere noch nicht zur höchsten Einheit aufgestiegene Bewusstseinsstufe zu bezeichnen."

NOTE H, page 172.

"Ist und bleibt die Einheit unwandelbar und ungetheilt, so bleibt es auch die Zweiheit dessen was in unwandelbarem Unterschied sich darstellt und in ungetheilter Anderheit zusammenleuchtet."

NOTE I, page 182.

"———Sondern auch das Resultat ist ein Doppeltes, in soweit es nicht ausserhalb seiner ist, sondern auf seine Person selbst sich bezieht, obwohl die beiderseitige Thätigkeit in demselben Objekt zusammentreffen kann."

NOTE J, page 188.

"Dieses wie die Lehre von Christi gnomischen Willen zeigt, wie im monothel. Streit unter θέλημα auch die Actualität der Intelligenz verstanden wird, besonders später, vgl. Baur."

NOTE K, page 240.

"Die Einheit dieses scheinbaren Gegensatzes und das Wort des Räthsels ist der Geist. Er ist wirklich in sich seiendes Wesen, und doch zugleich in dieser sich selbstbehauptenden Reflexion in sich auch allgemein Wesen, das für Andere sein will. Oder genauer: die Wahrheit des Geistes, das Ethische ist erst im Stande über jenen Gegensatz des unmittheilsamen sich selbst behauptenden und des mittheilbaren Wesen zu erheben, über den Gegensatz des jüdischen und des heidnischen Gottesbegriffes."

NOTE L, page 261.

"Er lässt das Christum begründende Prinzip in der Art das Ich dieser Gesammtperson sein, dass der Menschensohn das Ich, das freilich zu seinem Begriffe gehört, habe in dem Gottessohn."

NOTE M, page 286.

"———Als die Wahrheit der Welt und als Gottes des Erscheinenden Zweck der wahre Mensch, genauer, die spekulative Gotteserkenntniss des menschlichen Geistes und die Seligkeit darin bezeichnet."

NOTE N, page 294.

"In dem *historischen* Christus kann daher Gott nur in einer Weise sich offenbart haben, welche zugleich eine Negation davon ist, dass er wirklich in ihm hervortrete, d. h. er kann nur in dem Bilde sich zeigen, welches einen Willen ausdrückt, für gegenwärtig zu gelten, zugleich mit der Forderung an die Menschen, durch das Bild sich anregen zu lassen, um in Negation des Bildes sich in das Bildlose oder Urbildliche zu schwingen."

NOTE O, page 313.

"Was das Wort annahm, das war nicht eine aus Seele und Leib zusammengesetzte Person und das Wort empfieng keine menschliche Person, sondern Leib und Seele empfangend, hat es sie unter einander und mit sich selbst geeint, und indem es sie einigte, empfangen. Aber wie ist, das wäre die Hauptfrage, dieses Empfangen und diese Einigung zu denken?"

NOTE P, page 377.

"Die ganze Vergangenheit der geistigen Welt versammelt sich wieder im Bewusstseyn besonders der deutschen Menschheit, um das grosse Werk möglich zu machen, das geboren werden sollte."

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